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This thesis focuses on the policy-making process of the National Health Insurance
scheme (NHI) in the Republic of Korea (Korea). The analysis of the policy process
of the Korean NHI scheme also makes it possible to observe the development of
social policy in Korea.
Health care in Korea was basically provided through the market until the
implementation of the NHI scheme in 1977. The health care programme was
initially introduced for a restricted section of the workforce, but gradually the
programme was expanded to cover the entire population. The study addresses the
questions ofwhy and how has the NHI scheme developed.
The policy-making process of the NHI scheme in Korea can be explained
better by socio-political elements than by economic factors. Policy-making in the
1960s and 1970s was carried out by a limited number of policy-makers within a
confined policy-making institution. At the beginning of the 1980s, however, the
government pursued a more explicit strategy of reform. Since then, the range of the
participants embedded in the policy-making arena has gradually become diverse and
complex. As democratic processes became stronger, the policy-making structure
became dynamically transformed, and power in the process was distributed among
various social actors in the society. The economic crisis at the end of the 1990s had
a significant impact on the style and structure of policy-making. There was a greater
involvement of civic and interest groups in the policy-making process, and the
government was less able to take any unilateral policy decisions.
The policy-making process of the NHI scheme over the past four decades led
to the development of the reformist and anti-reformist groups, and these groups
contributed to building ideological foundations not only for the NHI development
but also for social policy development in Korea. Two distinctive features were
identified as one of the many by-products created by the NHI policy process. First,
the policy-making style in the health care policy developed from 'authoritarian
leadership' to 'pluralist and corporatist styles'; second, citizenship has been
developed in the society and has influenced the policy-making process.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
I. Introduction to the Study
This thesis discusses the development of a national health care system and its
relevant policies in the Republic of Korea (henceforth referred to as Korea). The
National Health Insurance program (henceforth referred to as NHI) has come to
fruition in the context of national economic growth and the political development of
the country. It has survived despite the fact that it developed in a piecemeal fashion
under the direction of various, fragmented political administrations. Since the first
medical insurance law was legislated in 1963, Korea has undergone a political
transformation from authoritarian to democratic rule that has significantly influenced
the style and the outcome ofpolicy-making.
Reform was initially undertaken in the government not only to universalise
the coverage of the scheme but also to integrate fragmented benefit levels and
financing under separate medical insurance systems. During the reforming process,
the mode of the policy-making process varied according to the different political
contexts of the changing regimes. The more democratised that the country became,
the larger was the number of actors who engaged in the policy-making process and
the greater the competition between the political and bureaucratic interests of the
participating actors in this policy-making effort.
The thesis details the development of the NHI policy process in association
with the history of the socio-political development of the Korean republic. It
discusses the political responses of the participants in the policy-making process
during the forty-year history of the Korean medical insurance programme. It traces
this process from its initial, legislative introduction in 1963 to the adoption of
universal coverage in 1989 and then on to the reform legislation of an integrated
funding system in 2000. It is possible to trace the important developmental changes
in the health-care program through chronological sections as they correspond to the
five political regimes that have each put their own distinctive stamp on the national
health care system which is providing a universal floor of coverage today.
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1.1 Purpose of the Study
Health care policy demands significant and sensitive political determination in order
to pursue health care programmes. Because of the participation of a wide range of
interests, including medical providers, various levels of government, political
institutions, and citizens' groups in the health care policy-making arena, conflict in
the political domain among various societal groups is unavoidable.
National health insurance raises points of controversy between political
ideologies. It reflects the great divide between liberalism and socialism, and
between the free market and the planned economy, as Immergut (1992) points out
(p.l). Health care policy provokes acute conflicts among those holding different
political and economic ideologies. Medical professions, academic scholars,
employers, trade unions, citizens and other interest groups are actively engaged in
the policy-making process. In the effort of protecting vested interests, the
consideration of national health insurance becomes a highly politicised issue
(Immergut, 1992: 1). Even though the results of these conflicts vary, such conflicts
are most apparent in the case ofWestern Europe and North America.
Although there are a number of comparative or single-nation studies
regarding the policy-making process of health care policy in Western Europe and
North America, the examination of this issue in other regions has not been a popular
subject for research and analysis. In recent years, a number of research projects
relating to the welfare model of newly industrialised countries 1 - the so-called 'four
dragons' of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong - have been produced,
showing greater interest in Western academia. Nevertheless, these studies have a
tendency to generalise the welfare characteristics of the East within the context of
Confucianism and conservative ideology produced by broad historical, political and
economic developments (Jones, 1993; Jones 1990; Dixon & Kim, 1985) rather than
to identify and focus on the particular elements of each country which have
influenced its distinctive welfare development. White and Goodman (1998)
emphasise that "while they share certain common features, East Asian welfare
systems are not homogeneous and one should be cautious about over-simplification;
'
Commonly referred to as the NICs.
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they have serious deficiencies as well as strong points; and they have relied heavily
on distinctive social, demographic, political and economic conditions which may not
be present elsewhere and are, in any case, under threat in East Asia itself' (p. 19).
This research aims to challenge the conventional wisdom that one country's
welfare system can be simply explained by one or two common concepts without
going into depth regarding the particular welfare development of that country. In
this regard, this study concentrates on the formation and maturation of the NHI of
Korea. This study gives particular attention to the series of reform movements in the
development of health care policy from the beginning of the 1980s until 2000.
Previous studies about Korean social policy written in English have been
mainly concerned with the conservative style of the policy-making under
authoritarian regimes (Kwon, 1999; Joo, 1999) and have not given as much attention
to the political characteristics of the more democratic regimes in recent years. The
development ofNHI in Korea cannot be understood simply by the interpretation of
the traditional values of Confucianism and conservative ideology. This is because
any analytic tool based on Confucianism tends to become preoccupied with the
conservative and authoritarian aspects, which Confucianism has typically retained.
It fails to scrutinise broader and more dynamic aspects which came into being over
long periods of socio-political development in the nation. Ever since the birth of the
NHI, the country has been ruled by two authoritarian military regimes (those of Park
and Chun) and two democratic regimes (the two Kims). In between these two
extremely opposing styles of government, there was a transitional regime (Roh).
Accordingly, for forty years the Korean NHI has developed not only in size and
quality as health care systems tend to, but has also been subject to reform under a
notable variety of forms of government.
In the process of political transformation, reformist interest groups have
attempted to direct health care policy in a more radical direction. One can raise
questions as to how attempts to reform were possible and to some extent how the
participation of interest groups in reforming government policy under the
authoritarian political system was possible. In general one may investigate the
relationship between the political system (first authoritarian, then democratic) and
national social policy development. This research explores why and how Korean
governments have changed their ideologies and the political direction ofNHI policy
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since it was legislated in 1963. In particular, the study concentrates on how and why
various institutions and interest groups have intervened during the stages of the
policy-making process.
1.2 The Significance of the Study
Social policy-making is a series of consecutive interactions among sub-systems
which constitute the institutional terrain. The systems continue to deliver their needs
and interests in order to carry through the prospective decision making process.
Variety in institutional transactions in policy-making in developed countries has
been attributed to the different political and socio-economic circumstances that each
country has experienced. There has been considerable interest in the research
relative to the variety of institutional transactions occurring in the formulation of
policy in Western countries over the years (Bonoli, 2000; Moran, 1999; Glied, 1997;
Howard, 1997; Immergut, 1992; Heidenheimer et ak, 1990) but there is very little
literature that investigates this same process as it has unfolded in Korea and other
developing countries. Therefore, it has been quite a challenge to undertake the task
of recording the development of this process during the last forty years of Korean
history.
Regarding the development of social policy in the newly industrialised
countries, one can say that most of these countries have adopted social security
programmes from the Western developed countries, and Korea is not an exception to
this phenomenon. Since the Industrial Accident Insurance scheme was enacted in
1963, National Health Insurance, National Pension and Unemployment Insurance
schemes have been consecutively adopted and developed over the last four decades.
However, if we ask: "Have the newly industrialised countries been following in the
footsteps of the social policy development ofWestern cultures?," we can see that (at
least in the Korean case) social security programmes have shown procedures of
initiative and development distinct from those in the West.
Notably, health care policy in Korea demonstrates the particular history and
evolution of social policy in Korean politics. It can be said that since NHI was
legislated in 1963, its evolution has been directly connected with the particular
developmental procedures of socio-economic and political history in Korea. Indeed,
ifwe observe the development ofNHI policy-making, we are also able to witness in
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detail the history of Korean socio-economic and political development. This is one
of the merits of this study and the reason that National Health Insurance was chosen
for analysis. Secondly, health care policy in general is one of the most significant
social policies. This is because health policy is directly associated with the entire
population regardless of age, gender, occupation or income level, and because it is
clearly linked to well-being in daily life.
Thirdly, the National Health Insurance scheme is the pivot not only of health
care policy but also of the general social policy framework in Korea. Although the
medical insurance law was legislated alongside the Industrial Accident Insurance
scheme in 1963 and much earlier than any other social insurance programmes, it was
actually implemented in 1977. Thereafter, from an economic point of view, the
largest portion of the national welfare budget was concentrated in the finance of
NHI. From the political perspective, and in comparison to other social insurance
programmes, NHI has had the longest evolutionary history and has experienced the
most dynamic transformation. This transformation has continued for over forty
years and is still going forward. The policy-making process has gone through
numerous complicated stages with the participation of a number of interest groups
year after year. And through these experiences, NHI has clearly become one of the
most controversial issues not only within political and medical institutions but also
within the academic and public sectors.
Fourthly, in general, developmental stages of social policy programmes are
set within the framework of the political, socio-economic and socio-cultural
circumstances of each country. Moreover, different nations have designed their
political institutions in different ways and relied on different procedures for
representing the various interests. These procedural mechanisms are intertwined
with institutionalised relationships among interest groups, parties, and governments
that have developed over long periods of time (Immergut, 1992: xii-xiv). This is the
reason that a generalised model of policy-making cannot be applied to the policy
developments of different nations even though they seem to have shared a common
point of departure. By presenting the history of the evolution of the NHI policy¬
making in Korea, therefore, the study will contribute to building a specific paradigm
in social policy-making which will distinguish it from other nations.
Finally, it is important to build an appropriate theoretical framework through
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which to explain Korean health care policy. This study will assess whether or not
the formation of Korean health care policy can be properly explained through the
employment of "foreign-born" policy development theories. The historical context
of policy-making procedures in Korea is derived from different component factors
of Korean society which may be difficult to explain through the lens of foreign
experiences. Therefore, it is hoped that this research will provide valuable and
interesting insights in an analysis of the Korean social policy programme by
combining both foreign and Korean perspectives.
1.3 The Research Questions
The main intentions of the study are to examine: first, the relationship between the
roles and objectives of the participants, and the outcomes in the policy-making
process of the National Health Insurance scheme; second, the relationship between
the reform procedures of health care policy and the development of citizenship,
which would be explained as a by-product of the advance ofKorean politics.
In order to explore those main issues, "three key elements" of policy making
- the executive, the legislature and the interest groups - are examined. In general,
the following questions are asked in relation to these three key elements:
• What has been the role of the three key elements in the development of health
care policy?
• What have been the aims/objectives of the three key elements in the policy¬
making process of the National Health Insurance scheme?
• How has the significance of these roles and objectives changed?
Within the government in particular, the relationship between governmental
agencies and the personal contributions of executive leaders during the policy
process are scrutinised:
• What agencies have been involved in the policy-making process?
• What have been their aims in the policy process?
• Who has been involved in the policy-making process?
• What has he/she contributed in the policy-making process?
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In reference to the economic and political attributes of the nation, the
following question is raised:
• How have the economic and political changes transformed social and political
priorities in the policy development of the NHI scheme?
Finally, with the results of the questions above, the study tries to explore the
relationship between the introduction of citizenship and social rights, and the
development of health care policy asking:
• Has democratisation resulted in reform of the National Health Insurance scheme
in Korea?




In order to obtain a rounded picture of the situation and to gain a good view of the
conditional factors involved with the National Health Insurance scheme of Korea,
the case study approach is essential to this research project. The case study has
proved to be an attractive way of illustrating and conveying the rich detail of various
kinds of events, and it allows a more in-depth analysis of a chosen case. Thus, the
case study can throw important light on the analysis of the policy-making process
because it enables us to examine the complete set of political processes that
determine policy design.
A major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity to use many
different sources of evidence. As all sources of evidence are reviewed and analysed
together, the findings of the case study are based on the convergence of information
gathered from these various resources. Hence, the outcomes in a case study are
likely to contain more convincing and accurate results based on these multiple
corroborations (Yin, 1994: 90-93). The second advantage ofmultiple data collection
is that different sources of data can fill up lacunae in evidence. Thus, this research
methodology can support an increased constructive validity in comparison to a
single data collection procedure. For example, since this study approaches events
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chronologically, it is in a better position to capture "causal" relationship over time.
To investigate those causal sequences during such long time-periods of history, it is
not easy for a researcher to trace and collect sufficient and consistent evidence in
order to produce convincing findings that match every single causal sequence using
a single data collection method. In this case, multiple kinds of data are able to
supplement evidence from other sources relative to any specific event.
The third advantage of the case study is its flexibility. This research
methodology is able to provide an efficient way of addressing the explanatory tasks
of the study and to sufficiently represent the distinctive political circumstances of
the introduction of one of the most important social policy schemes of a developing
country (Colin, 1993; Rubin et al., 1993). To maximise flexibility, it is crucial to
cover a forty-year period for this study. The research project focuses on particular
aspects and issues to achieve a detailed and precise account of the policy-making
process of a national health care programme. The study also aims at refining
knowledge in order to observe patterns and relationships underlying the policy¬
making process. Thus, it needs to adopt various conceptual angles to explore those
issues and relationships.
Finally, it should be noted that this research is a case study of policy
development over a forty-year period but concentrating within it on key periods
when policy might have gone one way or another.
1.4.2 Data Collection
In order to carry out this case study, the data concerning the policy-making process
of the National Health Insurance programme of Korea was obtained by primary and
secondary data collection as well as interviews. For the primary and secondary data
collections, formal and informal documents as well as archival records were
gathered from the ministries of the government, the National Assembly, the political
parties and participating interest groups (including civic groups, the Korean Medical
Association, medical insurance authorities, enterprises, etc.), government statistics,
research articles, and academic dissertations. On the basis of analyses of the
primary and secondary data, interviews were also conducted. In addition,
newspapers were used as a valuable data source in the data collection process.
The main purpose of interviews in this study was to strengthen the
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description by obtaining a "behind-the-scenes" account of the events. This research
hinges mainly on the primary and secondary data obtained. However, as may be
expected with the political and bureaucratic culture under the authoritarian regimes,
there was some obstruction to the collection of written formal or informal data at
some points of the research continuum. In order to cover the lacunae, interviews
were used as a supplement. For instance, in the 1970s and 1980s - when the
authoritarian Korean governments exercised rigid censorship over printed materials
- scholars in the academic institutions were strongly controlled by the Academic
Tenure Law passed in 1976. This legislation severely restricted their access to them.
Thus, there was no opportunity to produce articles for publication (Han, 1999: 186).
Furthermore, the closed policy-making system of the government created difficulty
in gaining access to documentary sources. According to Han (1999), the secrecy of
policy-making in the Korean bureaucracy prevents those involved in decision
making from providing written accounts which would have evidenced a political or
administrative responsibility. Hence, many government-related materials would
either have been classified as confidential or would not have been circulated outside
the group of policy makers (p. 186).
Also, under the authoritarian regimes, data were hidden from the public in
the same manner and for the same reasons. Fortunately, some of retired policy
makers left vital written records which document the activities of the Korean
government during this period. However, it was more difficult to get written data
for the beginning of the 1980s because the political dialogues about NHI reform
were held only in a few extremely restricted political institutions. Neither were
political attempts for reform disclosed to the public, nor were they known to those
who might have been expected to possess the knowledge. Because of this limitation
in data collection, many departmental personnel in the government who should have
been privy to this information had very limited access to it, and thus only a few
articles testify to the unfolding of events. The articles available at this time were
either written by former civil servants or are contained in unpublished government
documents.
Interviews were focused particularly on this specific period for comparison.
In order to overcome these potential deficiencies in valuable data, the interviews
were conducted with ten former direct and indirect policy makers, who were there
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during this time period and who were in a position to attest to the events as they
actually occurred. Two former Ministers of Health and Social Affairs, a former
Vice-Minister of Health and Social Affairs, and a senior government adviser were
specially selected to cover this period. A government technical expert of the Kim
Dae Jung government contributed to the data collection process. Three activists
were chosen to observe a dynamic involvement of civic organisations in the policy¬
making process during the end of the 1980s and 1990s. A senior journalist in an
interest organisation participated in the interview to examine not only the NHI
policy process but also the story inside the organisation. In addition, a current high-
ranking civil servant was chosen to view the actual policy processes within
government. Their names and careers are listed in an appendix, except for three of
them (a current high-ranking civil servant and two members of interest groups), who
did not wish to have their names revealed. The information provided by these
anonymous interviewees was used as reference only for the purpose of analysing the
facts, without indicating any positions or organisations to which they belong.
Since the democratisation of Korean politics at the end of the 1980s,
however, information and data produced by the government has been more broadly
released to the general public through the press and through civic organisations.
Thus, the public has had more open access to information regarding policy-making,
albeit slowly.
During the data collection process in Korea, some difficulties were faced.
One of the obstacles to be overcome was the recruitment of interviewees who were
actually involved in the policy-making process during those years. The data
collection was undertaken in Korea from May to October 1999. During this period,
the radical reform of the NHI scheme significantly impacted on the policy-making
arena prior to the general election scheduled in April 2000. Because of the nature of
the political climate at the time of data collection and because the reform of the NHI
programme was a remarkably sensitive procedure within the political arena, a few
candidates refused an interview and a few interviewees did not want to reveal their
identities. In particular, high-ranking civil servants in the Korean government rarely
wished to reveal their perceptions and experiences with regard to sensitive political
matters within their bureaucratic domains. It has simply never been in their
tradition. Koo (1985) supports this view:
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A more important reason [why the civil servants rarely wish to disclose
their thoughts] may be attributed to a vague fear that one's revelation of the
nature of his work during his tenure of office might cause injury to those
who were involved in a particular decision and thereby bring about
personal wrath and uncertain political consequences from a regime still in
power (p. 15).
Out of respect for them, I will preserve the anonymity of those who did not
want to reveal their names. Other interviewees granted permission for their names
to be listed here (see Appendix I).
The second difficulty was the matter of access to data holders. With the
status of an ordinary student, it is difficult to approach former or current high-
ranking civil servants or other professionals to request that they provide official data
or interviews. In the hierarchical culture in Korea, they would have no reason to be
willing to become involved with a research project of this nature. Fortunately, I
have received enormous support from my father (Professor Kim Young Mo), who
has been involved as a government adviser in policy-making for the National Health
Insurance scheme from the beginning of the 1980s. He introduced me to former
executive policy makers of the government, and he was also able to provide access
to key data sources. He attended interviews with me which he was able to arrange
because of his position as a former government adviser and a policy actor. His name
figures in the thesis as an interviewee and as a principal policy actor during the
reform process of the 1980s. On the basis of this initial support, I was able to locate
appropriate interviewees with a range of differing perspectives on the policy
development by using the 'snowball' method. In addition, the interviews were
conducted with semi-structured open-ended questions. During the conduct of these
interviews, some invaluable unpublished documents came into my possession from
both direct and indirect sources. These documents were supplied to me by
interviewees who had either direct or indirect input into the formation of health care
policy.
The selection of interviewees was focused on key policy actors and was
mainly initiated on the basis of the information earned from literature reviews
regarding the event of the time period pertinent to each interviewee. The research
literature supplied the names and roles of the candidates who were chosen. Once an
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interview was successfully completed, the initial interviewee would sometimes
introduce me to yet another important candidate. As often as not, the initial
interviewee would actually make the introduction himself. There were some
occasions when my father brokered the contact since he had the academic and socio¬
political connections that were needed to obtain access to certain political figures.
The selected candidates were 'movers and shakers' of the time who could give us a
'behind-the-scenes' view of the policy-making process.
Interviewees were questioned according to their particular position and role
during the policy-making process. The questions reflected the information collected
from the literature review. They were also sometimes drawn from information that
had been garnered during a previous interview. Thus, there was some flexibility in
every interrogative process that took the interviewee's specific status and role into
account (see Appendix II). The interview structure, then, was quite open and the
direction of the questioning was tailored to suit the story or area that the interviewee
represented. A general question was asked at the beginning of the interview and the
range of questions narrowed as the story unfolded and became more interesting and
more valuable.
While the primary data sources (government documents, organisation
documents, archives and newspaper articles) were important to the compilation of
the materials that were used in this thesis, the secondary data sources were also
essential and invaluable to a complete examination of the issues raised. In
particular, the books written by two former members [Choi (1991) and Sohn (1981)]
of the Social Security Committee (SSC), research articles of a former civil servant
[Cha (1992, 1996)] and the autobiographies written by two former bureaucrats [Kim
(1985) and Moon (1999)] provided the story of the policy process made behind
closed doors.
Overall, in Chapter 3, I relied mainly on the accounts recorded by Choi and
Sohn. In Chapter 4, articles written by Cha and interviews with several other policy¬
makers who influenced these events were most useful. In Chapter 5, a wider range
of data sources was employed: especially, newspapers, interviews, organisation
journals, secondary research articles, and Moon's autobiography. For Chapters 6
and 7, government and organisation documents as well as newspapers supplied the
majority of the data sources used to analyse the case studies.
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1.5 Overview of the Chapters
Chapter 1 introduces the basic concept of the thesis through demonstrating the
purpose, significance, research questions and methodology of the study. In addition,
the general picture of health care development in Korea is described to assist the
understanding ofmedical professions and its sphere in Korea.
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical frames which are adopted to analyse the
medical insurance development in Korea. This framework is outlined by two broad
divisions of theoretical perspectives: social policy development and policy-making.
In this chapter, the concept of theoretical approaches related to each division is
introduced and evaluated to testify to their relevance to the medical insurance
development of Korea.
Chapter 3 considers the initial stage of health care policy development under
the authoritarian Park regime, mainly covering the time periods of the 1960s and
1970s. This chapter scrutinises why and how the medical insurance programme was
launched in the country.
Chapter 4 considers the first reform movement of the NHI scheme, which
occurred in the first half of the 1980s (from 1980 to 1983). This chapter discusses
two significant matters: who attempted the reform and why he/she did, and how the
efforts developed in the political arena.
Chapter 5 seeks to explain the policy-making in the second reform
movement which occurred from 1986 to 1989. In order to provide an appropriate
analysis regarding the second attempt at medical insurance reform, this chapter
looks at an aspect linked with the context of political democratisation in the mid-
1980s.
Chapter 6 considers the development of the political agenda in the health
care policy of the Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam governments (from 1990 to
1997) after the failure of the second reform movement. This chapter focuses
particularly on how the political and social changes derived from the democratic
movement transformed into the health care policy process in the political and social
sectors. In addition, the question is extended to observe how interest groups were
involved in the policy process.
Chapter 7 considers the reforming process of the NHI scheme related to the
economic crisis at the end of the 1990s (from 1997 to 2000). This chapter, in
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general, attempts to discover the relationship between the economic crisis and the
medical insurance reform, and in particular will also trace the extent to which the
societal changes made the reform under the economic crisis possible.
The concluding chapter discusses the applications of theoretical perspectives
to the nature of the policy-making process of the Korean NHI scheme. Furthermore,
the implications for the development of Korean health care policy are considered on
the basis of the analysis of the policy process.
II. Introduction to the Nation of Korea
1.6 Historical Background
Throughout the majority of the 2,200 years of its history as a distinct nation, Korea
maintained its status as a 'hermit kingdom' in East Asia. While China and Japan
were coping with the Western forces that were to bring societies of the region into
the 'modern' world, Korea upheld a strong sense of its racial, linguistic and cultural
homogeneity in a well-defined territory which was administered by a centralised
bureaucracy under orthodox Confucianism (Deuchler, 1977: 1-2). Korea kept its
doors firmly barred against foreign countries until 1876, when Japan forced it to
open those doors. This began its initial foray into the acceptance ofmodern Western
cultures as well as of the colonisation ofKorea by the Japanese imperial power.
At the end of the Second World War - although Korea obtained liberation
from the Japanese annexation - Cold War ideology immediately influenced the
creation of two significant events on the Korean peninsula: the Korean War and the
subsequent division of Korea. The ideological conflicts between communism and
anti-communism resulted in the dividing of the territory between North Korea,
which was supported by the communist Soviet Union, and South Korea, which was
supported by the United States.
After its liberation from Japanese annexation, the First Republic of Korea led
by President Rhee (1948-1960) was established on the basis of a democratic political
system. However, it also possessed the attributes of an authoritarian-style
administration, with astute manipulation of political factions as well as the
suppression of outright opposition (Han 1999: 29). Rhee's autocratic style of
leadership eventually precipitated a political crisis. On April 19 1961, across the
nation, the protests of students and professors undermined the political power of
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President Rhee and his 'Liberty Party.' As a result, the first successful democratic
revolution in Korean history brought about the forced stepping down of President
Rhee and his cabinet.
A democratic government was formed under the leadership of Chang Myun.
However, he inherited an ill-managed economy and failed to provide leadership in
satisfying expectations and demands for economic improvements and political
democracy. The continuing economic difficulties of political instability caused a
military coup on May 16 1961.
1.7 The Transformation of Social Structure
Since the modernisation began at the end of the nineteenth century, Korean society
has been enormously influenced by Western values and has rapidly been
transformed - socially, politically and economically. These swift contextual
changes helped to restructure the social composition of the country. These societal
impacts can be summarised in four historical events:
• Land reform carried out by the American Military Government (AMG) and
Korean authorities.
• An influx of refugees from North Korea after the liberation from the Japanese
annexation and during the Korean War.
• The change of family structure during the industrialisation.
• The increase in the ageing population because of the development of medical
technology.
Firstly, land reform was carried out between 1945 and 1950 by the AMG and
Korean authorities to redistribute all land held by the Japanese. The Korean
government legislated the Agrarian Reform Law to pursue land restructuring in
1949. After this land reform, the percentage of tenants in the farming population
declined from 48.9% to 7% by 1965. The amount of land farmed by tenants fell
2 The modernisation in Korea refers to 'Westernisation.' Since opening the door of the country,
Western culture has rushed into the country. In the beginning, Westernisation was led by
missionaries. However, the Japanese and U.S. governments widely spread Western systems to Korea
through the periods of Japanese annexation and the U.S. military government. The Western impact
demanded cultural and systematic changes in many parts of the society. After the Second World War
and Korean War, American influences became stronger in the society. Finally, Americanisation has
become almost a synonym for modernisation or Westernisation in Korea.
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from about 60% to 15% in the same period (Kang, 1992: 114-116).
Secondly, Japanese annexation and the Korean War displaced a large number
of Koreans who became refugees. Consequently, after the Korean War, there was
an enormous influx of refugees and repatriated people from North Korea, Manchuria
and China as well as Japan and from other localities where many Koreans were
"3
forced to serve the Japanese as either soldiers or labourers (Oh, 1999: 25). They
created their own settlements and communities without social and cultural ties in a
new place. These groups in particular were vulnerably exposed to serious social
problems such as starvation.
Thirdly, industrialisation has produced tremendous changes in the traditional
family structure. In rural areas, a large number of the younger population
abandoned farming altogether and relocated in urban areas. This phenomenon has
contributed to the disruption of agrarian society and industry, and has generated
long-term social problems. Thus, the transformation of traditional family and
community structure has created a new version of family composition - commonly
referred to as the 'nuclear family structure' - across the whole of Korea.





1960 1970 1980 1960-70 1970-80
Total
Population(A) 24,989 31,434 37,436 2.29 1.76
Urban Population 8,947 15,652 24,875 5.59 4.74
Agricultural
Population(B) 16,042 15,782 12,561 -0.16 -2.26
Ratio of
Agricultural
Population(B/A) 64.2 50.2 33.6 0.00 -3.07
Source: Chun, K.H. (1985) p. 364.
Note: 'Urban population' indicates the population living in a city and administrative district where
the population numbers over 20,000.
3
According to Oh (1999), the South Korean population in August 1945 was slightly over 16 million.
However, it rapidly increased to over 19 million by September 1946 and to 21 million in 1947 (p.25).
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Fourthly, rapid economic growth through successful economic performance
has helped to bring about an increase in the qualitative and quantitative levels of
education and experience among medical professionals, and has also allowed for the
development of the related technology which is so necessary for the advancement of
quality medical care. As a result, the average life span for the population has
gradually been increasing such that the size of the ageing population has become a
concern of society and of those who craft the government's health care policies.
1.8 Confucianism and Korean Society
Confucian tradition has strongly influenced the socio-economic development,
nation-building, social stability, political structure and the formation of cultural
identity in Korea as well as in other parts of East Asia. This ideological resource
was a spiritual pivot of state leadership as well as a cultural basis of community. Tu
Weiming (2000) emphasises that "East Asian modernity under the influence of
Confucian traditions presents a coherent social vision with at least six salient
features" (pp.205-206):
• Government leadership in a market economy.
• Organic solidarity resulting from humane rites of interaction.
• The Family as the basic unit of society.
• A civil society, which draws its inner strength from the dynamic interplay
between the family and the state.
• Education.
• Self-cultivation as the common root of the regulation of the family, of
governance through the state and from the stability provided by peace.
Confucianism has been the foundation of social and political attitudes.
Because hierarchy and authority are the main tenets of Confucian thought, they have
penetrated the ideology of the ruling and administrative sectors of society.
Accordingly, the Korean style of the governmental bureaucracy has been notable for
its strong and dominating leadership. It has remained a spontaneous by-product of
this particular ideology within Korean society. Kim and Kim (1997) have defined
two noteworthy factors by which Korean political culture has been affected: first,
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"Confucian hierarchical subordination," which implies a high sensitivity to
authority-support in socio-political life; second, "a high degree of cultural
homogeneity," which has tended to inhibit not only the fragmentation of power but
also the diversification of group political interests (p.64). These two ideological
norms contributed fundamentally to the formation of the political structure of
Korean bureaucracy. Oh (1999) describes Confucian influence in Korea thus:
The key legacies of Confucianism in Korea were authoritarian,
paternalistic, and family-centred, legacies that are visible in that
country today. Most Koreans still look to their leader, the president,
for key decisions and Korean chief executives have played
extraordinarily defining roles in Korean politics and government.
Family ties in Korea still constitute the central element in the lives of
Koreans and their organisations, particularly in the economic sector,
where family-owned and -operated conglomerates predominate
(pp.13-14).
Consequently, Confucian doctrine produced an elite, ruling class known as
Yangban. In Korean society, Yangban comprised a literati group which constituted
the dominant social class of the Chosun dynasty. They attained a monopoly on
prestige, power and wealth (Oh, 1999: 10). Their tradition embodied socio-political
formalities of ceremony, rites, ranks, and hierarchical structures. As the Yangban
occupied civil and military sides of the government, this class tradition provided for
the fundamental formation of a new version of ruling elitism in Korean society and
bureaucracy. Thus, Confucian principles as the official creed of government
consolidated the power base of the Korean ruling elites, securing a highly centralised
authoritarian bureaucracy (Kim & Kim, 1997: 65).
1.9 Socio-Economic Development in Korea
Industrial modernisation in Korea began with the military junta of Park Chung Hee
that took over state power through a military coup d'etat on May 16 1961. After the
military leaders gained control of the government, the military junta and the leader
established that the primary concern of the coup was the achievement of economic
revolution which would lead to a "liberation from poverty."
The military government aimed at export-oriented industrialisation for the
purpose of rapid economic development, and it embarked on a five-year plan which
Ch.1- Introduction 18
would push forward this economic agenda. Accordingly, the focus of the export-
oriented plan gradually moved from light industry to heavy and chemical industry.
These processes collectively caused the industrial structure to accumulate severe
imbalances between: ® rural agriculture and urban manufacturing industry; ® heavy
chemical and light industry; and ® big and small-medium size enterprise. This
economic development approach restructured the pattern of daily life of urban
workers and farmers as well as the labour market system in urban and rural areas.
This restructuring provoked complaints and challenges from the labour workers and
the farmers to the authoritarian-military government.
Since the mid-1960s, the government marginalised demands and the rights of
labour groups as part of their strategy for export-oriented economic growth. The
trade unions were completely excluded from participation in any policy-making
activities by an exclusionary and oppressive labour policy. In particular, under the
Yu-Shin regime of the Park government in the 1970s, the degree of suppression and
control over labour became harsher (Shin, 1990: 18). Ultimately, during the entire
decade of the 1970s, the government institutionally blocked the power of organised
labour through special legislation. The Park regime did not allow the trade unions to
become political partners at all. The activity of trade unions was condoned only
within a limited enterprise sector.4
During export-oriented industrialisation, the economic policy of the
government remained a Tow wage policy' from the labour side and a Tow price
policy for agricultural products' from the side of farmers in rural areas in order to
maximise market competitiveness in international trade (Chang, 1985: 27). These
principles of the government's economic policy were characterised by three
distinctive features in labour and agricultural markets: a cheap labour wage policy,
price suppression of agricultural products and strict labour laws. The logic
underlying this economic policy was that cheap labour was essential for constructing
a competitive export-based economy and a decreasing, national inflation rate.
Nevertheless, the most significant features in the composition of the socio¬
economic context in Korea during the 1960s and 1970s, were the fast growth of the
working class in urban areas and the contraction of the agricultural sector in rural
4 The military government especially kept watch over trade unions and reformed the structure of
unions so that the trade unions were allowed only within industrial sectors. Local unions were not
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areas. For the most part, this was brought about through rapid industrialisation.
During this time, as the government had to rely on big business for
successful implementation of the export-oriented, heavy chemical industry policy, a
small number of privileged entrepreneur groups were established to take over a large
part of the economy. These were commonly referred to as the chaebols or
conglomerates. Consequently, the state's capital became concentrated in a small
number of privileged sectors of the urban economy, whereas the standard ofworking
and living conditions in the rural agricultural sector diminished in capital funds as
well as in importance.
Second, while the industrialisation policy, especially the export-oriented
heavy chemical industrial strategy, generated many new jobs and absorbed the
growing labour force from rural areas, the economic policy of the government
marginalised Korean rural sectors in terms of developing agricultural industry and
improving the quality of life (Han, 1999: 153).
Third, the government's strategy also engendered complaints from the side
of labour. Since real income had increased at a much lower level than labour
productivity and inflation as well as the average living cost, the quality of life of the
labour force relatively degenerated (Hyun, 1985: 248).5
Fourth, this economic-oriented policy of the government produced two major
organisations respectively in the governmental sector and in the business sector: the
Economic Planning Board (EPB)6 and the Federation ofKorean Industries (FKI).
In order to drive rapid and successful economic development in the nation, the
military junta desperately needed an administrative body to orchestrate a
comprehensive plan for economic development. Through the highly important role
and duty granted it by the president, the hierarchical position of the EPB
significantly escalated inside the government. The chief of the EPB was also
deputy-prime minister in the cabinet until the EPB was closed in 1998.
Meanwhile, entrepreneurs in big business sectors established a representative
allowed to organise independently (Kwon, 1999: 45).
5 This phenomenon persisted in the Chun regime in the 1980s.
5 Under EPB, the Korea Development Institute (KDI) was founded as a think-tank by President Park
in 1971. The main role of the KDI was to contribute by conducting economic policy research and by
designing relevant economic plans. Its institutional hierarchical position in the government was high,
and its research capability was powerful. Later, the KDI expanded its research capacity and was
involved both in creating most policy designs with regard to economics and also in formulating social
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organisation to represent their collective interests. Because the participation and
role of the big business sectors in undertaking the economic policy agenda was
crucial for the government in driving the successful implementation of its economic
development strategy, the government acknowledged the FKI as a political partner.
Hence, the FKI members received political privileges from the government in
conducting their business. Both organisations were founded in 1961 as soon as the
military junta took power and subsequently set up the economic development plan.
Lastly, two major trade unions were born, the Federation ofKorean Trade
Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). The
FKTU was the only acknowledged representative of trade unions in Korea. After
the military coup on May 16 1961, the junta banned any industrial action.
Subsequently, it went on to dissolve political parties and civil organisations through
special ordinances on May 23. As a result, the FKTU was disbanded. On August
30 1961, the junta reorganised the FKTU because it was necessary for the Park
regime to draw on the support of the representative institution of labour in order to
promote the government-led rapid economic growth. After that, the government-
sanctioned FKTU was easily manipulated by the government and remained
'unfailingly loyal' to the Park regime (Oh, 1999: 200; Kim, 1990: 103-104).7
Since the democratisation movement in 1987, the rival representative of
trade unions, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), was organised
under the slogan of 'democratic labour movement.' The independent and
democratic trade union movement has expanded in size since the 'Great Workers'
Struggle' in 1987. The number of trade unions has exploded, and the struggle to
organise and 'democratise' trade unions has taken off against the repressiveness of
the military dictatorship and employers. The KCTU was militant and threatened the
government-authorised FKTU through its different advocacy agenda for labour. The
KCTU was not authorised as a legal representative agency for democratic trade
unions until the sanction of the Kim Dae Jung government in 1997 (KCTU
Website).
The FKTU announced resolutions supporting the military revolution of Park's military junta, anti-
communist drive and protection of labours' rights in its inaugural ceremony (Kim, 1990: 104).
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III. Introduction to the Health Care in Korea
1.10 Health Care Development in Korea
Over the centuries, Koreans had used acupuncture and herbal remedies to treat a
wide variety of illnesses, so-called 'traditional Korean medicine' practised by herbal
doctors. Treatment had been practised on a family and community-oriented basis,
where the daily life of people operated, rather than in a well-organised medical
institution. Nevertheless, traditional Korean medicine penetrated deeply into the life
culture of ordinary people.
From the end of the nineteenth century, the structure of medical provision in
Korea faced enormous changes with the influx ofWestern medicine into Korea as it
began gradually to open its territory to Western countries and Japan. Western
medicine was introduced in a number ofways:
• Japanese Western-trained doctors and American missionary doctors in the end of
the nineteenth century.
• Domination of Japanese-Western medicine during the Japanese annexation.
• Adaptation of the U.S. medicine and medical system during the periods of the
American Military Government and the Korean War.
Between 1876 and 1945, Korea entered into a process of modernisation and
transformation of its health care system. The first practitioners ofWestern medicine
in Korea consisted of two groups: one group from Japan and the other group from
North America. Based on the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 between the Chosun
Dynasty and Imperial Japan, when the Chosun Dynasty promised to open some
ports to Japan, several Japanese military Western-trained doctors began practising at
modem hospitals in those port cities where Japanese merchants were allowed to
engage in free trade (Son, 1999: 544). Continuous treaties made between Korea and
several Western imperial powers during the 1880s resulted in the arrival of
missionary doctors. For the purpose of spreading Christianity, missionary doctors,
mainly from the United States and Canada, treated both the elite ruling class and
ordinary people, mostly free of charge. In 1885, the Emperor Kojong built a
Western-style hospital, called Kwanghyewon, by accepting the proposal of Dr.
Allen, one of the American missionary doctors (Paik, 1970: 99-107 & 330-331).
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After the Japanese victory in the Russian-Japanese War (1904-1905), the
Japanese government accelerated the process for the annexation of Korea. In 1905,
the Ulmi Treaty was signed between Korea and Japan. Under the treaty, Korea
became a Japanese protectorate, and power to administer the nation was vested in
the office of the Japanese Residency-General. From then on, the Japanese
administration did not allow practitioners of Korean traditional medicine, and only
Western-trained doctors were allowed to practice (Son, 1999: 545). During the
Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), the Japanese government was hostile to all of
Korean cultural identity, including the practice of traditional medicine. In fact,
Japan opened its nation to Western countries much earlier than Korea did. Through
the Meiji reforms of 1868, Japan successfully modernised elements of its social,
political and economic systems, including the health-care system. Japan believed
that it possessed superior knowledge ofWestern medicine at that time. With pride
in its level of Western style medicine, the Japanese government scorned and
continuously suppressed herbal medicine in Korea during the annexation period
(Son, 1999: 545).
However, it should be noted that the Japanese government carried out the
medical insurance programme in the mainland, but did not introduce the health care
programme in its colony, Korea. Japan legislated for the medical insurance law in
1922, and implemented the medical insurance for employees in 1926 and for the
self-employed in 1937. However, the Japanese government never adopted the social
welfare programme in Korea (Cha, 1991: 59).
After the Second World War, the American Military Government (AMG)
was established in 1945, following liberation from the Japanese annexation. Korea
then experienced the Korean War in 1950. This period provided an ideal
opportunity to bring the advanced medicine, medical system and medical education
system of the United States into Korea. The Korean medical system became
tremendously influenced by U.S. medicine. The AMG and the U.S. government
introduced market ideology and an emphasis on the private sector in medical
services. This influence allowed the nation to experience private medicine first¬
hand, and this consequently became the basis of Korean medical service structures
(Han, 1999: 70).
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1.11 By-Products of the Modern Health Care Development
Korean medicine was replaced by Western medicine, as we observed in the
preceding section, and this thesis also focuses on Western medicine. Throughout the
course of these events produced by the development of health care system in the
country, a few distinctive features are worth noting: first, Western medicine
completely occupied centre stage in the health care provision system in Korea.
Hence, the Korean Medical Association (KMA), which represents doctors trained in
Westem-medicine, has become one of the most influential organisations responsible
for the creation and implementation of health care policy. From the 1960s through
the 1980s, the KMA was vested with a monopoly as the official representative of
medical professionals by the authoritarian government, which was a means of
corporatist control. Consequently, the KMA earned political assistance from the
government in dealing with policy matters that related to the provision of all forms
of health care. Broadly, the KMA often expressed political support for government
policy whether or not it related to health care policy. However, since the end of the
1980s, the KMA has regained its political independence and freedom in its
involvement in policy-making process and so it has not felt the need to take
positions on matters unrelated to health care.
Second, the private health care sector was large and growing rapidly in
Korea (Hasan & Rao, 1979: 137). As a result, health care services were mostly
supplied through the mechanism of the free market without a well-secured public
health care programme until the medical insurance scheme was enacted in 1977.
Access to medical services was exclusively confined to the middle and upper
income classes who could afford to pay. Those who were poor or who were living
at lower income levels had limited access to medical treatment (Park, 1980: 107).
Third, the free market system in the provision of medical care engendered
imbalances in the allocation of medical resources between urban and rural areas. As
medical manpower and facilities were largely concentrated in the major urban
centres where the market system could operate profitably, people in the rural areas
had limited access to medical facilities, regardless of their economic status. In 1971,
35% of licensed physicians in Korea practiced in Seoul (MoHSA, 1971).
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Table 1-2 Changes in the Number of Licensed Physicians* (1961 -
1995)















* Including conditionally qualified physicians.
** From 1975 to 1995, the number of population per physician was applied from the calculation of
the author.
Sources: Adapted and calculated from Ministry ofHealth & Social Affairs (1970, 1971, 1982, 1985,
1990) Year Book ofHealth & Social Affairs Statistics, the Republic ofKorea; Ministry of Health &
Welfare (1997) Year Book ofHealth & Welfare Statistics, the Republic of Korea; National Statistical
Office (1996) Korea Statistical Year Book, the Republic of Korea.
Table 1-3 Distribution of Medical Facilities: Concentration of the
Facilities in Seoul (Unit: %)
Year General Hospital Clinic
Hospital
1970 66.7 26.9 39.5
1971 71.4 26.7 38.6
1982 38.2 27.7 35.9
1984 30.0 28.4 35.4
1989 29.4 27.0 33.8
1995 27.4 23.9 29.5
Sources: Applied from Ministry of Health & Social Affairs (1970, 1971, 1982, 1985, 1990), Year
Book ofHealth & Social Affairs Statistics, the Republic of Korea; Ministry of Health & Welfare
(1996), Year Book ofHealth & Welfare, the Republic of Korea.
Fourth, the matters of access to and imbalance in medical resources resulted
in the formation of alternative medical resources, particularly in rural areas. Before
industrialisation in Korea during the 1950s and 1960s, the number of population
living in rural areas, where transportation and medical facilities were undeveloped,
was of course higher than after industrialisation. As a result, a large part of the
Korean population still preferred traditional Korean medicine and folk remedies,
which were easily accessible in comparison to Western medicine. In particular,
traditional Korean herbal medicine played an essential role as preventive medicine
and still performs that role not only in rural areas but also in urban areas. Another
alternative method for medical treatment was to use pharmacists. As pharmacists in
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Korea were able to prescribe a medicine without a medical doctor's prescription, it
was convenient for rural residents to use the pharmacists for accessing more easily
relatively cheaper medical treatments than the expensive medical facilities located
o
miles away from their rural residences.
Table 1-4 Trend of Population in Urban Areas and Seoul Metropolitan
Area (Unit: %)










20.8 28.3 35.5 42.8 45.3
Source: Ministry of Health & Welfare (1998) Year Book ofHealth & Welfare Statistics, the Republic
of Korea
Later on, the government included traditional herb clinics and chemistry into
the category of medical facilities for medical insurance treatment respectively in
1987 and 1989. This demonstrates that the government admitted imbalances and
lack ofmedical facilities for implementing the medical insurance programme.
Fifth, ever since Western medicine was imported into Korea, it became the
most dominant medical treatment in the country, whereas the usage of traditional
Korean medicine significantly decreased. Hence, the general term of "medical
treatments" or "medical services" now signifies Western medicine in Korea.
Although a certain part of the population still had a tendency to prefer traditional
Korean medicine, a majority favoured Western medical treatments before the
medical insurance was introduced in Korea in 1977.
This system caused misuse and overuse of drugs in Korean society. Hence, the Korean government
adapted the policy ofrole separation between dispensing by pharmacists andprescription by doctors
in 2000.
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Table 1-5 Medical Needs & Preferred Medical Institutions of Patients in
1981 (Unit: %)
Medical Institutions Preferences Actual Treatments
Hospital or Clinic 65.8 25.6
Public Health Centre 2.2 3.4




Source: Ministry of Health & Social Affairs (1982) The White Paper ofHealth, the Republic of
Korea, p. 141
Table 1-6 The Facilities for Western and Traditional Korean Medicine in
Korea (Unit: %)







Source: Ministry of Health & Social Affairs (1973, 1960) Year Book ofPublic Health & Social
Statistics, the Republic of Korea
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Conclusion
Among the many social policy programmes, health care policy is one of the most
complex in the policy-making arena because mixed variables from social, political
and economic sectors necessarily engage in the policy-making process. As a result,
the health care policy of any nation contains the distinctive characteristics of its
national components. Although many welfare developing countries have adopted
the welfare developmental pattern of the developed countries, each nation shows a
distinctiveness in its social policy development. Hence, if we observe the
evolutionary process of a nation's social policy programme, we will also be able to
witness the history of the socio-political and socio-economic development of that
nation.
In the same sense, this research is interested in the ways in which the
National Health Insurance scheme of Korea has developed over time. The study
question explores the relationship between the role/objective of the participants and
the outcomes in the policy-making processes of the Korean NHI scheme. In
particular, the power structure of key actors in the policy-making is the main
theoretical challenges in explaining the research in question.
The research questions are directed to three key elements of policy-making:
the executive, the legislature and the interest groups. Primary (interviews,
government archives and statistics, newspapers) and secondary data collections,
examining the chronological development of the NHI, are used to carry out the
study.
In the second and third parts, the chapter discussed the nation and the health
care of Korea. Korea was dominated by Confucian influences, and Confucianism
was the foundation of the social and political systems of the country. Throughout
three historical events - Japanese annexation, the Korean War and the
industrialisation - the country faced significant transformations in social and
economic structures. During the modernisation of the country, Western medicine
was introduced and became the basis of the modern medical system in Korea. In
particular, the influx of the American medical system crucially influenced the
establishment of the Korean medical system on the basis of the free market
mechanism.
By adopting Western systems as models in the social, political and economic
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arenas in the country throughout the modernisation process, Korea has become very
Western in its thinking with regard to national values. As Western medicine and
Western medical insurance systems became the norm, the Korean political system
followed suit. With respect to this assumption, the question can be raised as to
whether the development of the Korean NHI scheme can be adequately explained
within the context of a purely Western theoretical framework. In the next chapter,
some Western theories will be introduced before examining their applicability to the
final NHI system which exists in Korea today. Western theories can explain the
development of Korean health care policy in general and the policy process of the
Korean NHI scheme in particular.
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Chapter 2. Theoretical Approaches & Frameworks
I. Theoretical Challenges
In the West, various theoretical approaches have been adopted to explain why and
how social policy programmes have been initiated and expanded in modern welfare
states. These approaches seek to provide suitable explanations of the development
of social policy and the process of decision-making. It has always remained a
question, however, whether these Western-born theoretical approaches are suitable
for East Asian cases in general.
The newly industrialised countries of East Asia that had experienced
colonisation or annexation by developed countries in the empire-building period
began to reconstruct their national social, economic and political systems after the
Second World War. On account of the historical and cultural similarities between
those eastern countries, the studies from the West regarding social policy
development of the East tend to focus narrowly on common ideological perspectives
such as 'Confucianism.' Social policy initiatives of the newly developed countries
have been interpreted with a focus on bureaucratic-authoritarian approaches,
commonly manifested in countries with a Confucian tradition and family practice.
Confucian-based leadership has had a strong tendency towards autocracy, and is
often called 'imperial.' Such state leadership style for governing the society is
legitimated through the analogy of the moral authority of the father in a Confucian
family. Although its potential for explaining more complex modern social structures
is quite limited, it is impossible to ignore the significance of Confucianism when
considering policy development in East Asia. However, we need to widen our
analytical viewpoint. Because there have been rapid cultural and systemic
transformations in the countries of East Asia, approaches to the study of social
policy also need to diversify.
In the case of Korea, any single theoretical approach would be insufficient to
explain the development of social policy. Since the liberation from Japanese
annexation in 1945, the state of Korea has experienced a more rapid transformation
in its social, political and economic arenas by comparison with the other newly
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industrialised countries of East Asia. Over four decades, Korea faced two military
coups d'etat led by two different groups. With the end of these military
authoritarian regimes, it now enjoys democracy. Despite political fluctuations, the
nation has developed its economy enormously. In accordance with the success of
economic development, the average quality of life of citizens has rapidly improved.
In reference to the analysis of the development of National Health Insurance
in Korea, (as the focus of this research work), it is more difficult to discover any
particular theoretical pattern in analysis of policy-making. This is because the
number of participating actors and the degree of the involvement of these actors in
policy-making have dynamically changed along with the transformation in the
political features of regimes.
Two Theoretical Divisions
In this study, theoretical frameworks are divided in two: theories of social policy
development and ofpolicy-making. This is because when we analyse policy-making
in a health care programme, the development of health care policy as social policy is
simultaneously revealed. Hence, combining these theoretical approaches helps to
deliver more profound analytical frameworks as well as a wider scope of
understanding for the study of social policy. Based on this method, we observe that
power is at the centre of these theoretical approaches: first, since the transformation
of power resources through social change causes any type of redistribution of power
in modern societies, this phenomenon eventually influences the mode of
development for social policy; second, the power of key actors is a significant
feature in policy analysis because there is a crucial connection between decision¬
making patterns and power in terms of setting the policy agenda and implementing
policy propositions.
Figure 1 shows us a general structure of the policy-making of the NHI
scheme throughout the period. Environmental changes in social, political and
economic areas affected power structures of institutions and those of policy actors.
Environmental changes caused a transformation in the institutional power structure
that influenced power relations in the policy-making domain. Meanwhile, a
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mobilisation of interest groups took place and through their collective actions they
also influence the policy-making domain. During the decision-making process, the
interests of the participating actors in the policy-making sometimes compete with
each other or are sometimes co-opted by particular interest groups. All these
variables have become increasingly complex over the forty years covered in the
thesis. Whereas the adoption of particular policies used to be done totally at the
whim of the president, the process has steadily assumed the characteristics of a
Western model of a democratic formula for policy-making.




2.1 Theoretical Perspectives for Social Policy Development
Explanation as to what determines the development of social policy in a capitalist
country varies according to one's view of the attributes possessed by the state.
Korpi (1989) points out three issues key to resolving welfare state development: the
relevance of class, the nature of the distribution of power resources, and the
possibilities of democratic politics in Western societies (p.309). Furthermore, as
power reveals itself in many different ways in the elaboration of socio-economic and
political aspects (as Korpi defined above), the degree of class coherence and of the
distribution of power varies over time and between countries. Therefore, it is
difficult to categorise a nation into a pattern of a welfare development model.
A. Logic of Industrialisation
With regard to the rapid socio-economic development of Korea, the 'logic of
industrialisation' theory is a useful tool to illustrate social policy development. This
approach enables us to see that welfare state development is associated with
economic growth (Skocpol & Amenra, 1986; Wilensky, 1975; Wilensky & Lebeaux,
1965). Wilensky (1975) stresses that "economic growth and its demographic and
bureaucratic outcomes are the root cause of the general emergence of the welfare
state - the establishment of similar programmes of social security, the increasing
fraction of Gross National Products (GNP) devoted to such programmes, the trend
toward comprehensive coverage and similar methods of financing" (p. xiii).
Cutright (1965) extends this notion to the political. He emphasises that
"national political, economic, and social systems are interdependent" (p. 548). He
found that the degree of social security coverage is strongly associated with its level
of economic development. In addition, as the national government becomes more
and more representative when political independence is achieved in a nation, the
higher degree of politically representative government introduces national social
security programmes earlier than the less politically representative nations.
This theoretical approach shares many similar points to functionalist
perspectives in how it accounts for the development of social policy. This approach
explains that social policy programmes are necessarily born to deal with the impact
of social transformation into an urban-industrial society. Because urban-
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industrialisation and technical evolution cause massive changes in the structure of
family, community, labour and demography, government ultimately responds to
these rapid social changes by bringing a means of social policy.
This theoretical perspective offers a possible approach for the interpretation
of the Korean case. Since the Korean War, the country has succeeded in making
rapid economic development during the last four decades. This huge economic
achievement has resulted in tremendous social transformations in the areas of
family, demography, social structures and so on. While enjoying economic growth,
the country has also adopted welfare programmes. During the socio-economic
evolution, the question could be raised as to whether the economic development
contributed to the development of welfare programmes in Korea. As the NHI
scheme was initiated and implemented alongside the economic growth in Korea, the
economic growth may be a critical variable to explain the Korean welfare
development in general and the NHI development in particular.
With regard to the logic of industrialisation, thus, two controversial issues
became apparent with respect to the Korean experiences: first, even though the
industrialisation approach provides an explanation for the NHI development, the
efforts of political actors in the policy-making arena should be considered; second,
although industrialisation has brought progress, it has also contributed to the
collapse of traditional social welfare mechanisms in Korean society. For example,
neighbours have traditionally depended on each other for assistance during times of
crisis. Unfortunately, industrialisation has led to the breakdown of these informal
networks and created a need for the development of formalised welfare programmes.
B. Marxist Perspective
Another theoretical attempt seeking to explain the developmental origin of the
welfare state is rooted in how capitalism functions as an economic system. This
attempt from a Marxist perspective argues that class-conflicts occurring in
capitalism, and usually resolved in favour of the interests of capital (in the process of
capital accumulation), influence the development of the welfare state. To support
this theory, Marxists emphasise that "the capitalist mode of production is both
exploitative and conflict-ridden" (George & Wilding, 1994: 103). Because a small
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minority owns the means of production to maximise these profits generated by the
production system, Marxist theorists see the capitalist mode of production as
exploitative. On the other hand, as the work force attempts to improve its working
conditions and wages, it is conflict-ridden. Thus, class conflict and exploitation are
the 'natural and inevitable' results of the private ownership of the means of
production in a capital economic system (George & Wilding, 1994: 103).
O'Connor argues that the capitalist state is involved in two contradictory
functions - "accumulation and legitimisation" (O'Connor, 1973: 6). He points out
that the state must provide services to improve capital profitability and strengthen
conditions of social harmony in order to maintain the capitalist mode of production.
Otherwise, public acceptability of the capitalist system and state legitimacy will be
undermined. Gough (1979) also views the development of the welfare state as
essentially contradictory. It simultaneously embodies tendencies to enhance social
welfare, to develop the powers of individuals, to exert social control over blind
market forces, and to repress and control people to adapt them to the requirements of
the capitalist economy (pp.11-12).
Saville emphasises the interaction of three main factors for the development
of the welfare state in capitalist countries: "the struggle of the working class against
exploitation; the requirements of industrial capitalism for a highly productive labour
force; and the recognition by the propertied class of the price to be paid for political
security." Based on these three factors, he stresses the important role of the working
class and of the labour movement in the capitalist system (Mishra, 1981: 75-76).
In conclusion, Marxist theorists see the welfare state as an attempt to deal
with problems of capitalist development, class conflicts and recurring economic
crises contained in a capitalist economic system. Thus, the capitalist state provides a
measure to integrate the working class without a fundamental challenge to the
institution and distribution of private property, as Flora & Heidenheimer (1981)
point out (p.23).
This perspective provides a tool for examining the relationship between the
development of welfare programmes and the conflicts among different socio¬
economic classes. This is inevitably produced by the profit-driven mechanism of the
capitalist countries. In Korea, the export-driven economic development has allowed
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for the excessive accumulation of capital by a relatively small number of large
corporations, the so-called Chaebol (Conglomerate). This tactic facilitated rapid
economic development and resulted in the strong control of labour to maintain a
stable economic growth in the country. This kind of economic system caused unfair
competition and an over-use of power by a limited number of capitalists. In the
society, the redistribution of wealth has been uneven among classes, and the gap
between rich and poor has widened.
As Marx predicted, these social outcomes produced by economic
development under capitalist formation were sufficient to bring about conflicts
between capitalists and labour. In Korea, however, this theoretical perspective does
not explain appropriately the initiative of the first medical insurance law and its
implementation which occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. Since labour was
heavily controlled by the authoritarian government, it was almost impossible to take
any collective action against the government or employers. Thus, there was no sign
of conflict between labour and capitalists in the policy-making process of the NHI
scheme. This conflict became evident, however, during the democratic movement
in the 1980s. Government officials and entrepreneurs found that the increasing
number of labour disputes and the escalating demands of the labour force became a
tremendous challenge. It is interesting to see how the labor movement impacted
Korean social policy development with respect to government intervention in these
issues. In respect to this matter, we can raise two questions: "How has the Korean
government reacted to the class conflict?" and "Was the welfare provision a measure
of the government to undermine the conflict?"
Secondly, according to Marxists' views, labour is considered as a means of
production in the capitalist mode. Thus, welfare is a provision from the bourgeois to
preserve the health of labour which guarantees an increase in productivity. In
Korea, however, the demands for welfare provisions from the entrepreneur side were
not found. Therefore, it cannot be said that the welfare development of Korea was
attributed to the efforts of the bourgeois to preserve a high quality-labour capacity.
Finally, this Marxist theory is further limited by its narrow definition of
capitalism. It implies that every country will have an identical experience under the
capitalist approach. We know that this is not the case when we compare the result of
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capitalism in different national settings. For example, two capitalist styles,
Scandinavia and the U.S., show us a prominent differential in interpreting the
welfare development (especially regarding health care policy). Each country has
used a distinct method for dealing with social matters based upon its interpretation
of the functions of capitalism. In Scandinavia, the social democratic method was
used, whereas a liberal-market approach was adopted by the U.S.
C. Working Class Mobilisation Approach
The working class mobilisation perspective is an effective approach in explaining
the intervention of the working class in social reform. According to this approach,
welfare state development is a by-product created by persistent conflict between
classes in society. The strength of mobilised and unified working class power is
closely related to the production ofmore advanced social policy developments of a
country (Korpi, 1983: 39).
This perspective emphasises the extent of co-operation between trade unions
and political parties, in particular leftist parties. When the degree of the co¬
operation between the dominant left party and the trade union is higher, the working
class's ability to exercise political influence is more crucial for welfare
development, because the representatives of the working class can increase their
influence in legislatures and governments (Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1984: 180;
Alber, 1983: 163; Korpi, 1983: 39-41). According to the study of Esping-Andersen
and Korpi (1984), for example, the boundaries of social democratic reform are
substantially narrower in Austria and Germany than in Scandinavia because the
labour movement and political co-operation with a leftist party in Scandinavia are
relatively stronger (p.203).
The Korean working class has gradually enhanced its political power through
well-disciplined trade unions since the democratic movements of the 1980s. Korean
trade unions have continuously threatened governments and entrepreneurs with
various demands. Against their challenges, governments have responded sometimes
by using oppressive means in order to undermine the labour intervention in the
policy-making arena. Since the economic crisis, however, organised labour has
gained more effective influences and been able to exercise those powers on the
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policy process in association with policy makers.
The power achievement of the Korean working class in recent years may
account for the social policy development of the country related to two crucial
events - the democratic movements in the mid-1980s and the economic crisis in the
end of the 1990s - because the growth of labour influences on governmental policies
in Korea contributed to changing power relations in the political domain as well as
to encouraging social reform, as the theorists of this perspective consider.
D. Citizenship Perspective
The social citizenship approach was elaborated by T H Marshall through his famous
article, 'Citizenship and social class' (Marshall, 1963). He defined citizenship as "a
status bestowed on those who are full members of a community" (p.87). He also
emphasised that "all citizens are equal with respect to the rights and duties with
which this status is endowed" (p.87).
Marshall's perspective explains the development of social rights and social
solidarity with regard to the development of the welfare state in capitalist a country.
According to his view, although it is manifest to different degrees in different
capitalist countries, modern social history represents gradual progress towards the
realisation of civil, political and social rights: civil rights are concerned with
individual liberty, including freedom of speech and thought, the right to own private
property and the right to justice; political rights encompass participation in the
political processes of government, either as an elector or as an elected member of an
assembly; and social rights cover a whole range of rights, from the right to a
modicum of economic security through the right to share in the heritage and living
standards of a civilised society, including protection from the free market in the
areas of housing, employment, health and education (Sullivan, 1998: 74; Hasenfeld
et al., 1987: 396).
A significant point of Marshall's view is that there exists a permanent
tension between the principle of citizenship and the operation of the capitalist
market. In this tension, capitalism inevitably involves inequalities between social
classes, while citizenship involves the redistribution of political resources through
rights which are shared equally by all. When legislated social rights are established
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under this tension, the scope of the market is decreased, and the basis of power
distribution shifts from market power to political resources through consideration of
'justice.' Eventually, this tension between the market and politics is reflected in the
development of social citizenship and the welfare state in capitalism (Marshall,
1998: 72; Korpi, 1989: 312-313). Ultimately, in this theoretical perspective, the
political capability of citizens (amongst other social components) is the key to social
rights, universality and social solidarity, which are in turn the foundation of the
welfare state.
During the political transitions from authoritarian leadership to democratic
society in Korea, one of the most significant changes has appeared in the civil
sector. It was the development of power distribution in the civil society. The
struggles of citizens to acquire democracy has contributed to the increase in citizens'
participation in political activities through various channels, albeit slowly.
Secondly, since democratisation of the country, citizens have enjoyed a
political involvement in policy-making through civic organisations. As the success
of democratic movements allowed a space for civic groups to participate in policy¬
making and to monitor the implementation of policy, policy- and law-makers have
begun to be very cautious about the growing civil power.
Throughout various channels, thus, citizens have attempted to seek their
rights and to use them in many areas such as health, education, housing,
environment, and so on. With this respect, the citizenship perspective can provide
room for interpreting social policy development in relation to the democratising
process in Korea.
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives for Policy-Making
For the theoretical understanding of policy-making, two divisions of the actual state
of power need to be discussed: the concentration ofpower and the distribution of
power. These two concepts are in a reciprocal relationship when one considers how
power actually functions in the realm ofpolicy-making.
The concentration of power specifies where power has converged and what
degree of power is allocated to actors in the policy-making process. It is necessary
Ch.2 - Theoretical Approaches & Frameworks 40
to determine who actually holds the reins of power and the degree of influence they
really have. In Korea, it was readily apparent that power was almost always
conferred on a specific leader who usually headed an elite group and resulted in
authoritarian regimes. Thus, it is also imperative to look at the power distribution
scheme and how it affected the development of Korean social policy. In the policy¬
making arena, questions can be raised as to how the power is delivered and where it
is focussed. In the case of Korea, the lines of power have traditionally run from the
top downward. However, following the democratisation of the nation, things began
to change. This was due to the significant socio-political transformation that ensued.
The ultimate result was the restructuring of power sharing in Korean society as well
as in the Korean political arena. These changes constitute an example of the
redistributive process of power in a policy-making domain through the
democratising process of the country. In sum, this thesis examines how different
constellations ofpower have impacted policy-making.
Definition of Power
Power is defined by various ways by many scholars in policy studies. In classical
theory, power is associated with resistance (Sibeon 1996: 49). Max Weber insists
that "power is the possibility that one actor within a social relationship will be in a
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which
this probability rests" (Parsons, 1947: 152). Giddens (1997) defines power as "the
ability of individuals or groups to make their own interests or concerns, even when
others resist"(p.338). In sum, it can be said that power is being able to achieve one's
aims despite the resistance of others.
In political science, however, there is a tendency for the study of power often
to be identified with the study of government, involving elites and political
leadership. This approach may provide a limited scope for understanding a broad
concept of power in the decision-making process. This is because we cannot ignore
the fact that a large variety of actors in society are able to influence any type of
policy-making in a modern capitalist society. Thus, the study of the implementation
of power can be extended to the study of political participation in community
politics (Abercrombie et al., 1994).
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As part of the aforementioned idea, the definition of power in this study is
"the capacity to which one can deliver one's interests in policy-making arenas, in
order to influence the process of policy-making." Here, power can be exercised
from within or outside of government.
2.2.1 The Concentration of Power
This study adopts 'institutionalist' and 'elitist' approaches as methodologies through
which to view the actual concentration of power in policy-making. These two
perspectives provide a framework that addresses the question of "where power has
converged" in the real world of policy-making.
A. Institutionalist Approach
Institutional analysis in policy-making enables us to observe how policy-making
takes place under the formal structures of political institutions, and how political
actors adapt their strategies and responses to events outside the institutional context
(Kwon, 1997: 15). Institutionalists recognise the 'state' as an actor or an institution.
They are also concerned with the impact upon the policy process of the set of
institutions and constitutional structures (Hill, 1997:85; Skocpol, 1997: 5).
Institutionalist scholars emphasise the point that since organisations interact
with their environment to adapt, survive and thrive, the decision-making taking
place in institutional contexts is influenced by its dependence on the environments in
which it is situated rather than purely rational considerations. In other words,
decision-making in organisations may be driven by an inner logic, and the interests
and values of its members, rather than by rational calculation (Parsons, 1995: 324-
326; Perrow, 1986: 172).
With regard to the above basic exposition of the institutionalist perspective,
Hall (1986) extends this analytic notion of the institutional approach to the
relationship between society and the institution itself (p. 19). He insists that although
the institutional focus suggests that the formation of interests and ideas within an
institutional context determines outcomes in the policy process, the institution does
not exist by itself without a wider relationship to state and society (Parsons, 1995:
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334). Accordingly, Hall emphasises that institutional factors in this extended sense
play two main roles: first, the organisation of policy-making influences the degree of
power that any one set of actors can have over decision making and policy
outcomes; and second, the institutional position of actors influences the definition of
their own interests, responsibilities and relationships to other actors (Hill, 1997: 86;
Parsons, 1995: 334).
According to this state-society approach supported by Hall and Skocpol, the
matter of 'state autonomy' in the policy process becomes an essential part in
discussing institutional logic in general. Therefore, we can raise the question of how
the state could act with substantial autonomy from outside forces, such as interest
groups, political and socio-economic elites and so on, in building and implementing
a social policy agenda. Under this conceptualisation, it is difficult to see how
political institutions could be independent in policy-making because other outside
factors are also embedded in policy process in any modern democratic state. Thus,
policy analysis cannot be established without integrating an analysis of participating
forces outside the formal policy-making terrain.
This institutional approach has the advantage of explaining initiatives in
social policy development in Korea. Following the military coup led by President
Park, provisional military councils played a crucial role in establishing social policy
programmes. Most social policy decisions have been made within a restricted
institutional terrain. In such 'confined' institutions, a small number of policy
makers were able to access various policy-making stages. Certainly, the president
exerted the most significant power in the process of setting and implementing policy
proposals. Involvement in social policy-making was restricted to government
executives and some policy experts within a small number of institutions. Under
these circumstances, National Assembly and political parties, the legislative organs,
were not able to influence actively the social policy-making process.
In the case of Korea, it becomes clear that the participation of institutions in
policy-making was limited and the number of policy makers was also restricted to a
small number of groups in these institutions. Along with policy-making structure,
one must be circumspect with regard to the relationships between these restricted
institutions. Because constraint and ambivalence exist in the course of delivering
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the interests of those institutions, interactions between institutions are the centre of
observing the institutional activity in the policy-making. Through observing
institutional actors, one can identify the logic of decision making. Consequently, it
is important to observe the behavior of decision-makers from within the institutional
approach because of their participation as genuine, key members who have
orchestrated the activities of the institutions with which they were associated. The
elite approach is one among many perspectives useful for deriving an adequate
explanation.
B. Elitist Approach
The classical theorists of elitism stress that there is a fundamental division between
the elite and the mass. According to those theorists, the elite possess some
characteristics or resources, such as military skills, leadership qualities, wealth,
organisational skills, or powers of political manipulation, which the mass do not
possess (Sibeon, 1996:110).
From the perspective of the policy process, the elitist model explains that
power is concentrated in the hands of a few groups and individuals. Therefore,
according to Parsons (1995), decision-making within this model is a process which
works to the advantage of these elites (p.248). As a result, this approach simply
faces the task of interpreting the political situation by asking "who is actually
leading decision-making?" Elitism ultimately asserts the fundamental position that
there are "strata at the top with power versus the mass without power"(Parsons,
1995: 248).
With regard to the matter of 'power concentration' in policy-making, Marxist
approaches share similar views with elite theorists that 'society is dominated by an
elite.' But this view of the ruling elite is somewhat different. Marxists agree that
the elite belongs to the capitalist class, and is a dominant stratum whose power stems
from the economic structure of society, whereas elite theorists perceive the division
of society into dominant and subordinate groups as an inevitable fact of society.
They also claim that elite power also stems from various non-economic factors
which themselves are not rooted in economic relationships (Hill, 1997: 46; Sibeon,
1996: 110).
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Elite theory represents an important alternative to pluralism (Hill, 1997: 45).
In a similar sense, elitism is sometimes referred to as 'neo-pluralist theory' because
this perspective rests on a view that power is held by a relatively small number of
interest groups, that is, by fewer groups than pluralists suppose (Sibeon, 1996: 110).
Considering the relationship between elitism and pluralism, Schwarzmantel (1994)
points out that:
elite theory emphasises "the single versus the many": the co¬
ordinated and integrated elite versus the passive, fragmented and
disorganised mass. Pluralism, by contrast, is a theory of diversity
and the role of the many, who organise in groups and associations to
influence the power-holders and to compete for power. In sum,
whereas the pluralist picture focuses on dispersion and diffusion of
power, and the related concept of multiple sources of power, the
elitist hypothesis is one of power concentration, of a single power
elite that dominates a mass (p.69).
In reference to the pluralist argument against elitism, Clegg (1989) states that
"it is not that pluralists deny the existence of elites. They just simply see them as
more dispersed, more specialised and less co-ordinated than would elite theorists"
(p.9).
Schumpeter's conception of 'democracy elitism' argues that the existence of
elites does not threaten democracy so long as there are a number of competing elites,
and providing people have the opportunity to choose between those elites at election
time. In other words, regular elections based on competition between the leaders of
political parties, together with participation by pressure group elites in elections, and
interaction between these elites and the bureaucratic elites, are the ways in which
democracy operates in the modern state (Hill, 1997:45; Sibeon, 1996: 110). Thus, in
policy-making, these interactions involving different elites function as a protection
measure against political domination by one group.
In opposition to Schumpeter's thoughts, C Wright Mills (1956) in The Power
Elite took another line. Mills argued that those at the top of the economic, political,
and military institutional hierarchies constitute a relatively homogeneous power elite
that takes decisions of national importance. Thus, there eventually form anti¬
democratic patterns in policy-making (pp.287-297).
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Finally, in another interesting point with reference to the elitist approach in
policy-making, Parsons (1995) argues that there has been a circulation of elites in
democracy and argues that in the modern era a shift has taken place from class
struggle to a struggle between different 'skill groups.' These skill groups include for
example, those skilled in the use of violence (i.e. military and police elites); those
with communication and propaganda skills; those with business and commercial
skills; 'technocrats' who possess specialist technical knowledge; and bureaucrats
with administrative or organisational skills (p. 250).
This theoretical perspective is especially useful for observing a main leading
actor (or group) in the actual field of policy process. There has always been a
certain figure leading a policy decision, a so-called leader. The leadership of a
leader is usually expressed in diverse ways according to the type of the power
structure and the institutional characteristics to which a bureaucracy or political
institutions belong. Thus, if we study the dominant persons or groups in a certain
governmental context, it may enable us to understand more deeply the essence of a
policy analysis.
To an extent this Korean case study may receive an advantage from this
theoretical perspective. First, political power in Korea has been concentrated in a
few confined and specific offices in the government. For instance, the president has
been the one who has had the strongest grip on political power. Around the
president, a few restricted political elites have been brought into the presidential
secretariat office so that the office has become one of the most influential political
organs in the policy process. Subsequently, the head of the presidential secretariat
office, often called the 'mini-cabinet,' has acquired strong authority in controlling
ministerial offices in the government.
Second, as the primary agenda of the president and government was
economic growth, economic elites became more powerful key policy makers than
any others, not only in economic policy but also in social policy. Third, even in the
legislative body, actual participation by party politicians in policy-making has been
limited to a few exclusive executives in the party.
Consequently, these distinctive characteristics of the elite in the Korean
bureaucracy have created a singular form of policy-making. Since decision-making
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power has been focused on a restricted and specific group or individual, a 'top-
down' style of authoritarian policy-making has become enhanced. Accordingly,
policy-making has become vertical and closed within policy-making institutions so
that it has resulted in an excessive influx of the 'political will' of the leader into
policy-making.
Nevertheless, this approach is appropriate for exploring only a specific
period of the policy regarding the NHI scheme. Since democratisation, this elitist
view of the decision-making process is less useful as an explanation. This is
because power began to spread gradually to various areas, from the governmental
territory to the societal level. Therefore, we need to observe carefully the growing
multilateral transitions of power to effect a historical approach to policy-making
analysis.
2.2.2 The Distribution of Power
While institutionalist and elitist explanations are the most powerful ones in Korea, I
also want to discuss the applicability of corporatist and pluralist approaches used to
explain Western democracies because these two approaches represent the
explanation of how policy may function in a democratic society. A main concern of
both perspectives is 'the distribution of power' because the shape of power
distribution influences the structure of policy-making.
A. Corporatist Approach
The great depression and the acceptance of the Keynesian critique of the self-
regulating capitalist economy provided the major stimulus towards intervention by
government and other institutional sectors. This caused state activity to increase.
The state consequently had to deal with a growing emphasis on economic regulation
and social policy (Cawson, 1978: 191). Those socio-economic transformations in
the capitalist state began to demand both integrative and regulatory roles for
government in order to establish regular and mutually supportive relationships
between private and public institutions as well as interest groups.
In academic debates of political ideology, pluralistic ideology began to lose
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its persuasiveness in the changed circumstances of capitalist society. The corporatist
approach was one of the most threatening challenges to pluralism. Since Schmitter
published his article Still the Century of Corporatism? in 1974, the corporatist
perspective has become a critical approach in explaining the interest-representation
system in modern socio-political contexts.1 Schmitter (1979) clearly defines
corporatism thus:
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in
which the constituent elements are organised into a limited number of
singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and
articulation of demands and support (p. 13).
Jacek (1986) also supports Schmitter's definition of corporatism by
emphasising the values of "cooperation over competition, hierarchy over horizontal
social structure, controlled change over spontaneity, socially responsible obligatory
behavior over calculations of rational self-interest, the intermingling of public and
private, and reciprocal influence between civil society and the state" (p.421). Wynia
(1990) argues that corporatism rejects the notion of open competition and the
principle of government neutrality in favour of a more deliberate effort to organise
and regulate public-private sector relations. In addition, he emphasises that
corporatism may involve a willing collaboration by interest groups with authorities
because they believe that it is for their benefit to work together rather than to
compete openly for influence. Such is the case in Scandinavia, where a mild form of
corporatism has grown from mutual interests in the management of economic and
social policy (p.43). Robinson (1991) tried to find a distinctive characteristic of
corporatist perspective from a directive role for the state. He insists that "the
corporatist state seeks to control policy according to the principles of unity, order,
nationalism, and success maximising efficacy in the attainment of collective national
goals" (p.2).
' Schmitter's corporatist approach is called neo-corporatism. The term of corporatism used in this
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In short, it can be said that if pluralism emphasises the competitive market
system of pressure group activity, corporatism concentrates on the system of state-
licensed monopoly. Schmitter labelled corporatism as two subtypes - state
corporatism and societal corporatism. State corporatism is authoritarian and anti-
liberal (Hill, 1997: 66). This type of corporatism tends to be associated with
political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central
bureaucratic power; elections are non-existent; party systems are dominated or
monopolised by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically
exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based
on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed (Schmitter, 1979: 22).
This perspective is often linked to the work of O'Donnell (1974), notably termed
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. It argues that the state, which holds a type of
authoritarian rule, is dominated by a strong coalition of high-level technocrats,
military leaders and upper bourgeoisie in relation to foreign capital.
On the other hand, in the societal system of corporatism, changes in the
institutions of capitalism - including concentration of ownership and competition
between national economies - triggered the development of corporatism. The need
to secure the right conditions for capital accumulation forced the state to intervene
more directly and to bargain with political associations. Thus, emerging societal
corporatism came to replace pluralism as the predominant form of interest
representation (Hill, 1997: 66).
Many corporatist theorists have used this theoretical perspective to
understand the state intervention in a macroeconomic context. The initial usage of
'neo-corporatism' was largely confined to studies on macroeconomic policy
coordination between the state, business and labour.2 It focused on the specific
structural characteristics of organised interests and their ability to participate in the
study mainly means neo-corporatism.
2 With regard to the macroeconomic policy context, in particular state-labour relations, in the
corporatist approach, Collier and Collier (1979) pointed out that 'inducements' and 'constraints' may
ultimately lead to state penetration and domination of labour organisations (p.970). The term of
'inducements', according to Collier and Collier, focuses on provisions regarding registration, right of
combination, monopoly of representation, compulsory membership, and subsidy of unions.
'Constraints' includes provisions regulating collective bargaining and strikes, other controls on
demand-making, controls on leadership, and provisions for state monitoring and intervention in
internal union affairs (Collier & Collier, 1979: 971).
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formulation and implementation of public policy, stressing the regime
'governability' of countries that engage in 'tripartite' negotiations and suggesting
that corporatist policy networks have been able to adjust to the turmoil of the 1970s
international environment without resorting to deflation and mass unemployment
(Young, 1990: 73).
Crepaz (1992) points out two major outcomes of corporatist arrangements:
first, corporatism is expected to provide desired macroeconomic outcomes3; and
second, corporatism should achieve social harmony (p. 143). Panitch (1979) also
claims that "the major value of corporatism is social harmony" (p.l 19). In relation
to corporatist approaches to macroeconomic policy, they agree that economic
growth is the condition of maintaining social harmony. Economic growth may
contribute to social solidarity between labour and capital. Magagna (1988) indicates
a similar point that "the ultimate goal [of corporatism] is to maximize economic
growth and productivity...The essence of corporatism, therefore, is a politics of
representative efficiency" (p.429).
In corporatist countries, as Lehmbruch (1979) emphasises, a policy decision
will be dependent upon processes of'consensus-building' within the political system
(p. 170). However, as long as the consensus-building largely takes place at the level
of the top elite, even in the interest associations, it would be difficult to fully expect
independence and freedom in decision-making. It is probably a weakness common
to both corporatist and pluralist approaches.
In general, this theoretical perspective is an effective tool in interpreting
macro-economic policy-making, as especially being witnessed in western European
countries. In the same manner, the case of Korea is not exceptional. In the
beginning of economic development under the military authoritarian regime, co-
optation between entrepreneurs and government was an essential part of creating
rapid economic growth. According to very recent observation, a different type of
co-optation has been found in economic policy-making by comparison to the earlier
period. Following the economic crisis in 1997, the government has expanded its
3 The very nature of the Austrian social partnership is one of stability, and of equilibrium between
the functional groups. Social partnership is not a means to redistribute dramatically societal wealth or
to revolutionise society. It is a means to prevent violent struggles between labour and business
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political partnerships in order to strengthen its political relationship with social
forces to obtain mutual agreements for emergency agenda-setting in economic and
social policy. Consequently, the tripartite system involving the government,
entrepreneurs and labour has appeared as an emergency measure at a critical
moment.
Regarding the policy process of the NHI scheme, a similar corporatist
approach can be applied. For the initiation of the NHI scheme, the military
government desperately needed co-operation with entrepreneurs and the medical
profession to successfully carry out the health care programme. During the
economic crisis, the new government decisively undertook reform of the NHI
scheme. To do this, the government brought together various other lobbies, interest
and campaign groups and prompted a new negotiation with professional groups.
In the different periods of Korean health care policy, it can be argued that
different shapes of corporatism obtain over the evolution of the NHI scheme. It is
not obvious whether the two divisions of the corporatist perspective, societal and
state corporatism, are separately applicable to the analysis of the policy process.
Resolving this issue requires observation of the relationship between government
and involved parties outside government so as to examine how and why certain
collaborations occur throughout the policy process.
B. Pluralist Approach
Beginning from the twentieth century, classical theories of democracy have been
threatened with increasing complexity in society and the advent of the 'mass
society.' Public demands from citizens in various classes and from the different
interests of diverse groups has forced classical democracy to adopt to deal with the
new political atmosphere. Pluralism has become an alternative ideology suited to
the new political environment, by combining the ideal of democracy and the reality
of a mass-society.
Miller (1983) argues that pluralist theory identifies certain patterns of
political preferences as promoting the 'stability' of democratic systems and others as
threatening to such stability (p.734). Pluralism was developed to explain how
(Crepaz, 1992: 143-144).
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democracy could still work in a society in which representation is indirect and
pressure groups are actively involved (Hill, 1997: 28). Ultimately, this theoretical
approach recognises the existence of diversity in social, institutional and ideological
practices, and values which a modern society possesses (Dunleavy & O'Leary,
1987: 13). Pluralists view this diversity as a necessary and positive dimension of
social and political life, as Schwarzmantel points out (Schwarzmantel, 1994: 50).
On the other hand, Schmitter (1979) explains pluralism as a system of
intermediation between government and interest groups :
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in
which the constituent units are organised into an unspecified number
of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and
self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are
not specially licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or otherwise
controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state
and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity
within their respective categories (p. 15).
As Schmitter defines it, pluralist theory supposes that the state does not
exercise a monopoly of representational activity. In other words, pluralism
emphasises the fair distribution of power in the political arena.4 On the basis of this
assumption, pluralist theorists argue that in modern society, power is extensively
distributed. And public demands and opinions are able to influence the policy
process. Therefore, pluralist theorists have claimed that public policy is a by¬
product of the outcome of competition between individuals and between interest
groups (Parsons, 1995: 134).
Pluralism emphasises some critical points, as explained below:
First, the activities of 'interest groups and pressure groups' are key features
in the pluralist approach. This is because the political activities of pressure groups
can affect the policy agenda at the stage of implementation, and pressure groups also
influence the outcome of elections (Ham & Hill, 1984: 26-27). Pluralists stress the
4
According to the origin of the pluralism, institutional pluralism was strongly demanded in order to
avoid the state of absolute power derived from a period of sovereignty and tyranny. It emphasises the
separation of powers and federalism (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 14).
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importance of political competition and elections in polyarchies (Dunleavy &
O'Leary, 1987: 26; Drucker et al., 1986). These pressure groups are likely to have
influenced the policy process at any stage such as in negotiating legislation,
establishing links to influence the implementation process, monitoring policy
results, and so forth (Hill, 1997). And, according to the pluralist perspective, the
actions ofpoliticians and their beliefs are seen as constrained by a wide adherence to
the [democratic] creed that exists throughout the community (Debnam, 1975: 890;
Dahl, 1961: 325).
Second, 'power structure' is also a key factor for pluralism (Hill, 1997). As
power influences the formation of relationships between political actors in a society,
the balance of power distribution is a crucial issue within the pluralist argument.
Lastly, pluralist theorists suppose that decision-making in public policy is largely
determined by the set of preferences of the different members of society. Miller
(1983) states that a variant of pluralist theory is associated with patterns of group
affiliation: conflict in society reflects patterns of political preferences; and in turn
these preference patterns are related to the stability of the political system (p.735).
Thus, variations in democracy across countries can be accounted for by political
references to 'political culture' and the preferences of a country's population.
However, the pluralist approach has difficulty in explaining more
sophisticated socio-political phenomena that challenge modern society (Kim, 1994).
Firstly, pluralists emphasise that power is widely and unconcentratedly distributed
among different groups and individuals within a society. However, power is not
equally distributed and power tends to concentrate in modern society. In particular,
power is centred on a small number of political elites who dominate interest groups.
Thus, power is eventually concentrated in the hands of an elite or a number of elites
within a ruling class (Hill, 1997; Ham & Hill, 1984: 30-31; Cawson, 1978). In other
words, counter-valency does not operate. Some groups are very much more
powerful than others. Some interests go virtually unrepresented (Harrison, 1980:
69). Governmental departments and their personnel are actually aware of the power
of key individuals and combinations of citizens' groups in the policy-making realm,
and they are loathe to act before consulting and "clearing" with these particular
interests (Hunter, 1953: 102).
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Secondly, according to pluralist theory, everyone who is interested in
pressure groups can participate in the pressure activity and influence their interests
on political decision processes. However, only a small number of people actually
join pressure groups, thereby, their interests can be easily excluded from the policy
decision-making process by a power elite (Schattschneider, 1960: 34-35).5
Thirdly, in pluralism, key issues in the policy process are decided by a
competition among interest groups where the government performs its role as an
intermediary. However, crucially, political issues are decided behind closed doors
in government (Parenti, 1970). Based on this notion, Bachrach and Baratz (1962)
claim that there is "an additional face to power," that a lot of politics occurs behind
the scenes, concealed from the public, because small groups of elites make political
decisions and control the policy agenda. In addition, they propose "the mobilisation
of bias" in policy-making, since many political decisions are established with bias in
favour of a certain elite group or organisation. They argue that those with power can
actually exclude issues and problems from the policy-making agenda in order to
control the agenda because they focus on 'safe issues' by manipulating the dominant
community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures (Bachrach &
Baratz, 1962: 105).
Fourthly, pluralists believe that the political and economic sectors are
separate in the policy process. Therefore, they indicate that 'equal access of power'
to various sectors is available within pluralistic ideology. But Marxists deny this
point. Marxists stress that the bourgeoisie dominates capitalistic society. In their
view, policy in society is not a product of competition among interest groups, but of
the interests of the ruling class in capitalist society. The so-called "bourgeoisie"
dominates the policy process (Hill, 1997: 46-47).
Finally, the pluralist approach asserts that policy is always decided within the
structure of the government although there is some allowance made for receiving
input from the private sector. For example, government agencies and business
sectors may seek a political bargain. As economic issues are very important in the
policy process, both government agencies and business sectors need to co-operate
5
According to Schattschneider (1960), approximately 90% of the people cannot get into the pressure
system (p. 35).
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and negotiate to achieve their aims. In this regard, it is safe to state that policy
decisions can be made outside government through political bargains with any
interest group (Hill, 1997; Cawson, 1978).
As we face the fundamental problems underlined above with regard to actual
decision-making, we can question whether policy decisions are made by majority
decisions through the fair distribution and competition of power within the political
realm of highly democratic regimes. As pluralists insist, public policy should be a
by-product through equal competition based on the fair power distribution in a
policy market. Despite the scepticism that the pluralist theory engenders, it is still
worth the challenge of implementation by new democracies such as Korea.
When we discuss the course of policy-making in Korea, in general, the
pluralist approach also arouses scepticism. Under its unique political surroundings,
as discussed with regard to the elitist perspective, the top-down nature has prevailed
in the authoritarian bureaucracy in government as well as in the paternalistic
tradition of Korean society. This style of strong elitism existed in the bureaucracy
built on the political principles of 'subordination, submission and passiveness' (Han,
1999: 198). Subsequently, these bureaucratic features have contributed to produce a
monolithic power structure in policy-making.
After the military coup of 1961, access by interest groups to the policy¬
making arena was closed by the ruling authority. Thus, any political challenge
against those with power was disallowed. Therefore, the state failed to act as the
neutral arbiter in social policy-making as pluralist theorists have suggested.
Through democratisation, political power has become greatly decentralised in
Korean society, and the accessibility of actors to the policy process has significantly
increased. This phenomenon persuades us that there has always been distribution of
power in society at some level. However, there is still some scepticism with regard
to the Korean policy-making system as it relates to the pluralist perspective.
In a political system headed by a president, such as that of Korea, the
fulcrum of power rests with the president and his associates. Thus, it would be
difficult for actors to expect a fair and equal access to the policy-making domain.
Even though Korea has become a politically democratic country, the policy-making
process is not free from its underlying concern. However, scepticism towards the
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pluralist perspective will challenge the study of the applicability of pluralism to the
policy-making process of the NHI scheme in Korea.
II. Framework for Analysing Policy-Making Process of the
NHI Scheme in Korea
Examining the policy process of a certain policy agenda requires consideration of a
series of political dialogues in organised contexts in which there are established
norms, values, relationships, power structures and 'standard operating procedures'
(Hill, 1997: 86). Thus, it is important to understand how institutions constrain
decision making inside or outside government and how institutions shape and
determine decisions through formal or informal constitutional arrangements. This
research considers the evolution of the NHI scheme over a long period, examining
policy decisions and how they are the outcome of political conflicts over time.
The history of the policy-making process of the NHI scheme is divided into
four stages by chronological approaches: 'Stage one' gives an introduction of the
initial steps in building a national health care policy under Park's military regime.
At this stage, the authoritarian-military government is the only actor designing social
policy. This stage covers the 1960s and 1970s. 'Stage two' considers the initial
reform movement and conflicts within the government under the Chun regime.
Politicians and professionals become involved in the policy process, although their
number was limited. This stage concerns the time period from 1980 to 1983. 'Stage
three' illustrates a wider development of the reform movement in political
institutions and in civil society under the democratising process. This stage covers
from 1986 to 1996. Finally, 'Stage four' considers NHI reform under national
economic crisis. At this stage, new participants from wider sectors in society join in
policy-making as part of the effort to resolve socio-economic problems. At the same
time, radical reform becomes a pivot of crucial political matter. This stage examines
the period from 1997 to 2000.
Although the Korean constitution was changed in detail several times in the
period under study, the government has always been run by an elected executive
president similar to that of the United States. But there is no elected vice-president.
Instead, the president nominates a prime minister as an assistant and a co-ordinator
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between the president and the government. They serve as chairman and vice-
chairman respectively of the cabinet council. The National Assembly has to approve
the nominee before the prime minister can take up office and has occasionally
refused to do so.
Until the 13th general election of 1988, it was not possible for the opposition
to organise political power freely because of the authoritarian nature of the ruling
regimes which made certain that it held enough seats in parliament to quash any and
all opposing points of view. Neither was it easy for opposing members of
parliament to stand against the government policy because dissent was not well
tolerated by the leadership in the ruling, political party.
In Korea, there are two ways of accessing the legislative process. First, a bill
can be proposed by members of the executive branch of the government. In this
case, a governmental department will create the bill and bring it to the cabinet
council. After a deliberative process in the cabinet council, the bill can be proposed
to the National Assembly in the president's name. If the bill is approved by the
president, the prime minister, and the other council members, it is a so-called
"government" proposal.
Secondly, the National Assembly members can also draft and propose a bill.
When this happens, the bill is known as a "parliamentary" proposal. Either way, the
proposed bill should be deliberated in the National Assembly at a last stage of the
legislative process.
If the president is interested in a certain project, the matter can be referred to
a relevant government agency to be proposed as a bill by the Presidential Secretariat
Office. Once the bill is sanctioned to be proposed in the cabinet council, it needs to
be examined in the National Assembly through a deliberative process.
When the National Assembly was unable to act as an effective legislature,
most of the legislation that was proposed by the government - including those
specifically introduced from the president - was enacted easily. With the
democratisation of the country, however, the National Assembly has gradually
become an effective legislature. It has shown itself able to create and propose its
own bills that represent its own ideas as well as resisting the ideas of an exclusive
executive in government.
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Each stage emphasises how the activities of actors, in particular political
elites, political institutions, classes and interest groups, have been embedded in the
policy-making domain over the period of forty years. As we see in Figure 2, the
government was the only actor in policy-making at the initial stage. However, the
participants in the policy-making arena have gradually increased. Eventually, the
participation has been recently broadened to include other interest groups.
Subsequently, two groups - the reformist group and anti-reformist group - have
become clearly organised, and they have continued to have an input into the policy
process. In order to understand the history of the NHI scheme, theoretical
perspectives introduced in the preceding sections are tested for validity, and for
whether each approach explains well the phenomena of policy-making. However,
no single theoretical approach can entirely explain one nation's policy-making
process independently and the approaches do not have equal explanatory
significance. Nevertheless, the differing theoretical perspectives are not mutually
exclusive in accounting for different stages of the policy-making process.
Regarding the policy-making process during the first and second stages,
institutionalist and elitist approaches are useful explanatory tools. A strongly
confined institutional arena and a restricted number of participants were the only
elements in the policy process. The narrow scope of policy participation was
especially evident in the first stage, and it became wider at the second stage. But
participation was allowed only to a certain elite group, such as a limited number of
politicians and academics.
At the third stage, the scope of policy participation was opened widely
alongside the democratising process in the country, so that the involvement of
various interests groups increased in the political arena. Based on the effect of the
democratic movement, the pluralist approach can be tested on the transformation of
the policy-making style in the country because pluralists are concerned with the
(equal) power distribution in a democratic policy-process. The formation of policy¬
making process developed with respect to the economic crisis at the fourth stage. To
overcome the national emergency, the government adopted a corporatist approach to
deal with socio-economic issues in the policy-process. Thus, the corporatist
perspective would be a better tool in explaining this particular stage.
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Concerning the policy development of the NHI scheme in Korea, we need to
investigate three points through the observation of these developmental stages. The
relationship between industrialisation and welfare development would be studied in
the Korean case, and whether the success of economic growth has influenced the
development of the medical insurance programme in Korea. Second, it is important
to find out to what extent the development of the health care programme is a product
of the working class conflicts against government and employers as well as a means
of a regime's legitimisation for its political security, as Marxists claim. Finally, the
development of citizenship in Korean society becomes a crucial element in
scrutinising the health care policy process. As the democratisation of the country
significantly contributed to improving citizenship, it would be a necessary attempt to
link citizenship with the development of the NHI scheme.
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Conclusion
In this study, the Western-born-theoretical approaches are tested as to whether they
are applicable to explain the development of the Korean NHI scheme. The
theoretical perspectives are applied to two aspects: welfare state development and
social policy-making. Power is a key factor in analysing this case study because the
pattern of distribution of power formulated by the transformation of power resources
influences the shape of these two aspects.
In particular, the theoretical approaches used to explain Western democracies
are adopted to examine the policy-making process of the NHI scheme. It is a
valuable challenge to discover a broader scope of policy process associated with the
democratisation of the country. The theoretical approaches are applied to four
developmental stages of the Korean medical insurance. The four stages are
demonstrated by chronological approaches, and also describe how the range of
actors embedded in the policy-making process has been widened during the periods.
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Chapter 3. Building a Health Security System in
korea (1961-1979)
This chapter focuses on the initial stages of the introduction of social security under
the authoritarian military regime of the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, it considers
the foundation of national health care policy. To a certain extent this chapter
examines the motivations of the military government in introducing a medical
insurance programme and how executives and policy makers in government were
involved in building health care policy.
Following the end of the Korean War, the country experienced political and
economic unrest, as well as military and ideological tension between North and
South. The leaders of the First and Second Republics failed to demonstrate the
strong leadership necessary to overcome economic hardship and also to entrench a
democratic state. Social and economic conditions thus worsened. It was in these
desperate circumstances that Korea experienced a military coup d'etat led by
General Park Chung Hee on May 16 1961.
The military junta began to push for economic development under the slogan
of 'liberation from poverty.' However, the military leadership installed by the coup
struggled to generate sufficient support from broader society at the beginning of its
rule. Thus, it was necessary for the junta to acquire legitimacy, which it did by
bringing social security into its political agenda.
Following the success of the military coup, Park Chung Hee was elected as
president in the presidential election on October 15 1963. Accordingly, a general
election was held in November 1963 and the Democratic Republican Party (DRP)
became the ruling party. As a result, the Third Republic was born on December 17
1963. In an authoritarian, and bureaucratic atmosphere, the policy-making process
was constrained. This kind of lock-out style dominated all policy-making processes
within the Korean bureaucracy during this period.
Before introducing the main part of the chapter, it should be noted that this
chapter relies especially on the evidence ofChoi and Sohn. Access to data about the
policy-making process during the military regimes was limited for the public
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because most of the policy-making was made behind closed doors. In particular, it
was more blocked in the Park regime during the 1960s and 1970s. Fortunately, Choi
Chun Song, former Head of the Social Security Committee (SSC), and Sohn Jun
Kyu, former Assistant Technical Expert of the SSC, left valuable accounts (books)
regarding the policy-making process of the social security system in the 1960s and
1970s, after they retired from the position [Choi (1991); Sohn (1981)].
I. Initial Steps in Social Security Policy-Making
3.1 Political and Economic Backgrounds
After the coup led by General Park Chung Hee, the military junta promulgated the
Law ofExtraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction on June 6 1961, which
in effect superseded the Constitution of the Second Republic by granting
extraordinary powers to the junta. With the establishment of this emergency law,
the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction was instituted as a temporary
ruling body. The members of the Supreme Council were generals and colonels in
the military, particularly from the Army and Marines. The Supreme Council was
granted supreme decision-making authority and was able to exert absolute political
power over the legislative and executive authorities from 1961 to 1963, until the
presidential election in 1963, when General Park became president. The Park-led
military junta proclaimed its five fundamental principles of the military revolution
(Park, 1970a: 59-60): 'anti-Communism,' 'overcoming international isolation,'
'national democracy,' 'independent national economy,' and 'national unification.'
These five principles shaped socio-economic policy in the Third Republic.
Based on these political pledges of the junta, the Supreme Council was
determined to establish 'economic growth' as the primary policy agenda, in order to
keep the manifesto of the military revolution, which was liberation from poverty.
This political intention of General Park Chung Hee was revealed clearly through his
speech right after the successful Military Revolution. He announced (Park, 1970b):
I cannot think of anything else that would make me more miserable
than to be hungry. Priority one of my duties at this moment is to
drive poverty away from this chronically poor country, and I believe
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this is the only way to win the struggle against Communism (p. vii).
In pursuit of this, the Supreme Council designed the First Five-Year
Economic Development Plan (1962-1966). The economic development plan was
successful; economic indicators afterward showed rapid growth.
3.2 Initial Interest of Health Care Inside Government
From October 1959 onwards, the Research Seminar for Adopting a Health
Insurance Scheme was held every Thursday, voluntarily organised by the Medical
Policy Bureau in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA). This seminar
was designed to promote an interest in a social security system for officials in the
MoHSA and, further, to form the machinery for establishing a social security system
in the near future. Eight members joined the meeting, including civil servants and
consultants from the MoHSA. Three were high-ranking civil servants in the
ministry; the rest were non-regular staff in the ministry.1 Based on discussions in the
seminar, from 1959, the Medical Policy Bureau and the Labour Affairs Bureau had
considered a medical insurance scheme, and unemployment as well as industrial
accident insurance schemes respectively. In addition, a public assistance scheme
was considered by the Social Affairs Bureau of the Ministry (Sohn, 1981:19-20).
Yang Jae Mo and Um Jang Hyun were appointed to the Medical Policy
Bureau as consultants, and they and Sohn Chang Dal, an existing non-regular staff
member in the bureau, were involved in the study of medical insurance. They asked
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to collect references and data about foreign social
security systems through Korean embassies abroad. In particular, the research team
obtained a number of data from the United States, British and Philippine embassies
in Korea (Sohn, 1981: 19-20).
Most of the non-regular staff in the seminar group were health care experts.
' The participants in the seminar were: Youn You Sun (Head of the Medical Policy Bureau), Youn
Suk Woo (Director of Facility Division in the Medical Policy Bureau), Kim Yong Sung (Director of
Medical Affairs Division in the Medical Policy Bureau), Sohn Chang Dal (high-ranking non-regular
staff of the Medical Affairs Division), Kim Tak II (Technical Assistant of the Medical Affairs
Division), Chung Kyoung Kyun (non-regular staff of the Medical Affairs Division), Yang Jae Mo
(Consultant of the Medical Policy Bureau) and Um Jung Dal (Consultant of the Medical Policy
Bureau).
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Um Jang Hyun and Yang Jae Mo were Professors in Schools of Public Health at
Seoul National University and at Yonsei University respectively. Moreover, Sohn
Chang Dal had experience in operating a health care programme. In 1955, he had
established and managed 'Busan Labour Hospital,' which was run by a managerial
style of insurance-funding society to provide good quality medical treatment for
workers. As a result of this experience, he joined the MoHSA as a high-ranking but
non-regular officer in 1959 and conceived his long-time wish to carry out a health
care programme as part of social security policy (Choi, 1991:17). Chung Kyoung
Kyun was also a health expert, who later worked as a professor in the School of
Public Health at Seoul National University.
All eight participants in the seminar group had been directly involved in the
area of health care. Although they were not social policy experts, generally
speaking, they possessed valuable knowledge about health care and were interested
in developing health care provision. The weekly seminar provided an opportunity
for staff in the MoHSA to discuss their own interests regarding health care issues.
However, ideas for health care provision collected by seminar members were not
developed enough to be applied to actual policy-making during the period.
Nonetheless, the members' research created opportunities for future
development of social policy study within government. According to Sohn (1981),
Urn's report, Opinions and Report about Problems related to Adopting a Medical
Insurance Scheme, contributed especially to developing the framework of a Medical
Insurance scheme in 1977. Throughout the report, he emphasised that (p.21):
• Most citizens do not have sufficient financial capability for a medical insurance
programme at the current Gross National Product (GNP) level of 1959. Because
it is impossible for the government to carry out a programme to cover the entire
population under the present economic conditions and living standards, a limited
medical insurance scheme would be possible under the circumstances.
• In order to study sufficiently social security systems, a research body composed
ofprofessionals is necessary.3
2 Sohn Chang Dal contributed to making the regulations for the establishment of the Committee of
Social Security System; he joined this committee later in 1968 (Choi, 1991: 17).
3 This suggestion prompted the organisation of the Committee of Social Security System.
Ch.3 - Building a Health Security System in Korea 65
• The social insurance system should be the basis of the Korean social security
system. Public assistance and other welfare programmes should be
supplementary and simultaneously implemented.
• Existing programmes, such as occupational mutual benefit society systems,
which possess the characteristics of a social security system, are fragmented, as
they are currently carried out separately by each enterprise, and should be
unified.
When the military junta took over the governing power after the May 16
military revolution, the junta created many social welfare relevant ordinances4 in
accordance with the suggestions of these technical experts. Even though the
intention of the military junta with these ordinances was achieving legitimacy for the
military coup d'etat,5 those ordinances were the basis of future social policy
development in the country.
Although Western medicine and the Westernised structure of health care
were successfully adopted, concern by the government regarding public health care
for the needy was not specifically addressed in legislation until the beginning of the
1960s. In 1961, the Korean government legislated for the Livelihood Protection
Act6 which was mainly adopted from the Japanese Livelihood Protection Act and the
term 'medical aid' was classified under the Act as assisting people with low income
and those who are unable to pay for medical care (Shin, 1990; MoHSA, 1994).
However, since the legislative details about medical aid were not clarified in the law
at the time, the implementation of medical aid was not sufficiently supported by the
4 Those ordinances are ® Civil servant pension law (announced on January 1 1960); © Civil servant
industrial accident compensation regulation (announced on November 22 1961); © Labour standard
law (announced on May 10 1953; revised on December 4 1961); © Vocational stability law
(announced on December 6 1961); © Child welfare law (announced on December 30 1961); ©
Livelihood protection law (announced on December 30 1961); © Patriots and veterans relief
compensation law (announced on November 1 1961); and ® Ruined behaviour protection law
(announced on November 9 1961).
5 For more information about legitimisation in the welfare system of Korea, see Kwon's DPhil thesis
(University ofOxford, 1995) for, The Welfare State in Korea: the Politics ofLegitimation.
6 The Livelihood Protection Act was passed as one of the public assistance schemes in December
1961. In the legislation, the Act identified four categories of assistance: 'livelihood aid,' 'medical
aid,' 'maternity aid' and 'funeral aid.' In 1982, the Act was amended and 'self-support aid' and
'educational aid' were added (Doosan Encyber, 2002; MoHSA 1994).
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legislation. Based on the Livelihood Protection Act of 1961, the provision of
medical aid, under this inadequate legal document, was mainly carried out by public
health centres and state or public hospitals, which eventually faced managerial
difficulties due to poor economic conditions, and a lack of medical manpower and
facilities (Doosan Encyber, 2002). Medical aid was not stipulated in enforcement
regulations until 1977, when the Medical AidAct was legislated as one of the public
assistance programmes along with the Medical Insurance Act.
3.3 The First Public Health Research
From 1960, the population structure of Korea was, markedly, both of a low birth rate
and declining mortality. Thus, the income security of the elderly became a potential
social problem. As in other countries, (fast) industrialisation created pressures for
social protection programmes such as unemployment insurance and industrial
accident insurance. Alongside these developments, public health research was
undertaken for the first time in modern Korean history, accessing the health and
medical treatments of a thousand householders living in the Seoul area between
October and November 1962. According to this research, monthly average medical
expenditure per person was 66.7 Won7, and monthly average medical expenditure
per house was 364.5 Won; the monthly average income of the labour household in
the urban area was 6,680 Won (1963 values). Also, the research found that two
thirds of the interviewees lived with at least one sick family member, and only
67.2% among the sick family members obtained medical treatment. However, as
80% of the treated family members received treatment by using a pharmacy, the
research showed that most patients received low quality medical treatment and had
difficulty accessing medical institutions (see Table 3-l)(Choi, 1991: 60-61).
As illustrated above, in comparison to the speed of economic development
and structural changes in society, the quality of life lagged behind. It was a
significant concern for the junta how to improve matters compatible to the economic
development because it was important to show a new-strong leadership towards
citizens, and to show that the new government intended to take some political
7 Won refers to the unit of Korean currency.
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measures to improve the quality of life for fellow citizens in the country as the
military junta had promised.









27.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 56.1 8.1 2.6 100
Source: Applied from Choi (1991) The History ofSocial Security Research in Korea, p. 61
3.4 Committee of Social Security System
Just after the May 16 revolution, the military junta delivered a public pledge of an
'urgent solution for national poverty,' demonstrating a continued interest in social
security. In 1962, the Supreme Council announced that "equal provision of
medicine, improvement of the quality of living standards and social welfare will be
achieved on the basis of public assistance and a social insurance system." The
following year, the Supreme Council stated that the "causes of social instability such
as poverty, diseases and overpopulation will be eliminated by establishing a social
security system" and also that "the welfare state will be built alongside achieving
social justice" (Sohn, 1981: 28-29).
Sohn (1981) emphases that the main reason why the Supreme Council
became interested in social security was the consistent efforts of the social security
advisory staffs of the MoHSA and the Supreme Council. Through formal and
informal networks, they tried to communicate with the executives of the Supreme
Council, who themselves did not have sufficient knowledge of and interest in social
welfare, to stress the importance of a social security system. In 1961, when Chung
Hee Sup was appointed as the new Minister of Health and Social Affairs, he was
strongly persuaded of the important role of social welfare for the country by these
advisory staffs. This effort by the advisory staffs to persuade a direct policy-maker
influenced Sohn Chang Kyu and Kim Yong Soon, Chiefs of the Education and
o
Social Affairs Committee of the Supreme Council, as well as Hong Jong Chul, a
8 The Education and Social Affairs Committee of the Supreme Council took charge of the ministerial
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member of the committee. As they were key participants in the military coup, they
possessed strong political power in the Supreme Council. As a result, many
executive members became interested in a social security system and further,
consultancy staff could at any time enter and leave the Supreme Council when
access was usually very restricted (p.29).
On March 20 1962, the Regulation for the Committee of the Social Security
System was set up through the consistent efforts of researchers and consultants to
establish an official basis for working on a national social security system in the
government. With support from several powerful executives in the Supreme
Council, a regulation for establishing the Committee of the Social Security System
was passed by the junta. Accordingly, the Committee of the Social Security System
(CoSSS) and the Social Security Research Team were organised by the official
regulation. The research team officially focused on four research areas:
'comprehensive social security,' 'industrial accident insurance,' 'medical insurance,'
and 'public assistance and social welfare' (Choi, 1991: 29-33). The committee was
composed of technical experts, assistant technical experts and consulting members.
For the consulting members, high-ranking civil servants from the MoHSA and
academic representatives were appointed.
3.5 Order of the Chairman of the Supreme Council and the
Legal Framework of the Social Security System
The establishment of the CoSSS allowed the members to focus on the study of social
security systems with the official support of the junta. On July 28 1962, technical
experts of the committee received the surprising news that Park Chung Hee, the
chairman of the Supreme Council, issued an order of memorandum to the cabinet
stating, "Do establish a social security system." This memorandum was sent to the
Minister of Health and Social Affairs via the cabinet council of the Supreme
Council. This memorandum order can be summarised as follows (Sohn, 1981: 36):
• It is our ultimate goal to build a welfare state as soon as possible through
increasing national wealth and protecting citizens from life risks such as
unemployment, diseases and so forth.
activities of education and social affairs.
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• Although public assistance programmes have been providing services for people
in need under the livelihood protection law, permanent social security schemes
to protect citizens' lives should be driven forward in a manner compatible with
national economic development plans, involving citizens, employers and the
government.
• Among social insurance programmes, a suitable programme should be chosen
(in consideration of the current socio-economic circumstances) through a pilot
programme.
In fact, Kim Yong Kyun, Chair of Education and Social Affairs Committee
in the Supreme Council, and Hong Jong Chul9, a member of the committee, were
especially interested in the implementation of social security systems. They often
discussed the matter with technical experts in the CoSSS and the Supreme Council.
Eventually, this concern with social security issues was directly delivered to the
chairman of the Supreme Council by the efforts of a few of its top executives. As a
result, the chairman ordered the memorandum which was designed by Woo Ki Do
and Oh Jung Keun, technical experts of the Education and Social Affairs
Committee, and Sohn Chang Dal, a technical expert from the MoHSA, according to
Sohn (1981: 36-37).
However, Sohn's explanation is rather limited to the effort of the CoSSS and
the relationship between the members of the Supreme Council and the technical
experts of the CoSSS. Regarding this point, we need to consider another aspect.
Firstly, the leader and the junta might have chosen 'social security' as propaganda to
secure their political legitimacy for the military coup. As the public sentiment was
not yet convinced by the military leadership, the junta still needed to draw public
support by exposing the fresh policy agenda, in particular, prior to the presidential
election of 1963. Secondly, at the same time, prior to implementing the most
important (economic) policy project of the junta - the First Five-Year Economic
9
According to Choi (1991), Hong had been very interested in social security systems and frequently
visited the research office of the CoSSS to encourage research team members. One day, when he
returned from a business trip, he brought two books about social security from Japan and donated
those books to the research team. In addition, he often stressed to team members the importance of
establishing a social security scheme which could "cover the entire population rather than a
particularly selected group of the population" (p. 24).
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Plan - the leader might have been reflecting his personal intention to develop social
security simultaneously along with the economic development. Because Park
Chung Hee possessed a strong will to liberalise people from severe poverty through
the military revolution, the success of economic growth and social development
meant for him promising his manifesto of the military coup.
The order of Chairman Park encouraged the CoSSS members to design the
foundation of a national social security system. The members realised that a legal
basis was necessary to implement any social security scheme. In other words, a law
indicating and defining goals, concepts and programmes as well as a governing
institution was essential for the foundation of social welfare programmes. In the
process of developing this legal foundation, members of the CoSSS introduced a
draft of the law entitled the Law regarding Social Security, which was brought to the
107th Standing Committee Conference of the Supreme Council together with the
Industrial Accident Insurance Act on October 8 1963.
Before starting the deliberation process of the bills, Hong Jong Chul
described the welfare policy directions of the junta at a conference of the Supreme
Council and emphasised a few points using the implementation of social security
system (Sohn, 1981: 37):
• The slogan of 'building a social security system' had been contained in the
public pledge of the Supreme Council since the military revolution of 1961.
• The administrative policy in the junta's own Social Welfare Policy10 of January
5 1963 also includes a statement about a social security system.
• The memorandum order issued by Chairman Park on July 28 1963 contained
several concrete ideas regarding social security matters.
However, despite support from some cabinet executives, many crucial points
in the Law regarding Social Security were eliminated. In particular, eleven items in
the social security programmes11 originally addressed in the law were eliminated
10 The administrative policy contains the following five issues: ® the government would establish
medical insurance and industrial accident insurance schemes; © the relief policy for the poor and
unemployed would be launched; ® relief programmes would be brought forward; ® the housing
policy would be expanded; and © three basic labour rights (right to organise; right to bargain
collectively; right to act collectively) would be guaranteed (Sohn, 1981: 37).
11 The eleven items include allowances for medical services, holidays, unemployment, the aged,
industrial accident, family, delivery, tuberculosis, the bereaved, funeral and public assistance (Choi,
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during the deliberation process of the conference. This was because many executive
policy makers still worried that if those social security schemes were foreshadowed
in the law, there would be no excuse not to carry them out in the near future; i.e. it
was to avoid the responsibility of the government in dealing with welfare provisions.
Furthermore, the 107th Standing Committee downgraded the political status and the
role of the CoSSS. The chairman's position of the committee was moved from the
Minister of Health and Social Affairs to the Vice-Minister. The number of
committee members was also reduced from fifteen to eleven. Moreover, the name
of the committee was changed to the Social Security Committee (SSC). As a result,
the status of the CoSSS was diminished from an investigating institution to merely
an advisory body (Choi, 1991: 26-31).
In the policy process of the Law regarding Social Security, the first Korean
legislation regarding social welfare concerns, we can establish three critical points.
Firstly, the interest in social welfare of the political leaders in the Supreme Council
was low. Although the CoSSS created a frame in providing a legal basis for
pursuing social welfare policy, the primary concerns of the Supreme Council
executives were that the law would burden the junta with more political demands for
social welfare.
Secondly, despite a continuous stress on the 'welfare state' by the military
junta, the decision-making process regarding the law on social security in the
standing committee showed an important element in the policy direction of the
military government. The outcome drawn by the 107th Standing Committee
provided clear evidence of how policy structure and style were orchestrated by the
junta leadership as a means of consolidating the legitimacy of the regime. Although
the law was considered in the standing committee (on October 8 1963) prior to the
presidential election (scheduled for October 15 1963), substantial aspects were
deleted. The executives of the junta rushed to get the law passed within a week of
the presidential election without essential regulations. Hence, the law eventually
remained shallow legislation aiming at a short-term measure for political
legitimisation.
Thirdly, diminishing the status of the CoSSS made the policy capacity of the
1991:29-30).
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committee structurally marginalised in the policy process within the state hierarchy.
Sohn (1981) points out that the bureaucracy in the government often ignored
research results and suggestions produced by the CoSSS (p.31). As the members of
the CoSSS were non-regular staff in the government, hierarchical conflict with
regular staff had existed in the policy process ever since the CoSSS was established.
The Law regarding Social Security eventually contributed to fomenting a
dysfunctional bureaucratic environment between the regular staff and the CoSSS
members within the MoHSA. This situation lasted until the committee was
disbanded in 1983.
In sum, although the first legislation regarding social security matters in
modern Korean history was legislated under the support of several political
executives of the junta, social security legislation could not yet become a politically
fundamental concern of most policy makers under the political circumstances. It
was a concern of the junta leadership largely as a means of consolidating the
legitimacy of the regime. Nonetheless, the standing committee constructed the
initial foundations of social security and moreover, this foundation framed
subsequent (and indeed present) social policy in Korea.
II. The Birth of a Medical Insurance Scheme in Korea
3.6 The Birth of a Medical Insurance Scheme
As mentioned above, the technical experts in the government and the CoSSS had
already begun profound research collecting empirical and structural data with regard
to a health care programme. In spite of advanced studies of health care systems, the
industrial accident insurance scheme was legislated and fulfilled earlier than a
medical insurance scheme because the government intended to avoid financial
responsibility for social security programmes. Implementing the industrial accident
insurance scheme was relatively less costly for the government because employers
in the private sector had most of the financial responsibility for industrial
compensation programmes.
However, it was Hong Sung Chul, an executive council member of the
Supreme Council, who spurred the birth of medical insurance. He supported
building a comprehensive social security programme which could cover the entire
population. National pension and medical insurance programmes could be
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considered in the category of universal coverage.12 However, considering the
economic capability of the nation and the income level of the citizens at the time, a
national pension programme was rather infeasible (Sohn, 1981: 64). With respect to
the administrative expediency of the government, in addition, the implementation of
a medical insurance programme was ofmore importance than designing the plan for
a national pension scheme. It was felt that implementing a national health care
system would have been less expensive than financing a national pension
programme and that it would have been less complicated to set up the administrative
structure for the medical insurance scheme. It would have been a difficult task for
the government to build up the financial framework for the national pension
programme in such a short time. A national pension programme was, therefore, not
endorsed by the government.
The medical insurance research team of the CoSSS created an initial
• • • • 1 ^
blueprint of a national medical insurance law in 1962. Sohn (1981) insists that the
systems of foreign medical insurance were simply adapted to form the foundation of
the Korean medical insurance system. There was neither a profound critical filtering
of the texts of foreign systems nor any other measures to adapt them to the context
of the Korean socio-economic background (p.66). There were neither social policy
experts nor sufficient research regarding the comprehensive structure of medical
markets in the country. Therefore, the technical experts in the CoSSS had to rely
heavily on foreign secondary data.
The draft of the medical insurance law was written by Hong Chang Sup of
the research team. The draft was revised four times and then finally was accepted.
In order to get approval for the medical insurance bill from the Legislative Office,
Hong Chang Sup used informal connections. As a graduate of the College of Law at
Seoul National University, Hong asked graduates of his alma mater who worked in
the Legislative Office to deliver the bill to the National Assembly.
However, during the deliberation process of the bill, the clause indicating
'compulsory entrance to the scheme' was eliminated. Thereby, a major
characteristic of social insurance system, compulsory entrance, did not exist in the
12 For more details about the policy-making in the National Pension Scheme of Korea, see Kang's
Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1992), The Policy-Making Process of the National Pension
Scheme in Korea.
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final version of the legislation. This was because a legal consultant to the Supreme
Council was strongly opposed to compulsory entrance, based on the reasoning that it
was in contravention of the principle of freedom of contract embodied in the
constitution (Choi, 1987: 222). Furthermore, despite support from some executive
council members, the general tendency of the council cabinet was not in favour of
enacting the medical insurance scheme. According to Sohn (1981), what concerned
the council was as follows:
The primary assignment of the cabinet was solving national poverty.
However, if the compulsory entrance system was activated, the
private sectors and government would have felt huge financial
burdens because of the universal coverage of the scheme (p.69).
As economic growth was the most important agenda of the junta, the council cabinet
would not take any risks that might harm the economic plan because the outcome of
the economic plan would critically affect the credibility of the junta leadership.
Therefore, a voluntary entrance system, which was able to avoid placing financial
responsibilities on both private and government sectors, was preferred by the
majority of the council members at that time. Finally, a voluntary medical insurance
scheme was legislated as the first Medical Insurance Act on December 16 1963,14
but the law was not enforced after its legislation. Instead, voluntary-pilot schemes
were subsequently prepared in the junta for two years, and the first pilot scheme was
carried out by one of the state-run companies in November 1965 (Choi, 1991: 114-
115).
There is no evidence as to why the legislation was not implemented at the
time. However, it is an example of a phenomenon in Korean politics, so-called dead
legislation. The legislation has tended to remain unenforced for the following
reasons: ® detailed enforcement regulations were not ready; ® the political will of
top-executives in government was weak; ® surrounding socio-economic conditions
were not appropriate; © government executives failed to implement the law because
of the pressure from interest groups; and so on. This situation has usually occurred
without public recognition. It is thus one example representing the vertical and
13 Choi Chun Song, Kang Nam Hee and Hong Chang Sup were involved in the process.
14 It was the last day of the Supreme Council's legislating activity before the Third Republic.
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closed policy process style that existed in Korean politics.
Under the surrounding circumstances, it is clear that the interest and
participation of citizens in the medical insurance programme would have been low
under the voluntary regulation. This was because the public had insufficient
understanding and insufficient financing from national medical insurance. Under
those inadequate conditions for implementing medical insurance, the pilot scheme
did not even expand quickly to other sectors.15 Secondly, the junta did not have a
strong will to enforce the medical insurance law. In terms of the council cabinet's
view, since the First Five-Year Economic Plan was a top-priority in its interests, the
legislation for a medical insurance programme could never be a primary concern for
the junta.
In December 1966, in such a deadlock before the general election of 1967,
the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), the ruling party, presented a policy report,
the Long Term Out-Look of the Korean Economy (1967-1986). The report
emphasised the necessity of implementing social welfare programmes (Policy
Research Team of the DRP, 1966):
It is difficult to adopt all social security programmes which currently
operate in developed countries. But it is necessary to implement
social insurance systems such as medical insurance and
unemployment insurance programmes. Also, the range of livelihood
protection needs to be extended. These policies will be able to
contribute to the social stability of the country. Furthermore, this is
directly linked to economic stability as well as economic
development in the country. In order to succeed in this plan, a social
security tax needs to be established and social insurance funds also
need to be set up as a category in the national budget to raise
financial capability (pp.92-93).
Consequently, prior to the general election, the ruling party set up a public pledge
that the medical insurance scheme would be implemented. In order to demonstrate
the effort of the ruling party and the government, the legislation of the Medical
Insurance Act was revised with a mixture of voluntary and compulsory systems in
July 1970 under pressure from the public on the ruling party. In the [first] revised
15 Until 1976, the voluntary-pilot programme only covered 0.2% of the entire population of the
country (Moon, 1997: 94).
Ch.3 - Building a Health Security System in Korea 76
legislation in 1970, the compulsory entrance system applied only to employees, civil
servants and military servicemen. On the other hand, the voluntary entrance system
simultaneously applied to the self-employed (Sohn, 1981: 87).
However, the legislation was again not enforced. The exclusive executives
in the government and the ruling party did not have an actual intention to pursue
medical insurance. Therefore, such progress of the ruling party can be interpreted as
a political gesture to undermine public criticism over the stagnant implementation of
medical insurance before and after the general election.
3.7 The Yushin Regime and the Second Revision of the
Medical Insurance Act
As President Park introduced martial law, the so-called Yushin (Revitalising reform),
in November 1972, the regime turned to a more authoritarian style of political
leadership. With the introduction of the Yushin constitution, state power was
heavily concentrated in the hands of the president. Without restrictions on the term
of office and the participation of political parties, the president was to be elected by
the newly institutionalised National Conference for Unification. Furthermore, the
president was empowered to dissolve the National Assembly and to appoint one
third of the National Assemblymen as well as to appoint and fire judges. The
Yushin constitution provided the president with the power to take emergency
measures under a state of national emergency for national security.
After Yushin, the Park regime accelerated the formulation of social welfare
programmes. In November 1973, the National Welfare Pension Act was passed by
the National Assembly. Accordingly, the government increased demands for a
health care programme. For instance, in June 1975, the EPB announced that the
Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan would concentrate on developing the
areas of health, education and housing, and proposed the basic principles of health
care policy (Lee, 1989: 78-79):
• Hereafter, a comprehensive health care plan would be set up and carried out.
And as the private sector will be inducted into the health care sector, the
efficiency of health care investment will be raised.
• To minimise waste of medical facilities and manpower, the medical training
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system would be reviewed. In the meantime, the systemic structure of private
hospitals would be improved to maximise facilities and upgrade social functions.
• The administration system of the state and public hospitals would be
modernised. Furthermore, medical facilities specially caring for mental illness
and tuberculosis, with which the private sector avoids dealing, would be
developed.
• A pilot programme for developing the medical system in rural areas would be
carried out. Local public health centres would be upgraded to comprehensive
health care units.
• Preventive health policy would be consolidated to improve the living quality and
environments of rural areas.
• Regarding the above, pollution prevention programmes would be strengthened.
• To socialise medical fees, a system of insurance-funding societies and
occupational medical insurance programmes would be implemented. This
policy would contribute to the foundation of national medical insurance scheme
in the near future.
Although this announcement included many prospective ways of developing
health care policy, these measures of the EPB did not mean that the government
intended to pursue immediately a medical insurance programme. Until 1975, the
issue of implementing social welfare programmes was still not an important concern
of the bureaucrats in the government. For example, the MoFlSA sent Choi Soo II,
Head ofWelfare Pension Bureau in the MoHSA, to the United Kingdom for training
in Western social security systems for six months. When Choi returned from the
training, he recommended a general medical insurance scheme to Minister Ko Jae
Pil but the minister turned down the idea. Meanwhile, Minister Ko addressed his
thoughts regarding the implementation of a medical insurance scheme in the plenary
session of the National Assembly in July 1975: " the medical insurance scheme may
be able to start after completing the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development
Plan." Four months later, the minister reconfirmed his negative views with regard to
implementing a medical insurance scheme: the decision of whether or not one
should be introduced would be settled depending on the result of the pilot
programme, as many developed countries had experienced failure in implementing
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such schemes (Research Institute of Public Administration, 1989: 55).
This statement of Minister Ko implied that he did not have any intention at
all of carrying out a medical insurance scheme. Because the medical insurance-pilot
programme had been in place for almost a decade, since 1965, the outcome of the
pilot programme was sufficiently well-known at the governmental level. Thus, the
minister was merely trying to make excuses. We can therefore raise the question of
why Minister Ko held a negative view of medical insurance programmes. This
question will be answered later in the chapter.
Thus, the executive cabinet members of the government did not have either
any strong intention or any interest in enacting a medical insurance scheme until the
end of 1975. In turn, the matter of implementing a medical insurance scheme did
not yet occupy the political arena as a primary concern.
However, following Shin Hyun Hwak's16 appointment as Minister of Health
and Social Affairs in December 1975, the political agenda of the government rapidly
became more positive towards implementing a medical insurance scheme. President
Park asked Kim Jung Ryum, Chief Secretariat of the Presidential Secretariat Office,
to take care to nominate a good candidate for the Minister of Health and Social
Affairs. And as soon as Shin was appointed, the president gave an order directly to
the minister to design a medical insurance programme. The president especially
asked Minister Shin to create an appropriate health care programme for the country
which would be compatible with the development of economic growth and the
strengthening of national military power (Kim, 1995: 309). It was just after New
Year's day of 1976 that the president started to spell out the implication of enacting
a health care programme. On January 15 1976, President Park addressed his
political agenda through a New Year's press conference (Newspaper of the KMA,
January 19 1979):
The key point of the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan
will be focused on social development. Simultaneously, a national
medical insurance scheme will be established and implemented from
next year so that the entire population will be able to receive medical
16 Minister Shin was an economic expert. He worked as a high-ranking civil servant in the Ministry
ofCommerce and Industry, and was appointed as the Minister of State Reconstruction in 1959. After
that he was chairman of a few private companies before being appointed as Minister of Health and
Social Affairs in December 1975. Shin also had a close personal relationship with President Park.
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benefits at low medical cost.
Subsequently, when the president visited the MoHSA on February 10,
President Park stated that "the medical insurance programme should be achieved to
provide medical benefits to the lower income population." In the meantime, the
Minister of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) supported the president's agenda
that "the government will be keen on livelihood welfare policy to improve living
conditions through such issues as housing, medicine, pollution and the living
environment during the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan" (Dong A II
Bo, February 26 1976). In April, the MoHSA prepared a long-term health care plan
for the fourth economic plan. According to the plan, "businesses hiring 500 or more
employees should compulsorily build a funding society between 1977 and 1978.
From 1979 to 1981, businesses hiring 200 or more employees should compulsorily
establish a funding society, and voluntary regulation will be applied to medical
insurance schemes for the self-employed" (Lee, 1989: 80).
President Park Chung Hee promised to the public "medical benefits for the
lower income class" on June 16 1976. In consequence, the MoHSA started to
prepare for the plan based on President Park's public pledge. The following
message of the MoHSA demonstrated a more developed approach to fulfilling a
medical insurance scheme (Won, 1990: 40):
• The medical cost of the target population of the livelihood protection scheme
would be fully paid by the government.
• For the medical treatment fees of the poor living below the monthly average low
income level (40,000 Won in urban and 30,000 Won in rural areas), the
government would subsidise 30% of the fee and the other 70% will be paid by
the government. But the beneficiary should pay back the paid fees separately
within one or two years.
• Other citizens would receive medical services under the administration of
insurance-funding societies structured at the occupational and local level.
Three days later, on June 19 1976, Nam Duk Woo, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of the Economic Planning Board, announced the blueprint of the fourth
economic development plan. In the announcement, he emphasised that the fourth
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economic development plan will particularly focus on social development (Sohn,
1981:90).
In September 1976, Health and Social Affairs Minister Shin presented a
clearer health care plan through a keynote speech in a seminar for hospital managers
(Choi, 1987: 32):
The government was planning to announce a health care programme
in five years' time when the Institute for Health Development
completes its five-year research project. In advance, however, the
government decided to announce plans including a health care
programme in the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan,
which is to start in 1977.
At this point, we need to raise another interesting question: why was the
leader of the state suddenly so interested in implementing medical insurance? First
of all, the Yushin constitution granted an unlimited ruling period to President Park.
The regime therefore had to confront severe political opposition over the
implementation of dictatorship. Thus, in seeking both to deflect political challenges
and also to consolidate the legitimacy of the regime under the new constitution, the
Park regime encountered two incentives for action. One response was to take
forward social security programmes which had been postponed. The continuous
postponement of a national pension programme pushed the bureaucrats in the
MoHSA to initiate an alternative social security programme to replace the pension
scheme. In addition, as the medical insurance programme had been already
postponed several times following its initial legislation in 1963, the government
might run out of excuses for delaying the implementation further.
Second, we can find clues from matters within Korean society. Social
problems regarding medical matters dramatically increased in society during the
mid-1970s. In particular, some emergency patients in poverty were refused medical
treatment.17 The events by reference to corruption in medical fees provoked
demands for government intervention (Park, 1996: 71; Newspaper of the KMA,
December 6 1976).
Third, but more importantly, we can find another reason encouraging
17 Sixteen directors of hospitals were prosecuted for unethical medical practice in May 1976 (Park,
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President Park in his drive to implement the medical insurance programme in the
competition between the South and North Korean regimes. In the 1970s, the North
Korean regime was much more successful than the South Korean regime in
diplomatic terms. North Korea successfully joined the Inter-Parliamentary Union
and the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1973. While South Korea failed to
enter the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 1974, North Korea successfully
joined the conference. With regard to social security, North Korea had already
established a free medical care system in 1952 covering most people, and expanded
the system to the entire population in 1972. Inside North Korea, the North Korean
authority used the fact of the poor medical care system of the South as propaganda
to the North Koreans. Kim II Sung, the leader of North Korea, proudly announced
the success of the North Korean universal health care system to foreign authorities.
Moreover, the North conducted a direct propaganda attack against South Korea's
undeveloped health care system at international meetings (Joo, 1999: 396-397).18
President Park took the decision that the medical insurance programme
should be implemented. To carry out his plan successfully, Park positioned his most
reliable man, Shin, in the Minister of Health and Social Affairs. It seems highly
possible that the decision of the president was his own and only a few of his back¬
room men knew about the plan. It is evident that even former Minister Ko did not
recognise the plan in November 1975, when he repeated that medical insurance
would not start soon.
3.8 The Policy-Making Process in the Government
Most of the medical insurance planning was drawn up in the Welfare Pension
Bureau of the MoHSA. Choi Soo II, Head of the Welfare Pension Bureau, had
general responsibility for planning the scheme. Kim II Chun and Kim Jong Dae had
responsibilities for setting the framework of fee schedules and insurance
administration system respectively (Park, 1996: 91).19
1996:71).
18 In relation to this, an executive of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) brought a
leaflet distributed from North Korea to President Park and suggested the implementation of a medical
insurance scheme. This was because the leaflet severely criticised the medical problems of South
Korea (Won, 1990:42).
19 The separate funding system as the administrative structure of the Korean medical insurance
scheme was designed by these high-ranking civil servants at the initial policy-making stage. Later,
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At this time, the SSC was totally excluded from the policy-making process
of the medical insurance programme, although the SSC was a research organ for the
ministry. Why was the SSC excluded in the policy-making process in 1976?
According to Choi Chun Song (1991), a former Head of the SSC, he presented his
opposition to the government's plans with regard to the fee schedule and the
administration system operated by separate funding societies in an academic seminar
held by the Korean Medical Association in 1976. Thereafter, the executives of the
MoHSA began intentionally to exclude the SSC from the policy process (pp. 127-
128).20
However, there is another side of the situation. Bureaucrats in the MoHSA
discredited the members of the SSC. Because they were not regular-civil servants in
the ministry, the elite civil servants had a tendency to look down on them and did
not view them as social policy experts. Under the circumstances, it was difficult to
• • 21
expect good co-operation between elite bureaucrats and members of the SSC.
In pursuit of medical insurance, the government reorganised the structure of
the MoHSA. First of all, the Welfare Pension Bureau was turned into the Social
Insurance Bureau. In the bureau, the Insurance Management Division and Insurance
Affairs Division were established (Lee, 1989: 81).22 Inside the ministry, policy
makers had already established the principles of the medical insurance scheme
before beginning policy-making details. Choi Soo II elaborated these principles
(Newspaper of the KMA, November 18 1976):
• For a comprehensive medical security system, the medical insurance scheme
would be systematically linked with other social security programmes.
• The range of the beneficiary group would be selectively expanded according to
the suitability of socio-economic conditions. This means that the scheme would
not be immediately applied to the entire population. Instead, the compulsory
these civil servants formed an anti-reformist group to oppose the reform of the medical insurance
scheme in the ministry during the 1980s and 1990s.
20 From 1974, the research role of the SSC already began to weaken within the MoHSA. In the
policy-making process in 1976, only Shin Sun Ki participated in the drafting process of the law from
the SSC (Choi, 1987:41).
21 Interview with Yoo In Wang, Chief Editor of the Newspaper of the Korean Medical Association,
on September 1 1999.
22 Pension Planning Division, Pension Management Division and Research Division already existed
in the Welfare Pension Bureau. These divisions in the ministry were automatically included in the
new bureau.
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scheme would be gradually expanded to classes of people according to economic
feasibility.
• With regard to the financing of the scheme, the beneficiary would pay for the
scheme in principle. The government would simply take the role of controlling
sudden increases in insurance costs.
• An autonomous management system would be applied to the medical insurance
programme. Thus, democratic and autonomous management as well as healthy
finance of the scheme would be achieved through a funding-society system
which is organised on the basis of occupational and local units.
According to the pronouncements of the government examined thus far in
this chapter, we can establish the policy directions of the government. Policy
makers tried to design the health care programme primarily focusing on: CD the
minimisation of national finance; © the financial stabilisation of medical insurance
funds; and (D the expediency of the insurance administration system. In other
words, the government tried to avoid primary responsibility for medical insurance,
and only to occupy the role ofprogramme controller.
This policy direction was sketched by the Welfare Pension Bureau. So, why
did the Welfare Pension Bureau take the responsibility for the architecture of the
medical insurance scheme? As mentioned previously, Choi Soo II suggested the
implementation of the medical insurance scheme to Minister Ko Jae Pil after six
months' training abroad in 1975. The Welfare Pension Bureau, as the only
governmental office in dealing with social insurance matters at that time, was
assumed to be responsible for implementing the national pension programme within
the MoHSA. But as the pension scheme was continuously delayed, Choi, as the
head of the bureau, may have realised that the bureau was becoming merely a
nominal post in the ministry. As a result, Choi may have sought to raise the issue of
medical insurance to justify the existence of the bureau. Eventually, when the
executives of the government determined to pursue a medical insurance scheme, it
may have been obvious for the Welfare Pension Bureau and Choi to take
responsibility for the architecture of the scheme.
23 Minister Ko had been appointed as the Minister ofHealth and Social Affairs from December 1973
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Simultaneously, it is interesting to discover that there was no communication
between the Welfare Pension Bureau and other relevant offices in the ministry such
as the Medical Policy Bureau, the Pharmaceutical Policy Bureau or the SSC in the
policy-making process. In particular and notably, the SSC, the research organ of the
MoHSA, was totally excluded from the medical insurance policy-making. In fact, to
prevent this kind of administrative defect during the policy process, a special policy
adjustment post was set up in the Office of the Assistant Minister for Planning and
Management in the MoHSA. However, since the special post was ranked only at the
same level as a chief of a bureau in the ministry, it was difficult for this specially
positioned civil servant to exert powerful leadership to gain co-operation from other
divisions in the ministry within the Korean bureaucratic environment (Choi, 1987:
41).
According to Han (1999), once the president had committed himself to a
health care programme, a phase of deliberation followed. A small number of people
in the MoHSA participated in the deliberations, which were not made public. With
a potentially controversial decision such as medical insurance, great effort was made
to avoid the mobilisation of any opposition. President Park appointed the new
Minister of Health and Social Affairs, to whom he was known to be close, just
before announcing the policy. The president's direct orders to the new minister gave
him great power to pursue the medical insurance programme without strong
resistance (p.221).
Thus, the lock-out style of policy-making was engaged in the policy-making
domain to avoid any restraint from opposing sides not only from the government
agencies but also from the public sector. Hence, only the minister and certain
bureaucrats of the MoHSA took part in formulating the medical insurance scheme
by the direct order of the president. Any chance of intervening in this policy-making
by third parties, even in the ministry, was fundamentally blocked.
Choi Soo II constructed the framework of the medical insurance law based
on studies of the Japanese medical insurance system (Sohn, 1981: 93), just as much
policy-making in the medical insurance scheme in the 1960s had been based on the
Japanese. In particular, the MoHSA decided to take the Japanese style separate-
to December 1975.
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funding society system for its financial administration system. Why was the
Japanese style of the medical insurance system mainly adopted in the policy process
of 1976? In the policy process of the 1960s, the technical experts of the CoSSS
(SSC in the 1970s) collected and studied many foreign cases of various health care
programmes. The members of the CoSSS concluded the Japanese medical insurance
scheme was relatively better fitted to socio-economic conditions at that time.
However, in the policy process in 1976, the policy makers did not have much time to
construct a legislative bill for medical insurance, so they used the previous
legislative framework created by the CoSSS in 1962, for administrative expediency.
It is evident that the policy process for medical insurance began after Minister Shin
was appointed in the MoHSA in December 1975. The revised bill of the scheme
was completed in December 1976. Therefore, policy makers only had less than one
year to complete the project.
Secondly, the primary concern of policy makers during policy-making was
financial. The policy makers concluded that the Japanese style funding system,
which had a medical insurance administration system, possessed some
characteristics which were in between a state-operated insurance scheme and a
private insurance scheme. Therefore, government executives preferred the Japanese
style of medical insurance system. Not only could the financial burden of the
government be lessened, but also the separate funding system made it convenient for
the government to expand gradually the beneficiary population covered by the
scheme. Hence, the government was able to prepare the implementation of the
scheme in such a short time, basing it on the Japanese style of medical insurance
system. Han (1999) supports this argument. He stresses how Japan never
introduced the concept of a modern welfare system in Korea during the annexation
period. This means that many Korean bureaucrats ironically preferred to adopt the
Japanese scheme, and then followed the Japanese model with simple modifications
because of the similarity of social components, ease of managing the fund and
competitive business sense which the Japanese administration system possessed
(p. 195).
Other policy-making institutions strongly opposed the medical insurance
design of the MoHSA. First of all, the SSC criticised the attempts of the MoHSA to
cover a particular middle class rather than people at risk, and stressed the following
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(Choi, 1987: 42):
Adopting the medical insurance scheme is not a simple measure
which can be accomplished by adjustment and supplement for any
particular class...Thus, a solid and comprehensive approach should
be attempted with the medical insurance programme in order to
reduce the financial burden of citizens and for government. So, it is
necessary for the government to have more time to carefully review
this system.
Meanwhile, the EPB attacked the design of the separate funding
administration system. The EPB argued that (Choi, 1987: 42-43):
The separate funding administration style of the medical insurance
system will eventually lose its administrative control and produce
financial deficits. According to the MoHSA, the funding societies
will be ultimately unified in the long term but it is indeed impossible
to be achieved. Hence, the EPB insists on managing the medical
insurance scheme under government authority.
Regarding the administration system of the scheme, Nam Duk Woo, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of the EPB, and Shin Hyun Hwak, Minister of Health
and Social Affairs, were at one point in confrontation because of these opposing
views towards the administration system of the scheme. Eventually, Minister Shin
agreed that the fragmented administration system of the medical insurance scheme
needed to be unified in the future when the medical insurance scheme had settled.24
Despite debates from other government institutions against the programme
design of the MoHSA, the Medical Insurance Act was legislated in November 1976.
This was because the MoHSA succeeded in convincing President Park in a meeting
held in the Presidential Residence. Although there were serious debates held in the
process of obtaining sanction from the president, the MoHSA successfully argued
that the new medical insurance programme would not damage national economic
growth and would also be successfully launched. Minister Shin stressed that the
medical insurance scheme could be implemented without any government subsidies
(Han, 1999: 216-218). And he convinced the president.
As we have seen so far, the MoHSA exerted a significant role in medical
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insurance policies in the 1970s. In comparison to the National Welfare Pension
programme, which was initiated from the efforts of the Economic Planning Board
(EPB) and the Korea Development Institute (KDI),25 the role of the EPB and the
KDI was weak in the case of medical insurance. The most influential organs in the
government were not able to influence the policy process of the programme because
the direct order of President Park to the MoHSA granted much more power in
formulating the programme to the MoHSA. For the purpose of building the medical
insurance programme, the president brought Shin Hyun Hwak, who enjoyed the
president's high regard, into the position of Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
Appointing Shin as minister was an expression of the strong intent by the president
to enact medical insurance. Minister Shin was not only a man trusted by the
president but also one of the most influential bureaucrats and politicians in the
government. These credentials were enough to raise the position of the MoHSA in
the government at least in this particular policy process. Additionally, the direct
order to the minister and the MoHSA from the president to set up medical insurance
added more bureaucratic power in the policy process. As a result, the power of the
EPB was unusually weak. One of the best examples demonstrating this situation is
observed in the debate between the MoHSA and the EPB in reference to the
administration system of the scheme. Although the EPB opposed the idea of the
separate administration system introduced by the MoHSA, the MoHSA was able to
carry on its managerial idea despite this split with the EPB in this case.
3.9 Participation of Interest Groups in the Policy-Making
Through the 1960s and 1970s, involvement of interest groups in the policy-making
process is seldom apparent. Those actors key to implementing the medical
insurance scheme had only a minimal role. These key actors in the initial stage of
the policy-making can be defined as the Korean Medical Association (KMA: as the
service provider), the Federation of Korean Industry (FKI: as the insurer) and the
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU: as the insured). However, none of
these three interest groups actively realised demands on the government during the
24 Interview with Yoo, Chief Editor of the Newspaper of the Korean Medical Association.
25 President Park established the KDI under the EPB as a most influential think tank for economic
policy-making in 1971. Most ideas of social policy as well as national economic policy came from
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formulation ofmedical insurance.
A. Enterprises
When the government began to reconsider medical insurance in the mid-1970s,
interest groups started to express their demands to the government. First of all, the
FKI initially opposed the implementation of medical insurance because of the
financial burden on enterprises. However, Minister Shin successfully persuaded the
FKI to support the medical insurance plan of the government (Chung, 1993: 511).
Considering his background, his strong influence in the entrepreneurial arena is
understandable. Minister Shin had worked as a high-ranking civil servant in the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry for a long time and was appointed as the
Minister of State Reconstruction thereafter. He also worked as chairman in a few
private companies. Hence, it was clear that he had a wide circle of acquaintances in
the business sector, and this relationship influenced decisively his ability to draw
entrepreneurs into the medical insurance scheme.
During the minister's attempts to persuade the FKI, the executives of the FKI
realised the intention of President Park. Thereafter, the FKI accepted the idea of the
programme and started to persuade members to join the programme. Meanwhile,
the FKI demanded that the government: CD select the separate-funding society
system; ® guarantee the autonomy of management of the funding society; © set a
preparatory period before the implementation of the scheme; © provide tax
incentives to private sectors; © have a fee schedule set by the government; ©
gradually expand to a compulsory scheme; © subsidise the costs of administration;
and ® carry out the scheme only in businesses hiring 1,000 or more employees,
rather than 500 or more (Kim, 1994: 215-216).
As a response to the demands of the FKI, the government allowed the FKI to
manage 486 funding societies in the private sector. Accordingly, the National
• • • Oft
Association of Medical Insurance (NAMI) was established under the FKI. Kim Ip
Sam, Vice-President of the FKI, was appointed as the president of the NAMI.27
Previously, it was shown why policy makers in the MoHSA adopted the
this institute.
26 The NAMI was later expanded to the National Federation ofMedical Insurance.
27 In fact, when the MoHSA faced objections over the separate funding system from the EPB, it
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separate-funding administration system. In short, there were two reasons: © for
administrative expediency, to implement rapidly the medical insurance programme,
and © to minimise the financial responsibility of government. However, why did
the FKI agree to accept the separate-funding administration system, and why did the
FKI decide to operate the funding organisation?
First of all, if the enterprise itself managed the funding system of medical
insurance - in other words, if the employer became a representative of the funding
society of a private sector, this system could be a measure capable of making the
trade union powerless (Kim Y.M., 1989: 109). Second, the enterprise was likely to
want to use the reserve fund of its own funding society, as it could expect extra
benefits from the banking institutions, such as special loans and so on, when they
deposited a huge amount of insurance contributions. Regarding this matter, the FKI
in December 1977 proposed that the government provide tax exemption for the
interest income earned from the deposits of the reserved fund (Kim, 1994: 218).
Furthermore, we cannot ignore the possibility that the FKI was planning to adopt or
convert the funding system to a private health insurance scheme in the future.28
Kang (1992) employed Starr's perspective that "the proponents of social
insurance also expected that it would increase industrial productivity by creating a
healthier labour force"(p.280). And he accordingly argued that one of the reasons
for initiating the Medical Insurance scheme instead of the National Welfare Pension
programme was that "employers were advocating a medical insurance system for
their workers largely because medical insurance is helpful for the maintenance of
healthy workers" (p.280). However, this interpretation from a Marxist perspective
leads to a contradiction in explaining this particular circumstance. In fact, the
Korean Federation of Industry (KFI), the most representative institution of business
in Korea, opposed the initiative of a medical insurance programme for financial
reasons. In order to implement the scheme successfully, the co-operation of the
entrepreneur was a key solution. Thus, the executives of the government had to
persuade the representatives of the KFI of the case for medical insurance. In this
regard, the government provided the KFI with big advantages in managing the
asked the FKI to support the separate funding system (Kim, 1994: 216).
28 The private sector has tried to expand private-health insurance markets for a long time. At the end
of2001, the task force of the government announced the possibility of adopting a private medical
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funding system. Thus, Kang's argument is far from an adequate explanation of the
initial response of the private sector.
But we can find some room for Kang's point of view. The FKI knew that
they eventually would not have any choice except to participate in the medical
insurance scheme, as President Park had shown his strong intention to enact the
scheme at this time. More importantly, the Korean entrepreneur depended on the
government's actions more in the 1970s than at any other period because the
existence of the private sector desperately relied on the economic policy of the Park
regime. In particular, since the five-year economic development plan was
introduced by the Park regime, the Korean entrepreneur had been under significant
restraints in terms of the degree of necessary political co-operation with the
government.
Consequently, the enterprise sector had been pressured into the participation
in the national pension and medical insurance programme without a specific
timetable of implementing the programmes. From the entrepreneur's point of view,
the implementation of the National Pension scheme might not be necessarily
beneficial. Because most private sectors had provided their own severance payment
system for their employees, engaging in another state-operated welfare programme
meant another governmental control over the private sector. Thus, as the private
sector had to accept the health care programme of the government in any case, they
would rather prefer a medical insurance programme because the health care scheme
could provide at least some advantages to the private sector in terms of producing
healthy workforces and controlling trade unions.29
B. The Physicians
The KMA also opposed the medical insurance plan at the initial stage. In the mid-
1970s, when the formulation of medical insurance was activated in the MoFISA, the
KMA had already attacked Ko Jae Uk, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs,
with a warning that (Sohn, 1981: 91):
insurance programme (MoHW, December 2001).
29 From the viewpoint of big business (who were the key members of the FKI), the implementation
ofmedical insurance did not bring serious negative impacts on the financial concerns of employers
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If a medical insurance scheme is implemented, the government will
be in trouble similar to that in which Japan and Britain have already
been. Japan is now struggling with the financial deficit in the
medical insurance programme. Also, Britain has experienced side
effects from welfare provisions.
According to Choi (1987), pressures from the KMA significantly influenced
ministerial decisions. When high-ranking civil servants who were sent to foreign
countries to collect data of welfare programmes and train as social security experts
returned to the ministry, they suggested that the minister carry out a medical
insurance programme. But Minister Ko opposed the suggestion because of
pressures from the KMA (p.31). It seems clear that the lobby of doctors was
somewhat influential in the decision of the minister under the authoritarian regime.
However, the government strongly persuaded the KMA at this time with
promises that it would guarantee the autonomy of doctors in the making of fee
schedules. Like the FKI, the KMA had to co-operate with the government in
implementing the medical insurance scheme. However, their ultimate goal was to
achieve the best fee schedule deal from the government prior to implementation . In
the meantime, the KMA insisted that the representatives of the KMA take part in the
deliberating committee and examining committee (Newspaper of the KMA, July 15
1976). The KMA also emphasised that the government should guarantee the
participation of all medical doctors in the medical insurance programme. But most
of all, the most important concerns of the KMA were to keep professional autonomy
and to obtain a better deal for fee schedules after fulfilling a medical insurance
scheme (Kim, 1994: 219-221).30
Thus, the participation from the physicians was critically essential for the
government to carry out medical insurance successfully. This made it possible for
the KMA to achieve its demands better than other interest groups. On the other
hand, even though the KMA initially opposed the medical insurance scheme because
of concerns about losing its professional and economic autonomy in the medical
market, the implementation of the medical insurance scheme also had positive
aspects for physicians. This was because the compulsory medical insurance scheme
because they had already assisted in some amount ofmedical fees for their employees.
30
However, the government decided on a much lower rate (45% lower) for the fee schedule than the
original one in order to lessen the financial burden on the government
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was likely to improve the low level of utilisation both in clinics and hospitals (Han,
1999: 220).31 Ultimately, the government and the KMA were enabled to engage in
an inter-dependent relationship in implementing the scheme.
C. The Trade Unions
Unlike the FKI and the KMA, the FKTU did not actively associate itself with
policy-making. It only suggested that the government: CD expand the coverage scale
to the siblings of the insured; ® allow workers and trade unions to take part in the
managerial board of the NAMI; ® subsidise all administration fees and part of the
contributions for employees; and ® approve that the insured pay one third of the
contributions and the employers pay two thirds (Kim, 1994: 218).
Farmers and the self-employed in 1976 were totally excluded from the
policy-making process, and from coverage. However, they did not have any official
channel to express or resist their exclusion from the programme (Han, 1999: 219).
31
According to Han (1999), a 1973 KMA hospital survey demonstrated that the mean occupancy
rate for private hospitals averaged between 55.4% and 61.0%. The 1976 survey of clinics by the
KMA showed that physicians in private clinics received approximately 15 patient visits per day.
Thus, Korean physicians were underused compared with an average 50 patient visits in the US
(p.220).
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Conclusion
Throughout the 1960s, the foundation of social security in Korea was built mainly
by the efforts of the members of the Social Security Committee (SSC). There were
neither social policy expertise nor many social policy supporters in the government.
However, committee members used mostly informal channels inside the
authoritarian military junta. As a result, the idea of having a proper social security
system was spread by a few supporters among executive cabinet members in the
Supreme Council. And the ideas of the committee influenced the leader of the
regime in determining to set up basic legislation for a social security system.
In the 1970s, a small number of civil servants in the MoHSA performed a
crucial role in setting up medical insurance. Although the SSC members already
possessed sufficient data and knowledge about social insurance programmes, they
were completely excluded from being key players in the policy process. The strong
political desire of President Park to launch medical insurance made the policy
makers accelerate the formulation of the programme. However, as the government
wanted to build the medical insurance scheme while avoiding damage to continuous
economic growth and minimising the financial expenditure, the medical insurance
scheme initially covered only a certain group and excluded people in urgent need.
Thus, it is clear that the legislation of the medical insurance scheme started
from the leader's hands. Park Chung Hee, as the leader of the Supreme Council and
the president, decided the policy objectives and the fact of implementation of the
medical insurance scheme himself. As the government executives did not have
adequate knowledge and understanding of social security, they did not have the
capability to create and discuss the social security plan. Only a few SSC members
were able to convey professional ideas about social security systems to a few
executive cabinet members. However, SSC members were not in the proper
position to contact the leader directly. Fortunately, the idea was indirectly passed to
the leader by some council cabinet members and significantly influenced some
crucial decisions of the president.
Under the authoritarian regime from the 1960s to 1970s, as the political
intention of the leader was easily and rapidly reflected in the policy agenda, the
political decision of Park to enact a medical insurance system enabled the
government to carry out immediately the administrative processes necessary. Once
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the president determined the plan of medical insurance, he launched the plan quickly
in the confined policy-making institution and worked with a small select number of
officers. The degree of elitism and institutionalism was significantly high in the
decision-making process of the NHI scheme during this period. A certain group of
bureaucratic elites and a limited number of government institutions participated in
the policy precess. The state autonomy was strong in the policy-making process. In
this stage, the political reasons were more influential than the economic variables in
explaining the development of the Korean medical insurance programme.
Secondly, since interest groups could not aggressively achieve their demands
and sufficiently pressurise the government during the policy process under this
authoritarian environment, this circumstance provided administrative convenience
for the policy makers to push forward the implementation of the programme without
serious resistance from these interest groups. Although some interest groups
achieved some of their demands with the policy-making institutions, they had
limitations on expressing their interests and ultimately had to co-operate with the
government plan at all stages. Thus, state-corporatist approach is applicable to
explain the development of NHI policy during this period. Since the government
needed cooperation from certain organisations such as the KMA and the FKI in
order to operate the medical insurance programme, the government provided some
concessions to garner their supports.
Thirdly, it is difficult to fully support the logic of industrialisation in relation
to the start of the NHI scheme. This was because the initiative of the scheme was
more associated with the political reasons, strengthening the legitimacy of the
military regime.
Fourthly, there was no working class involvement in the policy process of
the NHI scheme during this period. Therefore, it cannot be said that the initiative of
the Korean medical insurance programme was influenced by the pressure of the
working class.
However, as the medical insurance scheme was unilaterally formulated at the
administrative expediency of the government without considering the needs of the
prospective insured groups, the medical insurance scheme produced problematic
outcomes and eventually faced severe reform pressures from the beginning of the
1980s.
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Chapter 4. The First Debate about The Reform of
TheNHI1 (1980-1983)
This chapter focuses on the first medical insurance reform initiatives. In particular,
it looks at the origins of and motivations for these first attempts at reform in the
early 1980s. Furthermore, it shall also consider who participated in the NHI policy
process and what the reformist and anti-reformist (conservative) groups wanted to
achieve.
On October 26 1979, Korean society was thrown into a political vacuum
when President Park was assassinated. The acting president, Choi Kyu Ha, the
prime minister, did not exercise sufficient political control over the military, led by
General Chun Doo Hwan (Kim, 1986: 42-44). Accordingly, the situation was
resolved when Chun was elected (after a cosmetic election in which he was the only
candidate) as president on August 27 1980.
The 1980s was the most important period in terms of developing and
implementing the NHI scheme, and was marked by political conflict between
reformist and conservative policy makers. These conflicts involved professionals
from the academic and medical sectors, as well as farmers and labour unions. In
particular, the second reform debate in the mid-1980s was part of a deliberate
movement to achieve social rights from the bottom upwards, involving solidarity
between farmers, labour workers and professionals. In comparison to the second
debate, the first reform debate originated largely from within institutions of
government and was introduced by certain policy makers, with limited participation
by professionals from outside the government.
4.1 The Socio-Political Changes in the 1980s
After the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, there were hopes for the end of
military-authoritarian rule, despite the legacy left by President Park of huge
economic development achieved within only fifteen years. However, this did not
' The proposed reforms to the NHI scheme sought to unify the separate administration system as
well as to reform its financial system. To an extent this was also an attempt to develop welfare values
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come true. After the death of President Park, General Chun Doo Hwan assumed
presidential power in Korea through the political turmoil known as 'the 12-12 coup'
on December 12 1979. As state leader, he exercised repressive authoritarian power
(Clifford, 1994: 152).
Although both President Park and President Chun took power through
military coup d'etat, the socio-economic conditions were not the same, and
consequently their agendas and leadership styles (although both authoritarian) were
different. While Park's agenda was economic development, Chun sought to
legitimise his regime through a policy of economic stabilisation.
In the social policy sphere, the government's intentions to develop the
National Health Insurance scheme (NHI) and in introducing the National Pension
scheme (NP) were evident in its declarations. Whereas the Park government merely
focused on passing various welfare laws for political expediency (especially to
legitimate the military government), the Chun regime in the 1980s instead sought to
develop the NHI scheme and actually to implement the NP scheme.
4.2 Implementation of the NHI Scheme and Its Fragmented
System
By revising the Medical Insurance Act in December 1976, the National Health
Insurance scheme (NHI) was implemented from July 1 1977. Large firms (hiring
500 or more employees) were initially covered, with the scheme expanded rapidly to
cover firms hiring 300 or more employees in 1979, 100 or more in 1981 and 16 or
more in 1982. From January 1 1979, the NHI scheme for government employees
and teachers in private schools began. In addition, the pilot NHI programmes for the
self-employed and employees who were excluded from NHI were simultaneously
carried out in three rural districts from July 1981 and then three more rural districts
in July 1982.
as part of a social service programme.
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Table 4-1 Insured Population in the NHI Scheme






























3,728 3,728 - 100
Source: Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, The Circumstances and Assignments in the National Health
Insurance, September 1982, p.7.
* Target population refers to those eligible to receive NHI benefits.
Until the revision of the Medical Insurance Act in 1976, there were neither
controversial debates nor issues raised within government regarding the
implementation of medical insurance. There were opinions regarding ways of
managing the NHI scheme held by those within government, but critically they did
not generate political discussions. The government was presented as being resolved
for the long-term development of the NHI scheme (Yoo, 1996: 157). Only after
implementation in 1977 were problems in management system discovered.
The first action taken by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA)
was to set up the Plan for Merging and Abolishing Medical Insurance Funding
Societies on February 20 1980. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the NHI
scheme was based on a fragmented approach to managing, where medical insurance
funding societies had to manage any insurance matters such as contributions and
funds, the level of contributions, the eligibility and benefits of the insured and so
2 The NHI scheme for employees working in private sectors was classified as Category I. The pilot
NHI programme for the self-employed [excluded from Category I, and the insurance for government
employees and teachers in the private school] was Category II.
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forth. When NHI was initiated in July 1977, the funding societies flourished
everywhere where there were insurers large enough to pay; big businesses
commonly had their own, and smaller ones clubbed together and used locally-based
funds (Cha, 1992: 319).3
In the Plan for Merging and Abolishing Medical Insurance Funding
Societies in 1980, the MoHSA pointed out problematic issues occurring under the
fragmented administration system (Cha, 1992: 319):
Table 4-2 The Number of Funding Societies by the Number of the
Insured
No. of Total Under 1,000 Under 3,000 Under 5,000 Under 10,000 Over 10,000
Insured
No. of Societies 602 229 221 65 52 35
(Component Ratio) (100%) (38%) (37%) (11%) (9%) (5%)
Source: Ministry of Health & Social Affairs (1980), The Plan for Merging and Abolishing Medical
Insurance Funding Societies. Quoted from Cha, H.B. (1992) 'Developing Process of Medical
Security Scheme in Korea', in Rhee, D.H. et al. National Medical Security, p.320.
• 130 funding societies - 22% of the total - were in financial danger. Small
funding societies would not be able to achieve adequate financial stability. More
problems would occur after the expansion of NHI to firms hiring 300 or more
employees.
• With any changes in the business such as bankruptcy, suspension or other
shutdown of the member firms of a funding society, the society would be
consequently vulnerable financially.
• Income redistribution and risk pooling, the principles of a social insurance
scheme, would be limited within each funding society.
As seen in Table 4-2, 75% of the total number of funding societies were
small in size with each society covering for about 3,000 or fewer insured persons. In
terms of economics, those small funding societies had created inefficiency in
management. Thus, the objective of the plan was to disband 450 small-sized
3
603 funding societies were established by 1979 (Cha, 1992: 319).
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funding societies which were comprised of 300 or fewer insured persons and then
replace them with joint, larger-sized, funding societies that had 3,000 or more
insured persons in order to increase efficiency.
4.3 Reform Initiative of Minister Cheon
Meanwhile, Cheon Myung Ki was appointed as the new Minister of Health and
Social Affairs on September 2 1980. The leaders of the country had not considered
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs as a major post in the government at the
time, in contrast to economically relevant ministries such as the EPB. Thus, the
position of the Minister of Health and Social Affairs had usually been given to an
opposition member or a female politician for political reasons. Accordingly,
Minister Cheon was appointed to the position just after the presidential election for
the political reason that Cheon was a politician from the opposition, being in the
Chief Secretariat of Kim Dae Jung, leader of a strong opposition party. It was
necessary for President Chun to alleviate uprising negative sentiments in the
political and popular sectors against the military coup led by Chun.
Soon after his appointment, Minister Cheon organised his advisory
committee and ordered them to report on current issues and problems in NHI. The
minister also ordered the committee to prepare a proposal for improving the scheme.
Members of the Social Security Committee (SSC) were mainly involved in the
advisory committee. From this point, the advisory committee started to study the
idea ofunifying the NHI administration system.4
Minister Cheon had received various advice from scholars and committee
members, especially from Lee Kwang Chan, who strongly influenced Cheon's
policy agenda. Lee, a member of the SSC and a Special Assistant of the Minister,
was a reformist in the ministry and possessed a constructive idea for the medical
insurance reform. Through the Proposal for Improving and Developing the Social
Security Scheme in Korea, he delivered collaborative arguments and policy
directions in terms of developing the social security of Korea. In particular, he
explained clearly current issues in NHI and considered the prospects for the NHI
4 Interview with Cheon Myung Ki, former Minister of Health and Social Affairs, on September 27
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scheme. He proposed that the government would ultimately need to unify the
separate NHI system and also suggested the developmental stages for this (Lee,
1980).
Furthermore, Cheon met with the Japanese Minister of Health and Welfare to
discuss his ideas regarding NHI reform. The Japanese minister explained to him
that Japan had already tried to unify its fragmented medical insurance system, but
failed because of conflict between institutional interest groups. The Japanese
minister encouraged Cheon to take action on reform before "the bones of the NHI
scheme stiffened."5
Minister Cheon, on his own initiative, decided to unify the separate NHI
administration system after much hard work collecting and studying data. He had a
clear point of view regarding the problems existing in the current scheme. At this
time, however, there was no political pressure to reform from other levels of
government, according to Cheon. There was no interest at all in this issue from
either the public or government.6
The main reasons Minister Cheon decided to reform the NHI scheme were
that:7
• Inefficiency existed in managing the NHI scheme because two administration
systems - the Korea Medical Insurance Corporation for Government Employees
and Private School Teachers (KMIC) and the National Conference ofMedical
Insurance Societies (NCMIS) - operated in one national health insurance
scheme.
• These two administration systems used two different computer systems.
As a result, the cost of managing the NHI scheme was excessively high.
Thus, the minister determined to unify administration systems - especially the
computer and financial systems. In order to accomplish this, he also set up longer-
term plans to unify gradually the fragmented NHI funding bodies under one parent
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avoid any resistance from funding societies prompted by sudden unification.8
On September 30 1980, Minister Cheon ordered the MoHSA civil servants to
study a national corporation style-administration system, which planned to merge
the various funding societies and the KMIC. However, the MoHSA civil servants,
embarrassed, asked for suspension of the plan because civil servants had been
implementing a different project, the Plan for Merging and Abolishing Medical
Insurance Funding Societies, which the former minister ordered just before Minister
Cheon came to the ministry. The civil servants in the MoHSA were ready to pursue
the second stage of the previous plan. In addition, most officers were not familiar
with Cheon's reform project. As this reform had not been seriously discussed in the
ministry until then, civil servants were confused by new orders from the new
minister. At this point, it is necessary to note that there was no administrative
relation between Minister Cheon's reform plan and the Plan for Merging and
Abolishing Medical Insurance Funding Societies. While the Minister's plan was to
integrate fragmented funding societies under a state run-administration system for a
long-term reform, the previous plan of the ministry was to merge small-sized,
funding societies as a short-term measure to avoid increasing inefficiency.
However, Minister Cheon strongly recommended suspension of the second
stage of the previous plan. Furthermore, he organised the Promotion Committee for
Unifying the Medical Insurance Administration System, on October 2 1980,
constituted by the MoHSA civil servants, even while some of them were still
insisting on implementing the second stage of the previous plan (Yoon, 1984: 40).
We can possibly assume that the opposition group already existed in the MoHSA
from the beginning of the reform debates.
On October 15 1980, Minister Cheon reported to President Chun that the
MoHSA had been examining a plan to unify the fragmented NHI administration
system.9 Meanwhile, Cheon faced resistance reporting this reform plan to the
president. He wanted to obtain the president's sanction for the reform before the
former's U.S. business trip, but the Chief Officer of the Second Secretariat Office of
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president. Moreover, the chief officer asked the minister to review fully the plan
once more after his U.S. business trip. The Second Secretariat Office of State
Affairs in the Presidential Secretariat Office was in charge of dealing with issues of
health and social affairs. And the office also reported on those matters to the
president. President Chun heavily relied for social policy matters on Yoon Sung
Tae, the senior officer in the Presidential Secretariat Office.
Why did the Presidential Secretariat Office try to stop Minister Cheon? It
was anti-reformist civil servants had already persuaded the Presidential Secretariat
Office to oppose the reform. Cheon believes that the officers in the Presidential
Secretariat Office might have been afraid of the minister meeting the president to
discuss the NHI reform plan; President Chun possessed a quick decision-making
style, and it was possible that the president might immediately approve the plans.10
There was a bond between the Presidential Secretariat Office and the anti-
reformist side in the MoHSA involved with Youn Sung Tae and Kim Jong Dae, the
senior officer and the officer in the Presidential Secretariat Office. They were
highly ranked civil servants supporting the separate NHI system within the MoHSA,
and they were sent to the Presidential Secretariat Office from the MoHSA in order to
assist health and welfare matters. They also acted as main key policy makers with
Choi Soo II when the Medical Insurance Act was revised under the separate
administration system in 1976.11 (Choi Soo II was Head of Social Insurance Bureau
in the MoHSA in 1976) Kim Jong Dae was a Director of Insurance Management
Division under the Social Insurance Bureau in 1976. Youn Sung Tae worked in the
Presidential Secretariat Office in 1976. They all participated in the policy process
and chose to revise entirely the Medical Insurance Act of 1976 towards a fragmented
medical insurance system (Park, 1996). In any case, they were strongly committed
to protecting the separate system to which they had contributed. In the beginning of
19 ....
the 1980s, as Choi Soo II worked in executive positions in the MoHSA, it was
10 Ibid.
11 See Chapter 3.
12 He was positioned in the MoHSA as the Head of the Health Bureau in 1980, the Vice-Chief of the
Office of Environment in 1981, the Assistant Minister for Planning and Management, and the Chief
of the Office of Environment in 1983. He also became the Vice-Minister of Health and Social
Affairs in 1986 and the President of the National Federation of Medical Insurance in 1990 (Park,
1996).
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possible for them to create a strong relationship between the Presidential Secretariat
Office and the MoHSA.
Furthermore, as the MoHSA civil servants were in charge of managing the
funding societies, they had developed a strong bond with those funding societies.
The MoHSA was in charge of approving the establishment of funding societies and
appointing a managing director to a funding society. Some of the MoHSA civil
servants thus maintained a strong relationship with the executives of funding
societies and the National Conference of Medical Insurance Societies (NCMIS). For
instance, until August 1982, the managing directors of 75 funding societies out of
145 in NHI Category I were appointed by the MoHSA (Yoon, 1984: 52). Senior
civil servants in the ministry were also positioned in the executive seats in the
National Federation of Medical Insurance (NFMI) (the later title of the NCMIS)
when they retired from the ministry. Choi Soo II and Youn Sung Tae were also
appointed as the president of the NFMI after their retirement. This kind of bond was
established not only with the MoHSA civil servants but also extended to the group
of politicians, the retired military, and so forth. This point is brought out in the next
chapter.
After reporting the reform plan to the president, civil servants in the MoHSA
officially started to develop a plan for NHI reform. The MoHSA set up a reform-
timetable. The MoHSA wanted to reform the current medical insurance programme
for a number of reasons.13 According to the Proposal for Improving the NHI
Scheme, the MoHSA stressed the problems contained in the current NHI scheme as
stated below (MoHSA, November 1980):
• Limited income redistribution and risk pooling.
• Complicated, and therefore expensive management system.
• Different calculating methods for contributions and different benefit provisions
between funding societies.
• Inconvenient management services for the medical institutions and the insured.
13 Lee Kwang Chan, a member of the Social Security Committee (SSC), participated in the project
under the title of Special Assistant to the Minister. Civil servants in the Social Insurance Bureau in
the MoHSA also joined the process (Cha, 1992: 321).
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• High expenditure of the NHI administration budget.
• Possibility of improper use of the NHI funds by employers in private sectors.
In addition, the proposal suggested policy directions towards which the
government should drive (MoHSA, November 1980):
• Formulating the basis of a heath care system for the entire population up to the
beginning of the 1990s.
• Developing the current fragmented social insurance programmes into a unified
system in order to maximise risk pooling and financial pooling.
• Achieving fairness raising NHI funds.
• Equal provision ofNHI benefits to the insured.
• Minimising the NHI budget, avoiding unnecessary waste and maximising
efficiency of the NHI management by unifying the separate administration
systems.
• Good co-operation among the insured, the employer, the public, medical workers
etc. to participate in the NHI management.
Under those policy directions, the MoHSA suggested organising a single
national level health care programme through unifying the fragmented funding
system. In order to achieve this, the MoHSA also suggested developing the plan
gradually to avoid rapid expansion of the national budget (MoHSA, November
1980). The Promotion Committee for Unifying the Medical Insurance
Administration System completed the Proposal for Unifying the Administration
System ofthe Medical Insurance. The deputy prime minister and the prime minister
approved the proposal on November 4 and 6 1980 respectively (Cha, 1996: 181;
Yoon, 1984: 40). Two suggestions were put forward in the proposal. One was to
unify the KMIC and the NCMIS, and then to set up a national corporation. The
second plan was to keep the KMIC independent but to unify the funding societies
under the NCMIS. Then the NCMIS would be reorganised as a national corporation
(MoHSA, November 1980).
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The main points of the reform plan can be summarised as follows (Cha,
1992: 321-322):
• Central management of the NHI funds.
• Unifying the contributions rate.
• Uniformity of benefits among funding societies.
• Maximising the effects of income redistribution and risk pooling.
• Improving social solidarity.
• Developing medical provision.
• Removing complicity and wasteful expenditure in the administration system.
The arguments of the MoHSA regarding the unification plan were that (Cha,
1992: 322):
• It would be difficult to expand the NHI scheme to cover the entire population
under this separate administration system in the future.
• Even ifNHI expanded its coverage, there would be different funding capabilities
between funding societies.
• Therefore, there was a strong possibility of unequal distribution of insurance
benefits to the insured.
4.4 Resistance to Reform
4.4.1 Mass Media
Reactions from the anti-reformist side began to arise against the reform. To
preserve the separate administration system from the reform movement, the NCMIS,
the FKI, and big business entrepreneurs established a firm bond with the anti-
reformist civil servants and the Presidential Secretariat Office. Under the support of
the mighty Presidential Secretariat Office in particular, the anti-reformist side was
able to respond promptly and aggressively over the reforming action.
At the beginning, the anti-reformist side delivered its arguments through the
media. Except the Kyung Hyang Newspaper, most major newspapers opposed the
reform. They supported the arguments of the opposition groups against the NHI
reform. The reform was a sensitive issue for the major media enterprises because
they were also a part of the large private sectors involved directly in the medical
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insurance as the insurer (employers) and as the insured (employees). Thus, anti-
reformist groups and the media enterprises shared a common interest.14
Most of the journalist groups in Korea played a very limited role by
delivering only the opposition sides' arguments without sufficient research, with the
exception of the Kyung Hyang Newspaper, which dealt reasonably with both sides.
Indeed, it delivered a clear and specific argument in support of the reform. This was
caused by a personal interest in the reform and the research effort of Park No
Kyung, chief editor of the newspaper company. On November 3 1980, it reported
the reasons underpinning the groups opposed to NHI reform through the editorial
column, titled "The NHI scheme should be unified." (Kyung Hyang Shin Moon,
November 3 1980):
• If the NHI reform is completed, the employers as the NHI insurers in the private
sectors would not be able to control the NHI contributions because the unified
NHI administration body would strictly supervise the use of contributions.
• If the rate of contributions is increased, the financial responsibility of the
employers would also increase.
• The opposition sides have argued that the reform would worsen the relationship
between the employer and the employee. However, the fundamental purpose of
pursuing the NHI scheme is to achieve a welfare state rather than for employers
to provide charitable and paternalistic services for their employees.
4.4.2 Presidential Secretariat Office and MoHSA
From November 12 to November 15, civil servants from government institutions
met to discuss the proposed reform. In the meeting, they reached an agreement to
unify the system. This meeting was held under the supervision of the
Administrative Co-ordinating Office of the Prime Minister's Office. The civil
servants attending the meeting were the Senior Officer from the Second Secretariat
Office of State Affairs in the Presidential Secretariat Office, the ChiefOfficer of the
Administrative Co-ordinating Office in the Prime Minister's Office, the Chief
Officer from the Budget Office in the Economic Planning Board (EPB), the Head of
14 Interview with Cheon, former Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
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the Planning Bureau in the EPB, and the Head of the Social Insurance Bureau in the
MoHSA (Cha, 1996: 181). The meeting proposed two ways for the reform - the
same as the Promotion Committee's.15 Through the meeting, they concluded that
the Minister of Health and Social Affairs should decide on one of the two options
(Cha, 1992: 322).
The MoHSA reported the Proposal for Unifying the Administration System
ofthe Medical Insurance to President Chun on November 17 1980. But once again,
President Chun put the proposal on hold. The Presidential Secretariat Office
suggested that this required "more research and review on the proposal" (Cha, 1996:
181). The Presidential Secretariat Office wrote the Written Opinion on Reviewing
the Proposalfor Unifying the Administration System ofthe Medical Insurance. This
paper crucially influenced the president in his decision to suspend the NHI reform.16
This paper included almost the same opinions regarding unifying issues as those of
the NCMIS. They pointed out that the separate NHI system was carefully selected
to avoid burdening national finances and to prevent 'the welfare disease' Western
countries had experienced. As the current NHI scheme was designed to fit into the
socio-economic circumstances of the country, the NHI reform would demand the
entire restructuring of the NHI system. The Presidential Secretariat Office also
indicated the potential problems that may follow as a result of the NHI reform
(Yoon, 1984: 60, 80):17
• Financially: farmers and fishermen would demand that the government
financially support contributions at the same level as the current government
support for Category I, and for government employees and private school
teachers. Hence, the NHI budget of the government would be significantly
increased. Thus, if the financial condition of NHI became worse, it would be
inevitable for the government to intervene in the scheme.
• Enterprises and employees: the increase of contributions would increase the
financial burden on the private sector. Hence, international trade competition
15 See p. 104 in this chapter.
16 With their power, they organised strong opposition in alliance with the NCMIS and the funding
societies. This powerful alliance had actively and continuously influenced the policy process of NHI
reform during the entire 1990s as well as the 1980s.
17 Their arguments over the reform were very similar to those of the business sector and the NCMIS.
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and the relationship between employers and employees would deteriorate.
• Politically: the unified administration system would eventually become a state-
based administration system so that it would create direct conflict between the
government and the insured. Therefore, the government would have the entire
responsibility for national health care.
• The management of the scheme: the reform would create a large bureaucracy in
the management system, and consequently result in inefficiency.
This paper concluded that since the proposal of the MoHSA demands the entire
restructuring of the current NHI scheme, it would be difficult to approve the
proposal (Yoon, 1984: 60).
On December 3 1980, another meeting was held to amend the MoHSA
proposal in the Administrative Co-ordinating Office of the Prime Minister's Office.
Attending officers in the meeting agreed to develop the plan, and they organised a
1 R
task force team to review it. The team completed an alternative proposal, the
Proposal for Improving the NHI Scheme, which suggested two alternative ideas.
One was to set up a national corporation to unify funding societies, but allow the
national corporation to coexist with the KMIC. The second idea was to unify only
the central funding bodies at first, with the funding societies remaining.
Subsequently, the funding societies would be disbanded and then would be unified
completely under one management organisation (Cha, 1992: 323).
While the proposal was being reviewed and adjusted within the government,
opposite opinions over the reform plan arose from various places. Some MoHSA
civil servants expressed opposition to the reform. However, they could not strongly
raise their voices against the plan because ofMinister Cheon's strong support for it
within the ministry. However, these civil servants organised an opposition group in
alliance with insurers such as the NCMIS, funding societies, the media companies
and the private sector. Further, these groups co-operated with officers in the
Presidential Secretariat Office to form a powerful opposition within government
against reform in the near future.
18 The task force team consisted of eight officers from the MoHSA, EPB, KMIC, NCMIS, SSC and
KDI (Cha, 1992: 323).
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4.4.3 National Conference of Medical Insurance Societies
The NCMIS19 was the very first organisation that announced official opposition to
the MoHSA reform plan. On October 23 1980, the NCMIS held a board of
directors' meeting and delivered its written opinion to the MoHSA. According to
the report, the NCMIS opposed the reform with the arguments below (Cha, 1992:
324):
• The current system, which has been managed under self-finance and
administration systems, is more reasonable than a national corporation-style
system.
• If the administration system is unified, conflicts between government and the
insured would be created due to an increasing financial burden on the
government.
• The principle of equity in terms of imposing a contribution rate and receiving
equal insurance benefits would not be achieved under the reform because of
income differentiation among localities and the poor distribution of medical
facilities in rural areas.
• The solidarity between employees and employers would be weakened.
• The merit of autonomous management of funding societies under the current
system would disappear.
Soon after the NCMIS's official announcement, the Federation of Korean
Industries (FKI), the Korean Employers Federation (KEF), the Korean Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (KCCI), the Korean Foreign Trade Association (KFTA) and
the Korean Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSMB) expressed
officially their opposition. Kim Ip Sam, Chief Executive of the NCMIS and Vice-
President of the FKI, prepared opposing opinions to the reform plan for the board of
trustees in the FKI on October 28 1980 (Cha, 1992: 324).
The opposition arguments were that (Cha, 1992: 324):
19 This was organised under the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) in order to manage NHI for
the private sector. It existed from 1976 to 1981 as a private incorporated body. After that, the
NCMIS was developed as the Central Federation of Medical Insurance Societies under legislation.
Finally, it became the National Federation of Medical Insurance, which managed the KMIC and other
funding societies in rural and urban sectors as well as in the private sectors.
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• The separate funding society system can contribute to stabilising the relationship
between employees and employers; and also retain the merit of autonomous
management system.
• The unified system will create 'welfare diseases of the Western countries' as
well as a bureaucratic environment within management bodies.
• Income redistribution may be less efficient under a unified administration
system.
Here, we need to point out that the opposition side drew the term 'welfare
disease of the Western countries' in order to justify its argument. This term has
been popularly used from the conservative side. Because the government had set up
economic development for its prime political agenda since the Park regime,
accumulating national wealth had always been a sensitive issue for the government.
Thus, whenever welfare became a critical issue in the government and the political
arena, the government was critically aware of the financial burden. Accordingly, the
conservative side threatened that the government would face a huge financial
responsibility for any welfare provisions just as Western welfare states had
experienced because the welfare programme would produce over-dependence on the
government.
As the NCMIS was organised in order to manage the Category I of the
insured (large-company employees) under the FKI in 1977, it was not surprising that
these other organisations in the enterprise joined to oppose the reform plan. This
was because if the funding societies in private sectors were unified, the private
sectors would obviously lose their authority and power over the management of the
NHI scheme and the NHI funds.
Meanwhile, there was no reaction from the KMIC over the reform. This was
because it was already established as a publicly based medical insurance
management organisation by the government that took care of government
employees and teachers in private schools. The reform would therefore not affect
the status of the KMIC. In particular, as one of the executives in the KMIC was a
strong supporter of the reform, there was no reason to work with other NHI funding
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organisations.20
4.4.4 Federation of Korean Trade Unions
Initially, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) stated its opposition to the
reform on November 4 1980. However, the FKTU changed its agenda to support
the reform several months later through the paper Suggestions for Improving the
Medical Insurance Scheme in August 1981. This paper stated that the funding
societies in Category I should be unified under one national managing organisation
and employees' representatives should participate in the management of the NHI
scheme (Yoon, 1984: 66-67). Why did the FKTU initially present its negative views
against the medical insurance reform? The FKTU was likely to protect its
(beneficiary) members (employees in large private sectors) from the sudden changes
of the insurance scheme. However, the FKTU quickly changed its agenda to avoid
the duplicated voice of the business organisations because it would be likely to
receive criticism from labour members. In particular, since only a limited number of
employees (in large private sectors) received the insurance benefits, the FKTU may
have realised that the opposite stand to the reform was not a politically clever idea
concerning the rest of members. The FKTU was not free from the control of the
government since its establishment (as introduced in Chapter 1); the agenda of the
labour's representative body had been inconsistent regarding the medical insurance
reform not only in the 1980s but also in the 1990s. The action of the FKTU in the
1990s is discussed in Chapter 7.
On January 1981, after discussion with the Presidential Secretariat Office,
the MoHSA and the Presidential Secretariat Office both agreed to review the reform
9 l
after the pilot NHI programme (Category II) in rural areas was fulfilled. Hence,
discussion about the reform was put on hold again. However, when the pilot
programme was implemented in July 1981, the government experienced
administrative difficulties in assessing and collecting NHI contributions, and in
managing the financial stability of the system. At the end of 1981, the issue of
20 Um Ki Sup, Executive Director of the KMIC. Interview with Yoo In Wang, Chief Editor in the
Newspaper of the Korean Medical Association.
21 The Presidential Secretariat Office established its own proposal based on the separate system (Cha,
1996: 181).
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reforming the NHI scheme was raised in the National Assembly (Cha, 1992: 324-
325).
Despite increased pressure from opposition sides, Minister Cheon did not
easily give up on the reform of the scheme. He announced that he would unify the
• • • • 99
NHI administration system gradually through unifying the regulatory bodies that
monitored the NHI contributions and computer systems (Cha, 1996: 182). When he
realised that political resistance to reform, threatening from both inside and outside
government, was subsequently undermining his reform plan, he attempted another
reform from inside the MoHSA. First, the minister planned to reorganise the
NCMIS, a private corporate body under the FKI, into the Central Federation of
Medical Insurance Societies (CFMIS), a public corporation under the MoHSA. As
the NCMIS strongly opposed reform (on the grounds of defending the private
sector), it had been one of the major obstacles to reform. It was therefore necessary
for the MoHSA to establish a public management organisation in order to push
forward the policy of the ministry. As a result, the CFMIS was established on
October 2 1981. Second, the minister also reshaped the organisational structure of
the ministry. He put more reformist civil servants in the front line of reform (Yoon,
1984: 67-68).
4.5 Parliamentary Reactions and the Involvement of the
Presidential Secretariat Office
On November 27 1981, the members of the Committee of Health and Social Affairs
(CoHSA) reached agreement that the MoHSA should submit a bill to reform the
NHI administration system by the plenary session in 1982 (National Assembly,
1981). This agreement was also passed at the plenary session of the National
Assembly held in December 1981. As the result of the agreement of the National
Assembly, the MoHSA started to re-write the proposal to reform the NHI
administration system from January 1982. The new proposal was similar to the
proposal in 1980 (Cha, 1992: 325-326).
In the National Assembly, members from the ruling party and the opposition
22 Each funding society had its own regulations and standards in determining contribution rate and
benefit provisions.
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parties in the CoHSA collaborated in support of the reform plan. Indeed, most of the
National Assembly members from the ruling party and the opposition parties in the
CoHSA supported the plan to unify the fragmented medical insurance system (Cha,
1992: 326). In terms of underlying reasons, National Assemblymen agreed that: ®
the separate system retains limitations for income redistribution; ® the unified
administration system can hold efficient management; and (D the NHI scheme
should not follow the management failure of the Japanese health insurance scheme
(Won, 1990: 75).
They were relatively free from pressure groups, especially from the
enterprise sector and the funding societies. The members of the CoHSA also had
sufficient discussions with social policy experts. They examined the issues through
various networks and were also aware of voters who had been excluded from
medical insurance benefits. Since the NHI reform was not regarded yet as a critical
political matter that demanded serious political deals between the ruling party and
the opposition parties at that time, they could collect neutral voices for the reform in
the National Assembly.
The MoHSA reported this new proposal to the policy conference of the
ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) in February 1982. Then the proposal was
reported to and approved by the prime minister and the deputy prime minister.
However, the proposal did not reach President Chun because the Presidential
Secretariat Office again insisted on reviewing the proposal more extensively in
meetings between the Presidential Secretariat Office and the MoHSA.
After the plenary session of the National Assembly at the end of 1981, the
ruling party and the opposition parties were determined to fulfil the NHI reform.
Accordingly, the MoHSA was also determined to resume the plan. In the meantime,
other administrative institutions in the government had not yet decided their position
regarding the reform plan, as the Presidential Secretariat Office had consistently
opposed the plan.
On the other hand, although the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which was
in charge of managing the national budget, supported the NHI reform from the
beginning, they were divided into two sides. The Budget Bureau supported the
23 Interview with Cheon, former Minister ofHealth and Social Affairs.
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unified administration system, but the Economic Planning Bureau supported the
current separate system. This was because the Economic Planning Bureau accepted
the point that the gradual expansion of the NHI scheme, rather than rapid reform,
would be safer in consideration of the Korean economy and national budget (Cha,
1996: 186). The former Vice-Minister Rhee explained that the civil servants in the
EPB thought the unified NHI system was principally the right way to go for NHI.
However, the anti-reformist civil servants in the MoHSA persuaded the EPB civil
servants that the current separate NHI system would reduce the state financial
burden for the health care scheme.24
Under these circumstances, in April 1982, the Research and Advisory
Committee of the Medical Insurance Scheme was established in the MoHSA in
order to prepare a reform bill for unifying the NHI administration system for the
next plenary session of the National Assembly. The committee consisted of 22
representatives, and a task force team was also organised in this committee. Four
were selected from academic sectors, five from research institutions, two from
insurer organisations, six from the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, one from the
EPB and four from the MoHSA. In addition, thirteen officers from the MoHSA, the
CFMIS and the KMIC joined the task force team in the committee (Cha, 1992: 328).
Rhee Doo Ho, Assistant Minister for Planning and Management in the MoHSA, was
appointed as chair of the committee. He expounded a clear principle of social
insurance in implementing the NHI scheme, which was maximising risk pooling.25
4.6 Struggle between Minister Kim and the National
Assembly
In May 1982, Kim Jung Rye was appointed as the new Minister of Health and Social
Affairs. It is difficult to say that his membership of the reform movement was the
main reason behind the removal of Minister Cheon from the MoHSA. The average
life span of a Minister of Health and Social Affairs had been one and a half-years.
Also, the minister's position in the ministry had usually been given to an opposition
member or a female politician for political reasons. Therefore, since Minister Cheon
24 Interview with Rhee Doo Ho, former Vice-Minister of Health and Social Affairs, September 14
1999.
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had already served the position for 20 months (September 1980 - May 1982), it was
time to replace him on the basis of the schedule of cabinet reshuffles. Furthermore,
as the new Minister Kim also supported reform while she was in the cabinet, it is
difficult to say that the reform movement caused the appointment of a new
minister.26
Minister Kim announced that it seemed too early to implement the NHI
reform plan at the session of the CoHSA in the 113th extraordinary session of the
National Assembly (Yoon, 1984: 44). But it does not mean that Minister Kim
opposed the reform. She was a supporter of the reform. In the meantime, a number
of seminars were subsequently held to discuss the NHI administration system: by the
KDI27 on August 20 1982, the Democratic Justice Party on August 28 1982, the
Korean Institute for Population and Health (KIPH), a think thank under the
MoHSA,28 on September 2 1982, and the Christian Academy on September 10
1982. Regardless of these events, the Presidential Secretariat Office, the NCMIS
and the funding societies maintained their opposition to reform (Cha, 1992: 329).
Plans for reforming the administration system could not reach complete
agreement within the government, even though the plenary session of the National
Assembly was approaching. The ruling and opposition parties demanded that the
MoHSA submit a bill in the plenary session. But the MoHSA could not achieve this
as the Presidential Secretariat Office still not only opposed the plan but also had
great influence over the president's political decisions. On September 24 1982,
when the General Secretary of the DJP reported on parliamentary matters to the
Presidential Secretariat Office, the office mentioned that "it might be a better idea to
unify only the examining body of the NHI contributions and the computing systems
rather than to revise the whole Medical Insurance legislation and to unify the
administration system." The Presidential Secretariat Office ordered the MoHSA to
26 Interview with Kim Jung Rye, former Minister of Health and Social Affairs, on October 5 1999.
27 The Korean Development Institute (KDI), one of the most representative think tanks in Korea,
supported the unified NHI system through a research paper published in 1981 (Park et al. 1981: 21).
However, they changed their support for the unified system. The KDI argued that NHI might need to
unify only the administration system, while the financial system might need to remain separated
(Won, 1990: 79). In his paper, Youn Ha Chung, who later became the president of the KDI, also
pointed out that the separate system of the NHI holds many problems. He especially indicated the
issue of income redistribution. But he did not clearly mention the issue of unification in the paper.
Later, he became an anti-reformist (Yeon, 1982: 105-126).
28 The title ofKIPH was later changed to the Korean Institute for Health and Social Affairs
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cease discussion on the reform of NHI and to prepare a plan to unify only the
examining body of the NHI scheme (Cha, 1996: 183). Thus, under these
circumstances, the MoHSA was not able to offer proposals to the National Assembly
(Cha, 1992: 329-330).
th • •
By the 114 plenary session of the National Assembly, the MoHSA was still
in difficulties. Simultaneously with the opening of the plenary session of the
National Assembly, the Subcommittee for Promoting a Unified NHI System was
established to monitor the policy process of reforming the NHI scheme under the
CoHSA. Choi Young Chul (Chair of the CoHSA) was appointed as the chair of the
subcommittee. In addition, Lee Chan Hyuk (DJP), Sohn Choon Ho (DJP), Chung
Jung Hoon (Democratic Korea Party: DKP) and Shim Hun Sup (DKP) were
appointed as members of the subcommittee (Cha, 1996: 182-183). On October 13
1982, Minister Kim announced at the meeting of the subcommittee that the MoHSA
could not submit the bill for the NHI reform. The next day, on October 14 1982,
Minister Kim reaffirmed at the plenary session in the National Assembly that the
MoHSA needed to research more before submitting the bill. Four days later, on
October 18 1982, National Assembly members from the opposition parties refused
to participate in the plenary session of the Committee of the Health and Social
Affairs. They strongly attacked the government for not keeping its promise to
submit a reform bill to the National Assembly. After a long political debate between
the ruling and opposition parties in the subcommittee for ten days, both sides
reached the agreement that (Cha, 1992: 332):
• The subcommittee would put forward reform proposals with the MoHSA by
December 18 1982.
• The subcommittee would prepare a revised medical insurance bill based on
established ideas of reform. The ruling and opposition parties would submit the
proposal together to the National Assembly within the shortest time possible.
• The government should officially apologise to the CoHSA.
The executives in the ruling party, the DJP, and the MoHSA decided to
receive the confirmation from President Chun directly in order to work out this
(KIHSA).
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deadlock. Until then, there was no clear acknowledgement by the president
regarding the reform debate (Cha, 1992: 332). President Chun had ordered the
suspension of reform plans for more careful consideration of them but had not
ordered their abandonment. However, the Presidential Secretariat Office
consistently advised opposing the reforms.
According to Minister Kim, she planned a year's preparation for the reform
proposal, as she realised that it would be impossible to persuade President Chun at
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that moment under these political circumstances in the government. Minister Kim
tried to meet President Chun alone to persuade him to support the reform. Because
President Chun had an aggressive and quick decision-making style, she waited for a
chance to discuss seriously the issue with the president. However, the president
always brought along Youn to every meeting, a senior secretariat and strong
OA
opponent of the reform, stating that "Youn is a welfare expert." Therefore, she had
no chance to persuade the president. Minister Kim suggested in our interview that
the president might have had a bias against her because she was a female. He might
have thought that she did not have sufficient knowledge about government
administration in health care matters. Thus, the president took Minister Kim's
administrative suggestions less seriously with regard to reform. The Presidential
Secretariat Office furthermore did not wish to make political concessions to get the
reform through. Moreover, as the senior secretariats in the Presidential Secretariat
Office had consistently presented negative views against the reform to the president,
it would be difficult anyway to persuade the president of the reform case. Thus, the
minister decided to develop more collaborative arguments for the reform for one
year before persuading President Chun. In order to do this, she planned to choose
two representatives from each side of the debate from each of the National
T 1
Assembly, academic sectors, the Presidential Secretariat Office and the MoHSA.
Minister Kim reached an agreement about this plan with the Chair of the
CoHSA, such that the CoHSA would not take any action before the minister's plan
was completed. However, the chairman broke his promise and directly asked the
president for an opportunity to brief him on proposals for NHI reform, in actual fact
29 Interview with Kim, former Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
30 Ibid.
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buttonholing him at a dinner party. President Chun immediately allowed the
meeting, and it was held just a few days later, on November 2 1982, in the
Presidential Residence. In the meeting, Rhee Jong Chang, the General Secretary of
the DJP, Choi Young Chul, the Chair of the CoHSA, Kim Jung Rye, the Minister of
Health and Social Affairs, Kim Tae Ho, the Chief Secretariat of the Presidential
Secretariat Office, and Youn Sung Tae, the Senior Secretariat of the Presidential
Secretariat Office, participated in the meeting. The representatives of the National
Assembly and the MoHSA prepared a paper entitled the Proposal for Koreanised
National Medical Security. However, they failed to gain a clear support from
President Chun. After hearing the briefing from each side, President Chun
suggested that the reform was a complicated political issue that needed more
profound research.34
Regarding this political outcome, in the end, Minister Kim felt that the
inferiority of the National Assembly members was one of the reasons for the failure
of the NHI reform. Despite the agreement with Minister Kim, which promised to
allow one more year for preparing the reform, the CoHSA wanted to pass the reform
bill in the plenary session of 1982. Because they reached the decision to pass the
bill by a certain plenary session, they were in a hurry to resolve the issue
unconditionally in the plenary session under the harsh political atmosphere.
Nevertheless, Choi, the Chair of the CoHSA, rushed to the president to obtain final
approval for the reform, but it was failed.
On December 18 1982, the long debates about reforming the NHI scheme
ended with the closing of the plenary session of the National Assembly. Moreover,
the Presidential Secretariat Office delivered the presidential decision, which
suspended the proposal, to the MoHSA and the National Assembly. Thereafter,
further debate was allowed neither in the government nor in the National Assembly.
Thereafter, the Presidential Secretariat Office started to undermine civil
servants in the MoHSA who had been involved in the reform camp. In October
1982, in order to remove groups in MoHSA supportive of the reform, the
Presidential Secretariat Office pressured Minister Kim to get rid of certain high-
32 Ibid.
33 iu;^I
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ranking civil servants in the ministry, Assistant Minister Rhee, and Director Cha,35
who participated in the reform process, but she refused. At the beginning of
February 1983, these high-ranking civil servants as well as executives in the KMIC
and CFMIS were investigated by the security services. They were accused of
receiving bribes from the CFMIS for lobbying National Assembly members, and
profaning the president.36 Despite being proven innocent after the investigation,
some of them lost their positions.37 This incident well demonstrates the political
power of the Presidential Secretariat Office under the authoritarian regime. In 1986,
the Social Security Committee (SSC) in the MoHSA, a strong supporter group of the
reform, was also disbanded by new Minister Rhee Hae Won.
4.7 Currents within the First Reform Movement
The first proposal for NHI reform was actively pursued within the government,
including the Presidential Secretariat Office and the National Assembly. During the
policy process, political conflicts existed not only between the MoHSA and the
Presidential Secretariat Office but also between the MoHSA officers themselves.
First of all, NHI reform was Minister Cheon's unilateral idea, which brought
tension between executives within the ministry. MoHSA civil servants had already
started to implement the Plan for Merging and Abolishing Medical Insurance
Funding Societies, which was a former minister's plan, and they had a strong desire
to continue. In addition, some of the MoHSA civil servants opposed the reform
because they thought that it was realistically impossible to pursue at that time.
Secondly, some of them had been seriously involved in creating the separate
system from the very beginning of revising the Act. These civil servants organised a
powerful opposition group against the reform movement within the government.
Thirdly, in the advisory committee of Minister Cheon, Cheon was the main
figure in leading research and creating reform plans. This solo lead made officers
feel relatively excluded from the main policy-making body. The strong relationship
35 Rhee Doo Ho returned to the MoHSA as Vice-Minister in 1988. Cha Heung Bong was appointed
as Minister of Health and Welfare (MoHW) in 1999.
36 Interview with Rhee, former Vice-Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
37 Ibid.
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between the minister and his advisory committee might have caused an increase in
complaints from some other civil servants in the MoHSA.
However, Minister Cheon's strong desire to reform the NHI scheme also
made it possible to bring in many reform supporters not only in the MoHSA but also
in the National Assembly. This supportive atmosphere in the National Assembly
increased pressures for NHI reform. On the other hand, Minister Kim, who took
over Minister Cheon's reformist lead, failed to show strong leadership in moves
towards a unified NHI scheme within the MoHSA and for the committee members
in the CoHSA. This was because she had very limited options available to
overcome the harsh political atmosphere that was mostly created by the Presidential
Secretariat Office. Not only Minister Kim but also both the MoHSA and the
CoHSA faced difficulties to overcome pressures from the Presidential Secretariat
Office.
It has been found that the political background of ministers at the MoHSA
significantly influenced the policy direction of the department. Minister Cheon was
able to carry out the reform because he was relatively independent from
governmental interventions due to being a member of the opposition party.
However, Minister Kim, a politician from the ruling party, was in a different
position. Although she personally supported the reform, she could not appeal to the
movement and possessed only limited options in pursuing reform. In the end, the
attempt of the reform failed at the very last stage of the first reform movement after
a meeting with President Chun, the leader of the ruling party.
Table 4-3 List of Ministers of the MoHSA during the First Reform
Debate
Name Career Period
Cheon Myung KI MP ofOpposition Party 9/1980-5/1982
Kim Jung Rye MP ofRuling Party 5/1982-2/1985
Source: Applied from Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998,) The White Paper of Health and
Welfare; Youn Hap Tong Shin (1999) Korean Biographical Dictionary
Meanwhile, specialist groups, such as the advisory committee members and
other social policy experts, were able to present their opinions through seminars and
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public hearing sessions. This was of course meaningful for the specialist groups
because it brought the collective exposure of their thoughts to the public. However,
those specialist groups were not fully developed as an organised and influential
force. Particularly, they were not able to influence policy making strongly, having
failed to support their arguments with adequate evidence. In particular, they failed
to demonstrate sufficiently arguments in support of social insurance to the political
authorities. Also, even if the reform supporting group emphasised the importance of
income redistribution in the NHI scheme and argued the issue against the opposition
TO
group, there was no sufficient data to support the reform.
In contrast, the opposition was able to organise and spread its arguments and
demands through various channels, such as mass media and government institutions.
However, reformist groups failed to provide concrete explanations and data to
• • • TO
persuade President Chun of the merits of the project. In fact, not many academics
were interested in the socio-economic issues surrounding the implementation of the
NHI scheme at the beginning of the 1980s. There were not even sufficient research
data. Under these circumstances, the issue of NHI reform did not become a
significantly popular political subject matter in the academic sector and political
institutions.
In December 1982, with the publication of the research paper, the Rational
Proposal for the National Health Insurance Scheme for All Citizens, by the Korea
Institute for Welfare Policy, the problems latent in implementing the NHI scheme
acquired political importance. The research report clearly demonstrated the points
of inefficiency, inequity, inequality and the reversed income redistribution existing
in the NHI implementation by statistical analysis. This was the first official research
outcome, and it provided concrete evidence for the reformist side to argue for the
NHI reform. Furthermore, it provided more opportunity for experts to join the
reform movement.
Most of all, the most influential institution in the policy-making process of
the first reform debates was the Presidential Secretariat Office. The Presidential
38 Interview with Yoo, Chief Editor of the Newspaper of the Korean Medical Association.
39 Interview with Professor Kim Young Mo, Chief of the Korea Institute for Welfare Policy and
former committee member of the Research and Advisory Committee of the Medical Insurance
Scheme for the MoHSA, on 20 August 1999.
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Secretariat Officers exerted their influence strongly under the authoritarian military
regime. This is a good example of the centralisation of power in the Korean
bureaucracy during the 1980s under the authoritarian state. As the president had
absolute political power under the regime, the Presidential Secretariat Office was
also able to exert politically powerful leadership within the government. In
particular, the role of the two secretariat officers, who were sent from the MoHSA,
was extremely influential in decisions of the chief secretariat officer and the
president. And as these two secretariat officers were strong supporters of the
separate NHI system in the MoHSA, they lobbied other executives in the
government to reinforce their negative views regarding NHI reform.
Regarding the institutional power, Minister Cheon indicated in our interview
that he did not know "how much power the Presidential Secretariat Office had" or
"the style of the bureaucratic structure." He stated that he had been too naive in
dealing with the bureaucratic structure and with the policy-making structures of the
government. The minister concluded that his reform movement in the ministry
resulted in strengthening opposition power within the government. To avoid this, he
had to develop the reform movement through pre-consultations with executives in
other ministries and political institutions, according to Minister Cheon.40
The first debates around the NHI reform developed into a crucial political
issue in the government and in the National Assembly. Because there were not
sufficient research data to prove the condition of the current NHI scheme until the
end of 1982, the public did not have any special focus regarding the NHI scheme. In
addition, the NHI scheme covered only a very limited number of people; it was not
part of general public interest. Despite the lack of strong support from the public
and the government, the idea of reform was strong enough to produce these first
debates and to contribute a theoretical basis and programme that would be taken up
in subsequent debates.
40 Interview with Cheon, former Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
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Conclusion
Three years after the launch of the medical insurance programme, the first reform
movement was attempted. The first reform movement was initiated and led by
Minister Cheon in the MoHSA and the ministry initially involved in the policy
process for the reform. The debates regarding reform expanded to other policy¬
making institutions in government and the National Assembly. Accordingly,
reformist and anti-reformist sides were revealed during the policy process.
Like the policy-making process of the medical insurance programme in the
1960s and 1970s, this reform movement was initiated and developed by a certain
elite group within a few policy-making institutions in government. The public was
neither involved in this policy debate nor interested in this reform movement.
Again, the decision of the president was extremely powerful in the policy process.
In particular, the Presidential Secretariat Office was highly involved in the policy
process and critically influenced the political involvement. The decision of the
president was significantly influenced by the voice of the Presidential Secretariat
Office.
The National Assembly and political parties contributed to urging the
government on medical insurance reform but failed to propose a profound plan as
law-makers to policy-making institutions. The resistance to the reform by insurers,
such as the NCMIS and the enterprise organisations, was revealed in association
with the media enterprises, but it was not strong enough to influence the policy
process. In addition, the involvement of the FKTU and the KMA in the policy
process was weak. This was because the policy process of the NHI reform was
operated mainly within the government and the National Assembly by a small
number of participants, and the authoritarian-political environment also dominated
the policy-making ground.
First, strong elitism and institutionalism were engaged in the policy process
during this period. Although the group of participants in the policy-making process
of the NHI reform widened in comparison to the 1960s and 1970s, the range of the
membership in the policy-making arena was still confined to the limited number of
elite bureaucrats and politicians as well as governmental agencies. The crucial
decision-making power was concentrated in the presidency.
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Second, the reform movement resulted neither from the effect of economic
development nor from the pressure of class conflict. It emerged from a personal
interest of the Minister of Health and Social Affairs. Thus, the initiative of NHI
reform was influenced by internal elements rather than by external environmental
factors.
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Chapter 5. The Second Movement for Reform of The
NHI (1986-1989)
In this chapter, the policy process of the second movement for reform of the NHI
scheme is considered. This is undertaken through examining in chronological order
the influence of different interest groups involved during the period from 1986 to
1989, the extent to which different parties exerted influence over policy, and the
outcome of their activities.
After President Chun's decision to suspend plans for reform of the NHI
scheme in November 1982, any political action for reform was not allowed inside
government. But in the summer of 1986, when President Chun announced his plan
to expand coverage of the NHI to the entire population by 1989, as part of a broader
strategy to improve the national health care system, the movement for reform of the
NHI scheme started to stir again.
The second movement for reform of the NHI scheme coincided with the
emergence of broader social reform movements, and thus the policy making process
around NHI reform was more complicated than the original reforms at the beginning
of the 1980s.
5.1 Expansion of NHI and Institutional Melee
After President Chun's decision to suspend NHI reform in November 1982, high-
ranking civil servants who had supported the reform were removed from the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA), and any discussion about reform
was prohibited within government. Subsequently, in February 1985 Rhee Hai
Won,1 a strong conservative politician, was appointed as the new Minister of Health
and Social Affairs. Following his appointment, the Social Security Committee
(SSC) within the MoHSA, which had been undertaking research into reform of the
NHI as well as putting forward ideas for social welfare policy for almost two
decades, was abolished in 1986 (Kim, 1988: 431).
Meanwhile, Youn Sung Tae and Kim Jong Dae, who strongly opposed the
1 Rhee Hai Won was a National Assemblyman in conservative-ruling parties for his entire political
career - in the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) under the Park regime (1971-1980) and in the
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) under the Chun regime (1981-1985).
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NHI reform and worked in the Presidential Secretariat Office, returned to senior
executive positions in the MoHSA in 1986 - as Assistant Minister for Planning and
Management and Head of Social Insurance Bureau respectively. Hence, strong
supporters of a separate NHI system occupied senior positions in the MoHSA and
were heavily involved in future policy-making on the medical insurance programme.
As a result, Minister Rhee subsequently gained support to pursue a separate system.
Why did the government appoint Rhee to the position of minister? The
executive in opposition to reform in the government might have needed a strong
conservative leader to alleviate concerns in the MoHSA caused by Minister Cheon
and Kim's proposed reforms. From the point of view of the government, and
particularly of the Presidential Secretariat Office, Rhee was a strong leader in the
political arena and had ready access to parliamentary leaders using his established
political network. Thus, the government might have wanted an experienced
politician to deal with the impending unrest in the government and the National
Assembly, as well as someone to develop a separate NHI scheme
Minister Rhee put forward a proposal called Major Projects ofthe MoHSA in
1986 at a meeting with President Chun on February 11 1986. At the meeting, the
minister proposed that the MoHSA would expand NHI coverage to rural areas under
a separate system. He also suggested that the head of local government should be
the managing director of the local NHI funding society (Newspaper of the KMA,
February 13 1986).
Just a day after Minister Rhee's proposal was put to the president, the
Korean Medical Association (KMA) started lobbying. From the perspective of the
KMA, the expansion of the medical insurance programme was a significant positive
development, as it provided a second opportunity following the NHI implementation
of 1977 to expand the medical market and increase the number of patients; however,
this development of medical insurance also threatened the professional status of
doctors. On February 12 1986, the KMA requested a meeting with the Democratic
Justice Party (DJP), the ruling political party, and requested that the KMA be
involved in the policy-making. The KMA also emphasised that there were
significant issues that needed to be discussed: financing, restructuring of the
administrative system, fee schedules and the efficiency of medical resources as part
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of any policy discussions on extending the NHI system (Newspaper of the KMA,
February 17 1986).2
On March 5 1986, at a meeting between the government and the DJP the
Comprehensive Plans for Farming and Fishing Areas were announced. This plan
had been prepared by a task force led by the Budget Director at the Economic
Planning Board (EPB), who had been working on it since October 1985 (Park, 1996:
118). This plan outlined the government's general agricultural policy, and also
included issues of supplementary incomes for farmers, education and measures to
improve health care policy for agricultural and fishing areas.
At the same time, a task force at the MoHSA, led by the Director of the
Insurance Division, started to work on a new proposal to cover the entire population
• • • • T
by the medical insurance by expanding the roles of local NHI funding societies. On
March 25 1986, the Vice-Minister of Health and Social Affairs and the EPB agreed
to expand the current NHI scheme. The MoHSA argued that if the government
increased the efficiency of medical services and the NHI contribution rate, it would
be possible to expand the NHI scheme to the entire population without additional
financial support from the government. However, the EPB insisted that it was
inevitable that the government would have to subsidise the NHI scheme to expand
its coverage because the NHI budget would rise with the increase of medical use and
in medical cost. In a session of the Committee of Health and Social Affairs
(CoHSA) at the National Assembly in April, the MoHSA again argued that the NHI
scheme would be able to expand coverage to the entire population without financial
support from the government. But the EPB again stressed that it could not agree to
the MoHSA's plan without a reasonable financial solution. Subsequently the EPB
became interested in a unified NHI administration system as a means of minimising
the financial burden on the government (Park, 1996: 118 & 146).
On May 28 1986, at a meeting with the government, the DJP put forward the
2
According to medical providers, the government set the fee at 45% lower than the actual cost as
measured at the general hospital in Seoul when the NHI was implemented in 1977 (Moon, 1997:
415). Consequently, for the KMA the fee level had been the most controversial part of the policy
since the NHI scheme was introduced.
3 The DJP promised to implement an NHI scheme covering the entire population from 1987 prior to
the 12th general election in February 1985. The DJP announced that the party would look at concrete
plans in conjunction with the government as soon as the party had decided the principles of the policy
(Kyung Hyang Shin Moon, January 28 1986).
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Project for Six Tasks, which included: (D a minimum wage scheme; © an NHI
scheme for the entire population; © compulsory education at junior high school and
free education at vocational high school for the poor living in urban areas; ® special
arrangements for leasing housing to labourers, administered by the local
government; © a booming local economy preparing for the local self-government
system; and © a comprehensive social security system for the poor in urban areas
(Seoul Shin Moon, May 29 1986). And it was agreed that they would pursue this
project in 1987. At this meeting, the DJP also put forward a clear timetable to
extend coverage of the NHI scheme to the entire population; and they proposed
implementing an NHI scheme for farming and fishing areas in 1988 and for urban
areas in 1989. The government accepted the timetable proposed by the DJP and
began to discuss the feasibility of the plans based on this timeframe (Park, 1996:
119-120 & 136).4
The DJP, as the ruling party, led the political debate on welfare issues during
the mid-1980s and put plans to extend coverage of the NHI scheme to the entire
population high on the political agenda. What made the DJP interested in the
development of medical insurance? Firstly, President Chun, the actual leader of the
party, was strong in support of health care development. President Chun wanted to
complete the expansion of the medical insurance programme to the entire population
before the end of the 1980s because the social and economic conditions in
agricultural areas had become a serious political issue. These conditions put
pressure on the president to ensure that the new NHI project would be carried out.5
Secondly, this idea of the president also provided a positive message to the party
because it would contribute to setting an attractive political pledge for electorates
preparing for an upcoming general and presidential election, in the party's point of
view.
At a meeting with senior civil servants at the MoHSA on July 11 1986, the
DJP opposed the MoHSA's plan to extend coverage of the medical insurance under
a separate system. The MoHSA and the DJP had opposing views regarding the NHI
development from the initial stages of policy-setting in mid-1986. These differences
of opinion were not narrowed until April 1987. At the time, the majority of CoHSA
4 The Projectfor Six Tasks was a welfare policy targeted at low-income families.
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members in the National Assembly and the DJP members in the committee still
supported a unified administration system (Cha, 1992: 337-338).
The DJP also objected to the EPB's plans. The EPB proposed creating a
special taxation scheme, a 'health security tax', to increase the financial capacity of
the NHI scheme. The DJP argued that adopting another special tax would meet with
strong resistance from the Korean public, as there were already special taxation
schemes in place for national defence and education. Faced with such strong
opposition from the DJP, the EPB began to consider a unified NHI administration
system. However, such a system was strongly opposed by the MoHSA, which did
not want to discuss alternative administrative arrangements for the new NHI scheme
with either the DJP or the EPB. This clash between the EPB and the MoHSA was
reminiscent of similar events leading up to the implementation of the first NHI
scheme at the end of the 1970s. During that time, the Minister of EPB and the
Minister ofHealth and Social Affairs had clashed over the same issue.6
Meanwhile, the DJP were considering the financial details of the NHI
expansion plans and proposed the following (Seoul Shin Moon, July 19 1986):
• Gradual unification of fragmented NHI funding societies into one state funding
authority.
• Re-adjusting the rate of the contributions.
• Increasing the out of pocket payment of the insured.
We can deduce the policy direction of the party through these proposals:
first, the DJP wanted to avoid a radical unification of fragmented funding societies,
even though the party ultimately supported the unified system; second, the ruling
party had a conservative view in dealing with the financing of medical insurance.
To minimise impact from the outside, the party preferred a financing plan for the
insurance that would increase contributions and out-of-pocket payments rather than
create a new financing source.
5 Interview with Yoo In Wang, ChiefEditor of the Newspaper of the Korean Medical Association.
6 Ibid.
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At an official press conference on August 11 1986, President Chun officially
announced that the NHI scheme would cover the entire population in 1989, and thus
put the policy high on the political agenda. However, the president announced that
the administrative structure of the new NHI scheme would be decided at a later date.
From then, the administrative structure of the scheme became a hot political issue
between the government and other political institutions. While the MoHSA
continued to argue that the government would not need to provide additional
financial support under a separate administration system, the DJP supported a
unified administration system. In between the MoHSA and the DJP, the EPB
examined the validity of both types of administration systems. This dispute carried
on until the end of 1986 without any agreement (Park, 1996: 121; Yoo, 1996: 164-
165; Cha, 1992: 338; Seoul Shin Moon, August 12 1986).
In examining this disagreement between the EPB and the MoHSA, we need
to pay close attention to what the primary concerns were of those key political
institutions and what they hoped to achieve.
The EPB, the department in charge of government spending, was keen to
reduce the financial burden on government as much as possible, regardless of the
type of administrative system that would be applied to the new NHI scheme. The
DJP supported a unified administration system, but its resolve to accomplish this
goal was weaker than it had been during the first reform movement, because their
party leader, President Chun, did not fully support such a system. The Presidential
Secretariat Office, the president's backbone, continued to oppose a unified system,
and therefore it was difficult for the DJP to keep pushing for reform. Ultimately, the
DJP suggested an alternative plan, which was a gradual unification of the
fragmented system, to resolve the administrative and financial matters.
However, the MoHSA's attitude towards financing the NHI scheme was
quite different from that of the EPB or the DJP. The MoHSA insisted that the new
NHI scheme could be implemented under a separate system without additional
financial assistance from the government and continuously attempted to persuade
the EPB and the DJP of this view. The separate system promoted by the MoHSA
was a more attractive option for the Presidential Secretariat Office because it would
minimise the government's role and its responsibility for implementing a new health
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policy. Consequently, the MoHSA and the Presidential Secretariat Office worked
closely on this issue.
In the disarray over how to take the policy forward, the Korean Employers
Federation (KEF) expressed its support for a separate administration system as it had
done at the beginning of the 1980s. At a board meeting of the trustees of the KEF,
on August 26 1986, they put forward the Proposal for the Unification of the
Organisations and Financing of the NHI Scheme, which proposed that the
government should expand the medical insurance programme under the existing
separate administration system (Cha, 1992: 339-340).7
An official presentation by President Chun on developing the NHI scheme
forced the government and the ruling party to get going and work on the policy. At
a meeting between the government and the DJP held in the Presidential Residence
on September 1 1986, the government announced the Plan for National Welfare as
part of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development. The sixth
five-year plan included plans for the NHI scheme as well as a national pension
programme, a minimum wage scheme, support for the poor living in urban areas,
and protection for people with disabilities (Won, 1990: 48). In the Sixth Five-Year
Plan for Social and Economic Development, the government focused on improving
national welfare as its primary goal, in contrast to the preceding five Five-Year plans
for Economic Development. In addition, the word social was added to the title of
the national plan (its earlier title was Five-Year Plan for Economic Development).
This means that the government reflected its distinctive intention to develop social
sectors for the country from the sixth plan.
In the meantime, on October 18 1986, the Budget Office for Health and
Social Affairs at the EPB presented a report, Social Insurance and Income
Redistribution, which was negative about developing an NHI scheme under a
separate system, and pointed out the following problems which were likely to arise
in such a scheme (Won, 1990: 49):
• Under the current taxation structure, as revenue from indirect tax is high, those
excluded from the current NHI scheme would pay towards financing the medical
7 The KEF repeated the same contents as the KEF announced in the beginning of the 1980s. See
pp. 109-110 in Chapter 4.
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insurance.
• Because uninsured services are not covered by the NHI fund, they place a
heavier financial burden on low-income classes, so it is possible that for them
such out-of-pocket payments would create a barrier to accessing medical
services.
• Increasing government revenue through a more progressive taxation system
would assist in financing the NHI scheme because the current fixed rate of
contributions provides limited income redistribution.
• Government support towards contributions might lead to those insured with
higher incomes in urban areas receiving more financial support than those on
lower incomes insured in farming and fishing areas under a separate
administration system.
In December 1986, the KMA lobbied the MoHSA, the EPB, the CoHSA, the
DJP and opposition parties on a number of issues: increasing fee schedules;
establishing an independent review body to investigate the cost of NHI medical
examinations and treatments; and guaranteed payments for NHI medical services.
On January 22 1987, the KMA also proposed that joint research be undertaken with
the government to calculate a realistic level for fees. Then on March 5 1987, the
KMA in conjunction with the Korean Hospital Association (KHA), put forward the
following proposals to the MoHSA (Newspaper of the KMA, March 9 1987):
• Undertake joint research to determine a proper level for fees.
• Increase fee schedules for the Medical Aid scheme.
• Establish an independent review body to investigate the cost of NHI medical
examinations and treatments.
• Carefully consider what kind of administrative system the NHI scheme should
have, as this is crucial in determining the success or failure of the scheme.
• Establish a statutory guarantee for payment ofmedical fees.
• Provide tax incentives for medical providers.
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In 1987, as the deadline was approaching for implementing the NHI scheme
for farming and fishing areas, the government and the DJP began to move faster to
resolve the issue. On February 17 1987, the MoHSA and the EPB reached an
agreement to build 134 local NHI funding societies by July 1987 and to increase fee
schedules by between 10% and 20% every year. The government decided to put
this proposal to the DJP.
Why did the EPB accept the separate system for the new scheme? The
research paper, the Evaluation of the Pilot Programme of the NHI Scheme in Rural
Areas, published by the Korea Institute for Population and Health (KIPH), was
highly influential in shaping the EPB's policy on the NHI administration system.
The KIPH was a think-tank within the MoHSA.8 The report of the KIPH
highlighted to the EPB that a unified administration system could not guarantee the
financial stability of the NHI scheme, as it would be difficult for the government to
determine an accurate rate for NHI contributions based on the income levels of those
insured under the current taxation system, and therefore income redistribution and
financial stability could not be achieved (Park, 1996: 123 & 146-147). But we
cannot dismiss the possibility that the KIPH might have intentionally backed the
political stance of the MoHSA through the research outcome because the think-
thank belonged to the ministry.
To the extent that the EPB did not have a specific preference regarding the
new NHI administration system, the EPB gave more credence to the MoHSA's
views. Since the current separate system had worked since the NHI was
implemented - although problems had been encountered during its implementation,
the system was seen by the EPB as a safer and more feasible option than a unified
administration system which would prove more challenging.
After reaching agreement with the MoHSA, the EPB changed its stance and
supported a separate administration system. On February 27 1987, the DJP held a
'Policy Forum for Implementing the NHI Scheme for the Entire Population'. At the
forum, Kang Bong Kyun, Head of the Economic Planning Bureau at the EPB,
8 The title of the institute was later changed to the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs
(KIHSA).
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together with Jang Won Chan, President of the National Federation of Medical
Insurance (NFMI), and Kim Jong Dae, Head of the Social Insurance Bureau at the
MoHSA, supported a separate administration system for the NHI scheme, whereas
Park Sung Tae, National Assemblyman of the DJP, Kim Young Mo, Professor of
Chung Ang University, and Cha Heung Bong, Professor of Hallym University, all
supported a unified administration system (Newspaper of the KMA, March 5 1987).
Here, we need to note two aspects. First, Cha Heung Bong participated in this
forum as a panel member for the reformist side. Cha was a high-ranking civil
servant at the MoHSA and had been sacked in February 1983 because of the
political conspiracy around the first reform movement. He taught at the university
and was appointed Minister of Health and Welfare under the new government of
Kim Dae Jung in 1999. Second, we can observe that the EPB changed its political
direction over the medical insurance agenda; Kang, Head of the Economic Planning
Bureau, was on the side supporting the separate system at the forum.
5.2 The Agreement between the MoHSA and the Ruling DJP
On April 11 1987, the MoHSA and the ruling DJP finally reached an agreement to
adopt a separate administration system for the NHI scheme for those in rural areas.
We need to question why the DJP changed its stance and agreed to a separate
administration system after long debates.
First, as there were no signs of government departments reaching an
agreement on the issue of the administrative system, the DJP was probably
encouraged to compromise on this matter by more influential government bodies
such as the Presidential Secretariat Office. According to the unanimous time-table
for implementing the new NHI scheme, time was running out for setting up the legal
content of a new NHI legislation. Thus, it was extremely important for the
government to move on to the next stage and fulfil its promise. Secondly, the DJP
might have perceived that the constant conflict with ministries and other government
organs would undermine and embarrass the party. Thirdly, since the Presidential
Secretariat Office had not supported the DJP's proposals for reform, the DJP
possibly decided to compromise on the issue. Fourthly, the DJP might have
admitted that there were differences in incomes and an unequal distribution of
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medical facilities between urban and rural areas. Thus, the party finally accepted the
practical difficulty of pursuing the unified system. Among them, the third and
fourth reasons provide the better explanations for this situation. Considering the
strong opposing view of the Presidential Secretariat Office and the negative research
outcome of the KIPH over the unified system, the DJP could not find further
justification to support the unified administration system.
It was agreed between the MoHSA and the DJP that there would be a
separate system for the new NHI scheme but that the scheme would be transformed
to a unified administration system in the near future (Cha, 1992:338). The
compromise mostly reflected the demands of the MoHSA, but the DJP alternatively
got an agreement for greater local coverage by NHI funding societies. In the
negotiations between the MoHSA and the DJP, the DJP insisted on city- (Si) based
NHI funding societies in exchange for agreeing to a separate administration system.
However, the MoHSA continued to insist on /f«9-based funding societies, as this
would make it easier for the government to collect contributions and it decreased its
responsibility by sharing it with local government (Park, 1996: 124).
The main points of the agreement are outlined below (Park, 1996: 124;
Newspaper of the KMA, April 23 1987):
• The NHI administration system would be restructured into a unified
administration system in the future. However, after taking into account the real
differences in incomes and the uneven distribution of medical services between
rural and urban areas, the new NHI scheme would initially be implemented
under a separate administration system.
• In order to improve income redistribution and administrative efficiency, the
principles of a unified system would be adopted within the new NHI scheme and
the management of local NHI funding societies would be improved. In addition,
the five present sectors within the NHI scheme (business, government and
private schools, local, types of occupation and voluntary) would be re-organised
into three sectors (business, government and private schools, and local).
9 Ku is an administrative-local district under city in Korea.
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• NHI funding societies would be established at city-size level (Si and Kun'°).
There would be one funding society respectively for Seoul and other large cities
to cover the entire area of the city.
• For farmers, fishermen and the self-employed on low-incomes living in rural
areas, the government would provide some support towards contributions.
• The government would cover the administrative costs of the NHI scheme for
farming and fishing areas.
• More funds would be invested in public health centres for medical equipment
and better medical services in farming and fishing areas.
• In 32 local areas with underdeveloped medical infrastructures, private hospitals
would be encouraged along with tax and financial incentives.
Prior to the presidential election (in December 1987) and following the
general election (in April 1988), the ruling party successfully included some crucial
points related to farmers and fishermen as well as to rural areas in the agreement to
draw votes from electorates living in local areas. However, at the last stage the
Presidential Secretariat Office opposed the establishment of funding societies at a
city level because it wanted to avoid the additional financial burden and
responsibility that this type of arrangement would incur. A wider local coverage
system placed more responsibilities on local funding authorities to levy accurate
amounts of contributions on and to collect contributions from the insured. In
particular, as the beneficiaries in the rural areas were the self-employed, whose
income level and source were not clearly revealed, this kind of coverage system
could put more administrative risks and financial responsibilities on the local
funding societies as well as the government in terms of managing the local medical
insurance.
President Chun ordered a review of the administrative system on April 22,
and on April 28 1987 the president took the decision to establish ATw-based rather
than city- (Si) based funding societies. As each city consisted of a number of Ku in
10 Si and Kun refer to the city-size districts.
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Korea, more funding societies were needed to manage the NHI insured under the
Ku-based administration system. The Presidential Secretariat Office still preferred
smaller coverage by local funding societies, as this could make it possible for
government to avoid more intervention in the medical insurance programme.
Accordingly, Minister Rhee at the MoHSA reported the decision to the executive of
the DJP and the Chair of the CoHSA, and the debate on establishing a new NHI
scheme between the government and the DJP was finally brought to a close (Cha,
1992: 339).
We need to note two points throughout this decision-making: first, the policy
interest of the MoHSA and that of the Presidential Secretariat Office almost
coincided; second, the policy direction of the Presidential Secretariat Office was
directly reflected in the decision of the president. Hence, from this we may also
infer that: firstly, there was still a strong bond between executives of the MoHSA
and the Presidential Secretariat Office in the policy-making of medical insurance;
secondly, the Presidential Secretariat Office was still influential at the crucial stage
of the decision-making; thirdly, the president relied heavily on the presidential
secretariats in the health care-policy process.
5.3 Autonomy and Policy-Involvement of Doctors
On April 29 1987, just after this agreement was reached, the KMA held a meeting
on NHI policy. The KMA called on the MoHSA to: (D increase fee schedules; ®
undertake a joint review of the new scheme with the KMA and the government; ®
establish an independent review body to examine NHI medical fees; @ appoint a
medical practitioner, with their own private clinic or hospital, as head of such a
review body; © issue public guidelines on standards under the NHI medical fee; and
© outline why the government had cut the NHI payment to medical providers (Park,
1996: 127).
On September 11 1987, senior officials at the KMA had a meeting with Kim
Young Sam, the leader of the Reunification and Democratic Party (RDP), and Roh
Tae Woo, the leader of the DJP. This illustrates that the KMA moved quickly to
lobby the political parties prior to the presidential election in December. The KMA
put forward the following proposals to both political leaders (Newspaper of the
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KMA, September 14 1987):
• Appoint a medical professional as a senior executive to deal with health care and
medical policy in the government.
• Readjust fee schedules to an acceptable figure.
• Guarantee payment to medical providers for NHI treatments within a statutory
time period."
• Guarantee the social status ofmedical professionals.
• Establish an independent review body to investigate the fee of NHI medical
examinations and treatments.
• Prevent the over-supply ofmedical practitioners in the market.
These repeated demands from the KMA arose out of general concerns
amongst medical professionals about their professional and economic autonomy.
When the NHI scheme was first implemented in 1977, the government relied heavily
on a price control policy over NHI fees for the rapid take-off of the medical
insurance programme. As the government wanted to minimise financial support for
the medical insurance, there was limited means of expanding coverage of the
programme in the short term. The only option was to lower the level of fees in
comparison to the actual market price, and to increase the patients' out-of-pocket
payment for insured services. From the point of view ofmedical providers, the level
at which fees were set for NHI treatments was regulated by the government, and this
was an intrusion by the government which threatened their professional and
economic autonomy. Meanwhile, those who were insured still had to pay a higher
rate for any medical treatment they received under the medical insurance programme
because of the lower rate ofbenefits.
However, it was inevitable that the government chose this option to achieve
extensive development of the medical insurance programme in such a short period
'' This issue was one of the primary concerns of the KMA because reimbursement for NHI treatment
was often delayed by funding authorities. Thus, medical providers had seriously complained about
the system.
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under the current socio-economic circumstances. Under the socio-economic
conditions at the end of the 1970s, the majority of the population in Korea could not
afford to pay contributions. Therefore, the government had to set a relatively low
rate for contributions to increase participation in the medical insurance, and to start
coverage ofmedical insurance with those who could afford to pay the contributions.
Doctors had been concerned by the huge structural changes in the medical
market over the previous few years, and they wanted reassurance about their
professional status. Thus, such demands from the KMA reflected doctors' fears
about the consequences of expanding the NHI scheme to the entire population.
They could foresee major issues arising with the forthcoming implementation of an
NHI scheme for rural areas in 1988 and a scheme for the entire population in 1989,
particularly in terms of economic autonomy and their income, despite the fact that
19
the new scheme would allow more people access to medical treatment. This was
because firstly, as medical doctors would no longer be able to treat uninsured
patients, they would be deprived of their extra income from uninsured patients.13
Secondly, the income of medical practitioners would be available to the medical
insurance and taxation authorities because the providers would have to claim a fee
from them for every single medical treatment.
12 In contrast, the Korean Pharmacist Association (KPA) was concerned that pharmacists would lose
their income if the NHI scheme for the entire population was implemented. These concerns of the
KMA and the KPA resulted from the way medical services were delivered in Korea. Korea did not
have a system for separating the prescribing and dispensing of drugs. In other words, physicians and
pharmacists had both been able to prescribe and dispense drugs. Thus, provision of medicine within
medical institutions had become one of the primary ways to increase profits under the regulated fee
schedule of the NHI system. Meanwhile, pharmacists working in pharmacies were able to sell and
provide drugs to patients without a doctor's prescription. Before and after the NHI scheme was
introduced in 1977, going to a pharmacy for drugs was more convenient and cheaper for uninsured
patients, in particular for the lower income groups and patients living in rural areas where there were
limited medical institutions. As a result of this system, there has been severe misuse of drugs in the
country.
During the pilot programmes of the NHI scheme at the beginning of the 1980s, income for
pharmacists in some areas declined. In order to address the issue of the falling income of pharmacists
and to prevent drug misuse, the government tried to set up a separate system for prescribing and
dispensing drugs. However, ongoing efforts at reform of the delivery system failed for almost two
decades due to clashes between doctors and pharmacists. Finally, a separate structure for prescribing
and dispensing drugs was agreed by the two groups as a result of mediation, and the new system was
established from August 2000. Differences of opinion between the KMA and the KPA to safeguard
their own interests have been endless, with both sides battling to secure profits and to an extent to
acquiring competence in the preparation of medicines. This case would be another interesting topic
to study as part of the policy-making process of health policy in Korea, but this will have to remain as
the subject of future research.
13 Due to the low level of fee schedules of the NHI scheme regulated by the government, medical
Ch.5 - The Second Movement for Reform of the NHI 140
These concerns were reflected in the Policy Direction ofthe KMA Regarding
the NHIScheme for the Entire Population, introduced in June 1986 (Korean Medical
Association, 1986):
The proper level of fee schedule should be applied to the medical
treatment of doctors under the medical insurance. The fee schedule
should be decided on the basis of a mutual contract [between the
medical provider and the insurer]. In the meantime, the level of fees
which is not covered by the medical insurance, needs to be fixed
under a liberal-market system. Then, the medical service can satisfy
various medical needs of citizens who live in a capitalist society
(P-31).
The KMA (1986) also emphasised in the report that "after the implementation of the
NHI scheme for the entire population, medical treatment for uninsured services
should be allowed to doctors, and the price setting of uninsured treatment should be
done by a market price" (p.34).
As the medical practitioners had the most to lose with regard to the proposed
development of the NHI scheme, the KMA consistently called on the government to
appoint a medical professional as the top executive in charge of the scheme. The
KMA were not confident that they could achieve their demands - especially on the
issue of regulated fees - given the current administration within government.
Hence, the KMA had to lobby hard. The KMA lobbied Park Sung Tae and Kim
Jip14, DJP members of the National Assembly, on the amendment bill of the Medical
Insurance Act to expand the scheme to farming and fishing areas to reflect KMA's
interests. Through their efforts, the KMA was successful in ensuring that its
interests were reflected in the amendment bill which was submitted to the MoHSA.
The demands were to: CD increase the number of doctors on the NHI Deliberating
Committee; © guarantee NHI payments to medical providers; and ® guarantee the
social status of medical professionals. In addition, the KMA's request regarding an
increase in the rate of fees was also accepted, and the level was increased by 12.2%
on February 15 1988. Another demand for a medical professional to be appointed as
providers had earned extra income from uninsured patients and uninsured services.
14 Both were medical doctors.
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a senior executive within the MoHSA was accepted, and Kwon Ei Hyuk was
appointed as Minister of Health and Social Affairs on February 25 1988 (Park, 1996:
128-129).
The amendment bill of the Medical Insurance Act was discussed at meetings
between the MoHSA and the DJP on October 14 and 19 1987. Park Sung Tae, Kim
Jip and Shim Kook Moo attended the meetings on behalf of the DJP, and Choi Soo
II, Vice-Minister, Youn Sung Tae, Assistant Minister for Planning and Management,
and Kim Jong Dae, Head of the Social Insurance Bureau, also attended the meetings.
The bill15 was passed in the National Assembly on October 30 and the NHI scheme
for farming and fishing areas was due to be implemented on January 1 1988 (Park,
1996: 125). In the end, the strategy of the KMA, in positioning two physician-
parliamentary members in the front line of the policy-making, was successful in
inserting some of its interests into the bill.
5.4 Democratisation in the Country
While the final details of the newNHI scheme were being discussed, President Chun
and his ruling party were facing serious civil unrest. On April 13 1987, President
Chun had announced that he would not reform the constitution, and that the
presidential election planned for December 1987 would be conducted under the
existing constitutional law. The president would therefore be elected through a
ballot of the electoral college. This electoral system had been used by President
Park to ensure that his presidency would not be brought to an end through lack of
public support. This announcement by President Chun provoked nationwide
demonstrations. Many ordinary citizens and university students took part in the
demonstrations, and violent confrontations broke out between demonstrators and
police across the country. Opposition parties established the National Committee
for Constitutional Reform to organise demonstrations for constitutional reform. As
a result, on June 29 1987, the presidential candidate of the ruling party, Roh Tae
Woo, pledged that he would introduce constitutional reform.16 Roh commented that
the Constitution would be amended to adopt a direct presidential election system.
15 The proposal was submitted by Kim Jip and Park Sung Tae.
,6 This is called the 6.29 Declaration.
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Subsequently, the main political parties agreed on a new constitution whereby the
president would be elected directly by the public. On December 16 1987, Roh Tae
Woo was elected president through the new presidential electoral system (Oh, 1999:
99; Kwon, 1999: 60-61).
Despite the DJP's victory at the presidential election, the party failed to win
even half the seats at the following 13th general election on April 26 1988. The main
three opposition parties - the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) of Kim Dae
Jung, the Reunification and Democratic Party (RDP) of Kim Young Sam and the
New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) of Kim Jong Pil - successfully obtained
56.7% of the National Assembly seats compared to 38.8% that the DJP had secured,
which meant that the new president and the ruling party, the DJP, faced significant
difficulties in taking the political lead during the Sixth Republic (Kwon, 1999: 63-
64). It was expected that for the first time in Korean politics there would be
confrontation between the president and the National Assembly.
Table 5-1 The Result of the 13th Presidential and General Election
DJP, Roh Tae Woo PPD, Kim Dae Jung RDP, Kim Young Sam NDRP, Kim Jong Pil
% of votes in the 13th presidential 36.6 % 27.1 % 28.1% 8.1%
election
% of seats in the National
Assembly, following the 13"'
general election 38 8 % 241 % 20 5 % 121 %
Source: Kwon, HJ (1999) p.64.
5.5 The Farmers' Movement
Soon after the NHI scheme for farming and fishing areas was implemented at the
beginning of 1988, complaints from those insured in these areas began to surface.
This was because, first of all, NHI contributions from those insured were higher than
that of waged employees in the private sector, the government and the private
schools. Secondly, the method for calculating the level of contributions was
different from that of the NHI scheme for employees and teachers. Thirdly, the
government set up a different health care delivery system for those insured in rural
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areas so that they were obliged to make appointments at small and medium-sized
medical institutions before they could make an appointment at larger medical
institutions. Fourthly, the uneven distribution of medical institutions and
practitioners in rural areas became a sensitive issue. And, fifthly, distrust of NHI
local funding societies increased amongst those insured (Lee, 1991: 161).
Concerning the fifth aspect, in particular, questions had also begun to be
raised about the process for appointing managing directors to NHI funding societies,
not only in the political arena but also amongst the public.
Table 5-2 The Background of the Managing Directors of the NHI
Funding Societies
Governing Military Civil Enterprise Right Expert Others Total
Party or Servant Wing Org.
Police
Seoul 6334 5 21
Bu San 1 I 8 1 1 12
Dae Gu 1 3 12 7
In Cheon 14 1 6
GwangJu 3 3
Dae Cheon 1 4 5
GyungGi 4 7 12 1 15
Gwang Won 2 2 11 6
Chung Cheong 16 7
Jeon Ra 2 6 12 11
Gyung Sang 1 1 12 4 1 19
JeJu 2 2
TOTAL 19 6 60 7 11 9 2 114
% 17 5.3 52.6 6.1 9.6 7.9 1.8 100.3
Source: The 1989 Parliamentary Inspection of State Administration, the National Assembly of the
Republic of Korea (September 19 - October 7, 1989), p. 163.
As shown in Table 5-2, 52.6% of the managing directors of funding societies
were former civil servants. Moreover, 83.4% of the managing directors were from
the ruling party, national defence institutions, the government or a right-wing
organisation. Clearly, as illustrated above, most of the directors did not have a
civilian background, and this therefore indicates why the funding societies had been
losing credibility amongst the general population. In addition, those who had
advocated a separate administration system had insisted that one of the merits of a
separate system was greater autonomy over their funding society by those insured.
However, the fact that most of the directors of the funding societies were appointed
from particular political groups made it hard to claim that these societies were 'self-
governing.'
Complaints over the new NHI scheme began to be voiced at a local level, but
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it took time before these concerns developed into a collective movement. On
January 15 1988, the Association for Farmers in Young Dong Kun (local district), in
Northern Chung Cheong province, who had begun to organise collectively,
delivered leaflets presenting their arguments on how the new scheme needed to be
reformed. The leaflets were entitled, the Claims of80,000 Farmers in Young Dong,
and put forward the following demands (Ko, 1989: 124):
• The government should subsidise over 90% of NHI contributions for farmers
and fishermen.
• Except for rich farmers, farmers and fishermen should be exempt from
contributions.
• The NHI service should be free to families in poverty.
• Greater transparency is needed in the policies of the NHI funding societies.
Although farmers gradually began to raise their concerns over the design of
the new NHI scheme, because they were so dispersed it was difficult to establish a
unified voice to present the arguments of different groups to the government. In
spite of being disorganised and dispersed, however, the activities of the farmers in
the different regions continued to gain popularity across the country. Their major
demands were as follows (Lee, 1991: 162; Ko, 1989: 124):
• NHI contributions should be significantly decreased.
• The number of medical establishments should be increased to cover those
insured in rural areas.
• Those insured should be able to use any medical establishment in the country.
• The government should increase national subsidies.
Farmers demanded a comprehensive range of rights with regard to health
provision, but their demands were not well developed or backed up with alternative
plans to lobby the government.
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5.6 The Government's Responses
President Roh appointed Kwon Ei Hyuk as Minister of Health and Social Affairs in
his first cabinet in February 1988. The KMA was clearly influential in this
appointment. Kwon had been a professor at the Medical School of Seoul National
University, then president of the university and was later appointed as Minister of
Education under the Chun regime.
Minister Kwon tried to understand the problems that had arisen from the
NHI scheme for farmers and fishermen. He complained at his first meeting with
ministers at the Economic Planning Board on February 27 1988 (Kim, 1988):
How has the government allowed the NHI scheme for farmers and
fishermen to develop into this dangerous situation? The NHI scheme
will be expanded to the poor in urban areas next year, but how many
times has this issue been discussed at ministerial meetings? The
reason that the NHI scheme for farmers and fishermen is only now
being considered as an important issue is because of the upcoming
general election. Whenever I meet politicians, they complain that
they are losing votes. This issue should be discussed seriously at the
meeting (p.541).
The new government carried out a 'reshuffle' within the MoHSA: Rhee Doo
Ho, former Assistant Minister for Planning and Management at the MoHSA and a
strong supporter of reform, was appointed Vice-Minister of Health and Social
Affairs. Rhee had been demoted to Deputy Director at the Environment Office
within the MoHSA from Assistant Minister for Planning and Management as a
result of the political conspiracy around the first reform movement in 1983. The
new government called him back to the MoHSA on March 5 1988. On the other
hand, Kim Jong Dae, Head of the Medical Insurance Bureau within the MoHSA and
a strong supporter of a separate administration system, was moved to the post of
Managing Director of the National Institute of Health, which was not directly
involved with medical insurance policy. This change in personnel inside the
MoHSA seemed to suggest that the government and Minister Kwon were lining-up a
team to take forward change in medical insurance programme under pressure from
farmers and other civic groups.
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However, we need to look at three aspects in relation to this situation.
Firstly, because of the general election scheduled for April 26, the government had
to demonstrate that it was aware of public demands for reform, so it might have
appointed Rhee, a reformist, at the MoHSA. In contrast, Kim, an anti-reformist, was
demoted to a department within the MoHSA. Moreover, in keeping with the
KMA's demand, the government appointed Kwon, a medical professional, as the
Minister of Health and Social Affairs. However, this strategy can be seen as no
more than a political gesture prior to the general election, as Minister Kwon left his
post after only nine months, and Kim Jong Dae returned to the ministry when
Minister Kwon was replaced by Minister Moon, who opposed the reform.
Secondly, Minister Kwon was in an ideal position to consider the NHI
scheme, as he had stepped directly into the cabinet without any strong political
associations (he had been a professor of medicine at a university) and was therefore
relatively impartial compared to other cabinet members. Hence, Kwon might have
been able to establish an administrative team to develop national health policy
purely from the perspective of a medical practitioner.
As soon as Roh took over the presidency of the Sixth Republic, he and his
government were confronted with a political crisis as a result of the implementation
of the NHI scheme in rural areas. This was a crisis not only for civil servants but
also for the political parties, as it broke out just before the 13th general election on
April 26 1988. On April 1 1988, the government and the DJP held an urgent
meeting to discuss the disorganised and slow introduction of the NHI scheme in
rural areas. At that meeting, having a unified administration system was
reconsidered. In addition, in order to raise revenue for national health care, two
options were put forward: (D establishing an hypothecated tax, such as a health
security tax; and © levying an earmarked tax through income tax, property tax or
value-added tax; but the government and the DJP settled the issue without making
many changes (Moon, 1999: 336). With three weeks remaining to the general
election, this idea of the government and the ruling party was risky and would be
unfavourable to the electorate. On April 3 1988, the government overturned its
initial idea. The government announced the following measures to counter the
demands of the farmers (Lee, 1991: 197):
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• The government would increase subsidies for rural areas from 35% to 50%.
• Those insured could pay contributions through a monthly or four-monthly
payment scheme.
• The government would develop a health care delivery system which took into
account the lifestyle of those insured in rural areas.
• The government would establish a Deliberating Committee for National Health
Policy within the MoHSA.
However, these measures announced by the government did not significantly
decrease the current malfunctioning of medical insurance. These measures were
merely gestures of the government to reduce any political damage prior to a general
election. Nevertheless, these measures announced by the government could be
claimed to be a major achievement in that it was the first time in the history ofKorea
that the public had achieved its demands over government on welfare policy. But
the measures were of course not enough to satisfy the farmers or fishermen.
Farmers' movements protesting against the NHI scheme became more organised and
widespread and pushed for more concessions. Furthermore, reformists from
academia joined the farmers' movement and assisted them in developing sound
arguments about reform of the NHI scheme. The farmers' arguments became more
refined, and farmers began to lobby more aggressively against government policy.
With little idea of how to resolve the issues around the NHI scheme for rural
areas, the scheme became an albatross around the neck of the new government of
President Roh. Under pressure, on April 30 1988 the MoHSA established the
Deliberating Committee for National Health Policy, a discussion forum which was
directly responsible to the minister. Park Jong Ki, former Head of Health Planning
Team at the Korea Development Institute (KDI), and Rhee Doo Ho, Vice-Minister
of Health and Social Affairs, were appointed as joint chairs of the committee. The
committee was set up to consider: ® health security; (D a system for separating the
prescribing and dispensing of drugs; ® delivery of medical services; and @ the
development of oriental medicine.
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The main purpose behind establishing the committee was to consider the
complaints of the farmers. However, it provoked more complaints from farmers
because the committee was composed mainly of representatives of the medical
providers and the insurers, including the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation
(KMIC) and the National Federation of Medical Insurance (NFMI), and excluded
any representation from farming or fishery (Han Kyo Reh, June 21 1988). The
government still did not consider farmers as stakeholders in the medical insurance
programme.
5.7 The Organised Farmers and Academics
On April 16 1988, the farmers and fishermen eventually had an opportunity to unite
their disparate demands when farmers' groups, progressive medical associations and
urban poverty groups held a Joint Forum for Securing Health Rights for Farmers
and Fishermen, in Chong Rho Catholic Church in Seoul. At the forum, delegates
put forward the following joint statement (Lee, 1991: 168-169):17
• Abolish NHI funding societies under the separate systems that are based on the
principle of private insurance.
• Implement a medical insurance programme under a unified administration
system on the same principle as social security.
• Significantly decrease the financial burden of farmers and fishermen by setting a
fair rate for NHI contributions based on their actual income.
• Increase government subsidies to the NHI grant for rural areas by 50%.
• Expand the Medical Aid programme for the poor living in rural areas.
• Caution senior officials at NHI funding societies and in the MoHSA who have
opposed reforms in order to maintain their own vested interests.
17 The groups who participated in the joint forum included:
Catholic Fanners Association, Catholic Female Farmers Association, National Association of
Farmers, Korean Federation of Christian Farmers, Association of Pharmacists for a Healthy Society,
Christian Association for Poverty Medicine, Korean Institute for the Farming and Fishery Society,
Christian Association ofYoung Doctors, Catholic Association for Urban Poverty, etc.
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Building on this opportunity, the movement formed the Subcommittee for
Organising the Farmers' Committee for Promoting Medical Insurance on April 18.
On June 28 1988, the National Committee for Countermeasure for Medical
Insurance (NCCMI) was established in the Dae-Jeon Farmers' Hall. It developed
into a well-organised movement across the country to lobby for its demands for
reform of the NHI scheme. At the inaugural meeting, the committee declared the
following (Lee, 1991: 169; Han Kyo Reh, June 30 1988):
• We have a right to a healthy life.
• We reject the commodification of medicine which disregards human life.
• We believe that the current separate NHI system is not the right system to
provide medical services for the poor. This programme exploits the poor as well
as farmers and fishermen.
• We have organised a national movement to achieve NHI reform. To achieve
reform, we will carry out ongoing national activities to educate the public.
• We will actively expand our movement nationally to achieve reform.
To accomplish the above aims, the NCCMI announced: (D the launch of a
petition with the aim of obtaining one million signatures; © refusal to pay
contributions; ® a lobbying campaign; and ® promotional and educational activities
based in rural and urban poverty areas (Association of Physicians for Humanism,
1988: 4; Han Kyo Reh, June 30 1988). Through the series of announcements
introduced by farmers' organisations, it is evident that their arguments had become
more refined and professionally developed because experts assisted farmers in
building up logical thought.
Meanwhile, these professionals began to publicise their arguments for
reform. In July 1988, eleven academics introduced a paper, Proposalfor the Unified
NHI Scheme, urging that reforms be implemented. This paper provoked academic
1 o
#
debates on reforming the NHI scheme in Korea. Against that, subsequently in
18 Interview with Professor Kim Young Mo, leader of the reformist academic group and government
adviser.
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August, a group of twenty academics and researchers who opposed the reform
published a paper, Suggestions for Developing the NHI Scheme: a Review of the
Proposalfor a UnifiedNHI Scheme, which rejected the ideas of the reformists (Yoo,
1996: 165). Again, two opposing groups of academics sparked a serious academic
debate on medical insurance reform.
The MoHSA and the CoHSA held a public meeting in August 1988
indicating that the government seemed keen to resolve the divisive issue of reform
of the NHI scheme. At the same time, the two groups of academics, each supporting
a different administration system, hotly debated the issue in public as a means of
promoting their views to government institutions.
The representative of the anti-reformist side, Moon Ok Ryun19 put forward
five points (Yoo, 1996: 166):
• The medical insurance policy should be primarily concerned with matters of
medical provision and use.
• Income redistribution is almost impossible to achieve through the national
medical insurance programme. It would be better to obtain income
redistribution, through the Medical Aid scheme or the public health service.
• To encompass both employees and the self-employed under a unified system has
not been yet tried out anywhere in the world.
• If a unified administration system commands popular support, a tax-based health
service may be a better option than one financed through a social insurance
programme.
• It would be particularly difficult to establish a unified administration system and
set contribution levels because of the difficulties of establishing the income of
those who are self-employed.
In contrast, Cha Heung Bong addressed the following arguments on behalf of
the reformist side (Cha, 1996: 166):
19 He is a professor of the School of Public Health at Seoul National University and also a medical
doctor of preventive medicine.
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• As the NHI funding societies under the current separate system are mutual
societies, it would not be appropriate to maintain the principle of social
insurance.
• The benefits of risk pooling and income redistribution are limited to each
funding society.
• There is no equity in the rate of contributions under the current scheme.
• The current separate system has been incurring unnecessary administrative costs.
The research division of the NCCMI submitted a far more progressive plan
in relation to the reform. On August 9 1988, the research division suggested a
National Health Service (NHS) based on government tax revenue. More
surprisingly, this proposal was introduced by medical practitioners on the Special
• • • • • • 90
Committee on Medical Insurance at the Association of Physicians for Humanism.
This proposal [about NHS] was put forward on September 3 at a symposium held by
the Association of Physicians for Humanism, where the following points were made
(Lee, 1991: 170):
• A comprehensive health care is only possible under the responsibility of the
government.
• There would be administrative savings.
• There is no need for separation of two health care programmes: Medical
Insurance and Medical Aid schemes.
• Income redistribution and equity of contributions could be achieved by
introducing more progressive taxes under an NHS system.
However, the farmers' groups and the research division at the NCCMI could
not reach an agreement on proposals for an alternative health care system. Thus,
members of the NCCMI delayed taking a policy stance until its general meeting. At
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the NCCMI's meeting at Dae Jeon Catholic Hall in the City of Dae Jeon on
September 10, the issue was debated with social policy experts. There academic
experts argued for unification of the NHI scheme but the research division at the
NCCMI continued to promote the NHS style policy that they wanted to propose to
the government. But members of the farmers' group argued that it would be
difficult for them to change completely their policy stance and embrace the NHS
proposal rather than lobby for a unified NHI scheme. Hence, they finally decided to
lobby for a unified administration system (Association of Physicians for Humanism,
1988: 5).
In fact, it would have been difficult for the farmers to adopt the alternative
policy given the current circumstances. Firstly, it was clear that the government
would reject the idea of an NHS system because it wanted to minimise government
responsibility for national health care as mentioned earlier. In addition, since the
farmers' group was not fully accepted as a negotiating partner in the policy-making
process, the first priority for the farmers was to open talks with the government to
discuss their demands. Because of this, a more reasonable and acceptable proposal
had to be crafted in order to open up discussions between the concerned parties.
Secondly, the general public was not ready to accept such a progressive idea as a
NHS. Up to this point, the health care programme in Korea had only provided
benefits for a limited number of people so that the majority had no understanding of
nor experience with national health care policy. For this reason, discussion over
whether to opt for the NHI or the NHS style of health care programme was of little
interest to the general public. The average Korean could not see why they might
benefit from any kind of government-sponsored, health-care system.
In the end, the NCCMI decided to keep pursuing reform under a unified
administration system but to include some aspects of the NHS system. On
September 11 1988, the NCCMI set up the Special Committee for Legislation to
take forward the points that had been agreed at the conference. On October 8, it
published the Proposalfor National Medical Security, which proposed the following
(National Committee for Countermeasures for Medical Insurance, 1988: 21):
20 This is an association organised by progressive young medical practitioners.
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• Use a progressive rate to calculate contributions.
• Adjust the contribution rate so that lower income groups pay less and higher
income groups pay more.
• Increase government responsibility by increasing government subsidies.
• Put an end to the stigma associated with the Medical Aid scheme by merging the
Medical Insurance and the Medical Aid schemes.
• Lower the out-of-pocket payments of those insured (under 10/100).
• Establish the same medical delivery system for the insured living in rural areas
as the one delivered under the NHI schemes in urban areas.
It is necessary to note that the NCCMI made two important demands for
reform: 'increasing government subsidies' and 'lowering the out-of-pocket
payment.' Because of the 'low maintenance' strategy of the government on the
medical insurance, the levels of benefits from and of government subsidies to the
NHI scheme had been low. Thus, the insured had to contribute a large amount in
out-of-pocket payment. This low benefit system caused financial burdens for the
lower-income class, such as farmers and fishermen, in accessing medical treatment
(see Table 5-3).
Table 5-3 The Out of Pocket Payment of the Insurer & Insured by Year:
1983-1996 (Unit: %)




























40.3 67.0 40.5 45.3 65.3 52.4 45.8 62.0 46.1 43.6 63.6 43.9
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Applied from Shin, J.O. (1997) An Analysis ofthe Level ofBenefits and Out ofPocket
Payments in the Medical Insurance, Health and Welfare Policy Forum, Korea Institute for Health and
Social Affairs, Vol.9, June, p.21
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With this proposal agreed, the NCCMI began to lobby the relevant
institutions with their demands. This proposal of the NCCMI contributed
significantly to achieving a reform bill, the National Medical Insurance Act, which
was passed in the National Assembly in 1989.
5.8 Politics in the National Assembly
Using a different tack, the KMA decided to lobby members of the National
Assembly from opposition parties who were medical professionals. They called for:
® greater local coverage of the NHI funding system (i.e. at city level); © a change
from the current 'compulsory appointing system' to the NHI provider to a 'contract
system'; © the establishment of a commission to set fee schedules; © the
establishment of a review body to consider the NHI grant; © the establishment of a
compensation fund for legal medical cases; and © reimbursement for medical
providers when payment is delayed. The KMA officially presented the Petition for
a Medical Insurance Act on November 18 1988. The proposal was put to the
CoHSA by Park Byung Sun, a New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) member
of the National Assembly (Lee, 1991: 187).
Importantly, Moon Tae Joon, the President of the KMA, and Park, had been
longstanding colleagues; they were both graduates from the Medical School at Seoul
National University and had trained together as surgeons. In addition, while Moon
became a politician of the Democratic Republican Party, Park Byung Sun was also
involved in the party. When Moon as President of the KMA was appointed Minister
of Health and Social Affairs, Park was elected to the National Assembly at the 13th
general election in April 1988. With their shared background, Moon was able to ask
Park to bring the KMA's political demands to the National Assembly.21
At a plenary session of the National Assembly in November 1988, the
parliamentary members had to deal with the NHI issue for the first time since the
controversy over reform began in the early 1980s. At the time, it was a sensitive
issue for all political parties because the general public were now aware of problems
with the NHI scheme, so it was no longer an issue of interest to just a few civil
21 Interview with Yoo, Chief Editor of the Newspaper of the Korean Medical Association.
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servants and members of the National Assembly. It was also a crucial moment
because it was a last stage of extending coverage to the entire population. The PPD
and the RDP prepared the NHI reform bill, which introduced plans for a unified NHI
scheme, and aimed to get the bill passed in that parliamentary session (Cha, 1992:
347).22 However, there was not enough time for the bill to be introduced in that
session, and it was suspended until the next session in the following year. On
December 5 1988, meanwhile, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs was
replaced by Moon Tae Joon, a former member of the National Assembly and the
current President of the KMA.23
Why did the government replace the minister at such a critical time, when
the reforms were being discussed and just before the implementation of an NHI
scheme for the entire population? Prior to the expansion of the scheme, which
would be remembered as a major political and historical achievement by President
Roh, the government expected the opposition parties to introduce a reform bill
alongside the government's amendment bill. In order to deal with the political
situation, it was important that there be a minister at the MoHSA with a strong
political background. Moon was a member of the Democratic Republican Party
(DRP) [the mother party of the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP)], and an
experienced politician under the Park regime. The government could therefore rely
on Moon with his excellent political skills and good relations with other politicians
and parties to deal with issues on the NHI scheme.
Whereas the PPD and the RDP were planning to introduce a bill to reform
the NHI scheme, the NDRP had no policy on reforming the current medical
insurance scheme. Thus, ifMoon succeeded in gaining support from the NDRP by
using his political skills and the natural affinity between the DRP and the NDRP24, it
would be possible for the government to ignore the calls for reform from the
opposition parties. Moreover, it would be expected that the KMA would support the
22 The PPD submitted the Billfor the National Medical Insurance Act, while the RDP proposed the
Billfor the National Health Insurance Act.
23 Minister Moon was a medical doctor and a Democratic Republican Party member of the National
Assembly, the ruling party under President Park's regime from 1967 to 1980. Until just before his
appointment as Minister of Health and Social Affairs, he had been President of the Korean Medical
Association (KMA) since 1979.
24 The NDRP was a successor to the DRP.
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government's stance due to the influence of Moon, who had previously been its
leader, in the perspective of the government. The government had also provided a
sweetener by appointing another medical doctor to the post of Minister of Health
and Social Affairs. Hence, the government had served two purposes by recruiting
Minister Moon to the cabinet.
In February 1989, a special parliamentary session began, and the CoHSA
held a public hearing to discuss the bill to reform the NHI scheme. The CoHSA was
willing to hold a special session to get the bill passed because party members wanted
the issues around reform of the NHI to be sorted out before the NHI scheme's
implementation in urban areas, which was scheduled for 1989. During the session,
the PPD and the RDP agreed on aspects of the blueprint put forward by the NCCMI
and the group of academics who had called for a unified NHI scheme. However, the
NDRP introduced a bill which reflected the interests of doctors and left out any real
attempt at reform. The NDRP bill included: (D a change from the 'current
compulsory appointing system' of medical providers to a 'contract system'; ® the
establishment of a review body to consider fee schedules; and (D setting a fair NHI
price for medical services (Yoo, 1996: 166; Cha, 1992: 347). The proposals put
forward by the NDRP had been strongly influenced by the KMA as a result of
aggressive lobbying on their part. The main reason that the KMA had called for a
contract system was to press the government for greater professional and economic
autonomy, a long-cherished wish of the medical profession (Moon, 1999: 346).25
The contents of the NDRP's bill infuriated farmers in rural areas. The bill of
the NDRP was submitted by Park Byung Sim and 34 other members at the 145th
special session of the National Assembly in February 1989. The bill reflected the
government's proposals and the interests of the KMA. It provoked the NCCMI and
farmers to occupy the NDRP's headquarters in February 1989, and to demonstrate
for twenty days demanding that changes be made to the party's proposal for reform.
As a result, the NDRP backed down, gave in to the NCCMI's and farmers' demands,
25 The contract system had been highlighted as one of the most important points for the KMA along
with the fee schedule when Minister Moon had been president. The KMA put these points forward in
the Policy Direction of the KMA Regarding the NHI Scheme for the Entire Population, published in
June 1986.
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and supported the reform bills of the PPD and the RDP (Cha, 1992: 348).26 Why did
the NDRP decide to give in to the demands of farmers? All four party leaders and
their members had strong regional support. In particular, Kim Jong Pil, the leader of
the NDRP, and the members of his party had been strongly supported in the Chung
Cheong area, in the middle of the country where the majority of the population
consisted of farmers. Since the constituencies ofmost parliamentary members of the
party were based on that particular region, the party had to make concession to the
farmers. Otherwise the party would lose votes.
This compromise significantly damaged government plans; because the
government had a small majority at the National Assembly, the U-turn by the NDRP
provided an obvious advantage to the opposition parties. A few times, Minister
Moon visited Kim Jong Pil, the leader of the NDRP, to persuade him to change the
NDRP's stance but without success. Moon even asked Kim Jong Pil to do it as a
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favour to him and played on their longstanding relationship. However, his efforts
failed to convince the party leader (Moon, 1999: 351).
In the meantime, at the National Assembly, the KMA became more
aggressive in pushing for its demands to be included in any medical insurance
legislation. At a special board meeting on February 24, doctors agreed to return
their certificates allowing them to practice as NHI medical providers to the
government, unless their demands were reflected in the bill (Lee, 1991: 188).
5.9 Minister Moon and the KMA
According to Minister Moon (1999), the issue of reform became the main subject of
debate in the political arena. Thus, he reported to President Roh that the arguments
for reform of the NHI scheme were becoming an obstacle to pursuing a national
health policy, and were creating dissent amongst the political parties, the MoHSA
and academics. President Roh reminded the minister that the reform issue had
already been addressed when Roh was a delegate of the DJP during the Chun
regime. It agreed that initially a separate system would be set up and then a unified
26 For more details about the bill introduced by each political party and the KMA, see Appendix III.
27 The NDRP was derived from the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) under the Park regime.
Minister Moon worked as a politician for the DRP from 1967 to 1980 with Kim Jong Pil, the leader
of the NDRP.
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system would be considered when Gross National Product (GNP) reached over
$10,000 or $20,000 per capita of population. Following the discussion with
President Roh, Minister Moon told him that he would prepare plans for an NHI
scheme for the entire population under a separate system, building on the experience
of similar administrative schemes, rather than implementing a new system which
had yet to be tested (p.349).
At this point, we need to pay attention to the president's changing attitudes
on the medical insurance reform. When Moon was the President of the KMA, he
had supported a unified system. However, he began to oppose this system when he
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became minister. What made him support the reform before and why did he
change his stance after the appointment of the Minster of the Health and Social
Affairs? The reason he supported the reform was related to the KMA's general
interest in the reform. Thus, we need to examine the KMA's interest to answer this
question. The aims of the KMA on the reform were mainly to achieve two goals: a
'simplified administration system', and a 'contract system' for setting fee schedules
and for appointing medical providers. Firstly, the KMA thought that medical
providers would receive their fees from a funding authority more promptly under the
unified system. Medical providers often waited a long time to receive their fees
because of delays caused by different administrative procedures as a result of the
fragmented system of funding societies.
Secondly, the executives of the KMA had continuously looked towards
achieving professional and economic autonomy through the contract system (Ko,
1989: 131). Under the current system of appointing medical providers and of setting
fee schedules regulated by the government, medical professionals found it difficult
to feel independent and to be free to carry out their professional duties. The
increasing number of doctors and medical institutions in the country under this top-
down style system had also significantly affected their professional and financial
status. To regain their professional autonomy and increase their political influence,
the contract system was a key for the KMA. Thus, doctors had attempted to insert a
contract system into the NHI legislation through the reform. This issue has
remained a sensitive subject for executives at the KMA. For example, a case which
28 Interview with Yoo, Chief Editor of the Newspaper of the KMA.
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occurred in 2000 shows how crucial a matter it was for the KMA. On August 1
2000, executives of the KMA appealed to the Constitutional Court that Article 40.1
of the National Health Insurance Act passed in 1998, which regulated all medical
institutions classified as NHI service providers, violated their right to private
practice (Dong A Il-Bo, August 3 2000). Eventually, the reason the KMA supported
the NHI reform was due to its self-interests.
Despite Moon's change of position, the KMA continued to support the
reform in favour of these underlying reasons. To draw support from the KMA,
meanwhile, the opposition parties included these two sweeteners - a 'contract
system' and a 'unified administration system' - in the reform bill.
Because Moon supported the reform as a representative of the KMA, he was
selected as an advisory member of the Commission for Adjusting Economic
Structure under the direct control of the president to represent the reformist side.29
However, he moved to the anti-reformist side with his appointment as the Minister
of Health and Social Affairs while in the commission. It is likely that senior civil
servants in the anti-reformist side in the ministry managed to persuade the minister
against such a reform that would cause the autonomy of doctors to deteriorate. We
can see this possibility from his changing perspective regarding the reform in his
autobiography (Moon, 1999):
From a medical professional's point of view [after the NHI reform]
since a massive [state] insurance agency provided medical services to
citizens, medical professionals would no longer stand at the centre of
supplying medicine. Hence, I was afraid that there would be a huge
change in the relationship between the doctor and the patient after the
reform (p.354).
As implied above, he was concerned that following the implementation of the
medical insurance reform, medical professionals might lose their professional status.
As the scheme would be governed by a state agency, he seemed to believe that
medical doctors would be reliant upon the state authority. This point of view of
Moon was different from that on which Moon insisted while he was the President of
the KMA. Thus, it is possible that he was influenced by the anti-reformist civil
29 Interview with Professor Kim, former adviser for the MoHSA, the Office of the Prime Minister
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servants in the ministry while in his ministerial post.
Second, in the end, Moon had never been a strong supporter of the reform.
Moon possessed conservative views about welfare and urged that social welfare
programmes in Korea be based on a liberal-market economy (Moon, 1999: 357).
From what we have seen so far, we can note the dualism that existed between
his actual actions taken in the KMA and his personal philosophy on the reform.
This gives us an ambiguous and inconsistent message through which to analyse his
political attitudes during his ministerial post in the MoHSA. In the end, it seems
that he was a politician and tended to work this matter out in the light of political
pressures.
5.10 The National Medical Insurance Act and the Veto of the
President
At the same time, with Kim Jong Dae's return to the position of Director-General of
Public Information in the MoHSA in 1989, Minister Moon's staff were solidly
opposed to the NHI reform bill. Thus, the minister was able to take a strong stand
with Youn Sung Tae, Assistant Minister for Planning and Management, and
Director-General Kim against the supporters for reform of the NHI scheme in the
National Assembly as well as within the MoHSA.
On February 23 1989, the three major opposition parties - the PPD, the RDP
and the NDRP - agreed upon a bill for reform, Bill for the National Medical
Insurance Act, following lengthy meetings of the Subcommittee for Examining the
Bill established by the CoHSA (Lee, 1991:194). Then, the leaders of the three
opposition parties agreed to put together a proposal and to legislate for the bill at the
145th special session of the National Assembly on March 3 1989 (Moon, 1999:351).
Minister Moon immediately requested a meeting between the government and the
ruling party. At the meeting, the government and ruling party discussed the
possibility of rejecting the bill, but it was agreed that such a rejection of the bill
would benefit neither the ruling party nor the government so close to the approach of
the mid-term evaluation of the presidency. During his political campaign, President
and the Commission for Adjusting Economic Structure.
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Roh had promised that he would initiate a mid-term evaluation from the public if he
was elected president. He had stressed that he would assume complete
responsibility if the result of that evaluation was negative. He said that he would
resign as president if he did not have the confidence of the nation at that time (Woo,
2001). This public pledge was the crucial card Roh and the DJP played in order to
win the presidential election. This was risky but necessary in order for them to
clinch the election for President Roh. As an alternative to rejecting the bill, the
party had decided to obstruct the bill at the special parliamentary session. They also
decided that if the first plan failed, they would attempt to remove unfavourable
articles in the bill and suspend implementation for as long as possible to give them
time to prepare another amendment bill (Moon, 1999: 351).
Despite resistance from the government and the DJP, the bill was passed by
the CoHSA on March 8 1989, and the bill was finally legislated in the 145th special
session of the National Assembly on March 9 1989. Interestingly, at the National
Assembly, members of the ruling party supported the reform bill proposed by the
opposition parties.
But why did the DJP suddenly change its stance to support the reform bill at
the National Assembly? First, many of the DJP members of the National Assembly
- especially the CoHSA members - still supported reform. Second, although
agreement had been reached between the government and the DJP to pursue an NHI
scheme for the entire population under a separate system, the agreement had failed
to persuade all members in the party (Cha, 1992: 348). Lastly and most importantly,
the DJP might have decided that rejecting the reform bill would not be helpful, with
the presidential mid-evaluation imminent.
However, the Chair of the DJP stressed the need for the reform bill to be
amended at a press conference on March 10. On the same day, at another official
press conference, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs pointed out that the
reform bill needed to be reviewed and might be vetoed by the president (Moon,
1999: 355).
On March 10 1989, the NFMI began to resist reform. The NFMI did this by
issuing negative statements which were printed in nine major daily newspapers. The
NFMI also issued a statement, Opposing the Bill of the Unified NHI Scheme, on
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behalf of all the NHI funding societies. The statement argued that the idea behind
the reform of the NHI scheme was to take away democracy and autonomy (Lee,
1991:184). In addition, the MoHSA had been providing statements opposing the
reform bill to the media since March 8. As they had done in the first reform debate,
most daily newspapers published special sections outlining the case against the
reform bill. They mainly emphasised "the increasing financial burden of the wage
earners after the reform" (Han Kook II Bo, March 9 1989; Chosun II Bo, March 9
1989; Dong A II Bo, March 8 1989; Joong Ang II Bo, March 8 1989). It was Kim
Jong Dae who released these statements to the press. At this time, as Kim held the
position of the Director-General of Public Information, which was in charge of the
public and media relations, he could easily spread this information to the public
through the press (Han Kyo Reh, March 16 1989). The statements he released to the
media were not fully authorised and verified by the top-executives in the ministry
but were more likely personal reports which were created by a managing director of
a local funding society and Kim. They mainly concentrated on three points
regarding the reform: ® the sudden expansion of insurance finance; ® huge lay off
of the funding society employees; and ® the burden on the national economic
growth.30
On March 15, the Korean Employers' Federation (KEF) expressed
opposition to the reform bill, and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)
published the following statement on the reform bill (Lee, 1991):
The idea of a unified NHI scheme is reasonable and the FKTU
supports the reform as a long-term plan. However, for labourers
under the system proposed by the current reform bill, we are being
asked to give up the benefits we enjoy under the existing system,
which has a separate administrative structure. Therefore, the current
position of labour is that a health care system should be set up under
a social security programme, based upon a national consensus and
created by integrating the interests of all the different social classes,
and by getting rid of the obstacles to reform (p.172).31
30 This fact was also discovered from some interviewees and anonymous documents.
31 The Position of the FKTUfor Improving the Medical Insurance System, March 15 1989, quoted
from Lee (1991) p.172.
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This ambiguous message from the FKTU was reported in some daily
newspapers, as saying labour opposed the reform. On April 1989, to counter the bad
press it had received, the FKTU issued the FKTU's Position Regarding the National
Medical Insurance Act, to make its previous message more explicit and to outline its
supports for the reform. Its statement made the following points (Lee, 1991: 172-
173):
• It would appear that the financial burden of waged employees will not be
•39
doubled as a result of the NHI reform.
• The current separate system has undermined moves towards income
redistribution.
• It is said that the government is not able to set a reasonable contribution rate.
But according to a source at the MoHSA, it is possible to levy a reasonable rate.
It is necessary to note the reaction of the FKTU. The FKTU did not express
a clear view on NHI reform. It often changed its position on a unified or separate
administration system during the debates at the beginning of the 1980s. The
organisation repeated the same action as at the first debate. At the second reform
movement, as they said through their statement, the FKTU ultimately supported the
reform, but it did not want the sudden changes to the NHI system because it was
afraid of losing the benefit it had under the existing scheme. The FKTU suggested
that the administrative system of the NHI funding societies should be unified but the
financing of the system remain separate. This means that the FKTU did not
fundamentally agree to share the savings of contributions of the insured in the
private sector with those in non-private sectors. It can be interpreted that: first, the 1
FKTU possessed liberal and conservative perspectives in terms of approaching
welfare; second, this organisation was still stuck in the political influence of the
government. This view of the FKTU on the NHI scheme can be traced back to the
relationship between government and the trade unions' organisation. As the FKTU
has shown a corporatist relationship with the government since its establishment, the
32 One of the main points insisted upon by the anti-reformist side to persuade those insured was that
private sector employees would have to pay twice as much for NHI than under the current separate
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organisation has never been free to speak out its sensitive political opinions,
especially about policy decisions led by government. Practically, as many white-
collar members had received benefits from the current scheme, it would not be easy
for the FKTU to support the reform.
On March 11 1989, a meeting was held between officials from the
Presidential Secretariat Office, a senior politician from the DJP and cabinet
•2-2
ministers to discuss opposition to the reform bill. They considered rejecting the
reform bill and three pieces of labour legislation which had been passed alongside
the bill in the special session at the National Assembly. Accordingly, at a
conference on March 15, headed up by the deputy prime minister, cabinet members
agreed to suggest to President Roh that the bill be vetoed (Moon, 1999: 356-358;
Dong A II Bo, March 16 1989). The underlying reason for this was the following
issue, which could warrant a presidential veto (Moon, 1999: 358-359; Cha, 1992:
351):
According to Article 5 of the Act, the NHI funding societies were to
be dismantled, and the rights and duties of the societies were to be
succeeded by a national funding authority. As a result, the funds of
the members of the existing funding societies would be transferred to
a national funding authority and would be used for the medical
expenses of people who were not previously members of the
societies. Therefore, this bill possibly contravened property rights set
out in the constitution.34
On March 16, meanwhile, the DJP executives held a meeting to discuss the
four bills passed by the National Assembly. They reached an early agreement to
veto the Labour Union Law and the Local Self-Goveming System Act, but they
were not able to agree on how to take forward the National Medical Insurance Act
system after reform.
33 Officials from the Presidential Secretariat Office, the Director of the Legislative Office, an
executive member of the DJP, the Chair of the Legislative Committee at the National Assembly, the
Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs and the Minister of Labour
attended the meeting (Moon, 1999: 356).
34 Before implementing the National Health Insurance Act - the NHI reform scheme - under the
government of Kim Dae Jung in July 2000, opponents of the reform appealed to the Constitutional
Court for the same reason; that a unified NHI scheme was a breach of the constitution, as it would
infringe upon human rights and property rights. However, the Constitutional Court ruled that it was
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and the Labour Dispute Intervention Law. Even members of the party could not
agree on whether to veto these pieces of legislation. As both laws had been passed
by the National Assembly with the unanimous consent of the ruling and opposition
parties (whereas the other two legislation - the Labour Union Law and the Local
Self-Governing System Act - were only passed by opposition parties), it was clear
that a veto would provoke significant resistance from the opposition parties and the
general public (Kook Min II Bo, March 16 1989).
Within the MoHSA during the veto stage of the reform bill, anti-reformist
civil servants approved a veto without the consent of Vice-Minster Rhee, a strong
supporter of the reform. They then issued a statement from the ministry that the
National Medical Insurance Act could not be implemented. This occurred because
the anti-reformists in the ministry suspected that the vice-minister would not
approve the veto. 5
On March 17, the three opposition parties requested that government
withdraw the veto on the reform bill (Han Kyo Rye, March 18 1989):
We believe that the veto, without valid reason, on the bill, which was
passed by ruling and opposition parties at the National Assembly, is a
serious challenge to the voting rights of the Assembly and by
choosing to ignore the National Assembly represents a move
backwards in political reform.
However, President Roh announced the suspension of the mid-term
evaluation of the presidency scheduled for March 20, and subsequently on March 24
1989 vetoed all four bills (the National Medical Insurance Act, the Labour Union
Act, the Labour Dispute Intervention Act and the Local Self-Governing System Act)
in spite of promising NHI reform as part of his manifesto during the presidential
election campaign the year before.36 According to Kwon (1999), the reasons that the
president broke his election promise can be described thus: firstly, he had not
constitutional (Dong A II Bo, June 29 2000).
35 Interview with Rhee, former Vice-Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
36 In order to relieve the pressure on him in relation to the reform, President Roh broke his promise
to the country, by suspending the mid-term evaluation. Subsequent promises for presidential mid¬
term evaluations were never kept.
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anticipated that the opposition parties would come to dominate the National
Assembly. Although President Roh thought that in due course a national fund was
inevitable, he did not want to be pushed around by the National Assembly.
Secondly, he feared that he had a lot to lose and not much to gain from a merger of
health funds into one national fund. The transfer ofmoney from the funds might be
used by others who would make greater use of the health service and contribute less.
From the president's point of view, it would be politically unwise to risk alienating
his main supporters in a clash with a hostile National Assembly (pp. 66-67).
Nevertheless, the most significant contribution in making possible the veto
of the reform bill was the cancellation of the mid-term evaluation of the presidency.
As mentioned above, the ruling party decided not to oppose the National Medical
Insurance bill to avoid any negative impact on the president and the party prior to
the mid-term evaluation of the presidency. With its cancellation, the president and
the DJP were able to veto the reform bill. This decision was critically dangerous for
the president and the ruling party because it could weaken their political justification
and could also damage the legitimacy of the Roh administration. First, as the reform
bill was passed under the full agreement of the ruling and opposition parties in the
National Assembly, it was difficult to seek an appropriate explanation to account for
the veto. Second, President Roh broke his political pledge in order to escape from
the medical insurance and labour reforms. Under the on-going process of
democracy in Korean society, this unreasonable decision of the president was not
easily acceptable to citizens.
If the National Medical Insurance bill had not been passed with three labour
laws - the Labour Standard Act, the Labour Union Act and the Labour Dispute
Intervention Act - it might have been possible to implement the reform bill without
T7
incurring a presidential veto. The previous two conservative-authoritarian
governments under the Park and Chun regimes had suppressed employment rights
for decades. Under these regimes, trade unions had continuously demanded basic
rights for workers from the government. Prior to and after the 'June 29 Declaration'
in 1987, the number of trade union movements and strikes increased dramatically.
Labour's rights had become a hot potato in Korean politics since the mid-1980s, and
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thus the trade union movement was not greatly favoured by President Roh and his
party.
Table 5-4 The Number of Labour Strikes in Korea
1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
52 206 265 276 3749 1873 1616
Source: International Labour Organisation (ILO) LABORSTA: Display Module,
http://laborsta.ilo.org/cgi-bin/broker.exe
The three labour laws proposed at the special session of the National
Assembly were a serious challenge to the Roh regime, so that the Roh government
was not likely to allow these laws to be enacted. So, the government's primary
concern had been to veto the labour laws. Although the Roh government opposed
the NHI reform bill, it was difficult for the government to reject just that bill alone
under the democratic process at the end of the 1980s. Moreover, as the reform bill
had been passed with the unanimous support of the members of the DJP and the
opposition parties at the National Assembly, the executives of the ruling party and
the government were not able to find any good reason to veto the bill. Also, it was
obvious that the public would resist the veto of the president in the circumstance.
Therefore, if the National Medical Insurance Act had been introduced on its own -
or at least not alongside any labour legislation - the government might have been
forced to implement the reform legislation whether it liked the reform or not.
On the other hand, if the government ditched the three labour laws all
together, it was obvious that the trade unions would increase their militant stance
against the government. Thus, the government might have decided to veto two of
the labour laws, providing an opportunity for the government to include the National
Medical Insurance Act as one of the vetoed items. Thus, the government was able to
diffuse the resistance from the labour and the general public. As a result, an NHI
scheme for the entire population was achieved under a separate administration
38
system.
37 Interview with Rhee, former Vice-Minster of Health and Social Affairs.
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5.11 The Roles of Participating Actors
If the policy process of the first movement for reform was described by political
wrangling between the government and the National Assembly, including
disagreement within the MoHSA, the second reform movement was defined by
more complex clashes between the government, the National Assembly, and various
interest groups.
Strong democratic movements in Korea during the 1980s provided an ideal
environment to put pressure on the government and the National Assembly into
reforming national health policy through expanding the NHI scheme to the entire
population. However, attempts at reform eventually failed because of the political
views of the president and particular members of the ruling party and the cabinet,
even though reform legislation was passed at the National Assembly with the
unanimous support of all political parties.
The different political influences on the second reform movement can be
summarised as:
First of all, at government level, the MoHSA continued to play a crucial
leading role on health policy. But unlike during the first movement, the MoHSA
strongly supported the existing separate administration system for the NHI scheme.
Following the removal of senior civil servants who had supported the reform in the
MoHSA, the ministry pursued an agenda to establish an NHI scheme under a
separate administration system.
From 1985 to 1989, there were three different ministers at the MoHSA . The
ministers included a conservative politician from the ruling party and two politicians
with a medical background - one who served in the cabinet under the Chun regime
and the other from the ruling conservative party under the Park regime. The two
politicians with a medical background were appointed as ministers in response to
demands from the KMA. They held conservative values with regard to health
policy.
38 The Roh administration exerted its veto points on seven pieces of legislation in one year.
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MP ofRuling Party 2/1985-2/1988
Kwon Ei Hyuk Medical Doctor, President of
Seoul National Univ.
2/1988- 12/1988
Moon Tae Joon Medical Doctor, President of
KMA
12/1988 -7/1989
Source: Applied from Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998,1 The White Paper of Health and
Welfare; Youn Hap Tong Shin (1999) Korean Biographical Dictionary
In addition, when two senior civil servants who had strongly opposed the
NHI reform returned from the Presidential Secretariat Office to take up crucial
positions within the MoHSA, the ministry developed strong support for a separate
system.
The EPB was more actively involved in policy-making during the second
movement for reform. The EPB, as the department in charge of national budgets,
had to consider carefully the most efficient administration system for the new
scheme because that would directly determine the success or failure of the national
health care programme. Basically, the disagreement over a separate or a unified
administration system was not particularly important for the EPB. Their primary
concern was assessing which kind of system would minimise the financial
responsibility of the government.
In contrast, the Presidential Secretariat Office showed less interest in being
involved in the policy process, compared to its involvement with the first movement
for reform. However, the Presidential Secretariat Office always stepped in at the
final stages of the process to consider how the policy might be viewed more
favourably for them. The incident on April 28 1987 provides a good example of
TO
intervention by the Presidential Secretariat Office.
Secondly, in the National Assembly, the ruling DJP was actively involved in
the entire process from 1986 to 1989, from when President Chun officially
announced plans to extend the NHI scheme to farming and fishing areas, and to the
self-employed in urban areas. The DJP took the lead in discussions with different
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government departments from the beginning. The DJP showed particularly strong
leadership in communicating with the MoHSA and the EPB on NHI reform in
comparison to how they had acted during the first movement for reform. As the DJP
preferred a unified administration system to develop the NHI scheme, they
constantly rejected the MoHSA's idea of pursuing the new scheme under a separate
system. As a result, it took more than a year for the DJP and the MoHSA to reach a
consensus on this issue. At the same time, the DJP had also rejected the EPB's plan
to create an additional tax to increase the financial stability of the government, as the
introduction of such a tax would damage the popularity of the party.
The CoHSA at the National Assembly and the opposition parties continued
to play active roles in the policy on the reform of the NHI scheme. Perhaps it can be
said that members of the CoHSA - members from the ruling and the opposition
parties - in general played the most influential roles in achieving reform of the
medical insurance scheme during the 1980s. In particular, the CoHSA and
opposition parties were successful in getting the reform bill passed during the 13 th
term of the National Assembly because the opposition parties had obtained more
parliamentary seats at the National Assembly.
Thirdly, with regard to the activities of interest groups, the KMA lobbied the
political institutions aggressively on behalf of the medical professionals, in contrast
to their behaviour at the beginning of the 1980s. When Moon Tae Jun was the
President of the KMA at the beginning of the 1980s, he was careful about speaking
out because he was prohibited from being involved in any political activities by
Chun's military regime.40 Thus, at the beginning of the 1980s, the KMA had put
forward very few demands with regard to the NHI scheme.41 However, when the
government began to develop the medical insurance programme in the mid-1980s,
the KMA started to lobby politicians, especially politicians with medical
backgrounds, and they were successful in achieving many of their aims.
When the NHI scheme for farming and fishing areas was implemented in
1988, farmers had mobilised and put pressure on the government to deliver their
39 See p. 136.
40 After Chun succeeded in his military coup d'etat in 1979, the military regime prohibited any
political activities of a number of politicians.
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demands. Fortunately, the democracy movements of the 1980s contributed to their
ability to command stronger support in their campaign against the government. In
association with civic groups, the farmers' groups established the National
Committee for Countermeasures for Medical Insurance (NCCMI) and put forward
its own proposal for NHI reforms. Ultimately, the proposal influenced the reform
bill drawn up by the opposition parties in the National Assembly.
In contrast to the strong movements commanded by the farmers, the trade
unions did not actively participate in lobbying on the reform. This was because the
trade unions decided to concentrate on reforming employment legislation during the
democracy movements of the 1980s. Thus, the reform of the NHI programme was
not of primary concern to the trade unions. In particular, as wage earners in the
private sector had benefited from the NHI scheme, their interest in the reform was
limited.
Academics published papers on different types of medical insurance
programmes. Unlike in the first movement, academics who were in favour of or
opposed the reform managed to influence policy makers and political institutions
with their evidence. Thus, not only did the academics form views on reform, they
also managed to have their arguments taken up by different interest groups and to
influence the political institutions. In particular, academics in favour of reform
provided sound arguments for the farmers' group which they used to influence the
public and the government.
In comparison to the first reform movements at the beginning of the 1980s,
the business groups - such as the Federation of Korean Industry (FKI), the Korean
Employers' Federation (KEF), the Korean Chamber of Commerce & Industry
(KCCI), the Korean Foreign Trade Association (KFTA), and the Korean Federation
of Small and Medium Business (KFSMB) - had much smaller roles in influencing
the reform. Because the National Federation of Medical Insurance (NFMI) and the
MoHSA led a strong anti-reformist campaign, the private sector did not have to
undertake serious lobbying.
41 Interview with Yoo, Chief Editor of the Newspaper of the Korean Medical Association.




During the 1980s, there was an opportunity not only to expand the NHI coverage but
also to develop a better quality programme. It was possible that President Chun had
the political will to develop a national health care system, but the policy-making
debate took place in virtually the same limited institutional setting as that of the Park
regime at the beginning. The Presidential Secretariat Office maintained a clear
policy of minimising government responsibility for two objectives: rapid economic
growth and placing the financial responsibility on the beneficiaries. With these
objectives in mind, the Presidential Secretariat Office strongly supported a separate
administration system and was extremely influential on the president's decision. In
short, the Presidential Secretariat Office exerted significant political influence over
health care policy. Not only did it influence the president's decision, but it also
ensured that health policy fitted with their wider political agenda.
After the failure of the first attempt at reform, the government appointed
conservative politicians to the ministries at the MoHSA until an NHI scheme for the
entire population was achieved under a separate administration system in 1989.
Ministers Rhee and Moon strongly opposed the reforms. The government did not
remove Rhee for three years from his position as minister, which enabled him to
influence policy with his conservative views.42 Minister Kwon (a member of the
first cabinet of President Roh and the first minister with a medical background)
made efforts to develop the health care system but played a limited role in
government. Unlike Minister Moon, Minister Kwon did not have a strong political
background, and his role was limited to dealing with other political institutions and
parliamentary members. When Kwon was replaced by Moon after just nine months,
the government gave more responsibility to Minister Moon in dealing with
parliamentary members who were on the reformist side at the crucial time prior to
the implementation of the newNHI scheme.
Second, the Committee of Health and Social Affairs (CoHSA) at the
National Assembly performed a leading role in reforming the NHI scheme
throughout the 1980s. The ruling party and opposition parties created a unique
42 This was an unusual because the average term of office for the Minister of Health and Social
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situation in Korean politics. Both the ruling party and opposition parties called for
reform during the first movement and, furthermore, during the second movement.
Finally, the reform legislation was passed with the unanimous support of all political
parties.
Third, a wider range of interest groups was embedded in the policy process
of the second reforming attempt than in the first one. The most remarkable interest
groups influencing the policy process of this period were the farmers' organisation
and the KMA. The farmers insisted on gaining their basic rights for health through
medical insurance reform and established a national organisation for their collective
actions over the government. On the other hand, the KMA tried to protect doctors'
professional and economic autonomy from the government's plan to expand the
medical insurance. The KMA aggressively contacted political leaders and
politicians as well as bureaucrats to deliver its interests before the legislation of the
new scheme.
Last but not least, the academic arguments presented in support of either a
separate or a unified NHI scheme were firmly established during the lengthy debates
of the decade. The research engaged with public interest and provided the basis for
ongoing arguments on the future of national health care policy.
During this particular period, democratic movements spreading through
Korean society encouraged participation among a relatively wide range of interest
groups in the policy-making process than had occurred heretofore. Their roles were
extremely influential. Some of the ideas of these interest groups were adopted by
and contributed to the policy agenda setting of the political parties. Thus, it might
be possible to explain this policy process through the pluralist perspective.
However, internal bureaucratic politics continued to play a very important role in the
policy process during this period. The role of a few actors in the bureaucracy was
still very significant in the decision-making process. The influence of interest
groups was still limited in comparison to systems with a longer history of
democratic tradition.
Regarding the expansion of the insurance coverage during this period, the
'logic of industrialisation' provides a partial explanation because the rapid economic
Affairs was one and half years.
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growth made it possible for the government to expand the coverage of the medical
insurance programme more quickly.
Finally, the most significant feature during this period was the emergence of
the farmers in the policy process of the NHI scheme. Farmers, who had been
excluded from the centre of government concerns for many years, began to organise
their collective actions and demanded the inclusion of their interests in the NHI
policy. When the farmers' group engaged in the reform movement in association
with civic and professional groups, the influence of the farmers was strengthened in
the policy-making arena. Thus, room for the 'working class mobilisation approach'
was created and this helps to explain the development of the NHI scheme.
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Chapter 6. Slow Reform of the NHI (1990 -1997)
This chapter considers the extent to which the advent of new leadership in the
country influenced the development of health care policy in general and the medical
insurance programme in particular. The chapter scrutinises how demand for health
care policy reform moved from the periphery to become a central rallying issue,
strengthening the focus and role of civil and trade union movements within a wider
process of increasing participation and democratisation. It looks at the ways in
which political institutions and pressure groups sought to influence the new
leadership, how the leadership and bureaucracy responded, and how these
relationships and policy responses facilitated or obstructed health care reform.
Following his vetoing of the National Medical Insurance Act in March 1989,
President Roh determined in January 1990 to merge his ruling party (the Democratic
Justice Party) with two opposition parties (the Reunification and Democratic Party,
and the New Democratic Republican Party) as a means of countering deepening
political deadlock. As a result, the traditionally dominant presidential role acted as a
far weaker institution throughout the 1990s.
Kim Young Sam of the merged party was elected as president in 1992. His
election seemed to provide an opportunity for NHI reformist groups to reinvigorate
pressure, as the new president had long been sympathetic to NHI reform. However,
the political priorities of the president did not coincide with reform action for
medical insurance; it took until 1996, stimulated by the presidential election
scheduled for the following year, for the ruling party to finally begin taking political
action for reform of the NHI scheme. The reform package was ultimately a casualty
of the ruling party's defeat, in a climate of deep economic instability, to Kim Dae
Jung in 1997. Although this period did not therefore result in concrete policy
reform, it was nonetheless highly significant in forging new and broader-based
reform movements, clarifying the reformists' agenda against formidable anti-reform
forces in the government and bureaucracy, and forcing policy responses from the
government. This pressure and these policy responses, albeit a series of statements
which were initially largely repetitive and conservative, ultimately forced
acknowledgement of the need for more far-reaching reform which provided the
foundations for the post-1997 policy process.
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6.1 Democratising and the Merged Ruling Party
At the beginning of 1989, the National Medical Insurance Act and three labour laws
were being examined in the National Assembly at the same time as the government
was preoccupied with confronting critical labour issues, which were essentially
expressions of wider pressure for democratisation and reform. Meanwhile, trade
unions - which had so far combined collective action under one national labour
umbrella, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)1 - had begun to organise
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new channels for democratic labour organisation. This resulted in the restructuring
of trade unions, and from 1987 onwards, an aggressive spread of labour movements
across the country.
The government responded to the growing strength of organised labour by
threatening labour and employers with special countermeasures. On October 17
1989, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) announced the principle of No labour,
no wage, warning employers that the government would impose sanctions on
companies disobeying this principle guideline. Subsequently, the Ministry of
Labour (MoL) announced Comprehensive Countermeasures for the Relationship
between Employers and Labour on October 30 1989; this involved the creation of
special headquarters to deal with labour disputes and extended control over about
500 democratic trade unions. In addition, private sector employers organised a
National Conference of Entrepreneurs, proclaiming on December 23 that it would
adhere to the principle of No labour, no wage. At the same time, 570 trade unions
which did not want to remain with the FKTU increased their independence and
bargaining position by organising separate representation as the Korean
Confederation of Trade Unions (henceforth referred to as the KCTU, since the
KCTU has developed through various stages; see footnote for the developmental
stages of the KCTU),4 and through this channel, began to lead more vigorous labour
1 The FKTU had been established by the Park military government and was therefore considered by
many trade unionists to be politically compromised.
2 Several groups of teachers inaugurated their democratic teachers union, the Korean Teachers and
Educational Workers Union (KTU) on May 28 1989; the National Federation of Farmers Unions
(NFFU) was created out of dispersed farmers unions on April 24 1990.
3 On June 30 1989, the number of trade unions in Korea was 7,159; 65.6% of them (4,698) had been
established since July 1987 (Han Kyo Reh, January 21 1990). See Table 5-4 in Chapter 5 for the
growing number of labour strikes.
4 The KCTU was initially established with about 70 trade unions and 120,000 members, under the
name of the Korea Trade Union Congress (KTUC). In June 1993, the Korean Council of Trade
Union Representatives (KCTUR) was formed to bring leaders of all democratic trade unions together
Ch.6 - Slow Reform of the NHI 177
and democratic movements in the country (Dong A II Bo, January 22 1990).
Increasing tension between labour and government on the one hand, and
labour and entrepreneurs on the other, was again creating political stalemate. As a
result, the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) sought to strengthen its position by
merging with two opposition parties led by Kim Young Sam (the Reunification and
Democratic Party - RDP) and Kim Jong Pil (the New Democratic Republican Party
- NDRP). The newly merged party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), was able
to dominate the National Assembly by a large margin (Dong A II Bo, January 22
1990).
Kim Dae Jung remained alongside as a leader of a minority opposition
group. In order to compete against a giant ruling party, Kim Dae Jung attempted to
organise a larger opposition party. The New Democratic Party was itself a creation
of a merger between the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) of Kim Dae Jung
and the United New Democratic Party in April 1991. In September 1991, the
Democratic Party (DP) was established by the merger of two opposition parties, the
New Democratic Party ofKim Dae Jung and the Democratic Party of Lee Kee Taek.
The important shift from a dominant single party to government by coalition
was an acknowledgement that growing labour, civil rights and democratisation
movements could no longer be easily controlled. The DJP also had to provide
political concessions to the opposition parties,5 which, combined with the merger
itself, cost President Roh and the DJP a considerable legitimacy in the Sixth
Republic. An important aspect of this loss of legitimacy was the president's vetoing
of the National Medical Insurance Act and two labour laws.
6.2 The Pressures on the New Ruling Power
What impact did this new political configuration have on the policy-making
domain? Following the merger, the president was no longer able to exert absolute
leadership in policy-making. The competing interests and priorities of the merged
into a single national body. On November 11 1995, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
(KCTU) was finally established with 862 trade unions and a total membership of 418,000; by June
1997, the KCTU had increased its membership to over 526,300 in 1,144 trade unions. However, by
1997 the government still did not recognise the new union on the grounds that there were two bodies
claiming to represent labour.
5 Politics and political parties in Korea have traditionally been dominated by powerful individual
leadership.
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party's three leaders also gradually made the policy process more open to different
interest groups and public participation than at any other stage in Korean politics. In
addition, as Kim Young Sam and other parliamentary members from the RDP who
were driving the bill were long-term supporters of NHI reform and were now in a
position to favourably influence the party agenda, the groups interested in changing
the NHI scheme therefore had strong hopes of resuming the reform movement with
the birth of the new merged party.
A major opportunity was soon created with another attempt to push the
National Medical Insurance bill (which had been introduced as a reform bill in 1989)
through the National Assembly following the presidential veto. Reformist
academics had been the first to maximise a more favourable political climate,
pushing in February 1990 through the Social Security Study Group for
reconsideration of the reform bill by the National Assembly. In their proposition,
academics insisted that the presidential veto over the National Medical Insurance
Act was unreasonable because the president interpreted the public property of the
NHI scheme as if it were a private concern. To warrant the presidential veto in
March 1989, the government insisted that the reform bill would contravene property
rights set out in the constitution because the funds of the insured in the private sector
would be transferred to the insured in the non-private sector after the unified
administration system. The proposition further argued that by this action President
Roh had broken a public pledge for NHI reform made during the presidential
election campaign (Social Security Study Group, 1990).
A pressure group of 132 doctors - Medical Doctors for Democracy and
Social Welfare - called for the public to withhold support from the new merged
party. They argued that the new government would simply continue a conservative
policy agenda of its predecessors which would again be dominated by economic
growth policy and neglectful of welfare development. The doctors demanded that
the new party immediately establish a platform to develop welfare policy and
achieve a unified NHI scheme for improving the quality of national health care
(Dong A II Bo, February 23 1990; Han Kyo Reh, February 23 1990). The following
day, pressure from the medical profession against the new party and in favour of
health care reform greatly increased: 1054 medical professionals - including
medical doctors, dentists, oriental medicine doctors, pharmacists and nurses - added
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their voices to the Medical Doctors for Democracy and Social Welfare (Han Kyo
Reh, February 24 1990).
On February 16, Kim Chung Jo, a member of the PPD and the CoHSA in the
National Assembly, expressed strong views of the presidential veto in a paper,
Countermeasures and Outlooks Regarding the National Medical Insurance Act,
(Kim, 1990):
It can be considered reasonable that the president uses the power of
veto over legislative bills only if those bills are crucially associated
with national security or the national economy. However, using the
presidential veto over a bill regarding national welfare is an abuse of
the president's authority.
The MoHSA reacted to these growing demands by reinforcing its opposition
to reform via the conservative Review of the National Medical Insurance Act. This
report argued that: (D compared to other countries, the current NHI scheme policy
had already imposed an excessively high rate ofNHI contributions on higher income
groups through its progressive [contribution] imposing system; © the national
medical insurance scheme should focus horizontally rather than on vertical income
redistribution; ® if fragmented financial systems were unified by reform, either
employees' contributions would considerably increase or the government would be
forced to take on drastically greater financial responsibility. Hence, the MoHSA
emphasised again that radical NHI reform was neither desirable nor necessary
(MoHSA, 1990). Key points of the MoHSA paper were virtually identical to those
raised by anti-reformist groups.6
The National Federation of Farmers Unions (NFFU) was a recently created
amalgamation of several disparate unions. In April 1991, it held an open forum to
discuss NHI reform and resolved that the National Medical Insurance Act should be
passed. However, it met consistent opposition from representatives of the MoHSA,
whose presence at the forum was an indicator of growing concern from the
government and National Assembly about the leverage of reform groups such as the
NFFU (NFFU, 1991).
6 See Chapter 5.
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6.3 The 7th Economic and Social Development Five-Year
Plan and NHI
Despite continuous efforts from the reformist sides and the PPD, the bill of the
National Medical Insurance Act was dropped without examination with the closing
of the 13th National Assembly in May 1992. Although this was a setback, the
government also acknowledged in the same year that health care reform was needed.
This acknowledgement was contained within the overarching plan for economic and
social development, the 7th Economic and Social Development Five-Year Plan
(1992-1996), in which the chapter on Health, Medical and Social Security Plans
emphasised the need for a new strategy to improve and balance the health status of
Korean citizens (MoHSA, 1992):
To formulate a new approach for health care policy, structural and
functional adjustments are necessary to improve: CD satisfaction with
medical treatment; ® general health conditions; ® efficient use of
medical resources. The traditional role of public health institutions
and hospitals as medical service providers needs to be developed
towards more comprehensive services focusing on both medical
treatment and prevention (pp.11-13).
The plan stressed quality oflife as the underlying theme for a new health care
improvement strategy and vision. To accomplish this plan, the MoHSA set up broad
goals for the purpose of developing a national health care system encompassing the
following (MoHSA, 1992: 17-18):
• To achieve financial stability of the NHI scheme for the self-employed and
farmers.
• To maintain equity of contributions and benefits in the NHI scheme.
• To ensure NHI allowance is always sufficient to coverNHI costs.
• To expand the NHI allowance for preventive medical treatment.
• To increase the efficiency ofNHI management.
• To improve the allowance level of the Medical Aid scheme.
An interesting point addressed by the ministry was that it exposed financial concerns
on the NHI through the report. Since the expansion of the medical insurance
coverage to the self-employed from 1987, the financial subsidies of the government
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had begun to increase dramatically. Thus, the financial stability and capability of
the scheme became a significant issue in the government (see Table 6-1). However,
the report of the ministry did not offer a detailed financial plan for those political
goals.
Table 6-1 Government Subsidies to the NHI Scheme for the Self-
Employed by Year (Unit: %)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Gov.
Subsidy 19.6 20.8 44.1 41.5 36.6 38.6 34.6 33.2 32.3 30.2 29.2 26.7 25.6
Source: Calculated by author based on National Health Insurance Corporation (1999) 1998 National
Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook, pp. 134-135
In March 1993, the Medical Insurance Bureau in the MoHSA delivered its
policy agenda and statement of prospective policy directions to the new president,
Kim Young Sam. The MoHSA set up three main political agendas almost identical
to the proposed plans of the 7th Economic and Social Development Plan (MoHSA,
March 1993):
• Maintaining financial stability of the NHI scheme for the self-employed and
farmers.
• Gradually expanding the scale of insurance coverage and increasing the number
of days covered by the scheme.7
• Integrating traditional Korean medicine into the Medical Aid scheme to improve
the overall quality and capacity of health care provision.
Throughout the report, the MoHSA judged the performance of the NHI
scheme for private sectors and government employees to be financially stable,
although it concluded that the financial condition of the scheme for the self-
employed and farmers had recently deteriorated. However, the MoHSA announced
that financial stability should be achieved continuously by adjusting NHI
contribution rates and strengthening management efficiency rather than through any
more profound reform. In addition, the ministry determined to implement the 'joint
cost-sharing project' for sharing fees of high-cost medical treatment across all
fragmented NHI funding societies in order to balance financial burdens. The
MoHSA also emphasised repeatedly that demands for the unified NHI scheme and
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independence of the examining body of medical fees (currently administered by the
National Federation of Medical Insurance, NFMI) would not be acceptable
(MoHSA, March 1993).8
Through the series of announcements made by the MoHSA, we can point out
three significant aspects regarding the health care policy. First, the MoHSA
reflected firmly in the presentation a clear policy direction of the medical insurance
system in order to undermine continuous pressures from the reformist group, the
opposition party and the KMA. Secondly, the ministry was aware of financial
concerns surrounding the medical insurance. Thirdly, the government still
demonstrated a policy direction of trying to resolve the financing of NHI through
conservative measures (rather than a radical reform) such as: ® contributions of the
insured rather than government subsidies; and ©joint cost-sharing project.
In the National Assembly on October 19 1993, at the parliamentary
inspection session of the National Assembly's 165th Plenary Session, Rhee Hai Chan
and Kim Byung Oh (both members of the CoHSA in the National Assembly and the
Democratic Party of Kim Dae Jung) disclosed internal problems associated with
executives of funding societies. Rhee asserted that funding society executives
recruited employees through non-transparent practices rather than promoting fair
and open competition in personnel affairs (Rhee, 1993). Kim meanwhile accused
local NHI funding societies of mishandling huge amounts of public funds raised
through accumulated NHI contributions (Kim, 1993).
In November 1993, the Policy Committee of the Democratic Party once
again proposed the Bill for the National Medical Insurance Act to the National
Assembly. Submission of the bill was justified on the following grounds (Policy
Committee of the Democratic Party, 1993):
Although the National Medical Insurance Act was successfully
passed with cross-party consensus in the 145th Special Session of the
National Assembly on March 9 1989, the government returned the
bill to the National Assembly for re-voting under the provision of
Article 53.2 of the Constitution. However, the bill was abolished
with the closing of the 13th National Assembly, and the party
7 Until 1993, the NHI scheme had covered the insured only for 180 days a year.
8 The Korean Medical Association (KMA) and the Korean Hospitals Association (KHA) submitted
the Petition for Independence of the Medical Fee Examining Body to the National Assembly in
October 1992.
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therefore proposes this bill based largely on the previous reform bill.
The purpose of the reform bill is to unify the separate administration
systems of the NHI scheme in order to more substantially embody
ideal principles of national medical insurance such as social
solidarity, income redistribution and spread of risk. Moreover,
through the unified NHI scheme, high quality-medical services will
in the first place be guaranteed on an equal basis to the entire
population. Secondly, social integration will be achieved regardless
of locality, class or occupational category. Finally, financial stability
of the scheme and expansion of the benefits will be achieved through
reform.
However, the party had somewhat stepped back from demands expressed in
the previous bill of 1989. The DP deleted the contract system for medical service
providers which had been agreed in the 1989 reform bill and instead inserted a
compulsory appointing system into the new proposal. It appeared that the DP was
attempting to provide concessions to the ruling party and the government to draw
this reform issue back to the negotiation table.
6.4 Two Special Committees
In January 1994, the MoHSA announced that a Special Committee for Health
Security Reform (SCHSR) would be established in the ministry with the purpose of
restructuring the health care system towards addressing the demands of the twenty-
first century. The SCHSR was scheduled to complete its activity within a short
period of only six months (by the end of June). The committee's first meeting was
held on 15 January (Dong A II Bo, January 11 1994; Kyung Hyang Shin Moon,
January 11 1994). Up to this point, the government had only focused on quantitative
expansion of the NHI scheme, and the quality of medical services had not yet been
seriously considered. As a result, complaints regarding quality had been
increasingly raised by both medical consumers and medical service providers. The
SCHSR set up three broad goals to help fulfil its purpose: ® to improve the quality
of medical services; ® to enhance social solidarity by achieving equitable service
provision and rebalancing financial responsibility between classes and between
funding societies; ® to increase efficiency and improve the management system of
the scheme (SCHSR, 1994).
In February 1994, the Special Committee for Developing Farming and
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Fishery Areas (SCDFF) was set up as a presidential advisory body. The
establishment of the SCDFF was one of the public pledges of President Kim during
his presidential campaign. The SCDFF focused its work on: (D increasing
competitive power of farming and fishery areas; (D improving the living
environment of rural areas; and ® strengthening welfare programmes for rural areas
(Dong A II Bo, February 1 1994; Kyung Hyang Shin Moon, January 9 1994).
Why did the government establish two special committees consecutively at
this moment? It was a countermeasure of the government for coping with outside
impact on the governmental leadership. The Kim Young Sam government faced
two concerns along its political journey in January 1993. First, the labour issue
became a significant challenge for the government. The increasing number of
labour strikes and the establishment of the KCTU became a big threat to the Kim
Young Sam government as well as to the entrepreneurs. The trade unions' demands
on the reform of labour laws and the improvement of welfare were a two-fold
nuisance. To alleviate pressures from labour, the FKTU and the KEF made an
agreement to increase wages for labourers (ranging between 4.7% and 8.9%) with
the purpose of stabilising the relationship between the entrepreneurs and labour in
April 1993. In January 1994, President Kim even declared "1994 the year without
labour disputes" (Choi, 1997: 472-473).
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Secondly, through the election campaigns of the 14 general election (March
1992) and the presidential election (December 1992), the politicians experienced the
hostile sentiment of farmers and fishermen against the agricultural policy of the
government. In particular, the agreement of the Roh Tae Woo government with the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to open
domestic agricultural markets to foreign competitors provoked more anger among
farmers and fishermen. To show his political intention and to draw support from the
farmers and fishermen, Kim Young Sam promised publicly that he would establish a
special committee for caring for the social and economic concerns in the rural areas,
if he was elected the president. Hence, the setting up of these two special
committees was likely to alleviate rising discontent amongst social actors towards
the government and political institutions.
The SCHSR quickly delivered national health policy recommendations,
particularly stressing the need for more independent actors and expansion of
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services. On March 2 1994, the committee announced that it was considering
handing over the role of determining NHI fee schedules from the MoHSA and the
EPB to a private independent body. On April 14, it proposed that the chairing of the
Medical Insurance Deliberating Committee should be transferred from the Vice-
Minister of Health and Social Affairs to a civilian from non-partisan and non¬
governmental leadership (Han Kyo Reh, March 3 1994). The SCHSR also proposed
that the government should consider creation of a private medical insurance system
to provide services excluded under the current medical insurance programme
(Kyung Hyang Shin Moon, April 15 1994). On April 18, the SCHSR proposed
abolishing the recuperation period which was restricted to only 180 days (Dong A II
Bo, April 19 1994). Two days later, the committee announced that the current NHI
administration system based on separate funding would remain but some problems
produced by the separate system would be addressed (Han Kyo Reh, April 21 1994).
In the meantime, the SCDFF submitted its mid-term report to President Kim
on April 19 1994. The special committee recommended integrating the fragmented
urban and rural medical insurance systems, which was different from the outcome of
the SCHSR announced just one day earlier. Against the report of the SCDFF, the
MoHSA strongly resisted (Kyung Hyang Shin Moon, April 20 1994; Han Kyo Reh,
April 20 1994). Based on the announcement of the SCDFF, the ministerial meeting
was held to make a decision for a final proposal on May 18.9 However, the cabinet
members participating in the meeting held different opinions about the unification of
the fragmented medical insurance system (Kyung Hyang Shin Moon, May 18 1994;
Han Kyo Reh, May 18 1994). On June 14, the government finally unveiled the
details of developing plans for farming and fishery areas based on the suggestions of
the SCDFF. But the unification of the NHI scheme was not included in the
government's plan. Instead, the government again inserted minor changes for health
care policy: ® the government subsidy would be increased from the current level of
40% to 50-60% for the NHI scheme for farming and fishery areas; ® the insured
living in farming and fishery areas would receive periodically a medical examination
as part of a benefit scheme ofmedical insurance (the same as the insured in private
sectors received); and ® funding societies located in adjacent city-size areas would
9 This meeting was led by the deputy prime minister (Minister of EPB). Ministers ofAgriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries, of Flome Affairs, of Finance, ofCommerce and Industry, of Construction, and
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be unified, and funding societies would carry out 'joint cost-sharing' for high-cost
medical services and for the aged (Dong A II Bo, June 15 1994).
We need to pay attention to a few points regarding the activities of the two
special committees: first, since the SCDFF was established as a presidential advisory
organ, the committee members could produce more progressive ideas, without the
pre-filtering of the MoHSA, such as the unification of the separate NHI system, than
the SCHSR, which was set up under the MoHSA. Second, during the examination
of the cabinet, however, the radical proposal of the SCDFF failed to receive full
support from the cabinet because of the strong opposition from the MoHSA. Third,
the committees were seeking financial stabilisation of the NHI scheme, which was a
primary concern of the ministry at the moment, through the introduction of two
crucial ideas: the adoption of 'private medical insurance' and the (joint) 'cost-
sharing project' amongst funding societies. Fourth, the government again promised
farmers and fishermen an increase in government subsidy up to 50-60%, the same as
the government did at the second reform movement in the late 1980s (see p. 147 in
Chapter 5). It had become a customary routine repertoire for the government to ease
rising complaints from the farmers and fishermen since the second reform
movement. However, the government had never kept its promise10 (see Table 6-1).
Meanwhile, the MoHSA approved the SCHSR's proposal(s) through the
Review of the Management System of the NHI Scheme in April. The report of the
MoHSA stated (MoHSA, April 1994):
To change the administration system of the NHI scheme is not as
simple as just reshaping an organisation. The crucial matter is how
continuity of a social security system is to be stabilised, and this
needs to be carefully considered (p.3) Therefore, as the SCHSR
suggested, it is necessary that the merits of both the separate and
unified administration systems be adopted ... rather than radical
reform of the scheme which would cause great confusion (p. 11).
The ministry also stressed that:
One of the reasons for reform is to reduce the contributions of
farmers and fishermen, but it does not seem that this prospect can be
of Health and Social Affairs participated in the meeting.
10
In the category of the self-employed in the NHI scheme, the farmers and fishermen are included.
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guaranteed. Because income and property data of farmers and
fishermen are more transparent than those of the self-employed in
urban areas, farmers and fishermen would possibly be disadvantaged
by reform...Hence, if the NHI reform is implemented under the
justification of assisting the insured living in rural areas (who occupy
only 13% of the entire population of the country), the contribution
rates of urban self-employed (consisting of 37% of the population)
would be reduced. On the other hand, the contributions of waged
employees (consisting of 50% of the population) would be increased.
Waged employees would therefore reject reform, and consequently
this situation would impact seriously on the government and
president... (p.9).
At the end of the report, the MoHSA again warned the government and president
that the government would have to take full responsibility for any implementation of
reform which would inevitably carry political risks. As the government could not
increase contributions flexibly under the unified scheme, financial deficits would
instead be borne by the national treasury (MoHSA, April 1994). Like the second
reform debate in the second half of the 1980s, these arguments of the MoHSA
became the centre of the anti-reformist side in the debate of health care reform in the
1990s.
6.5 The Conference of People's Solidarity and Trade Unions
Despite these new advisory bodies and a more open and discursive political
atmosphere, the Kim Young Sam government continued to avoid taking any
concrete progressive action to reform the medical insurance programme. Reformist
groups such as social policy research institutions, civic groups and labour unions
responded by trying to re-organise their strategies and structures towards
intensifying the pressure on political institutions.
From April 11 1994, civic groups began to concentrate their reform efforts
within the Conference ofPeople's Solidarity for the Unification and the Expansion
of the Benefits of the NHI Scheme (CoPS).11 The CoPS was a successor to another
civil movement for NHI reform, the National Committee for Countermeasures for
Medical Insurance (NCCMI), which had not been active since the presidential veto
1' As the CoPS, the movement became one of the influential non-governmental organisations in the
country, a role which has continued since its reforming in 1999 as the Solidarity for People's Health
as a Right (SPHR). The SPHR remains one of the powerful civic groups and focuses primarily on
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in 1989 and the subsequent weakening of its organisational influence in mobilising
collective actions. It took until 1994 for the group to rebuild sufficient leadership
• .19.
and political consensus to become a significant force. Reflecting on the failure of
the NHI reform in 1989, this civic organisation attempted to broaden its institutional
scope for another try at reform. With the establishment of two special committees in
the government, the positive atmosphere for health care reform went closer to the
reformist side. To take this opportunity, the organisation determined to widen its
membership and embody more concrete ideas for reform.
In the 1980s, this movement had represented a limited platform of farmers
and progressive civic organisations working in health and medical sectors, and it
therefore determined to broaden its support base to include others such as labour
organisations. It also had to develop a strategy for persuading the constituency of
those already possessing insurance to support a reform agenda. The earlier
movement had advocated a new model of social insurance involving risk pooling
and income redistribution; although many with insurance knew that the current NHI
scheme had unfair elements and had been badly implemented, they had yet to be
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convinced that reform was in their interests. Generally then, the reform movement
had grown in the 1980s in close connection with a process of democratisation; it
now faced a more democratised society and the need to develop an agenda and
strategies which were more convincing and attracted far wider participation.14 In
other words, more practical agendas were necessary to persuade ordinary citizens on
issues such as insurance benefits and so forth. We can probably deduce these
intentions of the CoPS from the new name of the organisation. The CoPS therefore
spent almost a year redesigning its policy agenda and the logic of its demand for
NHI reform, assisted by crucial medical insurance data being made available
through a local funding societies trade union.15
The CoPS had 22 members organisations by the time its new policy agenda
and strategy was developed. It then set about promoting its agenda amongst various
monitoring health care policy and advocating on health care issues.
12
Interview with Cho Kyoung Ae on October 6 1999, Deputy-Director of the Conference of
People's Solidarity for the Unification and the Expansion of the Benefits of the NHI Scheme (CoPS)
(1994-1998) and currently Director of the Solidarity for People's Health as a Right (SPHR).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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policy-making institutions, trade unions and civic groups. On May 2 1994, the
CoPS participated in a public hearing organised by the Committee of Health and
Social Affairs (CoHSA) in the National Assembly to discuss NHI reform; in July, it
met with the Chair of the Policy Committee of the Democratic Party (DP) and the
ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), after which it led a policy workshop for
trade unions and civic groups to strengthen participation and consensus among
groups of the insured. As a result of these and other efforts, the CoPS membership
trebled to 65 organisations by May 1994. The following year, membership had
further grown to 77 civic organisations and trade unions with 6 local branches in the
country (CoPS, 1999: 11-13).16
The policy workshops for members of the Korean Confederation of Trade
Unions (KCTU) were particularly helpful in stimulating new thinking amongst trade
unions (CoPS, 1999: 13). During the 1980s democratisation period, trade union
agendas had heavily stressed improvement of labour laws. Prioritisation of and
levels of understanding about reform of health care policy were far weaker, although
medical insurance particularly was an issue of very direct concern to trade union
members. Trade unions also needed to broaden their appeal to substitute for
democratic demands which had in large part been fulfilled. Reform of medical
insurance therefore became a highly attractive rallying issue, and one which allowed
the KCTU to take a clear position in opposition to the FCTU, against which it was
trying to assert its identity.
Prior to the announcement of the SCHSR's proposal in June, the KCTU had
officially announced its position on NHI reform on May 25 1994 (KCTU, 1994):
The KCTU urges the government to integrate the fragmented NHI scheme
and expand its scale of benefits. A number of executives in the MoHSA
and in NHI funding societies have presented their position on the basis that
the income of waged labourers are revealed completely in comparison to
those of farmers, fishermen and the self-employed being revealed partially;
waged labourers, they argue, could therefore be seriously disadvantaged by
reform. However, we do not agree with this assertion of the executives of
the government. This is a justification to maintain their vested interests in
the current NHI scheme...Even though the contributions labourers pay are
contributing to farmers and fishermen, as the government and the
executives of the funding societies have insisted, we labourers can accept
this situation on the basis of interdependence with farmers and fishermen...
16 See Appendix IV for a list of the CoPS membership.
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Therefore, we wish that the contributions we have paid contribute to
developing national health care services for the entire population of the
country.
In October 1994, the KCTU's Preparatory Committee went further and chose
NHI reform as one of the four objectives which formed the basis of its demands to
the government.17 At the same time, the CoPS began to lobby the National
Assembly on health care reform. On October 26, it held a public hearing to discuss
the bill for the National Health Insurance Act, which it followed with submission of
a proposition demanding medical insurance reform to the National Assembly on
November 17.
6.6 The Kim Young Sam Government and 'Globalisation
(Segyehwa)'
The MoHSA had meanwhile been facing internal pressures in addition to mounting
pressure from outside. Firstly, in November 1993, the Democratic Party (DP) had
submitted their new reform bill which modified some points of the original bill. The
possibility of reforming medical insurance became more credible with the
establishment of the SCHSR in January 1994. Some months later, on 25 April, the
CoHSA held a parliamentary hearing to discuss medical insurance reform. The
Special Committee for Developing the Farming and Fishery Areas (SCDFF), which
had been formed by President Kim in February 1994, was expected to propose NHI
reform as a cornerstone of alleviating health and welfare problems amongst farmers
and fishermen. Most importantly for the MoHSA, however, the CoPS was
becoming a relentless and increasingly powerful voice for reform.
The SCHSR went on to present the report which it saw as completing its
mandate, the Assignments for Health Care Reform and Policy Directions, in June
1994. The report suggested a compromise plan which would maintain the current
NHI administration system but adopt some aspects of the unified system. The report
recommended: ® adopting the 'joint cost-sharing project' which would result in all
participating NHI funding societies sharing financial burdens; ® reducing the
number and therefore increasing the efficiency of the funding societies; and ©
17 The four objectives are: ® NHI reform; © reform of the National Pension scheme; © reform of the
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setting up a comprehensive computer network. At the end of the report, the SCHSR
pointed out that the government needed to provide at least minimum financial
support in order to carry out this project (SCHSR, 1994: 22), but it gave no clear
indication of the scale of health care reform it was recommending. Repeatedly, it
insisted that "as medical costs will be increased after reform, the government will
ultimately have to bear increased financial costs and increased responsibility for
national health care policy" (SCHSR, 1994: 22). This report was obviously a
compromised version of reform, but considering the anti-reformist interest groups
the SCHSR was facing within government, it ultimately was making a reasonably
strong statement to consolidate the perspectives of the MoHSA.
In November 1994, health care reform also became an aspect of Korea's
growing understanding of and adjustment to globalisation. President Kim ordered
the establishment of a Project of Globalisation (Segyehwa) Plan which was first
discussed in the cabinet on November 22 (Dong A II Bo, November 20 & 23 1994).
The president had been stressing 'globalisation (Segyehwar)' as a key policy term
since his New Year's Day speech in January 1994, and the government subsequently
announced that a Committee for Promoting Globalisation (CoPG) would operate
from the beginning of 1995 with the prime minister and a member of a non¬
government sector to be appointed as co-chairs (Kyung Hyang Shin Moon,
December 28 1994). The CoPG held its first meeting on January 21 1995 in which
twelve sub-projects were set up: reform of the education system; development of
employer-employee relationships; improvement of industrial policy; improvement of
the training system for industrial manpower; strengthening technology and access to
Information Technology (IT) across society; more equal and balanced development
between localities; dealing with environmental issues for the twenty-first century;
developing an understanding of globalisation in the political outlook of citizens;
strengthening the role of the mass media; expansion of social participation of
women; strengthening education in a second language; and improving the national
status ofKorea (Kyung Hyang Shin Moon, January 22 1995).
Although the indication concerning health policy was not reflected in the
twelve sub-projects, it soon became a focus of policy put forward in the welfare
program endorsed by Kim Young Sam. In the CoPG conference on March 23 1995,
taxation system; and @ de-centralisation of capital ofChaebul (Conglomerates).
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President Kim Young Sam declared a significant new dimension of policy with the
Quality of Life project under the umbrella of the Welfare Design for 'Quality of
Life' in Globalisation. President Kim emphasised that "government policy needs to
be concerned with improving quality of life in the country while breaking away from
the preceding policy of economic growth." He argued that "the government should
be responsible for the lower income class living under the national minimum income
level in the areas of income, health care, education and housing. However, the
principle of self-responsibility should underlie the welfare of people who are
enabled to work." In addition, he stressed that "social insurance programmes and
welfare policy should be based on the principle of the responsibility of
beneficiaries." The president ordered the cabinet to draw up medium and long-term
plans for implementation of the idea proposed by President Kim by June and to
organise a National Welfare Planning Board in order to implement the plans (Joong
Ang II Bo, March 23 1995; Han Kyo Reh, March 24 1995). On May 18, the
National Welfare Planning Board (NWPB) was established under the CoPG (Dong
A II Bo, May 19 1995). The Kim Young Sam government had created continuously
new advisory committees since 1994. I will address the general point of the reason
that the government enjoyed setting up the new committees in a later section.
Meanwhile, from September to November 27, farmers unions under the
National Federation of Farmers Unions (NFFU) held a national rally to demand
enactment ofNHI reform. This rally played a forceful role in pressurising members
of the National Assembly areas with significant farming and fishery populations
prior to the general election of 1996.18
In November 1995, the NWPB presented a report, the General Plan of
National Welfare for 'Quality of Life' Globalisation, to the president through the
CoPG. This focused on (NWPB, 1996: 73):
• Growth of the economy and welfare becoming complementary rather than
conflicting.
• Traditional values of Korea, such as Confucianism and mutual aid, being
harmonised with Western values such as universalism.
• Establishment of a welfare community system linking families, local
18 Interview with Cho, Director of the SPHR.
Ch.6 - Slow Reform of the NHI 193
communities, the private sector and government to fulfil the government's
commitment to achieving a minimum living standard for all citizens.
• Provision of protective and productive welfare by the government.
The report discussed specific goals related to social insurance programmes:
(D maintaining equity of the social insurance allowance; © maintaining an adequate
level of financing of social insurance programmes; ® maximising social insurance
efficiency; and @ creating the conditions for adopting private insurance in the
welfare sector. The NWPB report also recommended sustaining separate
administration of the NHI scheme while stressing that the merits of the unified
administration system needed to be taken up (NWPB, 1996: 10-21). These
suggestions were important in that they exactly endorsed those of the MoHSA and
SCHSR. As we have seen, the Kim Young Sam administration simply offered a
broad, generalised approach to welfare policy through his new welfare projects.
Thus, there was neither a clear direction for the development of national health
policy nor a constructive plan for the improvement of a national health care
programme such as NHI reform. In his initial announcement of the plan, health care
policy was practically ignored and was not seen as a primary concern.
On December 20 1995, the National Assembly passed the Bill of Social
Security Standards at the plenary session of the 14th National Assembly. One of the
purposes of the bill was to organise a Social Security Deliberating Committee
(SSDC), chaired by the prime minister, to clarify the role and responsibility of
central and local governments as well as to channel participation of the private
sector in the social security field (Joong Ang II Bo, December 20 1995).
The Social Security Standard Act was implemented in July 1996; this was
followed in November with the establishment of the SSDC to provide policy
directions on social security issues, particularly through development of a five-year
social security plan. In February 1997, the Task Force for the Establishment of
Social Security Development Directions (TFESSDD) was set up and stressed that
(TFESSDD, 1997):
The goal of the plan is to build a Koreanised Welfare Model under
the theme of a 'harmonised welfare state.' Hence, the project aims to
Ch.6 - Slow Reform of the NHI 194
maximise 'quality of life' for people living in Korea through: ®
seeking a balance between economic growth and fair redistribution of
capital on the basis of values of freedom and equality; and ©
harmonising Korean traditions with the merits of Western welfare
states. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to: ® expand the
scope of welfare services; © develop protective and universal
services; © construct a welfare delivery system associated with
family, neighbours, local community and government on the basis of
a traditional family-oriented system; ® pursue a productive welfare
model; and © increase the role of the private sector (pp.6-12).
The task force produced some ideas to improve medical insurance in specific
reference to the NHI scheme. On the management system for medical insurance, the
committee argued for increased autonomy and responsibility for each NHI funding
society to enable greater efficiency through increased competition between separate
societies. The committee also suggested integrating smaller funding societies in
order to achieve 'economies of scale.' This idea of 'economies of scale' differs
from that ofmost NHI reform advocates. The task force argued for integrating small
funding societies to build bigger funding units under a separate administration
system. On the other hand, the reformists sought 'economies of scale' by integrating
fragmented funding societies into one national funding authority.
Regarding contributions of employees in private sectors and government/
private schools, the committee proposed a fixed rate system of levying by total
income19 which would replace the current system drawing on a monthly wage; it
argued in addition for simplification of the method for calculating contributions of
00
the self-employed in both rural and urban areas. The 'joint cost-sharing project'
was strongly recommended as a means of sharing financial resources and spreading
risk amongst funding societies. Lastly, the committee suggested increasing the level
of insurance benefits (pp. 18-34, TFESSDD, 1997). However, there was again no
comment about more profound reform of the NHI scheme in the paper. The
arguments of the task force in effect coincided with those of the anti-reformists,
which had insisted on opposing the reform during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as
19 Contributions for employees in private sectors and government/private schools were levied by
monthly wage until the 1999 reform package, after which bonuses and special allowances were
included in 'total income' calculations.
20 Contributions rates for the self-employed in rural and urban areas (which included farmers and
fishermen) had been calculated according to five categories: income of household, the number of
dependants within household, income, property, size and kinds of automobiles belonging to the
Ch.6 - Slow Reform of the NHI 195
other special committees. We can suppose, then, that the anti-reformist group inside
the government might have influenced the activities of the special committees and
the task force.
The most crucial point discovered here is that the Kim Young Sam
administration revealed the principles of its welfare policy through a series of
consecutive announcements: the president's declaration of 'Quality of Life,' the
report of the National Welfare Planning Board, and the announcement of the task
force team. Based on the president's view, two policy-making organs drew more
concrete pictures regarding national welfare of the country. The scope of national
welfare in the Kim Young Sam administration can be summarised in seven major
points: ® the principle of'self-responsibility'; (D maximising 'quality of life'; © a
balancing growth between national economy and welfare; @ harmonising Korean
traditions with the merits of the Western welfare state; © a strong bond among
families, communities, private sectors and government; © provision of 'productive
welfare'; and © increasing the role of the private sector. The government
emphasised 'self-responsibility' and 'the roles of the private sector, family and
community' to minimise the governmental responsibility on national welfare. In
particular, the government continuously stressed that the 'quality of life' would be
improved through 'globalisation of the country.' However, it was merely rhetoric of
the government to reduce its direct intervention in and to minimise its primary
responsibility on national welfare.
6.7 The Ruling Party and NHI Reform
A major breakthrough in this long cycle of policy reviews and statements came in
June 1996 with the Special Committee for Countermeasures for Medical and Water
Issues in Farming and Fishery Areas (SCCMW), organised in the ruling New
Korean Party (NKP) (the ruling Democratic Liberal Party changed its title to the
New Korean Party in December 1995).21 Hwang Seong Gyun, a surgeon and NKP
National Assembly member, was appointed as the chair of the committee. Hwang
came from a rural background and had long been concerned with problems in rural
insured.
21 Political parties in Korea have frequently changed their names for the purpose of preparing
elections or refreshing party atmosphere.
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areas. He proposed a reform plan for the NHI scheme through the special committee
which would be accomplished through three gradual stages. This proposal became a
great stimulus for re-enlivening the NHI reform movement and constituted the most
99
important step for NHI reform in the near future.
Hwang's proposal involved: as a first stage, unification of local funding
societies with the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation for the Employees in the
Government and Private Schools (KMIC), but initially retaining a separate financial
system; secondly, unification of private sector funding societies with the KMIC and
local funding societies, but still with separate financing; finally, unification of all
financial systems. Hwang stated, however, that the plan should be pursued with
flexibility according to circumstances and without the constraints of an exact time
table. The 'joint cost-sharing project', he argued, would need to continue until all
financial systems were completely unified, and the plan should be connected to
implementation of the National Pension scheme in urban areas. If the merger of
fragmented funding societies was completed successfully, it could be expected that
many funding society employees would become redundant, but they could instead
be transferred to expanded national pension funding organisations (Newspaper of
the KMA, January 2 1997).
The government realised, partly in response to this proposal, that the SCHSR
had not been able to achieve enough to satisfy advocates for reform. In November
• 9T
1996, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW) therefore set up a Special
Committee for Health Reform (SCHR) as a temporary year-long consulting body
under the prime minister. This committee was established on a higher position and
for a longer term than the SCHSR so as to avoid repeating its failure to attract
institutional and financial support from the government and to see through its
recommendations (Chosun II Bo, November 9 1996). The new committee's purpose
was to increase the quality, accessibility and comprehensiveness of health care, and
improve the efficiency of the health care delivery system. It was therefore expected
to confront a range of issues associated with health care delivery, the medical
professional training system, reform of the NHI scheme, development of the health
care industry, and development of Korean traditional medicine (SCHR, 1997).
22 Interview with Yoo, Chief Editor of the Newspaper of the KMA.
23 The MoHSA changed its title to the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW) in 1995.
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Meanwhile, on October 29 1996, the CoPS hosted a hearing in the National
Assembly to discuss the forthcoming reform bill with an impressive range of
representatives from the ruling and opposition parties.24 A few weeks later, the
National Congress for New Politics Party (NCNP), which was the now renamed
opposition party of Kim Dae Jung (the NCNP had been the new name of the
opposition party since November 26 1994), and the United Liberal Democrats Party
(ULD) of Kim Jong Pil, which was established by Kim Jong Pil in March 1995 after
breaking away from the merged ruling Democratic Liberal Party, announced a
policy agenda which effectively repeated and endorsed Hwang's proposal (Han Kyo
Reh, November 22 1996):
Two parties will submit a reform bill to the forthcoming plenary
session of the National Assembly; this will call for unification of the
separate medical insurance administration systems because the core
aim of health reform is to achieve a unified NHI scheme and to
improve the quality of health care services. The bill will therefore
propose to unify the NHI scheme in three stages: unifying local
funding societies by 1997, unifying funding societies of private
sectors by 1998, and finally unifying all funding organisations.
The bill - which would integrate 92 local funding societies in farming and
fishery areas - was entitled the National Health Insurance Act and was officially
proposed to the National Assembly by Lee Sung Jae, Shin Nak Kyun and Kim Han
Kil of the NCNP, and Lee Jae Sun of the ULD on 29 November (CoPS, 1999:
464). However, the ruling NKP announced it did not plan to support the reform
bill before a forthcoming plenary session. On December 9 1996, Chung Young
Hoon, the NKP's Chair of the 3 rd Policy Coordinating Committee, and Sohn Hak
Kyu, Minister of Health and Welfare, met and agreed that immediate
24
Key participants in the public hearing were: Shin Ki Ha (Chair of the CoHW), Cho Heung Jun
(Chair of the Policy Committee of the CoPS), Cha Heung Bong (Professor of Hallym University),
Park Joo Hyun (a lawyer from Lawyer's Group for Democratic Society) and a cross-party group of
National Assembly members - Hwang Kyu Sun (NKP), Lee Sung Jae (NCNP), Lee Jae Sun (ULD),
Kim Hong Shin (DP) (CoPS, 1999).
25 The bill proposed that the National Federation of Medical Insurance, the Korean Medical
Insurance Corporation for the Employees in Government and Private Schools, and local funding
societies would be dismissed within one year, except for private sector funding societies, which
would be closed after two years (in Additional Article 4). With regard to the appointing system for
medical service providers, the bill proposed vaguely that the system would be replaced by either a
'contract system' or a 'compulsory appointing system' involving the insurer and medical service
providers (CoPS, 1999:464-465).
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implementation of the reform would cause tremendous confusion; it should therefore
be reviewed by the SCHR and its tabling before the National Assembly should be
postponed until the following year (Dong A II Bo, December 9 1996). Efforts to
enact the proposed reform bill therefore failed in the 1996 plenary session, and it
was postponed to some indefinite time in the 1997 parliamentary session.
On January 12 1997, however, the NKP changed policy direction and agreed
to the reform bill in unifying the National Federation ofMedical Insurance (NFMI),
the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation for the Employees in Government and
Private Schools (KMIC), funding societies in local areas, and private sectors. The
ruling NKP stated that "since there are 373 separate insurers existing under the
current Medical Insurance Act, the administrative costs of the scheme are wasted,
and huge deficits are being created in local funding societies. Hence, in order to
stop inefficiency, the administrative system ofmedical insurance needs to be unified
as soon as possible" (Chosun II Bo, January 13 1997).
Next day, the MoHW presented key projects for the ministry for the year
1997 which appeared to once again reverse the NKP statement of the previous day.
The ministry announced that it would prioritise a Quality of Life project - a
favoured theme of President Kim Young Sam - within which would be the
following objectives (Newspaper of the KMA, January 13 1997):
• To increase financial support to local funding societies in farming and fishing
areas.
• To expand the scale of the 'joint cost-sharing projects.'
• To steadily improve medical insurance benefits.
• To reform fee schedules.
• To gradually adopt a 'Diagnosis Related Group (DRG)' system26 instead of the
current system of 'fee for service.'
• To save management costs and increase managerial efficiency.
• To increase autonomy of funding societies.
• To strengthen the Medical Aid scheme.
• To improve the national health care system through reform of the current
26 The intention of this system was to reduce the cost of medical fees charged to the state; the DRG
system would allot a certain amount of the budget for certain diagnoses, and medical providers would
be restricted to keeping within this block grant.
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scheme.
Why did these differing positions and intentions on medical insurance reform
arise between the ruling party and the MoHW? The ruling party had become very
conscious of public opinion surrounding medical insurance matters (especially of
farmers and fishermen in rural areas) prior to the presidential election scheduled for
December and the subsequent general election. Although the Special Committee for
Developing Farming and Fishery Areas (SCDFF) was set up as a presidential
consulting body in February 1994, the special committee failed to deliver a health
care reform at the end. Under the circumstance, the ruling party established its own,
the Special Committee for Countermeasures of Medical and Water Issues in
Farming and Fishery Areas, in alleviating complaints from and in concerning
electorates living in those areas, and Hwang's proposal was ultimately produced in
the party. Eventually, the party did not have any other choice but to support the
reform proposal for the presidential and general elections.
Meanwhile, anti-reformist civil servants had been strongly resistant to the
reform within the MoHW, which was the most powerful opposition to medical
insurance reform during the Kim Young Sam government. As we have seen so far
through the outcomes of various advisory institutions, the MoHW thoroughly
blocked any reform. However, the MoHW was threatened when the opposition
parties supported the reform proposal of the ruling party and therefore opposed
strongly the Hwang's proposal.
6.8 The Presidential Election and Reform
6.8.1 The Government and Political Parties
The ruling NKP confirmed that it would positively review a reform plan proposed
by the Special Committee for Countermeasures for Medical and Water Issues in
Farming and Fishery Areas (SCCMW) of the party on June 30 1997. In August
1997, with the elections fast approaching, it finally declared officially that it would
see through the NHI reform plan, a decision which was publicly supported by the
opposition party, the NCNP (Chosun II Bo, August 15 1997). The same month
however, the MoHW presented a plan for improving medical insurance which
appeared to be contradictory. This plan emphasised: 0) saving management costs; ®
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merging small local funding societies; and ® enabling a more competitive basis in
the management of private sector funding societies (Newspaper of the KMA, August
25 1997). Regardless of the ruling party's decisions, then, the MoHW continued to
search for alternative methods to save management costs and improve the quality of
services within the current medical insurance system rather than seeking more
radical and progressive reform.
On October 29, the ruling NKP passed a reform bill within the party - the
Revised Bill ofthe Medical Insurance Act and Medical Insurance Act for Employees
in Government and Private Schools - and put it forward to the National Assembly
97
the following day. The Committee ofHealth and Welfare (CoHW) was to review
this bill which, as discussed above, addressed one of the three stages towards
completely unifying the fragmented NHI scheme. The bill provided for the merging
of local funding societies under the KMIC and subsequently (in July 1998) the
setting up of a separate examining body for medical fees under the MoHW, the
financial system of local funding societies remaining separate throughout. The
projected 4,000 employees of local funding societies who would lose their jobs as a
consequence would be transferred to positions in the national pension organisations
for urban areas scheduled for July 1 1998 (Dong A II Bo, November 7 1997;
Newspaper of the KMA, November 6 1997). Opposition parties decided to support
the NKP bill, although it promised a very partial - and, arguably, compromised -
step compared to radically unifying and restructuring the NHI scheme. Executives
of funding societies in local areas and private sectors were predictably opposed to
the reform bill and demanded its withdrawal (Dong A II Bo, November 7 1997).
On November 14, the CoHW modified the bill, replacing the role of local
societies and the KMIC with a new administrative structure, the National Health
Insurance Corporation (NHIC). The bill's title was also changed to the Bill of
National Medical Insurance Act. The new reform bill was passed in the plenary
session of the National Assembly on November 18 1997 with the full agreement of
ruling and opposition parties and was due to be implemented from October 1998
(Newspaper of the KMA, November 24 1997).
27 The title of the Committee of Health and Social Affairs (CoHSA) was changed to the Committee
of Health and Welfare (CoHW) in accordance with changing of the entitlement of the ministry.
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6.8.2 The KMA
The Korean Medical Association (KMA) meanwhile continued a determined drive
to press its demands on the political institutions,28 while the KCTU and the FKTU
both insisted on pursuing the unified NHI scheme at a public hearing organised by
the SCHR on May 9 1997. The President of the KMA met a number of senior
politicians to discuss fee scheduling and submitted its Proposition for the Reform of
the NHI Scheme to the National Assembly in March 1997. The KMA insisted on
inserting 'the contract system' and 'independence of the medical fees examining
body,' which were amongst it long-standing core interests (Newspaper of the KMA,
March 17 & 24 1997). Subsequently, the KMA sent its proposition to three major
political parties - the NKP, the NCNP and the ULD - and it continuously stressed
welfare and quality of life issues prior to the presidential election (Newspaper of the
KMA, June 26 1997). The President of the KMA stated in a press conference on
July 31 that (Newspaper of the KMA, August 4 1997):
We have been stressing issues of a 'welfare state' and 'quality of
life', but no presidential candidate is providing a concrete political
agenda on these matters. The KMA will therefore be interested in a
candidate who demonstrates true commitment towards health and
welfare concerns.
The KMA continued to put more pressure on politicians. The senior
executives of the KMA again met with presidential candidates to lobby for more
substantial changes in the areas of medical insurance reform. On November 10,
while the CoHW was examining the reform bill, the KMA handed in a written
petition to the National Assembly demanding more far-reaching policy reform: ®
abolition of the 'compulsory appointing system' for medical service providers; ©
changing the current 'fee schedule' policy regulated by the government towards a
'mutual contract system' between the insurer and medical service providers; and ©
setting up an independent examining organisation on medical fees (Newspaper of
the KMA, November 13 1997). On December 10, executives of the KMA met Kim
28 In 1997, the KMA held meetings consecutively - mainly to discuss fee scheduling - with the
Minister of Health and Welfare (January), the Minister of EPB (March), the prime minister (March),
the Minister of Health and Welfare (April), the executives of the MoHW and the EPB (July) and
Rhee Hoi Chang, leader of the NKP (August) (Newspaper of the KMA, August 25 1997).
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Dae Jung, the presidential candidate of the NCNP, who promised to enact the
'contract system' of fee scheduling if elected. Rhee Hoi Chang, the presidential
candidate of the ruling party also promised to review positively reform proposals if
elected (Newspaper of the KMA, December 15 1997).
The KMA was strategic and persistent in delivering its demands to policy¬
making institutions prior to the presidential election. Although the KMA supported
reform, it had not been able to express this support openly under the previous
authoritarian-military regimes. Under the civilian government of Kim Young Sam,
however, the KMA became more free to express its interests and adapted quickly to
its new role, seizing every opportunity to press its demands.
It is important to note that the reasoning behind the KMA's support of the
unified NHI scheme is rather different from that of other political institutions and
interest groups. While the KMA agreed in general with improving the quality of
health care through NHI reform, its more direct interest lay in the issues of fee
schedules. These, from the KMA's perspective, had been set unrealistically for
more than two decades: firstly, structural problems of local NHI funding societies
had resulted in severe financial deficits, and the rate of fee schedules could not be
improved as long as the separate NHI system remained. The financial stability of
medical insurance was therefore crucial for increasing fee schedules. However, the
KMA could not expect financially stable medical insurance or a reasonable increase
in fee schedules under the current separate NHI system. Secondly, the fee
scheduling system would always be heavily constrained as long as the government
maintained power over regulating the level of fees; changes in these would directly
impact on pricing of national commodities and would therefore not be permitted by
the EPB. The KMA therefore consistently demanded creation of an independent
body for fee schedules as well as for the contract system which regulated the
relationship between the insurer and the medical service. Ultimately, the KMA's
lobbying efforts with presidential candidates and political institutions succeeded in
creating an agreement that the contract system would be considered more seriously
in the policy process surrounding NHI reform.
6.9 The Essence of Special Advisory Organs under the Kim
Young Sam Government
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At the end of 1997, the SCHR officially unveiled its final report as a conclusion to
the committee's one year of duty. The substance of this report was no different from
earlier MoHW announcements on NHI reform. The main points of medical
insurance reform discussed by the SCHR concerned (SCHR, 1997):
• The need to change the current setting of Tow scale of benefits' based on Tow
rate of contributions' towards 'a proper rate of contributions and proper benefits'
as a result ofwhich the rate of 'out-of-pocket payment' of the insured to medical
services could be reduced (but 'a proper rate of contributions' means here that
the government would increase the contribution rates of the insured).
• Encouraging participation of private insurance companies to support
supplementary health care.
• Setting up reasonable fee schedules for medical service providers, and ensuring
regular examination by the Special Deliberating Committee for Fee Schedules of
Medical Services with medical consumers, medical service providers, insurers
and government.
• Contributing to financial stability and managerial efficiency through merging the
current 227 local funding societies on the basis of city size scales (16 cities).
• Encouraging competition between funding societies in the private sector to
increase managerial efficiency.
• Increasing levels of responsibility amongst executives of funding societies by
strengthening autonomous managerial power and minimising government
regulation.
• Reducing amounts of medical consumption and thereby saving medical costs,
including through adoption of the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) system
within the NHI scheme.
Once again, the SCHR, which was the last health care consulting body under
the Kim Young Sam government, concluded similar outcomes to those of the
MoHSA/MoHW and other advisory organs in the government. There was no
intention of a radical reform in the proposal. The SCHR repeated general
countermeasures with conservative views. Only to gamer the support of the medical
professions, the report mentioned about fee schedules. After all, all advisory organs
established by the Kim Young Sam government for the purpose of developing health
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and general welfare policies provided interestingly very similar points of view
regarding medical insurance reform (see Table 6-2). The main position of those
advisory organs was to develop the NHI scheme in maintaining the current frame of
the NHI scheme rather than in carrying out a radical reform in health care policy.
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Table 6-2 Major Outcomes from Advisory Institutions during the
Government of Kim Young Sam
SCHSR NWPB TFESSDD SCHR
(1994.6) (1995.11) (1997.6) (1997.12)
Based on the current separate -9 -9 -9
administration system but
adopting the merits of the
unified NHI scheme
Management Strengthening the Joint Cost- -9 -9 -9
Sharing Project
Optimising the size and X •v
minimising the number of
—T -T
funding societies to achieve
scale of economies. _v
Building computer networks
■9 mmT





Encouraging competition -9 -9
among funding societies
Improving the current fee -9 -9 -9
schedule
Adopting the DRG system to -9 -9
replace the 'fee for service'
Finance system
Establishing a committee for -9
-9
adjustment of fee schedules
for participating insurers,
insured and medical service
providers
Encouraging the role of -9 -9
private medical insurance
Others Gradually expanding the -9 -9
annual duration of receiving
NHI benefits
Sources: Adapted from The Special Committee for Health Reform (1997) The Assignments for
Health Policy, The Task Force for the Establishment of Social Security Development Directions
(1997) The Is' Directionsfor Social Security Development (Rough Draft); The National Welfare
Planning Board (1996) 'Quality ofLife' StandardDesign ofNational Welfarefor Globalisation', The
Special Committee for Health Security Reform (1994) The Assignments for the Health Security
Reform and Policy Directions.
• Symbol "-9" means the same as the SCHSR item
SCHSR: Special Committee for Health Security Reform
NWPB: National Welfare Planning Board
TFESSDD: Task Force for the Establishment of Social Security Development Directions
SCHR: Special Committee for Health Reform
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6.9.1 The Background and Purpose of the Government
With respect to the circumstance, we need to raise two questions: why did the Kim
Young Sam government set up relatively many advisory institutions during five
years of his presidency, and why did those advisory institutions produce similar
outcomes?
It is important to examine the factors underlying and influencing the series of
health care policy responses and recommendations within various advisory
institutions from 1990 to 1997. Firstly, we need to understand the reasons for
President Kim Young Sam's varying positions on health care policy. During the
presidential campaign, Kim Young Sam had heard repeated complaints from farmers
and fishermen concerning the government's decision to open domestic agricultural
markets to foreign competition within the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The atmosphere of the 14th presidential election was
tangibly different from that of the previous campaign. All candidates had civilian
backgrounds and democracy was reasonably well established in the country, so no
one could resort to the old issues of the debate such as democratisation and military
authority. Instead, presidential candidates had to demonstrate political commitment
to improving the welfare and living standards of voters; as a result, all candidates in
the 14th presidential election campaign were forced to concentrate on the issues
underlying hostile public sentiment and had promised to put a political priority on
matters of concern to agricultural societies. During the presidential campaign, Kim
Young Sam therefore promised the public to set up a Special Committee for
Developing the Farming and Fishery Areas (SCDFF) as a channel within the
government for dealing with agricultural and welfare issues for farmers and
fishermen. During his presidency, livelihood security within this constituency
considerably worsened; in 1996, President Kim decided to join the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), thereby creating an opening for
new international pressures to open further markets in agricultural sectors as well as
industry. Changes in economic policy therefore had profound impacts on the
agricultural economy and on the degrees of vulnerability and discontent amongst
farmers and fishermen in particular. If economic turmoil in rural areas during the
1970s and 1980s can be attributed to the fast economic growth policy, turmoil from
the end of the 1980s throughout the 1990s was caused more by the daunting speed
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with which domestic markets were being opened to foreign competition.
Ever since the creation of the NHI scheme for farmers and fishermen, the
government had had to appease this constituency by promising that the insured in
rural areas would receive 'high benefits through low contributions' and by
committing government support for the financing of local funding societies serving
them. As the government failed to keep these promises, farmers and fishermen were
driven to becoming more organised and allied with pressure groups. The president
and government therefore needed to take action to contain rising and more forcefully
articulated discontent.
President Kim not only had to appease pressure groups in the country; he
also had to calm growing complaints in the ruling party. Since economic and
medical insurance were the most important issues in rural areas, parliamentary
members with bases in these constituencies especially were facing growing pressure
from voters. Therefore party members also were demanding solutions to these
concerns, as were opposition politicians who were affected by similar pressures.
The creation of various special committees and advisory bodies - rather than the
passing and implementation of radical policies - were the government's main
response for easing tensions in farming and fishery areas. In addition, the president
also tried repeatedly to rationalise the term 'globalisation' in accordance with the
commitment to improve the standard of living in rural areas. Because of the
subsequent opening of domestic markets, the public became aware of the negative
impact on their well-being from the economic policy of the government. To
alleviate this negative sentiment being spread in the country, the president and the
government frequently used the terms 'globalisation' and 'quality of life' alongside
welfare development in the country as a means of protecting the legitimacy of the
governmental policy.
6.9.2 The Influence of the Ministry of Health and Social
Affairs (Health and Welfare)
We also need to look at the inside of the MoHSA/MoHW. The ministry consistently
opposed NHI reform and obstructed reform movements through its active role in the
policy process. What made it possible for the ministry to keep reacting against the
reform through various channels?
Ch.6 - Slow Reform of the NHI 208
Three major civil servants in the ministry - Choi Soo II, Youn Sung Tae and
Kim Jong Dae - who had opposed the unified NHI scheme, occupied major
executive positions in the government; an atmosphere of anti-NHI-reform therefore
dominated the ministry throughout this period, and the inputs of these individuals,
who occupied crucial positions in the government at the crucial moments of the
policy process, had decisive impacts on policy outcomes. Choi Soo II, the most
senior officer among them, was appointed as the President of the National
Federation of Medical Insurance (NFMI) (1990-1993) after being assigned as Vice-
Minister of Health and Social Affairs. Youn Sung Tae was appointed as the Vice-
Minister of Health and Social Affairs (1989-1992) and then moved to the position of
Chief Officer in the Administrative Adjustment Office for the Prime Minister (1992-
1993)29. In 1993, Youn was appointed as the President of the NFMI (1993-1998) in
succession to Choi Soo II. In addition, Kim Jong Dae occupied crucial positions in
the ministry. He was designated as the Senior Economic Secretariat Officer in the
Presidential Secretariat Office (1989-1992) and returned to the ministry as the
Assistant Minister for Social Welfare Policies (1992-1993). Later, Kim was
appointed as the Assistant Minister for Planning and Management in the ministry
(1993-1995) and, during 1995-1996, positioned as a Senior Officer of the 3rd
Administrative Adjustment Office for the Prime Minister.30
Under the influence of these officials, the MoHSA/MoHW appointed anti-
reformist professionals as members of the special committees and task force while
ensuring that reformist professionals were excluded. With this careful and
deliberate weighting of committee membership, the policy outcomes of advisory
institutions were inevitably - from a reformist perspective - conservative, indifferent
and compromised.
Secondly, ministers within the MoHSA/MoHW also had an impact. Most
ministers designated in the MoHSA/MoHW during the Kim Young Sam
administration were political allies of the president and had little or no experience in
social policy fields. The president frequently changed ministers, undermining
possibilities for civil servants to work consistently towards fulfilling a concrete
29 The role of this position is to co-ordinate political decisions between the Presidential Secretariat
Office and the cabinet offices.
30 The main function of this position is to adjust and reconcile policy decisions between the
Presidential Secretariat Office and the MoHSA/ MoHW.
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policy agenda. Most ministers spent only a few months in the ministerial position,
with the exception of Suh Sang Mok, who was in office for one year and four
months. Lack of knowledge and experience resulted in inadequate understanding
about and commitment to NHI reform. Ministers therefore relied heavily on high
ranking-civil servants rather than on their own political philosophy, and were unable
to exert sufficient leadership or pursue policy development with the necessary
confidence. For instance, the first special committee, the SCHSR, made several
statements and recommendations during its six month tenure, but lack of support
from government and state institutions ensured that none of these were
implemented. More fundamentally, the outputs of this committee and the various
bodies following and parallel to it were vague and repetitive, wholly lacking the
concrete, detailed strategies and budgets necessary for their implementation. This
kind of situation was not only limited to the activity of the SCHSR but also extended
to other advisory institutions during this period.
Table 6-3 List of Ministers of the MoHSA/ MoHW in the Government of
Kim Young Sam
Name Career Period




Song Jung Sook Journalist 3/1993-12/1993
Suh Sang Mok Vice-President ofKDI/MP of
Ruling Party 12/1993-5/1995
Lee Sung Ho MP ofRuling Party 5/1995—12/1995
Kim Yang Bae
Senior Presidential Secretariat




Lee Sung Ho MP ofRuling Party 8/1996-11/1996






Source: Applied from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998,) The White Paper ofHealth and
Welfare; Yon Hap Tong Shin (1999) Korean Biographical Dictionary
6.10 The Ruling versus the Opposition Parties
During this period, the social policy-making capacity of the ruling party was never
seriously developed; as a result, the policy directions of the ruling NKP were led
mainly by the government, especially by the MoHSA/MoHW. The NKP did not
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actively involve itself in creating a policy agenda or in leading the parliamentary
policy-making process. Instead, the MoHSA/MoHW delivered policy agendas to
executives at the final decision-making level of government; the ruling party was
then likely to simply follow these directions rather than debating or challenging
them. Health care policy therefore lacked dynamism and vision throughout this
period.
However, it was Hwang Seong Gyun who finally broke the stagnation of the
policy-making institutions, and his proposal for gradual reform gained sufficient
support from members of the ruling party who wanted to carry some achievements
to rural voters in the approaching elections. The MoHW and the NKP attempted on
December 9 1996 to block momentum behind Hwang's reform proposal before it
was delivered to the National Assembly, stating that 'the party and government will
determine carefully the reform of the NHI scheme based on the review of the
SCHR.' This political statement was intended to further delay any substantial steps
towards reform, as the MoHW was aware that the SCHR was unlikely to make any
radical proposals. In addition, the MoHW might have expected that even though
ruling NKP members were now supporting the NHI reform plan to gain political
capital during the presidential election in December 1997, any force behind reform
was again likely to be greatly diluted after the election. The MoHW, however, was
compelled to take some action and created a substitute bill to replace the reform bill,
the National Medical Insurance Act, which was passed with wide consensus
amongst members of the ruling party and opposition parties.31 Despite opposing this
reform bill, the NKP was left in some confusion by Hwang's agenda over how to
deal with NHI reform. After various policy reversals, the ruling party decided to
pass the reform proposal of Hwang within the party because party members realised
they would have to answer demands from a wide range of civic groups in the face of
the presidential election.
Unlike the NKP, on the other hand, the opposition party led by Kim Dae
Jung drove a highly consistent policy agenda regarding NHI reform. The opposition
leader continued to promise reform through public pledges in the 14th and 15th
31 Interview with Cho, Director of the SPHR, and interview with Kim Yeon Myung on October 2
1999, Vice-Chief of the Social Welfare Committee in the Peoples' Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy (PSPD), one of the strongest NGOs in Korea and a technical expert of the Board for
Promoting and Planning the Unified NHI Scheme (BPPU) under Kim Dae Jung government.
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presidential elections. Through Kim Dae Jung's steady efforts for reform, his party
was able to accelerate reform pressure in alliance with civic groups such as the
CoPS. Even after the birth of the merged ruling party, Kim Dae Jung was able to
expand his political power and establish himself as a powerful opposition leader,
largely on the basis of his positions on health care policy. Accordingly, he was also
able to drive a consistently strong political agenda within his party without
compromising with powerful opposition leaders such as Kim Young Sam and Kim
Jong Pil. Most importantly, in comparison to other party leaders, Kim Dae Jung had
a clear understanding and political vision concerning medical insurance reform.
This distinctive political view of Kim Dae Jung provided a continuous motivation
and impetus for him to pursue a reform agenda as well as a sound base within the
National Assembly with which reformists movements could ally.
Before the 15th presidential election, however, Kim Dae Jung was influenced
by Kim Jong Pil who, after seceding from the merged party, increased pressure on
Kim Dae Jung and the NCNP to work for more radical reform. After Kim Jong Pil
built the ULD, this party joined the reform movement in alliance with the NCNP.
Kim Jong Pil was not in reality a strong supporter of reform, but he was aware that
he needed to convey a reforming image to attract voters as a returning opposition
leader with a progressive agenda. The alliance of these parties strengthened the
force behind medical insurance reform in the parliament and enabled the two Kims
and two opposition parties to create the reform bill for the National Health Insurance
Act. Co-operation between the two Kims continued and provided a basis for a
powerful political alliance when Kim Dae Jung won the 15th presidential election in
December 1997.
32 Interview with Kim, Vice-Chief of the Social Welfare Committee in the PSPD.
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Conclusion
President Kim Young Sam had been a supporter ofNHI reform throughout his long
tenure as an opposition leader. After his election as president in December 1992,
however, he demonstrated little commitment to reform of the medical insurance
programme. His main policy tool, when confronted with acute and unavoidable
socio-economic problems in rural areas, was to establish several special advisory
institutions to convince the public that he had the intention to support reform. Under
pressure from foreign counterparts and international economic organisations, the
Kim Young Sam administration sought to add legitimacy to its economic and
foreign policy through the rhetoric of 'globalisation' and 'quality of life.' The
government backed up this political rhetoric by adopting a neo-liberalist approach to
national economic and social policy. Based on the attitude of the government,
special advisory institutions produced outcomes of health care policy, but their
policy direction was to develop the NHI scheme within the current conservative
system without radical challenges.
The MoHSA/MoHW strongly opposed reform of the NHI scheme. Anti-
reformist civil servants occupied major executive positions in the ministry and
steadily obstructed any reform movement. When the ruling party finally decided to
reform the NHI scheme, the MoHW failed to co-operate. The ministry pursued its
own political agenda against any changes in the health care programme, and its
success was largely based on the fact that members of special advisory bodies were
overwhelmingly chosen from anti-reformist platforms.
In response, the activity of pressure groups became more organised and
provided a crucial role in policy-making battles during the 1990s in an environment
which was very different from that of the 1980s. Reformist pressure groups were
forced to become more systematically organised and clear in the content of and
grounds for their agendas. The CoPS was able to draw on public concern and the
support of trade unions, farmers and fishermen for health care reform to create a
more broad-based platform for the reform movement which it was then able to lead.
It was also able to draw on its long experience to create a convincing health care
policy agenda. Involvement of a new trade union, the KCTU, particularly
accelerated the reformist movement's capacity to pressurise the government and the
National Assembly. As a result, opposition parties and the National Assembly
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eventually responded to pressures from the reformist side and the socio-economic
crisis in the rural sector by preparing the reform bill.
The KMA expressed and delivered its demands to political institutions more
aggressively than at any other period; its membership was tremendously increased
prior to the presidential election, and the strategy of the KMA to make the most of
the presidential election season was successful in ensuring support from presidential
candidates.
In this period, a higher degree of pluralism is found than in the case of the
second reform debate in the late 1980s. More interest groups participated in the
policy process, and their influence also increased in comparison to earlier periods.
As mentioned earlier, the involvement of the labour organisation increased the
influence of the reformist side in the policy-making arena. It is clear that the
'working class mobilisation' approach can explain the medical insurance
development during this particular period. A limited number of elite groups and
institutions were still influential in the policy process, although the degree of
involvement of certain elite groups and institutions was less prominent than in
previous stages of the reform campaign. This seems to imply that political power
was more evenly distributed among a broader range of actors within the government.
Amidst the development of democratisation in the country, the influence of
the broader citizenry was improved in the society. The growing political influence
of citizens converged around the collective activities of an umbrella civic
organisation known as the CoPS. Compared to the reform civic group of the second
reform movement which was active during the latter part of the 1980s, this
organisation became more varied and solid. The agenda of these reformers focused
principally on the acquisition of the citizen's right to health care from the
government. This was accomplished through increasing the pressure on the political
system and by demanding financial support for a health care programme from the
government. The strategy was to continuously apply pressure to political parties and
politicians until success caused the policy makers and politicians to heed the voices
of the electorate - especially during the election seasons.
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Chapter 7. Success in Integrating the NHI (1998-
2000)
In this stage of the reform movement, activities between reformist and anti-reformist
sides become more complex. Thus, this chapter identifies the interest groups
engaged in the battle over medical insurance reform and explores the actions and
limitations of the new government in legislating and implementing the NHI reform.
Under the economic crisis which began towards the end of 1997, the nation
expected a new leadership in the social, political and economic arenas to emerge.
As a result, Kim Dae Jung, leader of the opposition party, was elected as the new
president.
Medical insurance was seen as being an unsuccessful policy, and there was
pressure to reform it radically. The new leader of the country, who had strongly
supported reform of NHI, carried out the reform of the scheme with the support of
the organised reformist groups. Meanwhile, the anti-reformist group in the
government continually attempted to block legislation of the reform. A newly
organised anti-reformist interest group outside the government became heavily
involved in the policy process in order to obstruct the enforcement of the reform bill
before the implementation of the reformed medical insurance programme and the
general election.
In this period, the government handled two major assignments at the same
time - the implementation of the 1997 National Medical Insurance Act (which was a
moderate reform bill suggested by the former ruling party), and the legislation of a
radical reform bill (which was the new ruling party's preference).
7.1 The Economic Crisis and Political Transitions
Prior to the 15th presidential election1 towards the end of 1997, the state of Korea
confronted two significant events. Firstly, the country began to face economic
crisis, the so-called IMF crisis. The economic crisis critically affected the entire
functioning of the national economy and this impacted upon the citizens' daily lives.
The collapse ofmany private sectors due to the financial bankruptcy of the country
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led to the rapid restructuring of all levels of society. Large-scale job layoffs
occurred within a short period, leading to further economic turmoil, a rapid rise in
homelessness, and widespread fracturing of family and society in Korea. As a
result, the economic crisis brought the country into fundamental confusion.
The second event occurred within the political domain. In October 1997,
two months before the presidential election, Kim Dae Jung, leader of the National
Congress for New Politics party (NCNP), and Kim Jong Pil, leader of the United
Liberal Democrats Party (ULD), announced a political alliance between two of the
opposition parties for the forthcoming presidential election, the so-called DJP
Alliance. Two opposition leaders made an agreement that Kim Dae Jung would be
the only presidential candidate to represent the two parties, and if Kim Dae Jung
won the election, Kim Jong Pil would be offered a prime ministerial position. In
addition, the agreement offered to change the constitution into a German-style-
cabinet system within two and a half years, which was Kim Jong Pil's long-time
aim. Tied to this was a promise of 50% political power to Kim Jong Pil in the new
government.
Through these unprecedented economic and political turning points in Korea,
Kim Dae Jung was elected as the 15th president in December 1997. He became the
first president to be elected from the political opposition in the history of Korean
politics. However, President-elect Kim and other policy-makers in his party fell
immediately into a dilemma over two major difficulties. One of these was to spend
a huge proportion of the national budget to restructure and attempt to save the ruined
domestic economy. On the other hand, they had to increase public spending on
constructing a social safety net to deal not only with social demands from domestic
factors in need but also with international demands from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. A real concern of the president-elect and his
fellow politicians was how to confront concurrently these two discordant matters in
such harsh economic conditions.
Moreover, Kim Dae Jung and the ruling coalition had to start their political
journey under the difficult parliamentary circumstance of a small ruling party, and a
larger opposition party. In accordance with the result of the 15th general election,
the former ruling party, the Grand National Party (GNP) acquired 165 seats out of
1 The 15lh president is Kim Dae Jung.
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299 total parliamentary seats. The GNP was the new name of the former ruling New
'j t
Korean Party (NKP). However, the number of total seats of the new ruling
coalition, the NCNP and the ULD, was only 121 seats - 78 from the NCNP and 43
from the ULD. During the Roh Tae Woo government, similar parliamentary
circumstances had occurred. At that time, three opposition parties possessed over
half of the parliamentary seats in the National Assembly. But, now, as there was a
huge single opposition party occupying the National Assembly, it was expected that
the opposition party could easily tackle the policy of the government and the ruling
party from within the policy process.
7.2 Response of the New Government to the New Paradigm
At the very initial stage of the new government of Kim Dae Jung, the government
was committed primarily to dealing with unemployment issues caused by the
economic crisis. The economic crisis hit vulnerable groups harder, increased the
proportion of part-time and daily workers, and reversed the trend of steady
improvement of income distribution (see Table 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3). In order to
confront one of the most painful failures in the modern history of Korea, the
government had to provide extended coverage of social insurance schemes so as to
strengthen the 'social safety net' as protection from the socio-economic turmoil.
This was a short-term measure and a minimum level of treatment provided by the
government, designed to cushion the sudden impact on the daily life of citizens. In
fact, the 'social safety net' or 'social protection' was not a popular term in the
Korean political arena until the onset of economic crisis. During almost two
decades of consistent and rapid economic growth, unemployment rates were
extremely low, and the employment culture also provided a secure work
environment for employees. As policy-makers had unilaterally concentrated on
rapid economic growth, there was very little incentive for them in bureaucracy to
take seriously social protection or social welfare programmes in preparation for such
an unexpected crisis.
2 The New Korean Party (NKP) changed its title to the Grand National Party (GNP) before the 15th
general election.
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Table 7-1 Unemployment Rates (1995 - 1999)
(Unit: %)
1997 1998 1999
Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
2.6 3.1 4.5 5.9 6.5 6.7 6.9 7.0 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.9 8.5 8.7 8.1 7.2
Source: National Statistical Office (1999) Monthly Statistics ofKorea, May, the Republic of Korea.






0.327 0.300 0.302 0.287 0.289 0.288 0.282 0.316 0.320
Source: Kwon, S.M. (2001) Economic Crisis and Social Policy Reform in Korea, International
Journal ofSocial Welfare, Vol. 10, p.100
* A state ofperfectly even (equitable) income distribution has a Gini coefficient of 0 with its
maximum positive value of 1 representing a perfectly skewed
Table 7-3 Changes in Monthly Average Income and Expenditure of
Labour Households Living in Urban Areas: 1980-1998
(Unit: '000 Won3; %)
1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998
Monthly Income 234.1 943.3 1,911.1 2,152.7 2,287.3 2,133.1
Expenditure of 183.6 723.0 1,409.1 1,602.9 1,676.9 1,536.2
Household
Source: National Statistical Office (1999) 1999 Social Indications ofKorea, the Republic of Korea.
Through a series of social policy-making during this period, the Kim Dae
Jung government distinctively delivered two contradictory (dual) approaches to the
social policy setting. First, the new government adopted the neo-liberalism into
Korean social policy. As a result, the government emphasised three features in the
policy-making process: a 'small government,' 'privatisation' and 'market
mechanism.' On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung also showed the social-democratic
approach in the social policy-making process. We can observe this challenge of the
new president in: ® the radical reform of the NHI scheme; © the expansion of the
national pension and unemployment insurance schemes; and © the increase of
national budgets for unemployment relief. Although those progressive decisions
were made to mitigate the socio-economic problems caused by the economic crisis,
it contributed to the development of social policy in the country (Kim, 1999: 2-3).
Another key aspect in the social policy of the Kim Dae Jung government is
The unit of money in Korea.
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that the idea of 'workfare' was reflected in the welfare agenda through the
entitlement of 'Productive Welfare.' The workfare aimed to provide financial
support for the unemployed who were not insured through temporary public work
programmes. President Kim Dae Jung initially unveiled the idea of Productive
Welfare in his Liberation Day speech on August 18 1998. However, the same
picture of this concept was adopted from the Welfare Design for the 'Quality ofLife'
in Globalisation4 of the Kim Young Sam government.
Just as the social policy agenda of the Kim Young Sam administration was
likely to be adopted from the welfare reform of the Clinton administration in the
U.S., so that of the Kim Dae Jung government was influenced by the 'Third Way'
approach of New Labour and Tony Blair. Lee Jang Won, Chief Director of the
Planning Board for Improving Quality of Life,5 underlined that the idea of
Productive Welfare is based on the concept of the Third Way, in terms of excluding
two separate perspectives between 'market' and 'welfare' as well as of searching for
the middle-of-the-road policy (Lee, 1999: 5). It is clear, then, that the neo-liberal
approach stemming from outside influences contributed to the design of Kim Young
Sam and Kim Dae Jung's welfare ideology in general.
Why did these two governments engage this particular ideological
perspective in their welfare agenda? It is likely that they needed to adopt this
ideological approach, which had been seen as a popular trend in Western welfare
states, to legitimate their social and economic policies under the circumstances they
faced. The Kim Young Sam administration announced many welfare agendas to
alleviate mounting unrest over the open economic policy of the government under
the name of 'globalisation.' To justify the globalisation policy, it was necessary for
the government to bring similar neo-liberal trends into the policy-making arena.
Although Kim Dae Jung was a more progressive politician than Kim Young
Sam, he believed that he had no choice but to adopt the neo-liberalist approach to
the social policy process under the economic crisis. As the new government faced
the lack of financial capability in restructuring economic and public sectors, the
4 For more about the project of the Kim Young Sam government, see pp. 190-195 in Chapter 6.
5 After unveiling the Productive Welfare plan, the Planning Board for Improving Quality of Life was
established within the Presidential Secretariat Office. The Chief Secretariat Officer for Labour and
Welfare in the Presidential Secretariat Office took charge of the board. The board focused mostly on
working for the implementation of Productive Welfare plans and on dealing with other social policy
matters.
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leader might have had a limited choice besides preventing public spending from
over-investment.
The outside influences in social policy-making are discussed in a later
section.
7.3 The Adoption of a Corporatist State
President-elect Kim established the Transitional Committee to sketch the
restructuring blueprints for the new government. The Transitional Committee
intended to design one hundred projects for the new government to develop
following presidential inauguration. Meanwhile, the new ruling party (the NCNP)
was charged with organising the Tripartite Committee composed of employees,
employers and the government. It was vital for the government and new ruling party
to reach a consensus with these key economic players in order to tackle the national
crisis in the face of massive unemployment. The ruling NCNP dramatically made
an agreement to set up the Tripartite Committee with the Korean Confederation of
Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), via a
marathon conference between the party and two trade unions on January 14 1998.
Thereafter, the policy-making process of the new government and new ruling party
was closely associated with the activity of two committees - the Transitional
Committee and the Tripartite Committee - in a policy-making dialogue.
In relation to social policy issues, the Transitional Committee concentrated
on working on the key issues such as reducing unemployment, developing the social
protection system, and assisting those in urgent need who were at risk due to the
enormous cut in general income as a result of the economic crisis. In January 1998,
the Transitional Committee chaired by Lee Jong Chan divided the committee into
six divisions and instructed that major social policy research be conducted within the
Social and Cultural Division in the committee. Lee had been General Secretary of
the DJP, the ruling party under the Chun regime, in the beginning of the 1980s.
Also, he had been a supporter for the NHI reform in the first reform movement
(from 1980 to 1983).
7.4 The Resistance of the MoHW
Although the moderate reform bill, the National Medical Insurance Act, was
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meanwhile passed in the National Assembly in November 1997, the MoHW was not
actively working for the new law. To compound this, once the reform bill was
legislated, the MoHW again considered using the presidential veto to oppose it. The
MoHW contacted the Chair of the Policy Committee of the ruling and opposition
parties respectively to suggest mobilising the veto, but the executives of political
parties opposed this idea on December 26 1997 (Chosun II Bo, January 8 1998). As
soon as the idea of the veto over the reform bill was rejected by the executives of the
political parties, the MoHW decided to prepare an alternative bill to replace the
legislated reform bill (MoHW, January 1998a).
The resistance of the ministry to reform was led mainly by the anti-reformist
civil servants during this period rather than by the president or minister. First, since
it was a transitional period of taking over the government by the new president-elect,
the leadership of the current president and ministers were too weakened to lead the
anti-reform movement within the political arena. Second, as the last Minister of
Health and Welfare of the Kim Young Sam government, Choi Kwang, was not a
strong resistor of the NHI reform (unlike two ministers, Rhee Hai Won and Moon
Tae Joon, during the 1980s), there was no reason for him to become involved in the
action and take risks in the final days of the current government.
The intention of the MoHW to block the implementation of the reform Act is
illustrated in the MoHW's paper. According to the Report of Major Affairs
introduced to the Transitional Committee by the MoHW in December 1997, the
MoHW only addressed general points of 'building efficient management and an
autonomous competition system,' 'setting the principle of proper contributions and
proper benefits,' and 'improving the fee schedule for the medical insurance
programme,' which had been repeated by special advisory institutions under the
Kim Young Sam government (MoHW, December 1997: 34). There was neither a
concrete plan nor even any general ideas to carry out medical insurance reform in
the report before the implementation of the new law. The implementation of the
NHI reform was even dropped from 44 prior pledges selected by the MoHW for the
primary affairs of the new president (p.38). On January 8 1998, the MoHW reported
an alternative measure to the legislated reform Act to the Transitional Committee
(Chosun II Bo, January 8 1998).
The MoHW stipulated repeatedly that if the National Medical Insurance Act
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was implemented in October 1998,6 (D the financial burden of government would be
increased because of the financial deficit of local NHI funding societies; © the merit
of an autonomous management mechanism by competition between funding
societies would disappear; © institutional inefficiency would be caused by the
bureaucratic and inflexible system of a huge state-run funding organisation; and @
confusion would arise because of sudden systematic changes in the medical
insurance programme (MoHW, January 1998a: 7-8). Accordingly, the MoHW
announced that the ministry would propose an alternative bill, based on the
suggestions of the Special Committee for Health Reform (SCHR), to a special
session of the National Assembly scheduled in March 1998. The ministry also
stressed that the alternative bill would include the measure of merging 227 local
funding societies into 16 larger-scale funding societies on the basis of city-size level
(Si- and Kun-size level) (MoHW, January 1998a: 8).
As a result of the MoHW resistance, a radical reform plan to fully integrate
all fragmented medical insurance systems (a public pledge of President-elect Kim
Dae Jung during his presidential campaign) was not immediately fulfilled in the new
government. Since January 1998, each division under the Transitional Committee
had worked to select a hundred projects for the new government's primary
performances, on the basis of campaign pledges of President-elect Kim. The Social
and Cultural Division submitted its draft to the committee in January, but the details
of a more advanced reform plan were not included (MoHW, January 1998b). In
addition, on January 13 1998, the Transitional Committee delivered 59 emergency
measures which the president-elect had to implement immediately following the
presidential inauguration scheduled for February 25. However, the committee only
announced that the NHI administration system would be improved without
introducing a specific master plan for medical insurance reform (Dong A II Bo,
January 14 1998 & Chosun II Bo, January 14 1998). We can gauge that in this
transitional period the Transitional Committee was not even free to address medical
insurance reform. It is evident that anti-reformist power still dominated the policy
process in the government at the moment. As the Transitional Committee worked
closely with the ministries to take up the government, it was not difficult for the
anti-reformists in the government to reflect their aims in the proposals.
6 October 1998 was the original schedule for the enforcement of the new law.
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On the same date, the MoHW presented results of an organisational
examination which investigated the flaws of the administrative system of NHI
funding societies. According to the ministry, as local funding societies were
overstaffed by 18.3% (1,840 employees), and company funding societies were
overstaffed by 8.5% (344 employees), the number of surplus employees would be
reduced (Chosun II Bo, January 14 1998).
The strategy of the MoHW to block the reform was to persuade the policy
makers that the current separate system of NHI could obtain similar effects by
partial prescriptions without a radical reformation. Thus, the ministry kept
emphasising two particular alternatives, that the number of 'funding societies' and
'employees' would be reduced to an adequate level to increase administrative
efficiency.
7.5 The Decisions of the Two Committees and the
Subsequent Responses
Meanwhile, the Tripartite Committee reached an agreement to improve four social
insurance programmes. In particular, the committee members decided to reform
more radically the NHI scheme to unify all of the fragmented managerial and
financial systems. And the Tripartite Committee included these decisions in its
Proposal of Social Consensus to Overcome the Economic Crisis (Tripartite
Committee, 1998). The reform of the NHI scheme was strongly insisted upon by the
KCTU in the Tripartite Committee. In the proposal, many areas regarding
corporation, finance, taxation, social security, unemployment and employment were
chosen in the restructuring categories. In respect to the decision of the Tripartite
Committee, the Transitional Committee accepted their suggestion and stated in
response that the new government would pursue the radical reform of the NHI
scheme within the current year (Kyung Hyang Shin Moon, February 4 1998).
It should be noted that the design of the radical NHI reform was not created
by the Tripartite Committee. In other words, not only did the components of the
Tripartite Committee not participate in shaping the blueprint of the medical
insurance reform, but also individual interest of the committee's members was not
integrated into the formation of the reform. The committee performed a role of
merely confirming the necessity of the medical insurance reform and delivered its
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determination to the new government under the consensus amongst the three
representatives in the committee. As is evidenced in preceding chapters,
historically, reformist members had continued to communicate adequately about
medical insurance reform with the reformist politicians, especially in opposition
parties, for a long period of time.7 In this relationship, the political context and
consensus with reference to the NHI reform were already tuned between the
opposition party-politicians and the pro-NHI reform (civic) organisations.
At this point, we need to raise the question of why the new government
attempted a radical reform of the NHI scheme. The 1997 National Medical
Insurance Act was a moderate reform bill proposed by the former ruling party.
Although this bill was not as progressive as the reform proposal of the former
opposition party (now the ruling party), the opposition party had to support the
moderate reform in considering the incoming presidential election and following the
general election in 1997. However, since the former opposition became the ruling
party after the election, there was no reason for President-elect Kim Dae Jung and
the ruling party not to introduce a radical reform bill, which had been a long-time
public pledge of theirs. Of course, the public supporters of President-elect Kim
believed that he and his party would do so.
As soon as the political atmosphere favoured reforming the NHI scheme, the
first resistance of the anti-NHI reformist side was immediately triggered by the
National Federation ofMedical Insurance (NFMI). Youn Sung Tae, President of the
NFMI and former anti-reformist civil servant, delivered the Review Paper about
Contribution Payment of Employees After the Unified NHI Scheme. The NFMI
distributed this report to the major presses. In fact, Youn Sung Tae had already
distributed the Expected Problems After Implementing the National Medical
Insurance Act to obstruct the implementation of the first reform bill passed in
November 1997. In the paper, he gave a warning about the reform (the 1997
National Medical Insurance Act) scheduled for October 1998. The warnings were as
follows: (D as a financial deficit in the scheme is to be expected, the financial burden
of government would be heavily increased; ® the financial burden of farmers and
7 Interview with Kim Yeon Myung, Vice-Chief of the Social Welfare Committee in People's
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. (PSPD), which is one of most powerful non-government
organisations in Korea, former Policy Director of the CoPS, and a technical expert for the BPPU
under the Kim Dae Jung government.
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fishermen would be increased due to relatively more transparent income data than
that of the self-employed in urban areas; ® the efficiency ofmanagement would be
reduced (NFMI, January 1998).
According to the review, the NFMI stated the following (Chosun II Bo,
February 17 1998):
After implementing the reform, the contribution rates of employees in
private sectors will be increased to 38.24%, but the contribution rates
of farmers and fishermen as well as the self-employed in urban areas
will be lowered by 62.29% and 50.37% respectively.
The NFMI continually emphasised that:
If the reform is carried out, local funding societies will face a deficit
of one thousand billion Won. Hence, the financial deficit will be
directly transferred to the employees in private sectors.
The aims of the NFMI of these warnings were to put pressure on the
Transitional Committee before the reform policy was settled within the committee,
and to stimulate the wage earners. The second aim especially became a new pivot of
the arguments of the anti-reformists during this particular period. This is an
interesting point, that whereas the previous argument of the anti-reformists
emphasised the increase of governmental responsibility in medical insurance, the
new strategy aimed at the waged employees in private sectors.
In regard to the report of the NFMI, the MoHW denied the facts carried in
Youn's report on February 17. Consequently, the Conference of People's Solidarity
for the Unification and the Expansion of the Benefits of the NHI Scheme (CoPS),
the pro-NHI reformist umbrella organisation, criticised the NFMI and strongly
demanded an official apology in regard to releasing the unreliable data and the
delivery of a corrected edition to the public. The CoPS also stressed that "if the
NFMI does not apologise officially to the public, we will take a legal action against
the President of the NFMI" (Han Kyo Reh, February 17 1998).
7.6 Preparation for a Radical Reform
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On January 30 1998, regardless of resistance of the NFMI to the reform, the
government organised the Special Committee for the Establishment of a National
Medical Insurance Corporation (SCENMIC) in order to carry out the
implementation of the National Medical Insurance Act scheduled for October 1998.
The committee held its first meeting to discuss the details of policy and structure of
the administration body as well as of the imposing system for contributions for the
new scheme, on February 4. The special committee consisted of eleven members.
Many reform supporters were selected as committee members at this time (MoHW,
March 1998a).8 After the presidential inauguration on February 25 19989, as a
consequence, the MoHW officially established the Board for Promoting and
Planning the Unified NHI Scheme (BPPU) in the ministry on March 24 1998. The
goals of the board were to determine a feasible plan and schedule to pursue a radical
reform, and to formulate the managerial and financial structures for the new system.
In order to enact the idea, the BPPU consisted of three divisions and recruited more
reformists as board members, expanding it to include trade unions and more civic
groups. The 1st division was in charge of restructuring the management system and
disposing the reserve funds. The 2nd division focused on building the imposing
structure for contributions and the design for financial stability. And the
mechanisms of fee schedules and fee payments were discussed in the 3 rd division
(MoHW, March 1998b).
In order to avoid any possible confusion at this point, it is necessary to note
that the new government had taken two major steps at the same time: one was to
prepare for the implementation of the National Medical Insurance Act (which was
legislated in 1997 and was a moderate reform bill), and the other was to establish a
8 The special committee selected members to represent the insured, the insurers, medical
representatives and the public. As representatives of the insured, representatives from the Federation
of Farming Business Men, the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (one of the powerful civic
groups) and the Ministry of Government Administration (which had been in charge of the insurance
for civil servants) were selected. As the representative of the insurers, members were chosen from
the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation for Employees in Government and Private Schools, and
the Association ofManaging Directors in the Local Funding Societies. The representatives from the
Korean Medical Association, the Korean Pharmacists Association and the Korean Hospitals
Association also joined the committee. Finally, Cha Heung Bong, Professor at Hallym University,
Kim Yong Ik, Professor at Seoul National University Medical School, and a senior officer from the
MoHW participated in the committee (MoHW, March 1998a). Apart from the representatives of the
insurers and medicine as well as the government, the rest of the members were long-time NHI reform
supporters.
9 On February 25 1998, the new government began its political journey on the basis of the alliance
with the ULD. It is also called Citizens' government.
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blueprint of a radical reform. As the 1997 reform Act was scheduled to be enforced
in October 1998, the new government had to work first for the enforcement of the
legislation while in preparation for the radical reform.
In order to assist research in each division of the board, technical experts
were appointed (MoHW, March 1998b). In regard to the composition of the board
members, current members of the Special Committee for the Establishment of
National Medical Insurance Corporation automatically became members of the
board. In addition, the representatives from two trade unions (the FKTU and the
KCTU), the Citizens' Coalition for Consumers, the Federation of Korean Industries
(FKI) and the Korean Employers' Federation (KEF) were newly joined to the side of
the insured on the board. A representative from the Association of Managing
Directors in the Company Funding Societies entered the insurers' group. Also, more
reformists joined the technical experts' team in the BPPU (MoHW, March 1998b).
On April 10, when Health and Welfare Minister Kim Mo Im presented the
current performing procedures for the NHI reform to President Kim Dae Jung, the
minister also confirmed that the ministry would submit a radical reform bill to this
plenary session of the National Assembly in 1998 (MoHW, April 1998).
In this atmosphere, the Korean Medical Association (KMA) took action
quickly to reflect its demands on the policy-making of the reform. In the 50th
general meeting of the KMA on April 25 1998, the senior executive members
decided to support the NHI reform, and also to call for the 'independence of the fee
examining body' and the 'contract system for fee schedules' between the insurer and
the medical service provider (Newspaper of the KMA, April 27 1998). Two days
later, the Korean Hospitals Association (KHA) and the Korean Academy ofMedical
Law held a joint public hearing to discuss the new formation ofmedical insurance of
the new government. In the public hearing, Sohn Meong Sei, Professor of Yonsei
University Medical School, emphasised: (D changing the current 'compulsory
appointing system' for medical service providers to a 'contract system'; ® adopting
a 'contract system' for fee schedules between the insurer and the medical service
provider; and ® adopting a private medical insurance system (Newspaper of the
KMA, April 30 1998).
The Policy Committee of the ruling party revealed its special report, One
Hundred Days' Evaluation of the Citizens' Government, which aimed to evaluate
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the reform being processed by the new government, in June 1998. The report
described problems and countermeasures regarding the reform process occurring in
the social, political and economical arenas. In regard to health policy concerns, the
party underlined the following (Policy Committee of the NCNP, June 1998):
Primary projects for reforming the health care sector are to enhance
the public medicine, to secure macroscopic efficiency of the medical
supply system, and to distribute fairly health and medical services.
However, the context of the project can be achieved when the
structural reform is systematically performed. In this case, the role
and burden of government will be increased under the current
difficulty of the national economy. So, most of all, but alternatively,
the government needs to attempt health and medical reform without a
huge financial input, as possible. For this, the government should
primarily choose less burdening projects, which are associated with
the improvement of national health, from the one hundred projects.
And then, government needs to carry out the reform projects by
breaking through partial resistance from some interest groups which
oppose the reform. Otherwise, the reform in health and medical
sectors will not be achieved (p.39).
According to the statement above, the ruling party fundamentally agreed the
necessity of reforming the medical insurance. However, the party raised two major
concerns regarding the reform plan of the government. First of all, the party
suggested the government would need to minimise its financial input for reform.
And second, the party warned the government to prepare for mounting resistance
from those opposed to reform.
7.7 The Welfare Reform in the Kim Dae Jung Government
In June 1998, the Evaluating and Planning Board of Social Security (EPBSS) under
the government announced its report, the 1st Social Security Development Five-Year
Plan (1999 - 2003). However, this project demonstrated a very similar picture to
the idea of the Kim Young Sam administration. Similar to the Welfare Design for
the 'Quality of Life' in Globalisation10 of the Kim Young Sam government, this
five-year plan aimed at building a 'productive welfare community' in association
with family, neighbours, local community and government. In addition, the goal of
10 About this project of the Kim Young Sam government, see pp.192-193 in Chapter 6.
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the plan was extended to construct a social safety net to protect people in the
country. In order to achieve the goal in five years, the board addressed five points
(EPBSS, 1998: 2):
• To guarantee a standard national welfare line in respect of the 'right to live.'
• To attain the guideline for the 'scale of coverage' and the 'benefit level' in social
insurance programmes that the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
suggests.
• To build a welfare administration system for the 'demand' side.
• To increase national social security expenditure up to the level of the
international average.
• To set up a social security system in preparation for the unification of North and
South Korea.
This report especially emphasised that government would need to build a
new paradigm to harmonise 'economic growth' and 'welfare,' which enable the
generation of an ultimately 'productive welfare community.' In regard to this point
of view, the report mentioned 'balanced welfare state' (p.6). This term was also
used in the Welfare Design for the 'Quality of Life' in Globalisation in the Kim
Young Sam government. According to the EPBSS, the term 'Productive Welfare' is
defined as below (EPBSS, 1998: 6-7):
• When social development and economic growth are in balance, social security
can maximise national productivity by improving human development and work-
motivation as well as by achieving social solidarity.
• Social welfare would be expanded to suit the national economic level, in
maintaining a balanced relationship between economic growth and stabilisation,
relying solely on neither. Therefore, proper economic growth and fair
distribution ofwealth would be simultaneously achieved.
• On the basis of harmonising 'efficiency and self-reliance', and 'equality and
community,' the expansion of welfare should not restrict economic growth.
Simultaneously, social solidarity should be achieved by a governmental
guarantee of a standard national welfare line for the entire population.
• Basic social security in the areas of income, health, housing and education would
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be met as a government responsibility. Furthermore, government will guarantee
a standard of living for people who are unable to work or to sustain their quality
of life. However, government would also seek to create and provide a working
environment for people who are able to work.
• As the administrative systems of four major social insurance programmes are
diverse, it is necessary to merge fragmented social insurance programmes into a
singular management body.11
Besides the integration of four fragmented social insurance programmes, the unified
NHI scheme and the adoption of private insurance systems were also addressed in
the proposal (EPBSS, 1998).
As we have seen, the Kim Dae Jung government adopted many similar
points of view from the welfare agenda of the Kim Young Sam government.
However, we can observe three distinctive aspects in respect of welfare policy of the
Kim Dae Jung government: © the intention of improving welfare; © simultaneous
development of welfare and national economy; and © the adoption of the market
economy into welfare development. Its fundamental idea of social policy was that
the government would intend to develop national welfare but also would look for
economic growth at the same time. However, this agenda was closely allied to the
rhetoric. Because the new government inevitably had to provide clear measures to
the public in dealing with two confronting difficulties - economic recovery and
welfare provisions - under the economic crisis, it unveiled the policy agenda, which
included a political intention to achieve both objectives together, in convincing the
public.
The second speculation upon the policy agenda is that President Kim Dae
Jung gave more political priority to economic policy because of the national turmoil,
although he was recognised to have possessed more socialistic views than other
senior politicians in the country. Therefore, the welfare agenda of the new
government was designed to take account of the mounting demands for welfare
development in order to avoid any negative impact upon the economic recovery.
11 The national pension and medical insurance programmes have been managed by the MoHW. On
the other hand, the industrial accident and unemployment programmes have been controlled under the
Ministry of Labour (MoL).
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More discussions about the welfare ideology of the new government will be
discussed at the end of the chapter.
7.8 The Reform and the Company Funding Societies Union
The BPPU held the 8th general meeting on July 8 1998. The board deliberated the
final major points in order to prepare a reform bill and decided to engage in dialogue
with each special division to discuss more details regarding the reform process. In
the meeting, the following issues were discussed and determined for the reform bill
(BPPU, July 1998):
• To organise an independent fee examining body.
• To adopt a 'compulsory appointing system' rather than a 'contract system' for
the medical service providers.
• To entitle the National Health Insurance Corporation as a new NHI
administrative body.
• To adopt a single contribution imposing system based on income level.
• To consolidate the fragmented NHI financial systems.
• To transfer comprehensively the current reserve funds of each funding society to
a new funding body.
• To implement the new NHI scheme in January 2000, after a one-year-
preparation period.
In the meantime, President Kim authorised Health and Welfare Minister Kim
Mo Im to accomplish the reform in the meeting on July 8 1998 (Chosun II Bo, July 9
1998). Soon after the BPPU's meeting, a rough draft of the reform bill was made by
the MoHW (MoHW, July 1998) on the basis of the agreement of the BPPU. Despite
continuous efforts from the government to restructure the social security system, the
Korea Employers' Federation (KEF) delivered the Opinions ofEntrepreneurs about
Expanding the Beneficiaries ofthe Social Insurance System on July 31. Through the
petition, the KEF complained that (Han Kyo Reh, August 1 1998):
The idea of the government to expand the beneficiaries of four social
insurance programmes, as one of the countermeasures in dealing with
the unemployment issue under the economic crisis, is to ignore
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current difficult circumstances in private sectors because it will add
financial burdens on the company and its employees.
Under pressure from the government, company funding societies rapidly
established their own trade union, the Korean Federation of Company Funding
Societies Union (henceforth referred to as the Company Funding Societies Union) in
July 1998, and the union stressed that "the new NHI scheme has not yet been
verified in the world, and it is going to provide a financial burden to the government
and the insured." Most employees working in the company funding societies feared
losing their jobs in the wake of the reform. As the local funding societies were
bigger than the company funding societies, there was a possibility that the latter
would be absorbed into the administration of the former after the birth of a state-run
funding society. The workers in the company funding societies had supported the
unified NHI scheme for a long time. However, when they feared layoff under the
economic crisis and the NHI reform, they decided to protect themselves from an
uncertain future in association with the NHI reform. In particular, the executives of
both funding societies - company and local - were among the most vulnerable after
the implementation of the reform. Thus, they of course strongly opposed the reform
bill and even incited their employees to take action against the reform.12
The new trade union joined the FKTU. As the FKTU did not have powerful
trade unions as its members in comparison to the KCTU, it was an advantage for the
FKTU to hold the Company Funding Societies Union, where sub-member unions
were widespread in the country, as a member of the FKTU. In consequence, the
FKTU broke the agreement with the Tripartite Committee and began to oppose the
NHI reform in affiliation with the Company Funding Societies Union. The
Company Funding Societies Union declared that it would begin a 'one million
signature collection campaign' in order to resist implementation of the NHI reform
on August 7.
7.9 The National Health Insurance Act and the KMA
On August 8 1998, the reform bill entitled the National Health Insurance Act was
officially unveiled by the MoHW to be examined in the National Assembly. The
12 This information was gathered from interviews.
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main points introduced by the government were as below (Newspaper of the KMA,
August 10 1998):
• The Health Insurance Deliberating Committee would be organised under the
MoHW to examine the fee schedule and develop a calculation method for the fee
schedule (Article 5).
• The insurer of the new medical insurance programme would be the National
Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC). The chief director of the corporation
would be appointed by the president, and the board of executives would be
designated by the Minister of Health and Welfare (Article 11 and 19).
• Medical insurance finance of the employees in the private sector and the self-
employed in the local area would be unified (Article 32).
• Although medical service providers are basically appointed by the NHIC, health
care institutions, hospitals or pharmacies established under the Regional Health
Care Act, the Medical Act, and the Drugs, Cosmetics and Medical Instruments
Act would be automatically designated as the NHI medical service providers
(Article 41).13
• The Health Insurance Examining and Evaluating Centre would be separated
from the NHIC and independently organised in order to examine objectively and
fairly the service fee payment. The head of the centre would be appointed by the
Minister of Health and Welfare (Article 58 and 62).
• The reform Act would be enforced from January 1 2000 (Additional Clause 1).
When the reform bill was introduced, most of the KMA's demands were not
included. The most important interests of the KMA - the 'contract system' for the
medical service providers and fee schedules as well as an 'independent fee
examining body' - were excluded from the legal draft which was endorsed by the
government. Even though the KMA had lobbied the government for those
requirements for many years, it seemed that the government still intended to hold the
key to controlling the medical supply and fee systems after NHI reform was put in
place. This situation notwithstanding, the KMA became more determined in its
13 The executives of the KMA appealed on this article to the Constitutional Court. According to the
claim, they pointed out that "to appoint compulsorily the medical service providers through the
National Health Insurance Act is to infringe excessively upon the freedom of business activities"
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effort to reflect its interests in the reform legislation. This was a crucial opportunity
for the KMA to obtain the independence of the medical professions from
government control by inserting these two demands into the NHI reform bill.
In response, the KMA immediately proposed its demands to the MoHW.
The main concerns of the KMA were (Newspaper of the KMA, August 27 & 31
1998):
• To adopt the 'contract system' for medical service providers as well as fee
schedules, instead of the 'compulsory appointing system.' And if the contract is
delayed, the Health Insurance Deliberating Committee would intervene in the
situation.
• To give more independent power to the Health Insurance Deliberating
Committee in examining fee schedules and so on.
• Regarding medical accidents, the KMA demand that a medical accident-risk
allotted fund be included in the bill.
• That the executive members of the Health Insurance Examining and Evaluating
Centre should consist of a head, 20 members of the board of the executives and
an inspector. Among them, 10 executive members should be selected according
to the recommendation of a medical representative institution. On the other
hand, 5 members should be appointed from the insurers' side, and the rest should
be elected from members of the public
On December 3 1998, the National Health Insurance Act was passed in the
cabinet meeting and was delivered to the National Assembly (Chosun II Bo,
December 2 1998). In the meantime, on December 2, Hwang Sung Gyun, National
Assemblyman in the opposition party, who proposed the 1997 National Medical
Insurance Act, submitted a revised bill of the National Medical Insurance Act to the
National Assembly. A number of the KMA's demands were included in his revised
bill. As Hwang was a medical doctor and the incoming general election was
scheduled in one year and three months, it seemed that those two reasons affected
the decision of the opposition party to consider the KMA's interests in the revised
bill. The revised bill included (Newspaper of the KMA, December 7 1998):
(Dong A II Bo, August 3 2000).
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• Adopting the 'contract system' instead of the 'compulsory appointing system' to
the medical service provider.
• Establishing an 'independent fee examining body'.
• Postponing the merger of the financial systems of the waged workers in the
private sector and the local insured until the income of the self-employed is
properly disclosed.
These two bills (the National Health Insurance Act proposed by the
government and the revised bill of the current National Medical Insurance Act
proposed by the opposition party) were submitted to the bill examining body under
the Committee of Health and Welfare (CoHW) in the National Assembly at the same
time.
The ruling NCNP meanwhile delivered a convincing message about the
reform to President Kim as below (Newspaper of the KMA, December 10 1998):
With reference to the NHI reform, anti-reform movements have been
rising up with the sudden establishment of the Company Funding
Societies Union to oppose the reform. Moreover, a number of the
GNP politicians in the CoHW, and some members of the NCNP and
the ULD, oppose the reform. However, the NCNP confirmed that the
reform aiming to pass the bill in the National Assembly in affiliation
with the ULD will continue.
During the bill examining session in the CoHW, the committee agreed to
submit a compromise reform bill between two proposed bills on December 10, and
this compromised bill was passed in the CoHW on December 23. Finally, the bill
was passed in the plenary session under the title of the National Health Insurance
Act on January 6 1999 (Newspaper of the KMA, January 11 1999). In the
examining process of the National Health Insurance Act, demands of the KMA were
largely transplanted into the reform bill at this time. Similar to the 1989 reform bill,
the National Health Insurance Act included crucial parts which the KMA had
requested for a long time. The KMA celebrated the results by expressing that "the
KMA achieved its long-cherished desire" (Newspaper of the KMA, January 11
1999). There were two significant points in the 1999 reform bill. Firstly, the fee
examining body was converted to an independent institution. This decision was
Ch.7 - Success in Integrating the NHI 235
significant in minimising unnecessary friction between insurers and medical service
providers, and in reinforcing the professionalism of medical doctors. Secondly, the
'contract system' was adopted to decide annually the fee schedule between the
insurers and the medical service providers. However, since the decisions made
between the two sides had to be examined and determined once more through the
Financial Management Committee in the NHIC (which consisted mainly of the
representatives of the insured), the fee schedule would be highly controlled. In
addition, it was added that if the contract was delayed, the Minister of Health and
Welfare would be able to overrule the decision through the examination of the
Health Insurance Deliberating and Adjustment Committee.14
As far as the KMA was concerned, these outcomes were great achievements
obtained after a long struggle between the government and the medical professions
because the government accepted the demands put forward by the nation's doctors.
Practically speaking, however, it is difficult to say whether the KMA fully gained
independence in the decision-making process relative to the fee schedules since the
fee-schedule agreement between the insurer and the medical service providers must
be reviewed by the Financial Management Committee before it could be officially
sanctioned. Whereas Health and Welfare Minister Kim Mo Im supported the
contract system, the issue was not reflected in the bill of the BPPU (Newspaper of
the KMA, January 14 1999). However, Hwang Sung Gyun introduced the 'contract
system' in a revision so that the issue was addressed in the CoHW. Eventually, on
the basis of strong support from physicians, National Assemblymen, including
Hwang himself, the 'contract system' was also included in the reform bill. This
fulfilled a pledge given to the KMA that the ruling party would ensure passage of a
bill that would make some form of NHI the law of the land. Hence, the proposed
reform bill was a middle-of-the-road compromise between the government and the
opposition party.
7.10 The Anti-Reformist Group and the FKTU
When the opening of parliamentary session was approaching at the end of 1998, the
activity of anti-reformist organisations became more intensive. At this time, the
14 Interview with Kim, Vice-Chief of the Social Welfare Committee in People's Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and a technical expert for the BPPU.
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Company Funding Societies Union, the KEF and the FKTU co-operated to tackle
the reform process of the government. The Company Funding Societies Union
repeatedly delivered a message to the public that if the reform was achieved, the
contribution rates of the wage earners would increase up to 40%. In addition, the
Company Funding Societies Union insisted that "since the reserve fund of the
funding society in the private sector is the property of the wage earners,
transforming of the reserve fund of the company funding society into the new NHI
funding organisation is infringing property rights." On November 23, the Company
Funding Societies Union also announced that it would provide a petition to block the
reform to the National Assembly within a week, (Han Kyo Reh, November 24;
Dong A II Bo, November 24 1998).
As mentioned earlier, the FKTU broke the agreement for the reform made in
the Tripartite Committee with acceptance of the Company Funding Societies Union
as a member. As a result, the Tripartite Committee faced a serious problem. The
committee was going to have a meeting to discuss the details of financial support
from the government to pursue the NHI reform, but the FKTU did not co-operate
with the committee. On November 30 1998, the Tripartite Committee eventually
announced that the agreement could not be reached for the financial support to
promote the reform due to a huge gap of understanding regarding the reform
between the government and the FKTU. However, the MoHW stressed that the
reform would implement the original schedule despite the stalemate in the Tripartite
Committee. The Company Funding Societies Union and the FKTU stated
continuously that "the private sector will have to assist the local sector to cover their
funding deficits after the reform. To avoid this situation, the government has to
increase its financial support up to 50%." Meanwhile, the KEF claimed that "the
reason that the enterprise has allotted a certain portion of the contributions for the
NHI scheme was for occupational welfare in the company, but now there is no
reason for us to pay partial contributions for employees under the unified NHI
scheme" (Han Kyo Reh, December 1 1998).
7.11 The National Pension Scheme and Organised Anti-
Reformist Groups
It was the National Pension (NP) scheme which brought an opportunity to the anti-
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NHI reformist side to resist firmly implementation of the radical reform bill. In
preparation of the implementation of the NP scheme for the self-employed in urban
areas scheduled for April 1999, a serious flaw became apparent in the Korean
taxation system. The biggest problem in Korean taxation structure is the extremely
low transparency rate of income disclosure of the self-employed.15 In advance of
implementing the NP scheme, the government advised prospective pension receivers
to report their income to the NP authority. However, not surprisingly, a large
number of high income earners, such as medical doctors, lawyers and so on,
reported much lower income data than the actual amount. Consequently, this
underreporting of income provoked an angry response among those who earned a
salary. The anti-reformist groups began to accuse the government and the NHI
reform of the victimisation of the wage earners. When this spread throughout the
country, the government finally organised the Special Committee for Revealing the
Income of the Self-Employed on April 16.
Following the decision of the Company Funding Societies Union to enact a
general strike to invalidate the National Health Insurance Act on February 3 1999
(Han Kyo Reh, February 4 1999), the union delivered its message through a
statement, the Problems of the Unified Medical Insurance, on May 2, that the
contribution rates of the wage earners in the private sector would increase up to 49%
following the NHI reform due to the adoption of the new imposing system. Also,
the Company Funding Societies Union insisted that the wage earners would have to
pay arrears of the insured in local funding societies after the reform (Dong A II Bo,
May 3 & 7 1999). Concurrently, 87 member unions of the Company Funding
Societies Union appealed to the Constitutional Court regarding the violation of the
constitution in the reform bill on May 19. According to the petition, they argued
that Article 33 of the 1999 reform Act about financial unification infringed upon the
right of equality, and Article 62 (about transferring the reserve funds of the company
funding societies into a new state-funding authority) violated the right of property.
(Dong A II Bo, May 18 1999; Han Kyo Reh, May 20 1999). To intensify anti-
reform action, the FKTU established the National Conference for Preventing the
Salaried from Over-paying Contributions and for Social Insurance Reform (NCPS).
15
Generally speaking, only about 25% of income of the self-employed is disclosed (Dong A II Bo,
May 20 1999).
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The conference aimed to suspend the implementation of the NHI reform until the
income transparency rate of the self-employed increased to 80%, and until
government paid for 50% of the finance of the local funding society (Chosun II Bo,
May 22 1999).
As soon as the anti-reformist group began to expand its organised power,
President Kim appointed Cha Heung Bong as the new Minister of Health and
Welfare, on May 24 1999. He was not only one of the distinguished representatives
of the NHI reformist side, but was also a former high-ranking civil servant in the
ministry. Cha had both professional knowledge and administrative experience in the
area of social policy. Cha was the first professional in Korean government who
studied and held a doctoral degree in Social Policy. Ironically, he was one of the
high-ranking officers in the ministry who was removed by the anti-reformist side in
the government at the beginning of 1980s.16 When the president appointed Minister
Cha, the intention was to give an order to complete the medical insurance reform to
the new minister. When Cha returned to the ministry, a critical institutional
restructuring was expected inside the MoHW. Because, so far, the anti-reformists
had heavily occupied the policy-making arena in the ministry, there were internal
difficulties in pursuing strongly the reform in the ministry.
Among key anti-reformist officers in the MoHW, Kim Jong Dae, Assistant
Minister for Planning and Management, continuously led anti-reform movements
inside the government. In the process of appointing a vice-minister, Kim Jong Dae
was removed from the nomination of candidates and was pressurised to resign from
the ministry.17 However, he continually refused to resign and distributed his own
proposition to journalists in the press centre of the ministry. According to his own
proposition, he emphasised that "since the NHI reform brings difficulties to the
contribution imposing system and contribution collecting system, and, in addition,
since it is difficult for government to increase the contribution rates at the proper
timing, the NHI reform should be entirely reconsidered" (Kyung Hyang Shin Moon,
June 16 1999; Han Kyo Reh, June 16 1999). Eventually, he was dismissed from the
16 About this incident, see pp.118-119 in Chapter 4.
17 Kim Jong Dae was already on the highest position in the ministry as a civil servant. There were
only two positions remaining, that of vice-minister and minister, above the assistant minister's
position. However, since the two seats are appointed by the president, it was normal procedure for
him to voluntarily resign or move to a senior executive position of a sub-institution under
government.
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ministry (Joong Ang II Bo, June 19 1999). This incident is an unusual case in
Korean bureaucracy. It reflects the sensitivity with which the medical insurance
reform was considered by anti-reformist policy-makers. Furthermore, the reform
was closely aligned with their own political standpoint.
7.12 The General Election and Suspension of Reform
With six months remaining before the enforcement of the National Health Insurance
Act, the government and the ruling party suddenly decided to suspend the
unification of NHI financial systems for two years and submitted the revised bill to
the National Assembly on July 12 1999. Thus, even though the three fragmented
NHI administration systems (government and private school employees; employees
in private sectors; the self-employed) were going to be integrated by January 1 2000,
the current separate financial system continued to operate without a financial merger
by January 1 2002 (Chosun II Bo, July 13 1999; Han Kyo Reh, July 13 1999). This
was because the anti-reformists exerted enormous pressure in relation to the
underreporting of income to the government and the ruling party prior to the
upcoming general election scheduled for April 2000. The strategy of the anti-
reformist targeting of the wage earners and establishing of the anti-reformist
umbrella organisation (the NCPS) provided a significantly negative impact on the
government and the ruling party. The suspension of the radical reform announced
by the government was a political retreat in response to the pressure from the
growing anti-reform movement.
Meanwhile, the NCPS began its '10 million signature collection campaign'
to reject the contribution payment for the NP and the NHI schemes on July 13. Park
In Sang, leader of the FKTU and the NCPS, insisted upon: CD the separation of the
national pension funding system between the wage earners and the local insured (the
self-employed); © the postponing of the implementation of the National Health
Insurance Act for two years; and ® the expansion of social insurance programmes to
small business sectors hiring four or fewer employees. In regard to the revised bill
of the ruling party, in particular, the NCPS maintained that "the NHI reform should
be delayed in order to discover transparent data of the assets and income of the self-
employed for at least two years, and a pilot programme should be performed to
verify the efficacy of the new system before its implementation" (Dong A II Bo, July
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14 1999; Chosun II Bo, July 14 1999).
On July 22 1999, eighteen civic groups, including the Citizens' Coalition for
Economic Justice (CCEJ), the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
(PSPD), the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), and the Korean
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), urged the government to fulfil the radical
reform as set out in the original schedule in January 2000 (Dong A II Bo, July 23
1999). Thereafter, the representatives of the National Federation of Farmers Unions
(NFFU), the KCTU and the PSPD met the party leader of the ruling NCNP, to
protest against the party's decision (Chosun II Bo, July 28 1999). In spite of the
pressure from the reformist side, the cabinet passed the revised bill of the National
Health Insurance Act on September 17, and the revised bill was delivered to the
National Assembly (Dong A II Bo, September 18 1999). Thereupon, the KCTU
warned the government that (Han Kyo Reh, September 23 1999):
If the reform is not implemented according to the original schedule,
the KCTU will conduct a contribution-rejecting campaign. The
implementation of the reform is delayed because of disturbance of the
entrepreneur groups and some of the executives in the MoHW...The
government's will to reform the socio-economic sectors has been
1 o
disappearing prior to the general election. If the government even
tries to delay the NHI reform, the KCTU will fight against the current
government in association with labourers and civic groups until the
general election.
Meanwhile, the NCPS announced on September 25 1999 that the number of
participants so far in the ten million signature collection campaign already exceeded
five million within only two months. The NCPS said that "this outcome
significantly reflects the public sentiment to oppose the reform so that if the
government still forces the implementation of the reform, the NCPS will begin a
nation-wide campaign to reject the contribution payment." Following this, the
umbrella organisation delivered the five million signatures and petition to the
National Assembly (Dong A II Bo, September 25 1999). Under pressure from the
anti-reformist side, the CoHW of the National Assembly held a general meeting to
examine the revised bill of the National Health Insurance Act submitted by the
government to suspend the reform of the NHI financial system through September
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27 and 28. However, the CoHW failed to approve the bill because the opposition
party did not agree to the revision. The GNP, the opposition party, argued that (Han
Kyo Reh, September 28 1999):
The party cannot accept the government's intention to suspend the
financial unification of the fragmented NHI scheme before
implementing the National Health Insurance Act. We cannot agree
with the reason of suspending the reform because this suspension of
the reform is intended to ease the mounting anti-sentiment of the
wage earners against reform prior to the general election.
The reason that the opposition party did not co-operate in agreeing on the revised
bill was merely to give political damage to the government and the ruling party in
advance of the general election.
Just before the general meeting of the CoHW, the Solidarity for People's
Health as a Right (SPHR),19 [the new name of the former Conference for People's
Solidarity for the Unification and Expansion of the Benefits of the NHI Scheme
(CoPS)], had a press conference with the intention of putting pressure on the CoHW
in the National Assembly (Han Kyo Reh, September 28). At the same time, the
NCPS held its own meeting and pointed out that (Han Kyo Reh, September 28):
The revised bill intends that the government and the ruling party
admit to themselves the impossibility of the NHI reform. Thus, an
attempt to unify the administration system of the NHI scheme should
be simultaneously suspended along with the attempt to merge the
financial system.
On October 9 1999, the government and the ruling party confirmed the
suspension of unifying the fragmented management agencies of the NHI scheme for
six months (newly scheduled for July 1 2000). In the meeting, Kim Jong Pil, Prime
Minister, Cha Heung Bong, Minister of Health and Welfare, and Chiefs of Policy
Committee from the NCNP and the ULD participated (Chosun II Bo, October 11
1999). The executives from the government and the party also agreed once more to
keep the separate financial structure of the NHI scheme between the wage earners
and self-employed for two years (January 1 2002). Im Chae Jung, Chief of the
18 The general election was planned for April 13 2000.
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Policy Committee of the ruling NCNP, explained that this decision was caused by a
delay in building the computer network system, insufficiency of income data of the
self-employed and strong resistance from the FKTU and the NCPS (Dong A II Bo,
October 11 1999; Chosun II Bo, October 11 1999).
Contrary to the government's decision, the SPHR announced in a statement
on October 11 1999 that "this further delay, as a result of the incoming general
election, signifies some concern and suspicion as to the political intention of the
government to welfare reform". On the same date, in response, Minister Cha held a
press conference and announced (Han Kyo Reh, October 12 1999):
We have no choice but to delay the plan because the National
Assembly failed to pass the revised bill by the end of September.
The time frame does not allow us to introduce the unified NHI
scheme by January 1 2000 as scheduled. And it was impossible to
pursue administrative affairs for the reform because the Company
Funding Societies Union had not been co-operative. Hence, the
MoHW first requested the government to postpone the unification of
management agencies of the NHI scheme.
On the other hand, the NCPS accused the new decision of the government
that (Han Kyo Reh, October 12 1999):
To delay the unification of the NHI administration system for six
months is only a political strategy of the government to avoid
political pressures caused by the general election. The reform should
be delayed for at least two years until the income data of the self-
employed are transparently revealed.
Meanwhile, the SPHR raised suspicion as to the number of signatures which
the NCPS had received from anti-reform supporters on the street. The SPHR
stressed that a large number of the signatures were fake and suggested investigation.
Kim Hong Sin, National Assemblyman of the GNP and the CoHW, and Lee Sung
Jae, National Assemblyman of the NCNP and the CoHW, were involved in the
investigation. They announced that the number of real signatures was only about 2.9
million (Dong A II Bo, November 17 1999). The FKTU, one of the member
organisations in the NCPS, partially admitted the result of the investigation (Han
19 The CoPS changed its title to the SPHR in July 1999.
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Kyo Reh, November 20 1999). Lee Sung Jae, National Assemblyman of the ruling
NCNP, insisted on November 23 that the real number of the signature is about 0.97
million. However, the NCPS strongly denied the outcome (Kyung Hyang Shin
Moon, November 23 1999; Han Kyo Reh, November 23 1999).
As a result, the SPHR accused the NCPS and insisted upon the withdrawal
from the six months suspension of the reform. Despite the result of the
investigation, however, the CoHW passed the revised bill of the National Health
Insurance Act on November 24, and it was finally passed in the plenary session of
the National Assembly on December 7 2000. The revised reform bill indicated three
stages for the completion of reform:
• The unification of the fragmented management system would be achieved on
July 1 2000.
• The NHI financial system for government and private schools, and for private
sectors would be integrated on January 1 2001.
• Two financial systems (private and local sectors) would be finally consolidated
on January 1 2002.
7.13 International Pressures and the Social Policy of the Kim
Dae Jung Government
In the course of receiving the emergency funds from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
of the World Bank, two international funding organisations strongly recommended
the restructuring of the social protection system of the country. The IMF and the
World Bank focused substantially on the structural adjustment of financial,
corporate, labour market and social safety net sectors. In particular, the World Bank
recommended three main points to the government in regard to welfare (World
Bank, March 1998: 9):
• Strengthening social protection for workers by extending the coverage of
unemployment insurance and benefit schemes.
• Protecting 'pro-poor' expenditures in the budget to cushion the impact of
adjustment on the poor, and improving the targeting of these expenditures.
• Strengthening the pension system, by securing income support for the needy
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elderly, improving the transparency and efficiency of public pension fund
management, and laying the foundation for a reform towards a privatised and
funded pension system.
Based on the recommendation of the World Bank, the government agreed
welfare policy measures with the World Bank, summarised below (Minister of
Finance & Economy, October 1998: 27-30):
• Improve the framework for the design and co-ordination of social safety net
policies: complete interim assessment report on the cost-effectiveness of
integrating contributions to social risk management funds for pensions, medical
insurance and unemployment insurance, including (a) collection mechanism; (b)
contribution base determination; and (c) cross-checking features.
• Expand provision of 'workfare' for the unemployed who are not insured:
implement an expanded temporary public works programme at wage levels
designed to target the poor jobless.
• Improve efficiency of financial intermediation by public sector health insurers
through reducing the unit costs of administration per insured under the national
medical insurance system: implement a consolidation plan for insurance
societies under the self-employed medical insurance.
• Strengthen supply-side incentives for efficient provision of medical care through
a universal reform of the provider payment system to improve cost containment
incentives based on Diagnosis Related Group (DRG)-based pricing.
• Improve demand-side protection against major financial risks for medical
insurance system beneficiaries and for poor beneficiaries of medical aid
programmes by reducing out-of-pocket co-payment: commitment to adopt the
coinsurance reform plan for the medical insurance and medical aid programmes
by 2000, including a significant reduction of the effective coinsurance rate for
hospital inpatient care, adjustments to special treatment charges, inclusion of
non-covered services, and reallocation of health insurance coverage from minor
to major risks.
In the agreement between the Korean government and the World Bank, two
distinctive features are found. First, the World Bank focused on stabilising the
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financing of health care programmes through improving the management efficiency
of the scheme. To improve the efficiency of the health care programme, the World
Bank recommended the consolidation of insurance societies for the self-employed
medical insurance and the introduction of the DRG system. Since both
recommendations had been considered carefully by the Korean government, there
was a coincidence with the World Bank. The Kim Dae Jung government had
prepared a radical reform to unify all fragmented funding societies in the entire NHI
system. In addition, as the DRG system was suggested by several special
committees under the Kim Young Sam government, it had already been taken into a
political consideration by the government.
Second, the World Bank introduced 'workfare' as an alternative measure for
social protection. This approach intended that the government would not provide
financial support for welfare of the people who were able to work, and would give
restricted income assistance to welfare beneficiaries in order to gain economic
efficiency. This idea of 'self-responsibility' in welfare was exactly the same as the
welfare policy agenda of the Kim Young Sam government. Thus, it could be said
that the economic crisis and the subsequent treatment by the World Bank
contributed to strengthening and spreading neo-liberalism quickly in the country.
It is difficult to conclude that the recommendation of the World Bank
influenced crucially the social policy agenda of the government because the proposal
of the World Bank was not compulsory. But it was likely to provide a guideline for
the government to deal appropriately with a growing number of social upsets under
the harsh socio-economic conditions. It was a positive aspect that the policy
guidelines of the World Bank urged the government to expand welfare provisions to
the people at risk. However, the main policy recommendation of the World Bank
was limited to partial reforms in stabilising the financing of welfare programmes
rather than a universal reform in restructuring progressively the welfare provisional
programmes of Korea.
Based on the policy guidelines of the World Bank, the government
responded that it would basically follow the guidelines of the World Bank.
However, it was unlikely that the measures of the World Bank influenced the
decision of President Kim Dae Jung about the medical insurance reform. This was
because he had held strong views on the reform for a long period of his political life
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before the economic crisis and the World Bank's prescriptions, and the reforming
plan had already been developed through sufficient dialogue between the opposition
political institutions and civic groups over a long period. However, even though
there was the negative aspect from the World Bank, that the international funding
organisation spread the market mechanism in Korean social policy, the Kim Dae
Jung government would have had no choice but to follow the neo-liberal style of
guidelines in order to receive emergency funds from the World Bank.
In sum, the measures of the World Bank brought a positive and negative
aspect in developing social policy in Korea (Cho, 1999: 17). On the positive side,
the pressure of the World Bank on the government contributed to the expansion of
welfare provisions on public assistance schemes as well as unemployment
countermeasures. For health care policy, in particular, the recommendation of the
World Bank for the coinsurance reform in the health care programme provided a
significant message to the government in reducing the out-of-pocket co-payment of
the insured. However, this efficiency-oriented policy of the World Bank was a
prescription to solve the urgent problems existing in social policy without additional
expenditure from the government to avoid a negative impact on the fragile economy
under the economic crisis (Kim et al., 1998: 34). For its political priority upon the
economic efficiency in welfare provision, the World Bank increased neo-liberal
notions in the social policy-making arena.
7.14 The Limitation of the Kim Dae Jung Government
The new government accelerated the NHI reform in the political arena based on the
agreement of the Tripartite Committee at the beginning. As President Kim
appointed consecutively two experienced medical insurance reformists as the
Minister of Health and Welfare (Kim Mo Im and Cha Heung Bong), the president
showed to the policy-making institutions and to the public his political will to
achieve reform.
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Table 7-4 List of Ministers during the Reforming Period
Name Career Period






Former Civil Servant of
MoHSA, Professor of Social
Policy
5/1999-8/2000
However, when the general election neared, his political will to reform (both
health care policy and economic policy) became weakened because of political
pressures. Evidence of this can be seen through the fact that although the ruling
party prepared thirty proposals (including eight reform bills for the parliamentary
sessions), none of them was dealt with in the parliament prior to the general election
(Kyung Hyang Shin Moon, August 9 1999). The government and the ruling party
suspended the implementation not only of the NHI reform but also of the
Consolidated Taxation scheme for Banking Income (another controversial reform
bill) prior to the general election.
In particular, in the mid-term of the Kim Dae Jung administration, the
influence of the reformist side in the policy-making ground was relatively weakened
in comparison to the early stage of the regime. This reflects that the political efforts
behind the drive for reform were undermined inside the government in relation to
the outset of the ruling period. Relatively conservative policy-makers could
gradually expand their influences in the policy-making domain (where they had
already dominated for a long time), maximising the bureaucratic environment and
the general election campaign season. These circumstances simultaneously resulted
in the weakening of the activities of civic groups in the reformist side.20 Therefore,
it became more difficult for the reformist side to carry on the reform.
7.15 The Limitation of the Parties and Their Politicians
In the National Assembly, both the ruling and opposition parties were constructively
committed to the policy-making required for the reform. Although there was a
20 Interview with Cho Kyoung Ae, Deputy-Director of the Conference of People's Solidarity for the
Unification and the Expansion of the Benefits of the NHI scheme (CoPS) (1994 -1998), and currently
Director of Solidarity for People's Health as Right (SPHR).
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sizeable gap in dealing with the reform bill between the ruling and opposition sites,
both sides exhibited co-operation to deliver a compromise reform bill which became
the National Health Insurance Act in 1999. However, parliamentary members
demonstrated a very passive political attitude in dealing with such a sensitive reform
in advance of the general election. The opposition GNP, in particular, intentionally
delayed the deliberation of the reform bill in order to inflict political damage on the
ruling party prior to the general election. When the ruling NCNP submitted a
revised reform bill in July 1999, the opposition party refused to review the bill.
Following this, the opposition refused to open the special parliamentary session for
two months in order to delay the deliberation of the revised reform bill. In
September, moreover, the CoHW postponed the examination of the revised bill until
mid-October because the petition of the five million signature collection campaign
had arrived in the National Assembly.
Prior to the general election scheduled for April 13 2000, politicians and
parties failed to show a consistent political agenda to voters. When the waged
workers demonstrated their movements against the reform, the ruling and opposition
parties hesitated to implement the reform, aware of the general election. Unlike
previous cases, it was apparent at this time that the government had political
intention to reform the scheme, but the parties and politicians were eager to suspend
the reform until the completion of the general election, conscious of losing
popularity from the waged earners.
7.16 Revealing Conflicts in the Institutions
7.16.1 Conflicts in the MoHW
Meanwhile, conflicts between the reformists and anti-reformists became apparent
inside the MoHW in advance of implementing the reform. For almost two decades,
as the anti-reformists had occupied a crucial executive position in the government,
the reformists could not make their voice heard inside the government. When the
National Medical Insurance Act was passed in December 1997, the MoHW
immediately considered either use of the presidential veto or an alternative bill to the
reform legislation. Because the opposition side in the ministry realised the difficulty
in tackling implementation of the reform after the new government, they responded
promptly with the ministerial opposition to the moderate reform bill enacted before
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the presidential inauguration. When Cha Heung Bong was appointed as the Minister
of Health and Welfare, the resistance of the opposition side peaked. This was a
good example in revealing the tension inside the MoHW, that Kim Jong Dae (leader
of the anti-reformists in the MoHW) clearly exposed his opposing views towards the
minister. He provided a personal statement about the reform to the press and public
which was a highly unusual occurrence in the cultural context of Korean
bureaucracy.
7.16.2 Conflicts between Interest Groups
Civic groups committed more actively to the policy process during the Kim Dae
Jung government than in any other period. In previous eras there was limited
opportunity for civic groups to be involved directly in any policy-making process.
However, the Kim Dae Jung government opened the 'closed doors' of the policy¬
making arena to civic and interest organisations through various channels so that
they were able to be involved in the decision-making process. Moreover,
governmental information was also released to the civic sector to facilitate better
communications and mutual understanding between government and civic
organisations. This was a significant development in terms of transparency of the
21
policy process in Korea.
However, with the underreporting of income of the self-employed, the anti-
reformist side began to resist strongly the reform movement. When the anti-
reformists established the NCPS in affiliation with the FKTU and the Company
Funding Societies Union to tackle the implementation of the medical insurance
reform, the battle developed into a serious confrontation between the SPHR and the
NCPS, as well as between the KCTU and the FKTU. Since then, these three
organisations (the Company Funding Societies Union, the NCPS and the FKTU)
virtually took over the previous role of the National Federation of Medical Insurance
(NFMI) and the Korea Employers' Federation (KEF), which previously led anti-NHI
reform movement. At this time, the NFMI and the KEF played a limited role (as
back-up support) towards these anti-reformist groups. As before, major press
enterprises had supported the anti-reformists by frequently releasing reports about
21 Interview with Kim, Vice-Chief of the Social Welfare Committee in People's Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and a technical expert for the BPPU.
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the unilateral victimisation of the wage earners. This followed implementation of
the reform to stimulate the anger of the waged workers in the private sector. Indeed,
the most important characteristic of the anti-reform movement during this period
was that these anti-reformist group members were collectively engaged in protecting
their own self-interests more than in any other period. Facing the implementation of
the NHI reform, the strategy of the anti-NHI reformists concentrated on winning
over the wage earners in the private sector in association with the issue of a one¬
sided and unfair increase of contributions as well as the victimisation of the wage
earners.
In particular, suspicion was raised by the reformist side during the policy
process that a political deal was secretly agreed between the FKTU and the ruling
party to suspend the implementation of the reform. This would be instead of
recruiting Park In Sang, leader of the FKTU, as a party member for the incoming
general election scheduled for April 2000. Consequently, Park joined the ruling
NCNP and was elected as a National Assemblyman in the general election.
Nevertheless, this incident resulted in the breaking up of political solidarity between
two representatives of labour, the FKTU and the KCTU, which was formed by the
effort of the Tripartite Committee under the national crisis. In addition, this case
produced a worse scenario, meaning that the implementation of the reform was
delayed.
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Conclusion
During this period, a healthy atmosphere was created to reform radically the NHI
scheme. Firstly, the popular sector began to demand a more advanced social
protection system to deal with increasing social problems under the economic crisis.
Secondly, along with the emergence of the Kim Dae Jung government, expectations
of reforming socio-economic sectors were remarkably higher in Korean society.
Under these circumstances, Kim Dae Jung was able to drive the medical insurance
reform with less resistance to the radical reform inside the government compared to
the previous governments. As a result, opposition policy makers and political
institutions could not completely obstruct reform movement at this time. When the
National Medical Insurance Act (the moderate reform bill) was legislated in 1997,
the MoHW again attempted to abolish this law but failed to block the enforcement
of the reform act, unlike the case of 1989.
Although the president's clear intention to reform the NHI scheme was one
of the significant elements which made the reform possible, the popular sector
played a crucial role in adding more pressure on the policy makers to pursue a
radical reform. Under pressure, the new government and the Tripartite Committee
agreed to reform radically the NHI scheme and legislated successfully for the radical
reform bill. However, prior to the enforcement of the legislation and the incoming
general election, anti-reformist groups exerted strong influence to interrupt the
implementation of the reform. The FKTU broke the political consensus with the
Tripartite Committee that agreed to reform the NHI scheme, and allied with the
Company Funding Societies Union. This alliance produced a serious consequence
that suspended the implementation of the radical reform.
Through the various events of the policy process at this stage, we can point
out three aspects. First, the Kim Dae Jung government strongly accelerated the
medical insurance reform, unlike the former governments. To legislate successfully
for the radical reform bill, the new government maintained a consistent political
argument regarding the reform based on the president's lead. Second, although the
president had shown strong political intention to reform, the political will of the
government and the political parties became weakened on account of the outside
pressure prior to the general election. Lastly, during this period, the most significant
event was the increasing participation and role of civic organisations in the policy
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process. This occurrence contributed to enhancing the transparency of the policy¬
making process within the government and the National Assembly.
During this period, parties and politicians responded carefully to the interest
of voters. Even though politicians and parties unanimously legislated for the radical
reform Act, they delayed intentionally the implementation of the reform to avoid a
negative impact on the upcoming election when the resistance of the waged workers
was mobilised.
During this period, it is most significant that there were more corporatist
elements in the policy-making process. Under the economic crisis, the new
government desperately needed the political co-operation of labourers and
entrepreneurs to work out growing social and economic concerns in the country.
Therefore, crucial social and economic policy decisions were made through dialogue
among three major economic key players on the negotiation table in the Tripartite
Committee. As decision-making was available under a consensus among three
parties, the typically strong leadership of government in policy-making process
became undermined. This became a new paradigm for the policy-making structure
in Korea.
The range of participants in the policy-making process became greater than
in previous periods. The reformist and anti-reformist groups expanded their
membership. At this stage, the anti-reformist side rapidly enhanced its political
influence by mobilising its membership through its newly established umbrella
organisation. The degree of competition between two sides of interest groups was
higher at this period than at the previous time. This major level of involvement of
the civic and interest groups in the policy process made the policy-making
institutions less able to take unilateral political stances during the policy process. In
addition, the growing influence of civic and interest groups resulted in undermining
the power of a certain elite bureaucratic or governmental agency in the policy¬
making arena. Therefore, the corporatist policy-making style and the participation
of a wider range of interest groups in the policy process contributed to diffusing
concentrated political power within a certain elite and political group to broader
social sectors.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion
We have seen so far the way the Korean national health insurance has been
introduced and developed over the previous forty years. Throughout its
development, we have also observed the diverse range of actors that became
involved in the policy-making process. While the coverage of the Korean medical
insurance has rapidly developed from a selected occupational group to the entire
population in twelve years (1977-1989), the policy process for NHI reform has been
implemented slowly (1980-2000) because of competition between the political and
bureaucratic interests of the participating actors in the policy-making arena.
This chapter summarises the answers to the research questions and the
theories introduced in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. In addition, the role of the state and
the participating actors in association with the development of the NHI scheme is
discussed. The ideological conflicts between the reformist and anti-reformist
groups, which have essentially contributed to the development of the Korean NHI
scheme in particular (and the health care policy in general) are examined. Finally,
the role of the Korean government in health care policy is discussed in this chapter.
8.1 Three Major Actors in the NHI Policy-Making Process
We have analysed the policy-making process of the NHI scheme on the basis of the
responses of the three key actors: the executive (the government), the legislature (the
National Assembly), and the interest groups. Their roles and their degree of
participation in NHI policy-making have varied depending on the socio-political
environments. In this section, these actors and their fundamental roles and aims
during the policy-making process are the centre of attention.
8.1.1 The Executive: the Government
In general, there are two points in explaining the health care policy of the Korean
government. First, there has been a common political view in the policy-making
process throughout varying governments that the government should have a
minimum role and responsibility in providing the health care programme.
Whenever this political principle was threatened by outside actors, the government
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responded to protect its role of a marginal social policy provider from external
pressures. During the Chun regime (1980-1988), the Presidential Secretariat Office
took the preventive role in the front line of the policy process. After that, the anti-
reformist bureaucrats within the government performed the same role. The role of
Korean government in the health care policy in relation to the welfare typology is
discussed further in a later section.
Second, the governments' objectives in NHI policy-making have varied
according to the perspectives and priorities of each president. Whereas the Park
regime (1961-1979) mainly used the NHI scheme to protect its legitimacy, the
expansion of the NHI scheme during the Chun regime was likely to maintain the
ruling power by gaining the victory through the forthcoming presidential and general
elections. The reform of the NHI scheme during the Kim Dae Jung government
(1998-2003) was a result of his strong political will combined with the economic
crisis. These intentions for the NHI scheme were decided by each leader's political
view.
Unlike the previous three governments, the Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) and
Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) governments did not have clear aims regarding the
development of the NHI scheme. Although the NHI scheme for the entire
population was implemented during the Roh government, it was not an achievement
of President Roh but was already planned by the Chun government. Even though
the Kim Young Sam government established several special advisory bodies dealing
with the health care reform within the government, its objective was merely to
undermine the emerging complaints from the farmers and fishermen. These arose
when domestic agricultural markets were opened to foreign competitors. There was
no political vision or will to develop the medical insurance in either government.
The key actors who participated in the policy-making process within the
government were the president, ministers and civil servants in the Minister of Health
and Social Affairs (later Ministry of Health and Welfare), the Presidential
Secretariat Office, and the Economic Planning Board. First, the most significant
NHI policy-making had been dependent on the president's leadership in each
government and the individual interest of the leader in the medical insurance. It can
be said that there is a relationship between the degree of leadership and the
individual interest of a president, because a strong interest of a president in the NHI
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scheme has usually brought a strong degree of leadership in driving the NHI policy.
The president was a key decision-maker not only for the initiative of the health care
policy but also for the implementation of the policy.
Two presidents (Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan) in the authoritarian
regimes exerted a stronger leadership and possessed individually more political
interest in the medical insurance (although the purpose of implementing the medical
insurance was different) than the later two presidents (Roh Tae Woo and Kim
Young Sam) in the civilian governments. Hence, their unique style of leadership
made it possible for the Park and Chun regimes to achieve rapid development of the
NHI scheme in such a short time without serious interference from outside actors in
the policy process.
The democratising process weakened the typically strong leadership of the
president in the government because the political influences of other actors (outside
and inside the government) became relatively stronger. Thus, the interference of
other actors increased, making it more difficult for the government to bring a strong
leadership into the policy-making process. For instance, although President Kim
Dae Jung and his government had a strong political intention to reform the NHI
scheme, they could not easily drive their policy agenda.
Second, since power was heavily concentrated in the president under the
authoritarian style of leadership, the Presidential Secretariat Office also gained
strong power in the policy process during the Park and Chun regimes. Although the
secretariat offices in both regimes held strong power, the secretariat office of
President Chun especially exerted a crucial influence in the NHI policy-making
process. This was because President Chun relied on a few presidential secretariats
regarding the medical insurance policy, and the interest of those secretariats was
transferred to the decision of the president. Two anti-reformist civil servants of the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Youn Sung Tae and Kim Jong Dae, took a
significant role in opposing the reform inside the Presidential Secretariat Office
when they worked as presidential secretariats in the office. Generally, President
Chun enjoyed receiving briefings from non-presidential secretariats, such as
ministers and civil servants who worked in the front line (Rhee, 2000: 56), and
encouraged them in order to avoid the excessive interference of the Presidential
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Secretariat Office which had occurred during the Park regime.1 However, the policy
process of the NHI was an exception. Hence, whenever the NHI reform became a
hot issue in the policy-making arena, the Presidential Secretariat Office was directly
involved in the policy process during the Chun regime.
Third, as a department taking charge of the health care programme, the
MoHSA/MoHW was the most important organ among governmental agencies in the
policy-making process. The ministerial decision was often influenced by a certain
minister or a certain group of high-ranking civil servants. During the beginning of
the 1980s, Minister Cheon initiated the NHI reform with his personal interest in the
ministry. Consequently, the civil servants were divided into reformist and anti-
reformist sides inside the ministry. The competition between the two groups caused
the serious consequence of the expulsion of some reformist civil servants from the
ministry.
From that time, the anti-reformist group occupied the ministry and formed a
strong bond with anti-reformist groups outside the government, such as the medical
insurance agencies and the entrepreneurs. With the appointments of two
conservatives (Rhee Hai Won and Moon Tae Joon) as Ministers of Health and
Social Affairs, the anti-reformist civil servants were able to expand their influence in
the ministry. However, when President Kim Dae Jung appointed Cha Heung Bong,
who was a strong reformist, to the Ministry of Health and Welfare in order to
operate the radical reform, the influence of the anti-reformist civil servants
weakened in the policy process.
Fourth, from the initial implementation to the expansion of the NHI scheme
to the entire population, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was an influential
organ in designing the administrative shape of the NHI scheme. As this department
was concerned with the governmental treasury and the economic development of the
country, the position of its ministry and minister were the highest amongst other
ministries and ministerial posts. As the Minister of EPB also held the position of
deputy prime minister, its influence in the policy process was significantly high in
the government.
The primary interest of the EPB was how to set up the most efficient
1 This fact is also confirmed from the interview with former Health and Social Affairs Minister
Cheon.
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administration model for the NHI scheme in maintaining the steady economic
growth of the country. In the battle between the reformists and the anti-reformists,
thus, the EPB's concern was to take the more efficient system between two options
(a unified or separate administration system). Once the decision was made by the
EPB, it was directly reflected in the decision-making process because of its strong
power in the bureaucracy.
8.1.2 The Legislature: the Political Parties and Politicians
Firstly, the role of the National Assembly (including political parties and their
politicians) was passive and limited as a lawmaker in the policy-making process of
the NHI scheme during all these periods. During the Park regime, the National
Assembly was almost neglected in the NHI policy-making. The parliamentary role
at the moment was merely to deliberate the legislation of the medical insurance
programme which was already made and decided in the government. When the
reform was attempted during the 1980s, the involvement of the parties and
politicians gradually increased in the policy-making arena. Through the
democratising process, furthermore, the original role of the National Assembly as a
legislature was gradually restored in the political arena. But the members' growing
commitment was a passive response to the political pressures from external actors
rather than a spontaneous involvement of their own in the policy-process. This
attitude of the parliamentary members continued until the 1997 presidential election.
For example, although two major elections (the presidential and general elections)
were scheduled in 1992, there was no evidence that political parties and politicians
engaged in the NHI policy process prior to the election seasons. When the external
pressure on the National Assembly was lessened along with a recession of the
activity of the reformist-civic organisations, the interest of parliamentary members
in the reform also disappeared. But when the civic organisations regained their
political leadership in 1994, the parliamentary members resumed their involvement
in the NHI reform process.
Secondly, unlike among the interest groups, the political competition on the
NHI policy between parties was weak. For the political parties (both ruling and
opposition parties) and their fellow politicians, the NHI reform was an opportunity
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to gain political popularity from the voters, especially in rural constituencies,
therefore they supported the reform without serious conflicts in the National
Assembly. During the 1980s, while the government opposed the reform, the
parliamentary members passed the reform Act through unanimous support without
serious competition among them. In the policy-making process of the 1999 radical
reform bill, a similar situation occurred in the National Assembly. There was no
serious conflict or competition between parties or politicians to insert their concrete
views of national health policy into the medical insurance bills.
Thirdly, because of the weak competition amongst parties in the National
Assembly, political philosophies and policy directions of the parties regarding the
health care policy were also weak. Without clear principles of the NHI scheme,
most parties could not have created the legislation for the NHI reform based on their
logical views. Thus, their political arguments were often inconsistent, and they
instead relied on the ideas of the interest and pressure groups to set up the party
proposals for the NHI policy. For example, during the 1989 reform process, while
two opposition parties (the Party for Peace and Democracy, and the Reunification
and Democratic Party) were significantly influenced by a reformist-civic
organisation (the National Committee for Countermeasures for Medical Insurance),
the Korean Medical Association influenced the bills of the ruling Democratic Justice
Party and the opposition New Democratic Republican Party. Compared to other
parties, the party led by Kim Dae Jung had maintained a relatively consistent
political agenda on the NHI reform until 1997 when the party became the ruling
party.
8.1.3 The Interest groups
The emergence of interest groups in the policy process of the NHI scheme was one
of the most significant outcomes caused by the democratisation of the country. The
interest groups carried out the role of the idea-providers as well as of political
pressure groups. They sometimes surpassed the political parties in creating the
policy ideas for the medical insurance development. Unlike the political parties,
their involvement was voluntary and consistent in the policy-making process.
Interest group involvement in the NHI policy process can be categorised into
three kinds: the reformist, the anti-reformist, and the pure interest groups. Whereas
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the reformist group consisted of progressive medical professionals and academics,
farmers' organisations, civic groups and a progressive labour organisation, the anti-
reformist side contained conservative academics, entrepreneurs' organisations,
media enterprises and a conservative labour organisation. The pure interest group
included a professional organisation, such as the Korean Medical Association
(KMA), which concentrated on the protection of the professional status of the
members from outside impact. During the authoritarian regimes, their activities
were not allowed in the policy-making arena. Only a restricted number of
professionals and academics could access the policy-making ground. Since the
democratic movement in 1987, however, a broader range of interest groups was
engaged with, and their political influence escalated in the policy-making process.
All of them carried particular strategies for the purpose of spreading their
demands to the policy-makers and the policy-making institutions, especially
targeting the election campaign seasons. Their growing political influence
threatened the political institutions. In particular, when the reformist and the anti-
reformist groups established their own umbrella organisations, their influence
increased significantly in the policy-making arena.
Second, their objectives varied according to their political perspectives.
While the reformist groups concentrated on reforming the separate administration
system of the NHI scheme, the anti-reformist side tried to protect the separate
system from the reformists' challenge of the status quo. The details of the political
efforts between the aforementioned two interest groups are discussed later in this
chapter. On the other hand, the KMA focused on protecting the professional and
economic autonomy of doctors from the political intervention of the government in
the health care market. Their demands of the medical insurance were to defend the
privileges and to improve the status of doctors.
In sum, with the democratisation of the country, interest groups became an
influential participant in the policy-making process of the NHI scheme. Unlike
among the political parties, as the competitions on the NHI policy-making between
interest groups (especially, between reformist and anti-reformist groups) were
strong, their responses to the socio-political transformations had been prompt. On
the basis of their clear political philosophies and consistent political views on the
NHI scheme, the interest groups maintained steady positions regarding their role and
Ch.8. - Conclusion 260
objectives in the policy-process. All interest groups put their demands on the
policy-makers and the policy-making institutions at the crucial times of political
events, such as elections. Their continuous pressure on the government weakened
the strong leadership of the president and the governmental institutions. Hence, the
involvement of the interest groups contributed to restructuring the policy-making
style of the country.
8.2 Theoretical Applications
It is worthwhile to scrutinise how well the Western-born theories can explain the
policy-development of the Korean NHI scheme. This section is divided into two
parts: the first part demonstrates how the theories of power are applied to four
developmental stages of the NHI policy introduced in Chapter 2, and the second part
examines welfare development theories in relation to the NHI development of
Korea.
8.2.1 The Application of Power to the Policy-Making Process
The policy process of the NHI scheme can be discussed according to four major
stages. The first stage includes the initial steps in building a national health care
policy in the country and the implementation of the NHI scheme during the Park
regime. The second stage covers the initial reform movement that occurred in 1980
inside the government. The third stage concerns the relationship between the
country's socio-political transformation and the NHI reform. In particular, the
democratic movement that occurred in the end of 1980s and the emergence of the
first civilian government in the beginning of the 1990s are the locus of the analysis.
And, the final stage consists of the policy process of the radical NHI reform under
the economic crisis at the end of the 1990s.
A. Stage One (1960s-1970s)
First of all, strong elitism can be said to be present within this stage. Immediately
following the military coup, political power was strongly concentrated in the
military junta. The military junta dominated the role of policy-making, and the
military elites were the main actors in the junta, with some assistance from technical
experts in social policy-making. Most significant decisions were made within the
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closed political domain. General Park, the leader of the junta, was a key figure.
After he was elected president, his ruling style differed little from his style as a junta
leader. He had almost absolute power in decision-making. Only several elite-
executives in a certain institution of the government were involved in the decision¬
making process. Therefore, only the interests of those particular actors were heavily
reflected in the policy-outcomes. This was especially the case, as power of the
economic institutions [such as the Economic Planning Board (EPB)] in the
government was extremely strong under the economic development policy of the
regime. Therefore, the interests of economic elites in the institutions were always a
political priority (Chung, 1992a: 236). Consequently, the matter of welfare was
behind the economic development, and even the welfare policy issues were
significantly influenced by these economic elites.
Secondly, authoritarian-state corporatism is eminent. According to Collier
and Collier (1979), 'inducements' and 'constraints' may lead to state penetration and
domination of labour organisation under a corporatist state. This phenomenon is
well demonstrated not only in the case of labour interests but also in the case of
medical and entrepreneur organisations during this period. President Park's regime
strongly constrained its collective actions and maintained controlled leadership, in
particular by suppressing labourers. To control labour, President Park gave an
inducement to labour whereby the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) was
admitted as a monopoly representation of the trade unions. Even though it was a
marginal inducement for a confined number of labourers, the Park government gave
medical benefits to employees in private sectors by implementing the NHI scheme.
In addition, the regime provided plenty of inducements to the entrepreneur for the
purpose of rapid economic development and a successful launch of the first medical
insurance programme. The government granted to the Federation of Korean
Industry (FKI) managerial authority of the medical insurance for company
employees. For the same reason, the government accepted the Korean Medical
Association (KMA) as a political partner in dealing with the health care programme.
Although the FKI and the KMA gained political partnership with the authoritarian
regime, their input in the NHI policy process was very limited and closely monitored
under the authoritarian environment.
Thirdly, the policy process of the NHI scheme was also influenced by the
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general political atmosphere of the authoritarian regime. The initiative of the
medical insurance legislation started from the leader's hand, and the interests of the
leader and a certain political institution were key concerns during the policy-making
process.
Lastly and most importantly, the primary motivation for the implementation
of the NHI scheme was to strengthen the legitimacy of the authoritarian-military
regime. As the design of the health care programme was derived from such a
political reason, the NHI scheme was initially introduced for a restricted section of
the workforce with exclusion of the people at risk.
B. Stage Two (1980-1983)
Whereas the role of elites in the government and the state-corporatist approach to
certain groups were crucial elements for the successful launch of the NHI scheme at
stage one, this stage demonstrates the development of the NHI scheme.
During this period (similar to the Park regime), an authoritarian regime
dominated the policy-making domain. However, in comparison to the Park regime,
more institutions were relatively involved in the policy-making in the government.
When the NHI reform was initially attempted inside the Ministry of Health and
Social Affairs (MoHSA), bureaucratic elites in the ministry were divided into two
groups, reformist and anti-reformist, and these two groups gradually expanded their
influence to the National Assembly. This particular conflict between the two
different elite groups can be explained by Parsons' argument regarding the elitist
approach, that of a struggle between different 'skill groups' (including 'technocrats'
and 'bureaucrats' who possess specialist skills and knowledge) (Parsons, 1995: 250).
There are two distinctive aspects regarding the NHI reform in this stage:
first, the reform movement was introduced by the personal view and decision of
Health and Social Affairs Minister Cheon in 1980; second, although the minister,
some high-ranking civil servants and politicians called for the reform of the NHI, it
was denied because the Presidential Secretariat Office held opposing political views
in regard to the reform. The president still exerted the strongest power in regard to
decision-making. As in the Park regime, the political power was heavily
concentrated on the president. However, the Presidential Secretariat Office gained
power and became a strong influence in the policy-making of the medical insurance
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during the Chun regime. Its ideas regarding any policy decision-making
significantly affected the determination of the president (Chung, 1992b: 237).
Unlike during the Park regime, however, the Presidential Secretariat Office was
deeply involved in the NHI policy-making process during the Chun regime.
Compared to the Park regime, the power of the leader (the president) at the
policy-decision stage was probably less absolute. But the president still held a
definite key position when it came to a final decision. Once the decision was made,
there was no room to appeal the decision of the leader. For example, since President
Chun showed opposition to the NHI reform in the meeting with Health and Social
Affairs Minister Kim, parliamentary members and his secretariats in November
1982, the discussion of the reform was not allowed in the government.
The number of policy makers and institutions engaged in this policy-making
process increased. Four elite groups - civil servants, politicians, presidential
secretariats and a small number of social policy experts - emerged in the policy
process. In addition, the number of participating institutions (the government, the
National Assembly and the Presidential Secretariat Office) increased. However, this
does not mean that the degree of power distribution was improved within the policy¬
making arena. The accessibility of policy makers and political institutions in the
actual policy-making were still confined under the authoritarian regime.
C. Stage Three (1986-1990 & 1990-1997)
After President Chun's decision to suspend plans for NHI reform in the end of 1982,
any political action and discussion for reform were not allowed inside government
until 1986 when President Chun announced his plan to expand coverage of the NHI
to the entire population.
With democratic movements in the country during this period, two
significant elements arose: the 'coalition of farmers and fishermen,' and the
'uprising of labour movements.' These two events arising under the democratising
process exerted a vital influence on the policy-making process of the NHI
development.
From the end of the 1980s, the farmers and fishermen started to mobilise
their power to protest against their unfair contribution and the uneven level of
benefits provided by the NHI scheme in comparison to those of employees in urban
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areas. When the coalition of farmers was assembled with the reformist-professional
groups, their pressure on the NHI reform became enormously influential. The
participation of trade unions in the reform movement also doubled their
organisational power during the early and mid-1990s.
In this period, reformist and anti-reformist groups clearly revealed
themselves. Academic scholars, medical professionals and the entrepreneurs formed
representative bodies to advocate their ideology on the NHI development and
actively engaged in the policy-making process. When the government announced
the expansion of the medical insurance to the farmers and fishermen, and further to
the self-employed in the urban areas, the KMA geared up to spread its demands to
the political institutions. The politicians in political parties vigorously debated about
the reform in the National Assembly, and they fulfilled their duties as lawmakers
during this time. Most of all, bureaucratic elites in the MoHSA and the EPB
crucially exercised their political power in the policy-making. The democratising
process in the country resulted in undermining the extent of power of the president
and the Presidential Secretariat Office, and the role of elite-bureaucrats in other
governmental institutions relatively increased, which in effect replaced the strong
positions of the president and his secretariats in the policy-process of the NHI
scheme. This phenomenon shows that the range of the elitism became broader in the
scene of policy-making.
The participation of social actors in policy-making became greater in
comparison to that of the previous stages. In consequence, the authoritarian-
bureaucratic governing style was undermined in the decision-making arena. It was
evident that President Roh used a veto over the legislated NHI reform Act of 1987.
This was because the power of the president was not as strong as that of President
Park or Chun, and if his power had been strong enough, the reform bill would not
even have been submitted to the National Assembly. During this period, the policy¬
making influence gradually dispersed to social actors outside the bureaucracy, and
the power concentration in a specific political institution was consequently
undermined. As a result, the intensifying influence of civic organisations and
pressure groups in the policy-making market likely gave pressure to politicians and
their parties. As pluralists insist, this engagement between the pressure groups and
politicians was attributed to the concerns of the parties and their politicians in
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relation to the outcomes of elections (Ham & Hill, 1984: 26-27).
Moreover, the development of 'citizenship' was an important factor in
developing the NHI scheme. The emergence of the farmers' coalition and trade
unions in the medical insurance reform was able to threaten the ruling authority.
The policy makers within the government faced difficulties in making a unilateral
policy decision within a confined and closed institutional field. As mentioned
earlier, the National Assembly had restored its actual role as a lawmaking authority,
and the politicians had simultaneously received heavy pressure from civic and
interest groups over the NHI reform. In association with this political
transformation, political parties and politicians whose constituency was especially in
rural areas became conscious of the voters. Therefore, being aware of social
constraints, the government too established many special committees to demonstrate
its efforts in dealing with health care policy. This picture shows us a crucial sign in
developing citizenship in terms of achieving political rights and demanding social
rights (in particular 'the right to health') from social elements to bureaucratic
authority during the democratising process. It is further significant evidence that the
power concentration became more decentralised, and power began to be distributed
more widely, albeit slowly, in the policy-making domain as well as in the society.
D. Stage Four (1998-2000)
There are two significant reasons that this stage should be considered separate from
the previous stage. Firstly, a new political paradigm was introduced in policy¬
making process by the new Kim Dae Jung government under the economic crisis.
Secondly, the radical reform of the NHI scheme was introduced and successfully
legislated in the policy-making arena in only two years.
To cope with the social and economic turmoil, the government established
the Tripartite Committee to draw the labour, entrepreneur and government sectors to
the bargaining table. This was the first time in Korean history that a government
had formally established a partnership with the trade unions. The aim of the
partnership was to overcome the social crisis and to restructure the economy. As
Young (1990) points out, the establishment of a 'tripartite' system provides strong
evidence of a corporatist approach (p.73). The corporatism was clearly evident in
Korean economic and social policies, particularly as the government's involvement
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became more direct and it became more willing to bargain with a wider range of
interest groups during this period [as Hill (1997: 66) points out].
The number of interest groups and their degree of involvement in policy¬
making became greater than at stage three. The government seemed open to
considering the demands of interest groups. The KMA was able to discuss its
demands with policy-making institutions whenever NHI reform was on the political
agenda, and the majority of the KMA's demands met with success. On the other
hand, the anti-reformist groups established an umbrella organisation to influence the
medical insurance reforms. From that time, these reformist and anti-reformist
umbrella organisations competed politically to influence the policy process of the
NHI reform. The degree of pluralism and of competition amongst interest groups at
this stage was higher than at the previous stage.
During this period, political parties and the government became more
conscious of the voters prior to the general election campaign. Despite the fact that
the NHI reform legislation had the unanimous support of the ruling party and
opposition parties, the ruling party and the government reached an agreement to
postpone radical reform of the NHI scheme until after the general election. This was
because politicians feared that resistance to the reform from white-collar workers
would threaten the outcome of the forthcoming general election. The anti-reformist
organisations continued to protect their privileges from the medical insurance
reform, despite efforts from the reformists to achieve the right to health care under
the government's health policy. The more the opposing reformists and anti-
reformists engaged in the policy-process, the more energy politicians and their
parties put into calculating the benefits they could reap from the reform. It is
pertinent to point out at this stage, that, unlike in other stages, a stronger degree of
citizenship was starting to develop.
In sum, alongside the development of democratisation, the participants in the
policy process became more diverse than at any other stages. Meanwhile, in the
face of economic crisis, the government concentrated on establishing social
partnerships with the trade union and business sectors in order to achieve social
stability and to reach a consensus in emergency economic and social policy
measures. Subsequently, the distribution of political power diffused from an elite
group and particular political institutions. In particular, as the Kim Dae Jung
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government opened up the policy-making process to the public, the degree of power
concentrated within a defined section significantly decreased.
8.3 Explaining the NHI Development: the Wake of
Industrialisation and Democracy, and Welfare Development
In relation to the introduction of the medical insurance programme in the 1960s and
its implementation in the 1970s, there is a limit to how the aforesaid events can be
explained by the 'logic of industrialisation.' Although Korea's rapid economic
growth during this period is an important factor when considering the country's
welfare development (as perceived by functionalists), the introduction of the Korean
medical insurance was more closely associated with the political strategy of the
leader.
As many Korean social scientists insist (Kwon, 1999; Chung, 1993; Kwon,
1989), a medical insurance programme was introduced in Korea during the 1960s
purely for political purposes; that is to preserve the authoritarian system of, and to
strengthen support for, the ruling regime established by a military coup. The 1976
implementation of medical insurance in Korea is similar to that introduced by
Bismarck in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. Whereas Bismarck's
introduction of social insurance programmes strengthened the authority of the
regime, it also undermined the mounting political coalition under industrialisation
between the working class and the Social Democrats (Ritter, 1986: 49-51).
President Park faced possible threats from the public in the 1970s for two reasons.
Firstly, the introduction ofmartial law - Yushin - in 1972 enormously enhanced the
authoritarian leadership of President Park, but began to significantly undermine the
legitimacy of the regime. Secondly, the rapid emergence of the working class, due
to rapid industrialisation, became a growing concern for the regime. Thus, as a
means of strengthening the president's power, President Park decided to give a gift
of medical insurance to employees in the private sector, and as a result, the health
care programme rapidly expanded in the number of beneficiaries in the industrial
sector.
Secondly, in regard to the expansion of the NHI scheme in the 1980s, the
'logic of industrialisation' provides a partial explanation, in that, the rapid economic
growth made it possible for the Korean government to rapidly develop the NHI
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scheme because of the improved financial situation of the government and of the
citizens. Unlike during the Park regime, there is not sufficient evidence that the
expansion of medical insurance during the 1980s was associated with strengthening
the legitimacy of the Chun or the Roh governments. The expansion of the NHI
scheme in 1987 and again in 1989 can probably be accounted for by the 1987
presidential election and the 1988 general election; the political strategy of the ruling
regime was to win the forthcoming elections by holding out carrots to the voters.
Thirdly, a distinctive feature is evident in the development of the NHI
scheme during the 1980s and the 1990s: the emergence of the farmers' coalition and
the trade unions. These two groups became the most significant key players outside
the bureaucracy in developing health care policy during the aforesaid periods. Since
the democratic movement of 1987, these two groups had strengthened their
influence in association with other civic and professional groups, and established an
umbrella organisation to advocate NHI reform as well as to exercise collective
power over the policy-makers. Marxist and working class mobilisation theories may
explain the policy process of NHI reform with respect to the activity of these two
classes. Both theoretical perspectives agree that class-conflicts occur during the
process of capital accumulation, and that welfare development is a by-product
created by ongoing conflicts between different classes in a capitalist society (George
& Wilding, 1994: 103; Korpi, 1983: 39). These two working class groups - farmers
and labourers who had been exploited and excluded from the ruling authoritarian
regimes - increasingly began to push welfare demands as democracy spread. Their
demands focused on achieving the right to health care and receiving adequate
services through NHI reform. Their collective interests and activities during the
reform movement contributed, not only to advancing democracy in Korea, but also
to accelerating the development ofKorean health care policy.
Finally, the development of citizenship is an important by-product of the
socio-political transformation of the country. While political power was distributed
to a broader range of groups within society, the political potential of citizens was
increased. The growing political power of citizens converged around the activities
of civic groups, and the civic groups began to demand the development of health
care policy through NHI reform. It was a struggle for the citizens to acquire their
rights to health care from the government.
Ch.8. - Conclusion 269
8.4 Ideological Battle between the Reformists and the Anti-
Reformists
An overall explanation regarding the seriousness of the competition between actors
during the development of the NHI scheme was implicit in the ideological struggle
between the reformist and anti-reformist sides. When legislation for the medical
insurance programme was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, the policy makers
merely adopted a framework from foreign medical insurance programmes -
especially the Japanese programme - without a constructive discussion about
guiding principles or a clear vision of health care policy. As the government
imported the framework from the Japanese medical insurance model, which was
based on the separatist approach, without a careful filtering process, the question
was raised by a specialist group as to whether the separate medical insurance system
could adequately perform the role of a welfare programme. Thus, the kernel of the
debate between the two sides focused on whether there should be separate
administrative systems under the NHI scheme. When the separatist group engaged
in the debate for the NHI reform to preserve the current system, the conflicts
between two sides became deepened.
The reformists wished to unify the separate systems into one state-run
administrative body, while the anti-reformist wanted to preserve this separate
administration system. To accomplish the reform, progressive academic and
medical professionals, farmers organisations, progressive trade unions, and civic
groups gathered round the reformist side. On the other hand, the anti-reformist side
consisted of conservative academic and labour groups as well as the entrepreneurs'
organisations and the media-enterprises to protect their privileges from the current
separate NHI system. Under a separatist system, a large number of funding societies
would manage the beneficiary groups categorised by occupation, locality and so on,
and the financing and management would be controlled by each funding society.
The requirements of medical insurance eventually diverged from the financial
capability of funding societies.
We need to further examine what both groups have tried to deliver for two
decades through the policy process of the NHI scheme. Simply, it was an
ideological battle between universalism and selectivism. The reformists attempted to
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insert the principle of universalism into the health care policy while the anti-
reformists preserved their selectivist approach. First of all, whereas the reformists
emphasised equity and social solidarity, the anti-reformists put more emphasis on
efficiency, regardless of social stratification. According to the reformists' argument,
as the effects of risk-pooling and redistribution were confined within each funding
society under the separate system, this went against the principle of a social security
system. Thus, the separate system ignored the importance of equity and social
integration, and stigma was built into the national medical insurance programme by
the separate funding systems organised by occupation and locality. Hence, the
reformists insisted on integrating the Medical Aid scheme (a public assistance
programme for those on low-incomes) into the NHI scheme because the scheme
stigmatised those on low-incomes. Meanwhile, according to the anti-reformists,
financial and administrative efficiency was a crucial element for the success of the
NHI scheme, despite the existence of class divisions. In addition, they stressed that
since vertical income redistribution would be impossible within the mechanism of a
social insurance system, the reform to unify the separate systems would increase
financial risks without achieving greater redistribution because the reform might
undermine the financial security of the medical insurance system.
Secondly, as Pinker (1971: 99-100) argues, the reformists attempted to adopt
an institutional mode for the administrative system, unlike the anti-reformists,
whose preference was a residual approach. The reformists supported state
intervention in health care policy, and believed that social inclusion would be
achieved by the NHI scheme if it were administered by a state-run organisation.
However, the anti-reformists opposed the institutional approach because they were
confident that state-oriented administration would result in inflexibility and
inefficiency due to the bureaucratisation of NHI management. Separatists also
understood that a residual approach to the national medical insurance programme
was key to maximising efficiency and minimising wasted resources. Thus, the anti-
reformists were likely to employ market forces to the management of the NHI
scheme. In the same way, the anti-reformists proposed a strategy of market
competition between funding societies to increase efficiency within the system.
In sum, the universalist perspective of the reformists brought about the first
reform debate within government at the beginning of the 1980s. With the
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emergence of the anti-reformists, these two parties engaged in debate over the
development of the NHI scheme. Through ongoing debates for twenty years, the
political and theoretical principles of Korean social policy were developed in
government and in other political institutions. This ideological development also
spread to other divisions of social policy. In addition, the increasing interest in
welfare encouraged the public to realise that they had not received adequate benefits
from the medical insurance in comparison to their contributions to the scheme. As a
result, this provoked the farmers and fishermen to become involved with NHI
policy-making, and the popular sector began to demand more governmental
responsibility for health care policy to achieve their right to health care.
8.5 Classifying the Role of the Korean Government in NHI
Development
Over the last forty years, Korea has struggled to achieve a democratic political
system and to become a welfare state. With regard to the series of the
developmental stages of the health care policy, Korean NHI development can be
described as a challenge of the social democratic approach to a mixed welfare state
with conservative and liberal ideologies.
Esping-Andersen (1990) classifies welfare states into three types: liberal,
conservative and social democratic-type regimes. In the conservative welfare
regime, there is the preservation of differentials. Redistribution of resources is
negligible. And the state only plays a minimum role as a subsidiary breadwinner
when the family's earning capacity is diminished. Under the liberal welfare state,
welfare is marginal. Thus, entitlement rules are strict, and the range of benefits is
modest. In this type ofwelfare state, the state encourages the market and guarantees
minimum welfare provision. Finally, the social democratic welfare state focuses on
equality based on the adoption of 'universalism' and 'de-commodification of social
rights' (pp.26-27).
It has similar characteristics to conservative welfare. The NHI scheme was
initially introduced for a few privileged classes, and their funds were managed by
separate funding societies organised by occupation. Therefore, redistribution was
between similar economic classes within each funding society. In particular, the
government only performed a minimum role as a health care programme provider.
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From the planning through to the implementation of the NHI scheme, the
government followed two predominant principles - 'the minimisation of government
responsibility' and 'the primary responsibility of welfare recipients' - to avoid
financial responsibility for the NHI scheme. On the basis of these principles, the
medical insurance implemented two systems: 'pay-as-you-go' and 'fee-for-service.'
As can be seen in Table 6-1 in Chapter 6, apart from the period 1988 to 1991
(a transitional period to expand the benefits to the entire population), government
subsidies to the NHI scheme for the self-employed did not exceed an average of
30%. The level of subsides has even decreased since 1992. It is evident that the
government has only provided a marginal amount of financial support to the NHI
scheme. Whenever the NHI reform became a hot issue, the government pledged to
provide more government subsidies to the NHI scheme for the self-employed to
undermine demands for reform. We can find this evidence from the two
governments' announcements presented prior to the 1988 general election (see
p. 146-147 in Chapter 5) and after the activity of the Special Committee for
Developing Farming and Fishery Areas (SCDFF) in June 1994 (see p. 183-187 in
Chapter 6). However, this promise was never kept.
It is even more evident from Table 8-1 how the Korean government's
spending on social policy has been minimal. In comparison to the favoured policies
of the government, such as economy and defence, the investment in social
development has been significantly lower than in other areas. This shows that social
policy had been given lower priority by the government.
Table 8-1 The Annual Expenditure of the Government on Defence, and
Social and Economic Development (Unit: %)
1977 1980 1982 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1994
Economic*
Development
22.7 21.6 17.5 20.1 19.4 14.6 14.9 14.1 18.6 23.1
Defence** 34.7 35.6 34.6 30.7 30.4 30.7 28.5 25.0 25.9 23.7
Social***
Development 4.1 6.7 6.2 6.8 8.2 7.8 8.9 8.9 9.7 9.0
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy (l 997) Annex to Summary of 1996 Budget
Economic Planning Board (1991) Annex to Summary of 1990 Budget
Economic Planning Board (1986) Annex to Summary of 1985 Budget
* Economic development expenditure/Annual expenditure ofgovernment x 100
** Defence expenditure/Annual expenditure of government x 100
*** Social development expenditure/ Annual expenditure ofgovernment x 100
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At the same time, the Korean NHI policy also had some characteristics of the
liberal welfare typology. As previously stated, the Korean government aimed to
have limited responsibility for the medical insurance, so that the level of benefit
from the NHI scheme had been low and the scale of government subsidies had been
limited. Hence, the insured had to pay a significant amount from their own pocket
for medical services (see Table 5-3, p. 153 in Chapter 5).
To supplement the huge gap in coverage between the insured and uninsured
(as seen in Table 5-3), and to avoid any state responsibility, the Korean government
continuously considered adopting a private medical insurance programme. This
effort was evident from the outcomes of special committees (see Table 6-2 in
Chapter 6) in the Kim Young Sam government and of a task force in the Kim Dae
Jung government (MoHW, 2001). In consequence, from the beginning, the design
of the health care programme was established on the basis of conservative and
liberal type welfare states. These two ideologies have dominated the social policy¬
making arena in general, and the policy process ofNHI in particular. As a matter of
fact, the welfare agenda of the Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung governments, the
so-called Quality of Life in Globalisation and Productive Welfare respectively
(which were closer to the neo-liberal style), were dressed up in these two welfare
ideologies in order to justify and gain public support for the similar policy direction
of these governments.
The reform movement of the NHI scheme can be interpreted as a struggle
towards a social democratic welfare regime. Against two predominant ideologies
(conservative and liberal) in the health care policy, the reformists attempted to adopt
universalism to achieve equity and equality, and to protect social rights within the
national health care policy. In the policy process, this attempt by the reformists has
been a serious challenge to the status quo, which has defended conservative and
liberal approaches, to preserve the privileges of certain classes.
Kwon (1997: 141-142) attempted a similar test to categorise the general
welfare system of Korea based on Esping-Andersen's welfare typology while the
subject ofmy test was the health care policy. Although Kwon found a tendency to a
conservative welfare regime in the general welfare system of Korea based on three
characteristics - CD the principle of compulsory insurance; © the emphasis on
maintaining the prevailing order; and (1) the policy initiative coming from those in
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power - he concluded that the Korean welfare system could not be put into the same
category as advanced welfare states because of the different nature and ideology of
politics in social policy between different countries. I agree with his point of view
that there is a limit to categorising one system with another, because many
characteristics of advanced welfare states are usually transformed by the social,
political, and economic context of a country which adopts those characteristics.
However, his scope for testing the Korean welfare is confined to a single
aspect. To understand welfare in developing countries such as Korea, a broader
scope of approaches is necessary because those countries usually contain a mixture
of characteristics from different welfare models. Since they have adopted and
sometimes copied many parts (ideologies as well as pragmatic elements) ofWestern
welfare modes for many years, many elements of different Western welfare models
are embodied in their welfare systems. Moreover, they are still further testing their
welfare development. For example, in the Korean case, conservative and liberal
welfare approaches were initially taken from the Western welfare states (including
Japan) by top policy makers and have been dominant in the health care policy in the
government. Later, a social democratic way has challenged the two predominant
ideologies for the past twenty years. Due to such a mixed experience in the Korean
welfare, it would be difficult to put the Korean health care system into a certain
category of welfare regime which represents the experience of the well-advanced
welfare states (as in Kwon's arguments). But it would be worthwhile to examine a
type of welfare development of the developing countries with broader scopes of
understanding because many elements of advanced welfare systems have been
imported from the Western welfare states in one way or another. Those
characteristics of the Western welfare states have already become a crucial frame of
the welfare system in the welfare developing countries.
In sum, the NHI scheme in Korea was initially established under a mixed
approach of the conservative and liberal welfare ideologies. Thus, provision from
the government for medical insurance was marginal, and the benefits were provided
selectively to some privileged classes. A redistributive element and equity were not
seriously considered by the policy-makers. To address these issues, a social
democratic welfare perspective was introduced by the reformists during the
developmental stage of the NHI scheme. This effort to generate social democratic
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principles in policy-making was the reform movement. As the reform movement
threatened the privileged classes, their resistance to preserve their vested rights was
intense. However, the influence of the social democratic approach within the
policy-making domain has contributed to enhancing policy-makers' visions, not
only for the health care programme, but also for other aspects of social policy.
8.6 Main Findings about the Policy Process
This thesis demonstrates how NHI policy has developed over forty years and how
the range of actors involved in policy-making widened during that time. All
participating players performed distinctive roles in the development of the NHI
scheme according to their specific objectives. The state played a major role as a
policy-making institution. The presidents and a number of bureaucrat-elites were
the main decision-makers under the authoritarian regimes. During democratisation
and the economic crisis, engagement with a broader range of interest groups
contributed to an acceleration of the distribution and the decentralisation of power in
the policy-making arena. Hence, the development of the NHI scheme over the
course of forty years provides an example of the transformation in policy-making in
Korea from a unilateral and dictatorial style to a more open and democratic concept.
Social and political factors were more influential than economic ones in the
development of the NHI scheme. The leadership style of presidents, political
competition (amongst bureaucrats, political institutions, and interest groups), and the
socio-political transformation of Korean society were key factors in explaining the
decision-making process.
The more the political system became democratised, the more diverse and
all-encompassing the range of the participants in the policy process became. As a
result, the power in the policy-making arena was increasingly dispersed, weakening
the concentration of power in certain elite departments and political institutions. In
other words, as the democratic process became stronger, power in the decision¬
making process became distributed amongst a greater number of players. The
increasing competition of participating actors, with diverse political interests,
resulted in the implementation of reform being drawn out. This is most strongly
evident under the government of Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003). During this period, as
democracy increased in the country, the range of participants wanting and opposing
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radical reform became more diverse than during the reform process of the Roh Tae
Woo government (1988-1993). Although the president and the government were
strongly committed to change, they faced political difficulties in taking the reform
forward because of competing interests amongst different groups.
In contrast, the speed at which legislation was introduced and in which the
policies implemented by the authoritarian regimes was much faster than that of the
non-authoritarian governments. As a result of the strong leadership of the presidents
of the authoritarian regimes, the government could drive through its policy agenda
quickly without any strong external challenges. Overall, the implementation of the
health care programme under the two authoritarian governments, the Park and Chun
regimes, proceeded steadily. Once one of these leaders made a decision on health
care policy, the policy proposal was quickly implemented by the government. Even
though there might have been opposing views during the policy-making process,
they could easily be ignored.
The most significant variable influencing the policy process of the Korean
NHI scheme was the political will of particular leaders despite the style of the ruling
regime. When a leader had firm intentions to develop the health care programme
(even where the political aims of leaders differed), the NHI policy was placed at the
centre of the government agenda, as we have seen in the cases of the three
governments led by Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan and Kim Dae Jung. In other
cases the development ofNHI policy failed to be high on the political agenda, as in
the cases of President Roh Tae Woo and President Kim Young Sam who did not
have a vision for health care policy. Accordingly, their impact in the area of health
policy was not significant.
The universalisation of NHI, then, occurred through the reform movement
only when the political leadership saw it as a primary concern. Since the first
reform movement of 1980, the reformers had attempted to adopt universalism to
achieve equity and equality as well as to protect social rights within the national
health care policy. Although the universal coverage was achieved by the effort of
the government, the reformers tried to accomplish a more advanced universalisation
by integrating the separate management and financial systems of the health care
programme. In Korea, this reform movement was initiated from inside under the
authoritarian government. Although the reform was not successful due to the strong
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opposition from more powerful policy actors, it was unusual that it was attempted
inside the government at all. This was because of the authoritarian political system
where any policy process was highly controlled by a state leader. In conjunction
with democratisation, the reform movement rapidly spread throughout the country
and the universalisation integrated the fragmented NHI systems. It could be said,
then, that the NHI scheme was ultimately legislated successfully. In the case of
Korea, universalisation of the NHI and political transformation is significantly
related.
While the political system of the country has been transformed to
democracy, the structure of decision-making in the NHI policy process has also
developed along more democratic lines. During the authoritarian-military regimes,
Western conventional theories did not provide an accurate framework to explain the
evolution of the policy process of the NHI scheme. A certain degree of elitist and
institutionalist approaches were evident in the policy-making process. Along with
the democratisation of the country, power in the policy-making arena has become
more widely distributed. At the same time, the decision-making process has become
more sophisticated in comparison to a simple top-down style under the authoritarian
regimes. Through this transition of power structures, Western democratic theories
have earned credibility to account for the development of the NHI policy process
because the policy-making style in health care has evolved from an 'authoritarian
leadership' style to 'pluralist and corporatist' styles in Korea.
These underlying outcomes provide distinctive reasons why a newly
democratic country such as Korea would actively pursue the adoption of a more
universally accepted approach to its national health care program than such older
democratic countries as the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. government only provides
national health care programmes to specific segments of the population whose
income status precludes their purchasing private insurance on the open market.
Japan - from where the Korean government imported the general framework for its
NHI scheme - has still maintained the separatist approach in the administration of its
medical insurance programme. This implies that democracy does not guarantee the
way towards a comprehensive health care system. In the Korean case, during the
social and political transformations in Korean society, struggles between
participating actors in the policy process made possible the steady development of
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the national medical insurance system. In particular, the political efforts of the
reformers introduced universalism to a health care scheme that has proved to be of
enormous benefit to the Korean people.
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Appendix II
Examples of Semi-Structured Interview Schedules
For a minister:
Minister Cheon:
• According to the information which I gained from a review of the literature, you
are the one who initiated and advocated the reform of the National Health
Insurance (NHI) program from inside the government. What caused you to
bring forward the idea for reform; what happened within the government after
you did this; who became involved in the reform movement from inside the
government?
• You said that the reform plan was your own idea: did you receive any other
internal (political) pressure or influence from inside the government circles; was
there any influence from external social sectors?
• You mentioned that the Presidential Secretariat Office intervened in the reform
movement: what happened with regard to this process; who actually got involved
with the movement and what part did they play; why did the Presidential
Secretariat Office step into the policy-making process?
• After all your attempts, efforts to bring about NHI reform from within the
government failed. From your perspective as an insider and government official,
what caused this failure?
Minister Kim:
• During the second reform movement, you faced strong resistance to the reform
inside the government while, on the other hand, you were simultaneously under
strong pressure to pursue reform from the National Assembly: what were the
demands from both sides; how did you deal with the inevitable political
confrontation?
• You mentioned that you had your own plan for initiating and implementing
reform despite the politically difficult circumstances: could you explain these
plans which you strategically designed to pursue the reform?
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• According to the information available to me, you expressed a negative view of
the administrative style of government and the behaviour of National
Assemblymen during the policy-making process; could you specifically
elaborate on what happened to cause you to feel that way?
For a civil servant:
Vice-Minister Rhee:
• According to an interview, you were a key policy maker in the MoHSA. It is
also said that you were actually involved in the entire reform movement of the
1980s: how did you become involved in this movement; who were the key actors
in the reform inside the government?
• What was your personal perspective as a high-ranking civil servant in the
MoHSA with regard to the NHI implementation and the subsequent reform?
• According to my research, the EPB did not originally support a separate NHI
system but it changed its stance towards the separate system later: what made the
EPB change its political decision not to support the unified system?
• You mentioned that - after the initial failure of reform - you and some of your
fellow civil servants were pressured to leave your department by another
government agency: how did this happen; how did this affect you and the other
civil servants?
Professional and an activist:
Professor Kim:
• It is difficult to find many relevant research documents and articles produced by
professionals concerning NHI at the beginning of the 1980s: how could a
professional group participate in the reform movement in the beginning years of
the 1980s; what encouraged the professional group to expand its influence in the
policy-making process during the entire decade?
• According to the literature, there were a number of debates between reformist
and anti-reformist groups through seminars and forums organised by several
institutions: how did the professionals seek to influence the policy-makers
through the series of debates?
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Activist Cho:
• What was the purpose of the establishment of the CoPS - previously known as
the NCCMI - and who initiated the establishment of this civic organisation?
• According to a booklet of the CoPS, the membership of the organisation was
opened to the admittance of a variety of different groups. In particular it seems
that the relationship with a labour union, the KCTU, became significant: what
made this expansion possible; what was the relationship with the labour union?
• When comparing the activities of the organisation of the end of 1980s with those
going on at the end of the 1990s, the ability of the civic organisations to effect
change seems weaker at the beginning and mid-1990s, despite the emergence of
a civilian government: what happened to the organisation during this time
period?
• From your perspective as a pressure group leader, how has the political
environment changed during the Kim Dae Jung government; what do you see as
the major differences between the politics of the past and those of the present?
• You mentioned that the NHI reform movement was attributed to the social
agreement among citizens, what is your evidence regarding this issue?
Professional and activist Kim:
• In social policy-making, how has the influence of civic groups been
transformed?
• Has there been any difference in the formation of the policy-making process in
the Kim Dae Jung government? If so, what is different?




SummaryoftheBillsPr posedbylitic lInstitutionst r ugh1988-1989 CurrentNHI SchemeAmendment BillofG v.Proposalf PPDProposalf RDP
Proposalf NDRP
Requestsof KMA
Unanimous* Proposal amongPPD, RDP&NDRP
Title
MedicalInsurance Act MedicalInsurance Actfor Employeesinth Governmenta d PrivateSchools
NationalMedic InsuranceAct Abolishingthe currentMedical InsuranceAct
NationalFlealth InsuranceAct SamesPPD's
Abolishingthe currentMedical InsuranceActfor Employeesinth Gov.andPrivate Schools Revisingthe currentMedical InsuranceAct
NationalMedic InsuranceAct
Management Structure
Fundingsociet es underthseparate administration system Incomeearners: ©Employeesin theprivatesectors -company-r district-based fundingsocieties, ©Employeesin Gov.andPrivate Schools-a nationalfu ding authority(Korean MedicalInsurance Corporation)
Widerrangeof localcoveragein partialareas: Si+Kun Si-basedfunding societyinthe metropolitan cities(Abolish Ku-basedf nding society)
NationalMedic Insurance Corporationunder aunified administration system
NationalHealth Insurance Corporationunder aunified administration system
Widerrangeof localcoveragef fundingsocieties underaseparate administration system
-Aunified administrationsystem: oneinsurersyst m
NationalMedic Insurance Corporationunder aunified administration system
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Farmersand Fishermen-Kun- basedfunding societies Self-employedin urbana e s-Si (City)andKu- basedfunding society
TheInsur d
Entire populations: excludingthe beneficiariesfrom theMedicalAid scheme
Entire populations: excludingthe beneficiariesfrom theMedicalAid scheme
Entire populations:unify theMedicalAid schemetoh NHIscheme
Samescurrentsch me
Entire populations: excludingthe beneficiariesfrom theMedicalAid scheme
TheMethodof Contributions
Itispossiblehat thegovernment canprovide partialfinanc supportforthe NHI administration
Applying progressiverat s
tocontributions forthehigh r incomesured Thebeneficiaries underth Livelihood Protectionscheme wouldbeex mpt fromthepay ent ofcontributions
Thegovernment shouldprovide partialfinanc supportforthe administrationof theNHIsch me Applying progressiverates tocontributions forthehigh r incomei sured
TheMethodof Appointing Systemtoh Service Provider
Compulsory appointingsystem







Determinedby Deliberating Committeef MedicalInsurance underMoHSA
-Samesth Government's
Establish Deliberating Committeef rth NHIfeesch dule
Establishingn Adjusting Committeef rth NHIfeesch dule
Establishing Deliberating Committeef rth NHIfeesch dule
Establishingn Adjusting Committeef rth NHIfeesch dule underthMoHSA
Examiningthe CostfNHI Treatment Providedby Medical Institutions
Examinedbyth insurer,National Federationof MedicalInsurance (NFMI)
Examinedbyth insurer,National MedicalInsurance Corporation
Examinedbyth insurer,National HealthInsurance Corporation
Establishingn independent examiningbody fortheNHIgrant andcost
SamesNDRP's
Ministerofth MoHSAshould




andSocialAffairs maybeabletos t upa compensation fundormedical disputes
Establishing compensation fundormedical disputes
SamesNDRP's
Sources:Appli dfromMini tryfHealthanSocialAffairs(1988,)TheRev wontB llftN tio alMedicInsur nceActhePPDdN tio al HealthInsuranceActoftheRDP,Unpublish dgovernmentdo um nt,N ve b r. CommitteeofHealthandS cialAff rsithNat onalAss mblyfRepub icKo a(1989)ThePubHe ringPropos lsfM ic lIn u an eAct ,Unpublishedparliamentarydocum t,Fe uary. ReunificationandDemocraticParty(1988)TheProposalftN ti nalHe l hInsur ceAct,Un ublishedrtyd um nt,Novemb r. TheNationalAssemblyft eRepublicKor a(1989)TheBi ftNationalM dicIns r nceA t,Unpub shedparl m ntaryd cum t,Nov mb r. Theproposalisbas dnt evi edilfNati nalMedicIn uranceA tsubmit dthNat onals mblyiN e b r1989.
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Appendix IV
Participating Members in The Conference ofPeople's
Solidarity for the Unification and the Expansion of the
Benefits of the NHI Scheme (CoPS)
(Based on the membership of 1998)
Labour:
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)
Korean Federation of Construction Trade Unions
Korean Federation of Public Sector Workers Unions
Korean Federation of Social Services Workers Unions
Korean Metal Workers Federation
Korean University Workers Union
Korean Federation of Tourist Workers Unions
Korean Bus Workers Union
Korean Federation ofChemical-Textile Workers Unions
Korean Federation of Taxi Drivers Unions
Korea Federation ofRailway and Subway Workers Unions
Korean Federation ofHospital Workers Unions
Korean Federation of Clerical Labour Unions
Korean Federation of Press Unions
National Lecturers Union
Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union
Korean Federation ofDaily Workers Union
Korea Cargo Transport Workers Federation
Korean Federation ofChemical Workers Unions
Daewoo Group Trade Union Council
Hyundai Group Trade Union Council
National Federation of Labour Unions Organisations
National Council of Labours Organisations
Korean Council of Labour Movements
Farmers and Poverty:
National Federation of Farmers Unions (NFFU)
Korean Confederation ofFarming Businessmen
National Federation of Female Farmers
Korea Institution for Farming and Fishery Society
National Federation for Farmers Organisations
National Federation of Street Vendors
Civic Groups:
Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ)
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
National Federation for Democracy and National Unification
Korean Federation of Females' Organisations
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Radical Politics Federation
Peoples' Council for Unification and Democracy
National Conference ofProfessors for Democracy
National Federation ofBuddhist Movement
Human Rights Committee in Korean Council of Christian Churches
Citizens Council in YMCA
